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PRACTICAL IDENTITIES AS SOURCES FOR EXPLORATION

Autoethnography as critical reflection

Lynelle Watts and Rebecca Waters

Introduction

At the very heart of autoethnography is a person engaged in reflection. Reflection may be about conditions, relations, indeed all manner of things. The kind of reflection it is may also be diverse, flowing from distinct methodological traditions such as interpretive phenomenology, post-structuralism or critical theory. Sometimes the person at the centre of autoethnography becomes taken somewhat for granted. And yet it is the capacity to be a self, engage with oneself, be in conversation with oneself, and the ability to explicate some aspects of the self and its experience that forms the very basis of autoethnography. Atkins (2005, p. 1) says that to speak of the self is commonplace in modern life but “this expression is more appropriately understood as a colloquial umbrella term that encompasses a range of concepts that relate to self-reflective activity, for example, ‘consciousness,’ ‘ego,’ ‘soul,’ ‘subject,’ ‘person,’ or ‘moral agent’”. Likewise, there is the issue of how to account for the subject and subjectivity, a question that emerged for Lynelle through the conduct of a study into reflective practice (Watts, 2015; see also Watts, 2019). Who is it that is speaking, and what makes up this self? After all, this ability to reflect is a remarkable capacity even as it is a quite ordinary feature of what Andrew Sayer has termed our human social being (2011). Sayer considers human social being to be an expansion on the earlier idea of human nature and derives his explanation of it from an eclectic range of philosophical sources. Human social being encompasses the idea of people being capable of suffering and flourishing and incorporates the sense of our being as emergent and interdependent with others. It positions us as having need of care, and of having concerns, as well as being endowed with capabilities, embodiment, emotion and reason. This ability to give an account of oneself is at the core of our human social being and from this springs a practical identity. We use the term practical to signal that identity is “a description under which you value yourself and find your life worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking” (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 101) and thus it is an identity aimed at being in the world. Further, a practical identity with its attendant concerns and cares may, in fact, shape the methods of critical reflection chosen for different autoethnographic projects.

In this chapter, we aim to outline different kinds of critical reflection in relation to autoethnography and we explore some philosophical conceptions of practical identity and consider
how these might inform understandings of the self at the heart of autoethnography. We ask a rather simple question: what is the relationship between self, identity, and reflection within autoethnographic accounts? The chapter begins by tracing the self-reflective nature of human social being back to the conception of what enlightenment entails, and how this relates to the method of autoethnography. Specifically, we contend that autoethnography has emerged as a method of diverse critical reflections that exemplifies an Enlightenment ethos. We then move on to discuss conceptualisations of practical identity, outlining the connection between personal and social aspects. Here we consider how autoethnographic processes interrogate these aspects to illuminate the cultural, social and practical aspects of specific human events and actions to engage in diverse forms of critique. From this, we establish the idea that the role of narrative is essential to the formation of practical identities. We present a case study that illustrates the workings of practical identity and narrative within the context of an intersubjective encounter in Occupational Therapy practice. This is a form of interpretive critical reflection in that it aims to understand the experience (Hodgson & Watts, 2017). The chapter concludes with the implications for how the self might be accounted for within autoethnographic inquiry to provide deep and rich explorations of human social being.

**Critical reflection post enlightenment**

The nature of human subjectivity and the self has been debated by philosophers for some time and a full accounting of this debate is beyond the scope of this chapter. Suffice to say, we are not philosophers, being from professions more practically oriented and this may mean our account is likely to have missed philosophical arguments about the nature of the self. As Atkins (2005) points out, the capacity to be self-reflective is at the heart of philosophy and the literature is vast. We have instead leaned on philosophers who have considered the nature of the modern self, identity and normativity (Atkins, 2005; Korsgaard, 1996, 2009; Laden, 2001; Taylor, 1989) and the role of critical reflection (Foucault, 1984; Tully, 1989, 1999) and narrative (Atkins, 2004). We are aware that these philosophers can be seen as coming from diverse traditions. Charles Taylor (1989) establishes the connection between the self and morality, suggesting three axes important to its conception in modernity: firstly, respect and obligations to others; secondly, the ability to evaluate what makes a good life; and thirdly, our dignity in the sense of “our power, our sense of dominating public space; or our invulnerability to power; or our self-sufficiency; our life having its own centre; or our being liked and looked to by others, a centre of attention” (p. 15). Taylor continues that in the modern age we have become preoccupied with the second axis, and consequently we have become what he terms strong evaluators of our lives. Strong evaluation relates to how “we constitute ourselves through evaluative judgements about what are matters of significance or importance for us” (Baynes, 2010, p. 443). This kind of judgement is well described as part of how we constitute ourselves (Korsgaard, 2009) and is a significant source of normativity (Korsgaard, 1996).

Korsgaard uses a Kantian orientation to her project about normativity. The Kantian orientation to thinking (reflection) is transcendental, meaning it aimed at what Owen (1999, p. 30) describes as a ‘Kingdom of Ends’ based on the lawful use of reason. The lawful use of reason has a particular meaning in this type of reflection; it involves thinking for oneself, thinking from the standpoint of others, and trying to think consistently (O’Neill, 1986). The point of this use of reason, to follow the Kantian orientation, is the achievement of Enlightenment via the establishment of “a possible community of rational beings” (O’Neill, 1986, p. 542). Thus, reflection is undertaken in order to communicate with others for the purposes of considering contemporary social and political conditions; as a form of social diagnosis; and for locating
transitions between current situations and future circumstances. Jurgen Habermas is widely considered to have elaborated this kind of critical reflection (Owen, 1999).

Critical theory-informed reflection has often been contrasted with Foucauldian genealogy (Ashenden & Owen, 1999). Foucauldian genealogical reflection is also a form of critical reflection but it is not aimed at transcending the present in the sense of achieving an ideal end-state but is rather oriented towards thinking differently within a present horizon (Tully, 1989). Owen (1999, p. 30; emphasis original) therefore presents genealogical critical reflections as “oriented to an immanent ideal and this orientation in thinking is articulated in terms of the process of becoming otherwise than we are through the agonic use of reason.” Here, the agonic refers to the ongoing practical struggles of how we live together, including our struggles for recognition and the rules under which we live (Owen, 2021; Tully, 1999). Owen considers this to be a different orientation to the question of reflection on the present. Both forms of critical reflection (critique and genealogy) can be seen as an Enlightenment inheritance as they can be traced back to Kant’s (1784) essay *What is Enlightenment*. Further, both come from a position that, by using reflective capabilities, we can understand the conditions we find ourselves in. Foucault suggests therefore that:

> The critical ontology of ourselves [that] must be considered not, certainly, as a theory or a doctrine; rather it must be conceived of as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them. (Foucault, 1984, p. 50)

Tully (2008) defines four features of this critically reflective ethos outlined by Foucault. These features are practices of governance; contemporary surveys; historical surveys; and engagement in multidisciplinary dialogue on contemporary problems and struggles for freedom. Practices of governance start with the practice of “questioning whether the inherited languages of description and reflection are adequate to the task” (Tully, 2008, p. 19). This first feature has led to six types of critical study on practices of governance:

- The relations of production, consumption and knowledge;
- Humanity’s relationship to the environment;
- Relations of inequality between women and men;
- Plurality of culture and cultural diversity in societies everywhere;
- Justice across borders, inherited nation-state relationships and immigration; and
- The terms of colonisation and post-colonisation relations.

Such programs of questioning have led to a multiplicity of inquiries with diverse aims, foci, interpretations and problematisations that provide us with “a broader and more flexible language of provisional description, one which enables us to take up a dialogical relation to the political problems as they are raised in, and animate, the concrete struggles of the day...” (Tully, 2008, p. 21). These various forms of interpretation and problematisation have resulted in an explosion of different forms of critical reflection aimed at disclosing the conditions of oppression, freedom, forms and practices of governmentality and power (Guenther, 2021). We see the many different faces of autoethnography as being part of this critique and interpretation of the present.

Secondly, Tully (2008) proposes conducting contemporary surveys of the various language-games and practices within which struggles for freedom are posed and where solutions...
are offered. Here Tully suggests that actors, even rival actors, engaged in proposing reasons and solutions about particular forms of political struggles are acting within an intersubjective field. We submit that such an intersubjective field is often what autoethnographers describe as the cultural context being interrogated or disclosed within an autoethnographic account. A good example of this intersubjective field can be found described in Wels’ (2019) account of the struggles of reading within an academic setting. The relationships between the students, the lecturer and the wider context of academia is a field through which the struggles of knowledge production and consumption are described.

A third feature outlined by Tully (2008) is that of historical surveys which are aimed at “a second type of critique that enables participants to free themselves from the horizons of practices and problematisation … to see them as one *form* of practice and one *form* of problematisation that can be compared critically with others” (p. 31, emphasis original). Arguably, this is a hard move as we all acquire habits of thought, acceptance of concepts and normative practices, indeed our actions and reasons are formative of our practical identities (Korsgaard, 2009). Tully (2008) poses the question: “what new institutions and relations of power are employed to induce people to acquire the appropriate modes of conduct and forms of subjectivity, and what new practices of freedom emerge and become institutionalised as a result?” (p. 34). Autoethnography has developed ways of conducting these historical problematisations, making the familiar strange, using story, performance and personal narrative as possible ways to interrogate the taken-for-granted nature of concepts and practices.

The final feature of this critical ethos that Tully (2008) describes is to take up political struggles and problems as an ongoing work of freedom. We read this final feature as having a significant connection to Denzin’s (2014, p. 6) claim that “autoethnographic work must always be interventionist, seeking to give notice to those who may otherwise not be allowed to tell their story or who are denied a voice to speak”. Being free means more than non-interference, it also means reflecting on our own subjectivity, the conditions we live in and the impact of these on our human social being. This, it seems to us, is the core of autoethnography. Thus who, how, and from where, one is speaking, via autoethnography is an important matter.

As mentioned previously, one such major project of critical study has been that of feminism (Allen, 2008; Tully, 2008). Feminist philosophers have championed the idea of the self and debated its constitution primarily because it is related to “questions about personal identity, the body, sociality, and agency that feminism must address” (Anderson, Willett, & Meyers, 2021). The very idea of the self was derived from masculinist notions of the individual associated with a form of autonomy that women barely seemed able to access. Anderson et al. (2021) outline the feminist philosophical project as proceeding across three main lines of argument: the deployment of various critiques of the Western notions of the individual; engagement in reclaiming feminist ideas of the self; and the conduct of works that reconceptualise the very idea of the self. These lines of inquiry have all the problematising features of Tully’s (2008) critical ethos outlined above. Likewise, various feminist philosophers (Allen, 2008; Benhabib, 1992; Griffiths, 1995) have engaged in reflection interrogating the limits of the present. Griffiths (1995) work *Feminism and the Self – The web of identity* is a notable example of a work reconceptualising the self by problematising the conditions of the concept itself. Others have approached the issue of the self through the body, narrative and performativity (Atkins, 2005; Butler, 2011). There has been an emerging convergence with regard to modern notions of the self and the key role of narrative plays, in articulating as well as constituting, the self (Atkins, 2004; Baynes, 2010). This convergence makes it possible for Benhabib (1992, p. 161) to ask in reference to the self “how does this finite, embodied creature constitute into a coherent narrative those episodes of choice and limitation, agency and suffering, initiative and dependence?” Autoethnographic inquiries
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have been a significant part of a reclaiming of many narratives and subjective experiences within the social sciences and has aided in expanding the inclusion of more diverse voices.

The method itself emerged from social science’s epistemological and methodological debates in the 1980s and 1990s (Benhabib, 1987; Ellis & Bochner, 2000; Harding, 1987).

Thus far we have described the making of the modern notion of the self via the role of diverse forms of critical reflection post Enlightenment. These forms of critical reflection are aimed at thinking differently about the present via interpretation, critique and problematisation and relate to the practical circumstances people find themselves in. These forms of critical reflection rest on the capacity of human social beings to engage in reflection on themselves in addition on the conditions of suffering and flourishing they experience. This kind of reflection is at the heart of practical identity and we turn now to consider that aspect of reflection.

**Practical identity**

Practical identity, for Korsgaard (1996, p. 101), refers to “a description under which you value yourself, a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking.” Korsgaard discusses this as emerging from our reflective stance towards our obligations, needs and relations with others. Here the focus is on the individual. While the project of Korsgaard is to ask about values and what role these play in our self-understanding and our stance towards others, Laden (2001) extended this by considering the role of various differences that might impact the prospects of engaging with others in forms of deliberation about social conditions and justice. Thus, Laden proposes that practical identities involve both personal and social aspects, and interrogates how these might affect what we see as our obligations to ourselves and others. The personal side includes those aspects that place us in a network of practical relations – family, friendships and intimate relationships that are generally reciprocal in nature. Social refers to aspects that are less reciprocal and which may have chosen and unchosen characteristics. Chosen might be our profession, memberships in sporting or other groups. Unchosen may be our cultural background and societally relevant social divisions (Young, 1990) that position us according to differences across gender, class, race, sexual orientation, ability and age. Social divisions will have different configurations depending on the specific society and culture in which a person is embedded. Social structures such as family, education, work or religion may have aspects that position us on social hierarchies that contain unchosen and chosen components. Likewise, these are subject to different configurations of social and cultural conditions. Figure 21.1 captures Laden’s description of the components of a practical identity.

In addition to Laden’s aspects, we have included embodiment as an added component to pick up on the phenomenological aspect of self-hood. Atkins (2004) argues for identity to be seen as an embodied consciousness. This involves us in a relation with ourselves as an ‘I’, the first-person perspective, and as a being that has a body; a body capable of suffering and/or flourishing (Sayer, 2011). Moreover, this relation is not between but instead is one where each is presupposed – the “I” and the body, such that Atkins (2004, p. 344), paraphrasing Marcel, can say “my body is untransferable property; something that can never be fully disposed since its active existence is a condition for its own instrumentality or disposability”. Therefore, the body is inescapably part of conditions of possibility for the reflective stance outlined by both Korsgaard and Laden. This also relates to the human capacity to deploy a first-, second-, and third-person perspective. As Atkins (2004, p. 345) suggests “It is because we are embodied consciousnesses that we can view ourselves from two different standpoints: as objects of theoretical understanding (from a third-person perspective) or as the originators of our actions.
(from a first-person perspective).” The second-person perspective relates to the intersubjective mediation of oneself (Griffiths, 1995). In an autoethnography any or all of these aspects (Figure 21.1) of the researcher’s practical identity might form the basis of critical reflection and interpretation. We turn now to a case study to illustrate these points. The case study involves the practice of Rebecca and is written in case study form with quotes included.

**Case study**

This case study is written using a range of voices and perspectives as the second author, Rebecca, recalls a series of engagements with a client, Margaret, in her role as an Occupational Therapist and the experience implementing person-centred practice (Waters & Buchanan, 2017). The first voice, written in italics, is the voice of Rebecca recalling her experience of working with Margaret some fifteen years earlier. The second voice is that of current-day Rebecca reflecting what she believed was happening at the time of the series of engagements and how she perceived these engagements as impacting her practice. The third voice is again that of current-day Rebecca reflecting on the experience via a process of critical questioning (Guenther, 2021). In exploring this narrative, Rebecca illustrates the process and result of using autoethnography via a form of interpretive critical reflection.

This episode is aimed at understanding the development of the chosen aspect of Rebecca’s practical identity and centres on her professional identity. Korsgaard (2009, p. 19) states “whenever you choose an action, you are constituting yourself as the author of the action. You are deciding who to be.” Clinical practice offers many opportunities to decide who to be, in often-complex practice contexts, with high-pressure demands. This points to already existing discourses and practice architectures (Kemmis, 2019) within clinical practice. Engaging in reflection via this autoethnographic method offers a chance for Rebecca to consider the moments of choice and limitation she experienced as a therapist in relation to practice demands and in working with Margaret. The capacity to step out of norms of practice that may be less person-centred remains an ongoing challenge in clinical work (Waters, 2019). Rebecca also...
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utilises the idea of practical identity to consider Margaret’s personhood and what that calls forth from herself as an Occupational Therapist.

First voice: I first encountered Margaret when she moved into a residential aged-care facility as a result of the progression of her Alzheimer's disease and the inability of her family to continue to care for her. I had never wanted to work in aged care but my employment circumstances had led me to work in this setting and I had, at that time, a choice to either embrace it or leave. I chose to embrace it. Margaret was in her late 70s, obviously frail, with wizened features and a sparkle in her eye. She was quiet and reserved, perhaps resigned to the idea that this was where she was to live out her years. She couldn’t tell me her story as her speech had been replaced by a language of one that only she understood, and Margaret’s story could now only be told by others.

Second voice: When I first graduated as a young therapist, I had no intention of working in aged care despite having a paternal grandmother with the same diagnosis. I was confronted by the idea of watching people lose their grip on reality, and I was frightened by the thought of this occurring to me or my own parents in the future. My reflection on the thought that this fate may also befall me was mortifying to me, both then and now.

First voice: Margaret made tut-tutting sounds that expressed both her pleasure with her meals and her cups of tea. Her squeals and shrieks communicated fear and distress, causing staff to recoil from her, and seek assistance to ‘keep her safe and quiet’. As Margaret’s dementia progressed, she became frailer, and care staff began sitting her in a high-backed chair at a window in the sun. She received less frequent visits from her son, and she engaged less and less with her personal care routines, meals and ultimately other people. Her days from my observations, seemed to roll into a monotony of care routines, rushed meals, and many hours sleeping slumped in a chair.

Second voice: I remember wondering about her story and the fact that she herself was unable to tell me about it — it made me curious about her life. Who was Margaret? What had she done? Who had she loved? What did she like? I also remember wondering about what Margaret might feel like having staff recoil from her in fear or when they were frightened of her. I also wondered about Margaret’s own fear of not knowing as the dementia slowly took away her memory and understanding and insight as to what was happening for her. I clearly remember thinking about a statement I heard in my training many years earlier about people not remembering what you said, but remembering how you made them feel.

Third voice: How could I understand who this woman was when her identity was being constructed by others? It seems to me now that Margaret’s first-person practical identity, or the story she would tell about herself would likely include so much of her social aspect. Yet here in this scenario, I was trying to understand what was important to Margaret and her care through a series of stories created by others’ experiences of Margaret’s dementia. After a life well lived, is this what it was to come to? Waiting to die while in fear of others and they in fear of you? Wolfensberger (2000, p. 109) suggests that people’s lives become “junked … not just days and weeks, but months, years, or a lifetime can go by while they are waiting for opportunities, challenges, emotional comforts, etc.”, and here it was in full view.

First voice: As her Occupational Therapist, I visited once a week and observed the decline in her condition. I’d walk cheerily down the corridors of the facility greeting everyone I met. Some care staff smiled; others scowled at me grumpily. I recall feeling a personal responsibility to show up as the best version of my professional self in this depressing environment to be a role model and show people how to engage with residents who were desperately grasping on to their last threads of control and normalcy. Margaret had been a much-loved mother and wife, who had worked and raised children. She was at the end of her days or months, alone, fearful and unable to understand what was happening to her.
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Third voice: It is clear to me now that the experience of dementia was eroding Margaret’s first-person identity, both the way she understood herself and the way she understood others. As an observer of Margaret losing her identity, I was stepping into a role of re-creating her identity in my interactions with her. Buber (2010) proposes that is through the ‘Thou’ that a man becomes ‘I’ and that all real living is meeting. The meeting with Margaret in the therapeutic relationship was clearly contributing to the development of my ‘I’, my first person identity, in this ‘Thou’ relationship. How could I let others legitimise no longer treating people in the end stages of their lives as human beings who mattered? How did my role and the role of others feature as the second-person perspective became the only reference for Margaret’s identity? What part did Margaret’s relative involuntary role in this interaction play? As Margaret’s identity was eroding, my own conception of my first-person practical identity was also further developing. Korsgaard (2009, p. 20) suggests “it is as the possessor of personal or practical identity that you are the author of your own actions, and responsible for them … and yet at the same time, it is in choosing your actions that you create your identity.”

First voice: Margaret began featuring heavily in weekly updates from staff. ‘Margaret was unhappy… she was squealing and shrieking a lot and nothing the staff did seemed to help’. ‘We can’t keep Margaret sitting up in her chair – she falls asleep and slides out of the chair. Is there something you can do?’ ‘Margaret hits out when we are trying to put her to bed or when we get her out of bed. It takes two of us to do anything with her, and the shrieking she makes!’, ‘We’ve made an appointment for her to see the doctor … maybe some medication to calm her down might work?’ Margaret was agitated most of the time now. But when I stopped to sit and talk with her, and massage some hand cream into the dry papery skin on her hands, she watched me intently. She didn’t shriek. She didn’t pull away. She was calm.

Second voice: Margaret was rapidly being labelled as a problem. As a result of that perception, she was being treated in ways that, while not necessarily inappropriate, did not acknowledge of a sense of being valued as a human being with a rich life history. I remember the experience of stopping and meaningfully connecting with Margaret had such a profound impact on me.

First voice: In these interactions with Margaret, I felt I was learning to be a better therapist. I ordered her an adjustable wheelchair so she could sit upright and added a wheelchair tray so she could hold things in her hands with less likelihood of dropping them. And still each week, care staff told me about the next instalment of agitation, and sometimes aggression, as they tried to rush Margaret through their showering, toileting and feeding routines. I watched the sparkle leave Margaret’s eyes. I was frustrated.

Second voice: I became frustrated as I watched care staff become operationally focussed and increasingly disengage from any personal connection with her as she was fed and watered, bathed, toileted and dressed. Margaret’s identity was increasingly eroded as the dementia impacted her available choices and actions.

First voice: One day, I sat Margaret up in her wheelchair, carefully instructed the care staff on how to position her correctly so she wouldn’t fall or slump down. I wrote a detailed list of instructions on how to best position her and support her and placed them in a plastic sleeve on her bedroom door. I wrote handover notes in her case file. I took Margaret for a walk outside in the sun in her wheelchair, sitting upright. When we walked out of the building, the front desk staff were baffled … ‘Where are you taking her? You’ll need to sign her out!’ When we got outside and the fresh air and sunlight hit Margaret’s face, she began tut-tutting. In the rose garden, I scooped the loose petals off the heads and placed them in her hands to feel and smell. I talked the whole time … commenting on the weather, the breeze, the flowers, the garden, the gentlemen playing lawn bowls close by. Margaret’s ‘tuts’ became more frequent, she made eye contact with me, and reached out to touch my hand with her weak flexed fingers while tut-tutting in approval. Twenty minutes later, the sparkle in her eyes
was back, and back in the building with the front desk staff, Margaret was bright-eyed, alert, making eye contact, and tut-tutting in pleasure.

Third voice: My actions as the therapist are both constitutive for myself, but also my agency is aimed at offering recognition of Margaret as a person with the full sense of her identity and intrinsic value included. Even if Margaret was unable to engage in the self-articulation of her first-person practical identity, her identity was able to find expression and was supported via the intersubjective act of recognition. While dementia is certainly a part of the disappearance of Margaret in the first-person sense, the care process also plays a part in that process if it does not offer this I–Thou form of recognition.

First voice: The staff were equally fascinated and perplexed. Was this the same Margaret? How had I, as the occupational therapist, manifested this huge difference in a woman who had been causing so many problems for them in her care? Creating a calm space, garnering respectful attention, showing compassion, speaking at a speed she could understand. I had altered her environment, provided a pleasant sensory alternative, assisted her to interact and communicate with others. I had given time, displayed compassion, and, in short, shown care towards the lovely woman who had lived a rich life despite not knowing now, what that life was.

Third voice: I can’t imagine what living with dementia is like but the thought of having some awareness of the gradual loss of my faculties is mortifying to me. It brings the relational dimensions of our practical identities into sharp relief. If it should happen to me who will see my humanness? Who will acknowledge my life, experiences, relationships and contributions? Who will know me? This engagement with Margaret has been formative in that my responses to exclusion and active acts of depersonalisation and lack of recognition are strong. Throughout the bulk of my career, I have actively chosen to work with people who are marginalised, devalued and depersonalised as I experienced first-hand the difference a therapist can make by the simple act of treating others as human beings capable of suffering and/or flourishing.

Conclusion

Within autoethnographies, researchers will often work across the various aspects of their practical identities, utilising their reflective capacities and processes to interrogate their various concerns. There are vast territories for exploration of contemporary and historical social conditions able to be accessed via the intersubjective field of the researcher. Practical identity, as outlined above, offers a range of entry and exit points into this field in addition to an endless array of experience through with we can engage in a process of self-articulation and narrative. Having a working understanding of the ways in which we might conceive of the self and practical identity can be seen as a crucial resource for autoethnographers but it is often neglected as a commonplace. We have demonstrated that there is merit in connecting autoethnography to this rich vein of thinking about the self and engaging with different genealogies of critical reflection and philosophical methods. It would greatly aid the readers of autoethnography if these points of entry and forms of critical reflection were connected more systematically to wider genealogies of methods and knowledge about human experience.

References


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