


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### **With Mass Deportation Comes Mass Punishment**

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## 19

# WITH MASS DEPORTATION COMES MASS PUNISHMENT

## Punitive Capacity, Health, and Standards in U.S. Immigrant Detention

*David Hernández, John M. Eason,  
Pat Rubio Goldsmith,  
Richard D. Abel and Andrew McNeely*

### Introduction

In recent years, liberals and conservatives alike were unified in their public critique of mass imprisonment. Otherwise feuding political leaders agreed that mass imprisonment is inefficient, costly, and a chief purveyor of increased racial and economic inequality. In contrast, the U.S. detention system remains shrouded behind a bureaucratic veil stitched together with indemnification clauses and laced with a host of other legal jargon. Detention, from our view, is a form of punishment like imprisonment, despite being an administrative (non-criminal) process for the purposes of deportation. While immigrants have rights (and in some cases due process), similar forms of institutional power are capriciously exercised over the lives of immigrant detainees as criminal offenders.

In February 2017, White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer asserted that the Trump administration would “take the shackles off” Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and border officers (Spicer, 2017), initiating a new era of mass deportation. “We’re getting really bad dudes out of this country and at a rate that nobody has ever seen before,” the President would later add (Trump, 2017). Spicer’s comment marked the roll out of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) “guidance documents” operationalizing Donald Trump’s January 25, 2017 Executive Orders on immigration enforcement. This new direction will build upon an already unprecedented detention/deportation apparatus that is removing immigrants at an already astounding rate from the U.S. (Nixon & Shear, 2017). In addition to Donald Trump’s angry declarations, invented truths about immigrants, and semi-naked racism, the sweeping orders and supporting rules rely on an overall expansion of resources and discretionary powers for enforcing immigration policies. In addition to expanding the detention infrastructure, the Trump administration has further constrained lawful avenues for immigration and impeded immigrants’ defensive capacities—that is, their ability to seek relief from deportation. All told, the current presidential administration has effectively completed an end-run around the immigration court system.

Whereas immigration advocates assert that deportations will split families, damage the economy, and instill fear across communities, our research focuses on the violence and punishment occurring in-between apprehension and deportation, within the immigrant detention system. Among the most

insidious of the Trump administration's plans is the need to expand the nation's incarceration system for migrants in deportation proceedings. These rapid changes to immigration laws and policies will gravely impact a system already fraught with massive problems. Between 2003 and 2015, over 150 deaths occurred across public and private ICE detention facilities. Despite fatal conditions, immigrant detention facilities routinely pass federal audits and are rarely held accountable for their deficiencies.

In this chapter, we use novel data to grapple with how immigrant policy changes made by the Trump administration will impact the current system. We ask: First, what can immigrant detention centers tell us about racial stratification? Second, given the non-criminal, administrative nature of detention, what is life like inside facilities for the average immigrant detained by ICE? We argue that the current immigrant detention system is a racial project for immigrants of Latin American descent. By analyzing the largest U.S. detention facilities, we develop a new type of structural violence—*punitive capacity*. We argue that punitive capacity is the combination of dangerous empirical factors within detention centers (e.g., the widespread use of restraints) that increase exposure to various forms of violence and poor health outcomes for detainees. While punitive capacity is prevalent across the immigrant detention system, it also varies across facility. Furthermore, we find that punitive capacity is unaffected by detention standards, and, despite the measurable presence of punitive capacity in detention facilities, it is illegible to the current audit and oversight systems. This means that despite haphazard efforts to bring oversight into a system that has historically operated in secret (Hernández, 2013), detention facilities continue to operate without consequences for endangering the individuals they are charged with protecting.

Given the limited scholarly information on immigrant detention centers, we provide background information to contextualize their basic parameters. After discussing relevant literature, we then describe the research design of this study including the importance of Freedom of Information Requests (FOIR). Next, we present findings across key indicators of immigrant well-being in detention centers, including deaths and attempted suicides. Finally, we suggest theoretical and policy implications of health and violence outcomes across immigrant detention facilities.

### Background: An Expanding Status Quo

Along with the increase in detainees, the number of facilities has expanded, now totaling nearly 250. Despite such brisk growth over the last three presidential administrations, we know very little about what goes on inside these facilities. Immigrant detention centers remain mysterious because of the clandestine ways in which they function. Despite being under the jurisdiction of ICE, immigrant detention facilities are not, by-and-large, run by federal authorities.

Signs of an expanding detention apparatus are ubiquitous. Under the Obama administration, immigrant detention and formal deportations expanded to unprecedented levels. Obama propagated reforms and “priorities” tilting enforcement toward a dubious target of “felons, not families.” Under Trump, ICE has initiated a new period of investigative raids, picking up deportable immigrants as they take their children to school, at work, and in their homes. Immigrants are no longer safe from ICE contact even within “sensitive locations,” such as courthouses, hospitals, and homeless shelters. There are increasing reports of Latino youth previously shielded by Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) being detained. Deplaning passengers have been subjected to additional identification verification on domestic flights. Jurisdictions offering various forms of “sanctuary” and noncompliance between local and federal authorities are increasingly targeted for retaliatory enforcement by ICE (Plohetski, 2017). The widening net of deportation and immigration detention under the Trump administration has increased fear in vulnerable/marginalized communities (Hamilton, 2017).

Trump's enforcement strategies strike fear in a broad spectrum of noncitizens—families *and* felons alike—including those who are currently eligible for discretionary relief from deportation. There are

cases of immigrants being subjected to detention and deportation as they attend officially scheduled meetings with immigration authorities. Other lawfully permitted ruses include ICE officials posing as local police officers to gain and then disrupt trust among migrants (Dooling, 2017). While these enforcement efforts are within the purview of the new administration's sweeping priorities, these efforts to increase detention pose serious challenges to public safety in immigrant communities. These aggressive enforcement measures are not only symbolic, they are part of a broader punitive turn in immigration policy, which aligns with our notion of punitive capacity that we find on the ground within detention facilities (Macías-Rojas, 17).

Toward the end of his presidency, Obama was moving away from using private prisons, which caused the correction corporation's stocks to plummet. Early reactions celebrated this move. Others observed this trend with healthy skepticism. While some may find this a small symbolic step by the federal government, it moves in the right direction for reducing mass imprisonment and expanding detention. However, the moratorium did not apply to ICE and immigrant detention facilities (Hernández, 2016). In contrast, Trump scrapped these paltry plans intimating renewed partnerships with private jailers. Private prison stocks have skyrocketed since the election, and cities and counties on the hook for construction bonds for prison expansion have been bailed out (Gillers, 2017). In fact, once shuttered facilities are on the verge of renewal.

For example, in hopes of getting a contract with ICE, the Management and Training Corporation purchased the vacant Raymondville Detention Facility in Willacy County, Texas (Lauer, 2017). The facility was damaged in a fire during riots by migrant prisoners in response to years of abusive and sub-standard conditions. Notoriously named "RITMO" by detainees for its horrid conditions reminiscent of GITMO (Guantánamo Bay prison in Cuba), it has had many lives—first as a detention center, then as a segregated federal prison for migrants, and now will likely return to a migrant detention center (Reigstad, 2017). This expected move is emblematic of the Trump administration's expansion of the detention infrastructure. This signals an expanding status quo of the punitive capacity of the detention regime that is part and parcel of the decades of mass deportation by the last four administrations.

### **Race and Legal Authority Across the U.S. Immigration System**

The current immigrant detention system is a strategic site of vulnerability for marginalized populations, especially for immigrants of color. Similar to the dramatic rise of imprisonment of U.S. citizens, over the last 20 years, the number of immigrants detained in the U.S. has increased by five-fold. In conjunction with this increase in the system, the proportion of Latino detainees swelled by 2010 to nearly 90% of all border apprehensions, detentions, and removals from the U.S. According to 2014 ICE statistics, in 2005, 95.8% of apprehensions by DHS were of immigrants of Latin American origin, with 84.6% being of Mexican origin. The geopolitical landscapes of many of the countries of origin, proximity to the U.S., and the historical migration patterns contribute to their higher representation. Since the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), there has been a steady increase in detention and removal operations of both criminal and non-criminal immigrants with tenuous legal status. In 2013 and 2014 fiscal years alone, 849,979 immigrants have been subject to detention and deportation, with the majority, 483,258, being non-criminal. As such, while the criminal justice system is a central funnel to immigrant detention, the flexibility of immigration laws and enforcement continuously ensnares "collateral" detainees.

Racial targets of immigrant detention are an enduring trend. Whether targeted for supposed criminality, contagion, as military enemies, or as mass waves of refugees, racial animus has always shaped immigrant detention (Hernández, 2008). Omi and Winant (1994) argue that a:

[r]acial project is simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial dynamics, and an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources along particular racial lines.

Racial projects connect what race means in a particular discursive practice and the ways in which both social structures and everyday experiences are racially organized, based upon that meaning.

(p. 56)

Detention authority should be understood as a racial project because it is a race-creating system that subjects and redistributes resources targeting particular immigrants of color under its custody. While there is some dispute regarding the use of Latino as a racial category, the race paradigm centered on a structural racism framework is useful in assessing and examining how immigrants of color are subjected to these specific discursive practices (Valdez & Golash-Boza, 2017).

### **Punitive Capacity**

There are various measures of violence that can be used to describe the detention system. Galtung (1969) defines structural violence as the gap between what you are and what you can become. Violence is the difference between actual and avoidable outcomes. Peace, in contrast, is the absence of violence. Menjivar and Abrego's (2012) legal violence links structural violence to the practices established within immigration law and experience. Legal violence is referred to as the harmful effects of the law that can potentially obstruct and derail immigrants' paths toward incorporation. In our study, we empirically examine how structural violence operates within detention centers. Therefore, punitive capacity provides a way to conceptualize and measure structural violence.

Punitive capacity accounts for the technologies of control available to jailers to manage and impose physical/emotional violence upon administrative detainees. Punitive capacity can be identified through the rate of assaults; forced moves (e.g., transfers); disturbances (e.g., hunger strikes, riots, etc.); deployment of chemical agents; special response teams (or SWAT teams); and use of restraints within a facility.

Punitive capacity is a part of what Hernández (2008) calls "undue process" in the detention authority. Undue process not only includes the ability to punish immigrants, but also compromises detainees' defensive capacity—or the ability to protect oneself in detention by accessing legal counsel, bond, and relief from deportation. Because being detained also reduces the ability of detainees to achieve successful legal outcomes, increased punitive capacity further diminishes defensive capacity as well. For ICE, the elements of punitive capacity are basic accounting metrics of detention facilities necessary for the administrative processing of detainees. In practice however, challenges to punitive capacity (e.g., increased defensive capacity) increases costs to jailers. This puts defensive capacity in direct opposition to the primary profit motive/cost minimization of detention facility operators.

In this chapter, we also demonstrate that detention centers function as a form of rational-legal authority. Administrative policies impact both punitive and defensive capacity. According to Weber (1978), rational-legal authority is legitimized through documentation and laws. Weber's concept of authority includes domination/authoritarian power of command through a consistent system of abstract rules. Lawful forms of violence are embedded within statutory and administrative practices. By disentangling statutory laws from administrative policies, we show how detainees' routine exposure to violence and poor health outcomes in detention facilities can potentially be rationalized by ICE. By examining the impact of punitive capacity on standards and passing, we show how administrative detention is host to a bevy of abuses that are a rational-legal process effectively harming, eroding the rights of, and targeting Latino immigrants.

### **Research Design: The Project on Health, Violence, and Immigrant Detention**

Our data originated from a FOIR. Pierce Greenberg (2016) argues that the FOIR can strengthen research by enabling new areas of research because "public records requests can uncover data on

‘hidden’ topics” (p. 112). The FOIR is an innovative and novel approach to expanding methods and data in the social sciences. Our data include contracts between ICE and detention facilities across the U.S. The data also include two separate audits performed by the Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) and Office of Detention Oversight (ODO) within ICE.

In 2004, 32 people died in custody at ICE detention facilities, marking the highpoint for immigrant detainee deaths. Given the increasing media coverage of deaths across the system by 2008, the National Immigrant Justice Center (NIJC) filed a FOIR request as an attempt to create transparency in the operations of the immigration detention system. Contracts and audits were released only after years of legal wrangling, including a lawsuit filed by the *National Immigrant Justice Center v. Department of Homeland Security* (NIJC v. DHS). The lawsuit was filed after DHS ignored an earlier FOIR request submitted by NIJC.

As a team of faculty, graduate students, undergraduates, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), we explore punitive capacity and document detainees’ exposure to violence and dangerous conditions across U.S. immigrant detention centers. We analyze data obtained through the FOIR that include five years of qualitative and quantitative data (2008–2012) across 116 of the largest ICE detention facilities, which represents 92% of daily detention beds. We use a multi-method approach including regression and qualitative analysis to further expose the arbitrary nature of how these facilities operate and provide evidence of how administrative detainees (that is, non-criminals) are routinely exposed to violence. This view allows us to better understand variation in violence, legal counsel, and health services across (and within) these facilities.

Qualitative data consists of contracts and inspection reports between ICE and detention facilities. The contractual agreements are between federal and local branches of government, such as the U.S. Marshals Service, ICE, and those who operate local county jails to secure the use of their facilities for the purpose of immigration processing and detainment. Contracts may also be between ICE and privately operated correctional facilities that cater exclusively to ICE. These contracts are not uniform and vary greatly between facilities. The ODO inspection reports, designed to document periodic inspections of the contracted facilities to ensure compliance with the ICE Performance Based National Detention Standards, have also been disclosed to the research team. A team of qualitative researchers are using ATLAS.ti to provide a deeper contextual analysis of the contracts and ODO inspection reports.

For this chapter, we use a negative binomial regression analysis of ERO summary sheets for a total of 465 audit years to provide a descriptive overview of ICE facilities. While the rates may be relatively high, the number of deaths and attempted suicides are rare events in detention facilities. Statisticians recommend modeling these types of outcomes with Poisson regression because they eliminate negative predictions and produce unbiased standard errors (Allison, 2005). We use a modified form of this regression known as a negative binomial model to correct for over-dispersion in the predicted values of these two outcomes.

We also weighted each facility based on Average Daily Population (ADP) to provide the average immigrant experience across facilities and not just a snapshot of the average facility. The total ADP for each facility was calculated by summing male and female ICE detainees, U.S. Marshalls’ detainees, and detainees classified as “other.” Total ADP is used either as a control variable or to calculate rates for other variables, some used in the construction of punitive capacity. Because total ADP is vital to many of the variables in this analysis, facilities that indicated zero ADP were missing ADP, or that had ADP redacted in a given year were dropped from the analysis. Many of the variables constructed as rates were multiplied by 1000 for easier interpretation. However, variables that were constructed as totals, such as deaths and attempted suicides, were not multiplied by 1000. Results are presented as very small coefficients appearing as zeros have been multiplied by 1000 to present real numbers and are labeled as such in the titles.

The key independent variable in this analysis is *punitive capacity*. Punitive capacity is measured as an index of the six variables (*Rates of Assaults, Forced Moves, Disturbances, Use of Chemical Agents,*



*SWAT Teams*, and *Restraints*) shown in the Table 19.1. To create the index, we logged each variable (to reduce the influence of outliers), transformed each variable into a z-score ( $M = 0$ ,  $SD = 1$ ) and then took the average of the six components. This index weights the eight underlying components equally. More positive values indicate greater punitive capacity.

There are five dependent variables we analyze to provide a baseline description of facilities, including: *final ratings*, *standards*, *deaths*, *attempted suicides*, and *health referrals*. *Attempted suicides* include a tally for each facility. *Health referrals* are the number of mental health and medical referrals each facility made that required a transfer outside the detention center for care. *Deaths* are a composite of suicides and other forms of what ICE calls “Permanent Injury Beyond Medical Intervention.” We are not clear if these are murders or deaths related to health or other conditions. For the sake of clarity, we provide more detail for standards and passing below.

Each facility receives a final rating on the annual ERO audit. These ratings come in several forms. The most frequent rating is based on a 5-point scale (1 = *At-Risk* and 5 = *Superior*, with 4 = *Good*, 3 = *Acceptable*, and 2 = *Deficient*). Two other forms of ratings are dichotomous (1 = *Acceptable* or *Meets Standards* and 0 = *Deficient* or *Does not Meet Standards*). The last two options for final facility ratings were used the least. The first is a 3-item scale (3 = *Good*, 2 = *Acceptable*, and 1 = *Deficient*). The last is a 4-item scale (4 = *Superior*, 3 = *Good*, 2 = *Deficient*, and 1 = *At-Risk*). These scales were all recorded as-is into the dataset and transformed into a dichotomous passing variable (1 = *Passing*), where *At-Risk* and *Deficient* were coded as failing in the 5-item scale and *Superior*, *Good*, and *Acceptable* were passing. In the three-item scale both *Good* and *Acceptable* are coded as passing, while *Deficient* was coded as failing. The 4-item rating scale was coded as passing for *Superior* and *Good* and failing for *Deficient* and *At-Risk*.

In every ERO audit, the facility is evaluated on a number of standards such as *Disciplinary System*, *Searches of Detainees*, *Access to Telephones*, *Food Service*, and *Medical Care*. Each standard is separated into sections and a number of items are evaluated for each standard. These evaluations are based on either a 5-item scale (5 = *Acceptable*, 4 = *Deficient*, 3 = *At-Risk*, 2 = *Repeat Finding*, and 1 = *Not Applicable*) or a 4-item scale (4 = *Meets Standards*, 3 = *Does Not Meet Standards*, 2 = *Repeat Finding*, and 1 = *Not Applicable*). Based on these several items, the standard then receives an overall rating on the same scale as the individual items that comprise that scale. These overall ratings are then combined into a single sheet that summarizes each of the overall standards. These scales are recoded into a dichotomous variable (1 = *Passing*) where the only passing rating was *Meets Standards* or *Acceptable* in their respective scales. *Not Applicable* was then coded as missing and a percentage of standards passed was created for each audit.

Our analysis provides an initial descriptive peek into the clandestine operations of U.S. immigrant detention facilities. We proceed as follows: First, we provide descriptive statistics to contextualize the average immigrant experience; then, we use factor analysis to show how we constructed the punitive capacity measure; next, we use a cross tabulation to demonstrate the rate of ICE facilities passing over time; lastly, we report bivariate analysis of the factor for punitive capacity predicting the rate of deaths, attempted suicides, health referrals, passing, and facility rating.

### Findings: Health and Ratings Across Immigrant Detention

We use negative binomial regression to test whether punitive capacity predicts the rate of deaths, attempted suicides, and health referrals across the ICE system from 2008 to 2012. We also measure the relationship between punitive capacity and ICE standards and whether or not a facility received a passing grade during inspection. By weighting each facility based on ADP, we provide the average immigrant experience across facilities.

Table 19.1 shows the rate of violence for each of the underlying indicators of our index of punitive capacity. All forms of violence are common across ICE facilities. For every 1000 people in a

Table 19.1 Descriptive Statistics

Variable (standardized)	n	M	SD	Min.	Max.
Assaults	443	125.99	348.17	0	4610.17
Forced Moves	443	34.23	147.69	0	1726.50
Disturbance	443	5.86	27.96	0	370.97
Chemical	443	8.01	24.99	0	253.97
SWAT Teams	443	9.23	80.85	0	1447.37
Restraints	249	33.04	180.53	0	2733.01

Table 19.2 Factor Analysis

Variable	Factor 1	Uniqueness
zlogassaults	0.6462	0.5824
zlogformov	0.5634	0.6826
zlogdist	0.6162	0.6203
zlogchem	0.7231	0.4771
zlogswat	0.6395	0.5911
zlogrest	0.7837	0.3858

Table 19.3 Cross Tabulation of Standards by Year

Audit Year	Does Not Meet Standards	Meets Standards	Total
2007	19	46	65
2008	28	46	74
2009	9	70	79
2010	0	46	46
2011	1	74	75
2012	0	83	83
Total	57	365	422

detention center there are 126 assaults, 34 forced moves, and six disturbances. Also, *Chemical* is used, on average, eight times; *SWAT Teams*, nine times; and *Restraints*, 33 times per year.

Table 19.2 provides a factor analysis of key independent variables. This table shows that the rates of variables using factor analyses covaried. In other words, detention centers that tend to have a high rate on one form of violence and punishment (e.g., assaults) tended to also have lots of the other forms too, as seen by all variables having factor scores of 0.56 or greater.

In Table 19.3 we report a series of cross-tabulations on standards by year from 2008 to 2012. While there were a number of facilities that did not meet standards prior to 2010, there is only one facility that was found substandard after 2010. This points to the policy changes and lack of detention oversight from ICE on local facilities.

We also examine whether or not important outcomes vary across detention centers in relationship to their level of punitive capacity. We find that punitive capacity associates with deaths, attempted suicides, and health referrals, as seen in Table 19.4. A one-*SD* increase in punitive capacity is associated with 2.84 times more deaths per year, 7.98 times more suicide attempts per year, and 4.97 times more health referrals per year. However, there is no bivariate association between punitive capacity and the final rating for the detention center or whether or not it received a passing rating.



Table 19.4 Cross Tabulation of Standards by Year

	<i>Deaths</i>	<i>Attempted Suicides</i>	<i>Health Referrals</i>	<i>Passing</i>	<i>Final Rating</i>
Punitive Capacity	1.04***	2.08***	1.6**	5.25	-0.16
IRR (OR)	2.84	7.98	4.97		0.85

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ .

### From Bad to Worse: Detention in the Trump Era

Our analysis demonstrates that the average administrative immigrant detainee (non-criminal) faces multiple forms of violence while being held in ICE custody. Punitive capacity should be understood as a type of structural violence that varies within but is also prevalent across the immigrant detention system. Overall, we found that the current system of standards and audits is ineffectual. Not only are facilities with high rates of deaths, assaults, and suicide attempts regularly receiving passing grades from the auditing process, but our analysis suggests that higher rates of punitive capacity (the set of punitive metrics listed above) predict facilities passing inspection. Lastly, this study suggests that the FOIR is critical to criminal justice research, especially immigrant detention research. There are policy and theoretical implications of these findings.

First, our research on punitive capacity indicates that any increase in the detention infrastructure will have a deleterious effect on immigrants, largely because the existing system already harms them. Ultimately, the expansion of the immigrant detention system will lead to higher rates of deaths, attempted suicides, and health referrals. Immigrant detention centers are havens for the denial of constitutional rights, widening the impunity of prison guards, and expanding punitive capacity. Our research demonstrates the real and certain danger of expanding this system that exposes detainees to violence.

Second, immigrant detention operations are often unnoticed and moderately assessed. Immigrant detention centers also remain mysterious because of the clandestine ways in which they function. Despite being under the jurisdiction of ICE, immigrant detention facilities are not typically run by federal authorities. Further, intergovernmental service agreements between ICE and the service provider (detention centers) require only satisfactory performance, which is vague and inconsequential. To be clear, our findings suggest the more dangerous the facility for migrant detainees, the higher likelihood of institutional endorsement from the federal government and continued contracting, or contract renewal. Whereas punitive capacity represents a set of factors increasing the exposure to danger in detention, one could imagine that from the perspective of ICE, punitive capacity is a measure of state control over detainees.

Third, politicians across the political spectrum have argued that immigration reform is necessary, yet only minor consideration has been placed on the deportee experience within the bounds of immigration detention facilities. At the same time, policymakers win big electorally by falsely drumming up the dangers of immigration. While scholarly work has been conducted on the racialization of Latinos in the U.S. (Johnson, 2000; Romero, 2001; Romero & Serag, 2005; Salinas, 2004; Sanchez, 1997), our investigation into the conditions Latinos experience in U.S. immigration detention facilities demonstrates that the federal system at this moment functions as a racial project.

To be sure, Trump's expansions are built on the previous administration's efficiencies. The Obama administration increased detention and deportation capabilities to produce record-breaking figures. Trump poses significant challenges for migrants fighting deportation. All of Trump's increased powers, new partnerships, and innovations in denying rights will invigorate and fortify an already bloated system and set new standards for punishing migrants. The DHS has already identified 20,000

additional detention beds (Hayes & Montopoli, 2017) for the administrative processing of deportation that will dramatically expand the detention system's capability to inflict punishment. Increased punitive capacity will negatively affect the physical and psychological well-being of detainees that will reverberate on families and communities. Rapidly hired, hastily trained ICE personnel and surrogate jailers apprehending and incarcerating migrants will worsen conditions for detainees. These changes, along with increased reliance on private prison corporations and local county facilities, will push a flawed system from bad to worse.

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