


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American “Independence is not Threatened”

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3

AMERICAN “INDEPENDENCE IS NOT THREATENED”

British Priorities in the War of 1812¹

John R. Grodzinski

Peace with America, then, was the natural policy of this country; and indeed the sole object of the war on our part was simply to resist aggression, and support our maritime rights. America had avowed as her objects in going to war, the conquest of Canada, the enforcement of the principle, that free ships make free goods, and the right of naturalizing our seamen,—principles which could not be surrendered, and on the maintenance of which depended our existence as a great nation. Accordingly they had not been surrendered; Canada had been gloriously defended even by a small body of troops, and peace had been made in the spirit of peace.

Hart Davis, Member for Colchester, House of Commons, April 11, 1815²

The American declaration of war against Great Britain in June 1812 came as British naval, military, diplomatic, fiscal and manufacturing capabilities were concentrating against Napoleonic France. Now facing a new conflict in a distant theater, Britain had to balance its European goals and commitments with the security of its North American colonies. As impressive in these years were as the harnessing of British financial might, the mobilization of its industry, and the employment of its population in military service to a level that would not be surpassed until the Great War of a century later, British resources were finite, requiring their leaders, in light of higher priorities, to restrict their strategy in North America to little more than maintaining the security of its colonial possessions. Once freed from the European war, the land and naval reinforcements it dispatched, largely to the Canadas, were to enhance the security of Upper and Lower Canada and achieve modest territorial gains that were to bolster the position of the British diplomats, who were about to commence peace negotiations with the Americans. Despite its efforts to keep the Anglo-American war separate from the talks on the future of Europe in Vienna, the British government found that they converged, causing it to subordinate its colonial interests to its goals in Europe. This strategy proved so successful that by 1815, Britain had preserved its North American colonies and achieved a height of global military and political prestige reached neither before nor since.

Between the American declaration of war in June 1812 and Napoleon's escape from Elba in early 1815—which occurred while the Congress of Vienna sat—the King's ministers remained firmly fixed on European affairs. The only significant departures they allowed to the restrictions that had been imposed on the commander-in-chief in British North America, Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, to refrain from demands for additional armaments, manpower, and money, came in the spring of 1813, when specie, reinforcements, additional equipment, and most significantly, a Royal Navy



Figure 3.1 The War in the Northern Borderlands.
(Map by Tracy Smith. Courtesy of Don Hickey.)



contingent, were sent to the Canadas; in the summer of 1814, the defensive strategy Prevost had followed since 1812 was redefined by expanding the naval establishment on the Great Lakes and the troop levels in the Canadas and offshore of the United States, in order to remove the military threat to the Canadas and give clout to a British commission that was about to commence peace negotiations with the Americans. Eventually, any aspirations the government had in securing territorial and other concessions from the Americans were trumped by concerns over the state of the talks at Vienna and the stability of Europe.

Recent publications have heralded a revived interest in British strategy and its strategic capabilities, including public and private finance, industry, shipbuilding, and the mobilization of its population, during the Napoleonic Wars that is not equaled in the historiography of the War of 1812. Historians of the North American conflict have generally given passing interest in the structure and operation of the British government, its ministries, and departments, as demonstrated recently by one author who casually characterized the entire strategic mechanism of Great Britain as “their Imperial Lords” without any explanation of its function. Some historians stress that the war in Europe forced British officials to give the North American war minor attention, while others claim the “lack of money”—whatever that may mean—forced the British government in 1814 to seek a prompt conclusion to the Anglo-American conflict. It is evident that despite the inefficiencies and corruption in all governments of this period, Britain possessed experienced ministries and departments capable of planning and executing military, naval, fiscal, and diplomatic operations on a global scale. The results, as the War of 1812 demonstrated, were not always as desired or expected (as the need for social and electoral reform would reveal). Still, even the American commissioners acknowledged that the terms of the Treaty of Ghent were “not such as our Country expected at the commencement of the war.” However, by focusing on Europe, Britain overthrew a previously all-conquering opponent, achieved unprecedented dominance of trade and on the high seas, acquired a new colonial empire, and yet still managed to retain its North American colonies. Furthermore, the British financial system was robust and capable of funding its war effort and servicing the largest of any government debt to that point. Within the context of strategic priorities and the diplomatic and economic challenges of the closing years of the Napoleonic Wars, one can appreciate why events in North America, although important to Americans, Canadians, and to the native population, drew less interest in London.³

Contemporary experience in the “Global War on Terror” and other asymmetric threats had demonstrated that might is not always matched by favorable results. Objectives can be grandiose, resources inadequate, and orders vague; the interests of many parties, the strengths and weaknesses of the individuals concerned, and the complications produced by “friction,” the unforeseen effects that impede the effective use of military forces, as military theorist Carl von Clausewitz suggested in his writings, are alive today as they were two centuries ago.

A Tale of Three Henrys: Bathurst, Goulburn, and Bunbury

A house at the western end of Downing Street, where the steps now lead down to St. James’s Park, served as the offices for the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, whose staff directed Britain’s war effort during the Napoleonic Wars. Better known as the Colonial Office, the position of its Secretary of State originated in 1794, following the rearrangement of the duties originally held by the Home and Foreign Secretaries.

Before continuing, we need to look at the British system of government. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland was a constitutional monarchy that relied on the separation of powers between the monarchy and legislature to safeguard the democratic House of Commons and to protect the army from being an instrument of an autocratic monarch. In contrast to the autocracies of the continent, British society was more liberal, respectful of the rule of law, and enjoyed a pluralist political system. The monarch, the Prime Minister and cabinet, the two houses of parliament, the judiciary and

courts all had distinct roles and powers. The political system was not democratic in the modern sense; however, public issues were debated openly in parliament and commented on in the press. The greatest influence the state had over its citizens was in the military draft, the naval press gang, and taxation. The lengthy war against France challenged the existing system and brought the tightening of public demonstrations and freedom of the press and increased taxation.

The monarch was the head of state whose powers had been much reduced since 1713, but who enjoyed enough residual power and political influence to insist on consultation on all government matters and the ability to dismiss any minister. Beginning in 1811 and until his death in 1820, the mental state of George III made him incapable of ruling, and in his place, parliament appointed a regent. At first, indications that the king might recover led parliament to avoid unnecessary upheaval by imposing restrictions on the notorious fickleness of the Prince of Wales for one year following his swearing in as Prince Regent on February 6, 1811. When in early 1812 he finally assumed the full powers of the monarch, the regent avoided interfering with the government of Spencer Perceval, and following the assassination of the prime minister in May 1812, Lord Liverpool, then Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, exploited the factionalism within the two major political groups, the Tories and the Whigs, allowing him in June to form a broadly based ministry that had the freedom to implement its program without interference from the regent.

The officers of state included the prime minister, several secretaries of state and other officials, including—to name a few—the First Lord of the Treasury (a post normally the prime minister held), Chancellor of the Exchequer, the President of the Council and the Master of the Mint, all of whom held rank as “His Majesty’s confidential servants” in the cabinet, the central decision-making body of the government. In 1814, the cabinet comprised 13 ministers, while 13 other officials held posts, including the Attorney General and Solicitor General, that were “not of the cabinet.” By the early 1800s, the prime minister had become the dominant figure in the cabinet, supplanting the departmental government of the eighteenth century with a unified set of ministers who reported to the monarch only through the prime minister. Unlike today, the existence of a government was independent of parliament elections, and the prime minister formed a government by bringing varied political interests into a compact. The survival of the government was dependent upon sustaining a viable coalition, ensuring the pleasure of the monarch, and in guaranteeing sufficient votes for the passage of bills in the House of Commons, which wielded considerable power.

The House of Commons held authority over financial matters, including the civil list, comprising the royal household and the civil government offices, and the navy and the army. Bills were introduced by the motion of a minister, and the government then had to reckon with the 658 members of the house. The House of Commons could, through its select committees, commissions, examination of public accounts and debate, bring sufficient pressure on to the government to cause it to collapse.

The Secretary of State for War and the Colonies administered reports and all military matters from every colonial governor and overseas commanders-in-chief. He coordinated with other offices, such as the Board of Ordnance, the government department responsible for the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers; and the Transport Board, which provided transport for troops and supplies; he also communicated with the Horse Guards, the headquarters of the British Army; and the Treasury, which held several military responsibilities. Finally, he transmitted the orders and instructions of the government to the colonies and overseas commanders. In June 1812, this post was held by Henry Bathurst, the 3rd Earl Bathurst, a sensible and experienced minister. Earl Bathurst, Prime Minister Lord Liverpool, and Foreign Secretary Viscount Castlereagh formed the inner group of ministers responsible for the day-to-day administration of Britain’s global strategy. While this system was responsible for some confusion and inefficiency, it was noteworthy that it rested on the authority the Crown granted to the prime minister and the cabinet to make decisions and execute policy.

Despite his considerable responsibilities, the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies employed a small staff. Assisting the Secretary were two Undersecretaries, one for colonial matters and, beginning



Figure 3.2 The Secretary of State for War and the Colonies occupied the center building of this block at the western end of Downing Street, Westminster. From here Earl Bathurst and his staff directed British military and colonial strategy during the Napoleonic Wars and the War of 1812. By 1876 the buildings had been razed and replaced by the steps down to St. James's Park.

(Watercolor by J.C. Buckler, 1827, No. 1880.1113.2744, © Trustees of the British Museum)

in 1806, another for war. Between August 1812 and December 1821, Henry Goulburn, a man much maligned for his role in the peace negotiations at Ghent, held the senior post of Undersecretary (Colonies); while between 1809 and 1816, another Henry, Colonel Henry Bunbury, an administratively skilled and experienced officer who had seen limited action, served as Undersecretary (War). The remainder of the staff included a private secretary, chief clerk, librarian, a translator, précis writer, a dozen clerks and several domestic servants.

Aside from overseeing his department and tending to his parliamentary duties—Bathurst was a member of the House of Lords and Goulburn a member of parliament—Bathurst handled a voluminous daily correspondence. Wellington, advancing during this time from earl to marquess and finally duke, the commander of the British and Portuguese forces in the Iberian Peninsula, was his main correspondent. In the 22 months between July 1812, when the first of Wellington's letters to reach Bathurst arrived, and Napoleon's abdication in April 1814, the men shared 500 letters; in contrast, the

31-month correspondence shared between Bathurst and Sir George Prevost from September 1811 to April 1815 amounted to less than half that number. Over time, Bathurst found himself completely immersed in the war in Europe, leaving the management of the North American conflict to his subordinates.

During the summer of 1813, as the fighting in North America intensified, Britain entered a new coalition with its European allies. The importance Britain gave to the alliance, which it hoped would achieve a decisive blow against Napoleon, led it to consummate the deal by agreeing to contribute a fleet to the Baltic and the dispatch of a 3,000-man contingent to Stralsund in northern Germany. It also sent arms and considerable financial assistance to Russia, Sweden, and Prussia. The scale of the assistance it provided was staggering, and over a 10-month period, the financial aid amounted to £11 million, nearly equivalent to *all* the subsidies between 1793 and 1801, while another £2 million was provided for arms, including 101,000 muskets. The members of the new coalition, which would be joined by Austria, Denmark, Holland, and Hanover by the end of the year, assembled their forces but found that their goal in defeating Napoleon proved elusive.

In May 1813, the defeat of their armies at Lützen and Bautzen discouraged Russia and Prussia, paving the way for an armistice with France, known as the Treaty of Pleiswitz. The exclusion of the British representatives at the allied headquarters from the discussions leading to the treaty and from additional talks that included Austria created concerns in London that Britain would be left to continue the war on its own. Fortunately for Britain, Napoleon's refusal to enter into serious negotiations, combined with a lack of faith in the Emperor's intentions on the part of the allies, ended the armistice, and in August 1813 the war resumed. In October, the allies imposed a convincing defeat on Napoleon at Leipzig, and following the retreat of his army across the Rhine into France in December, Napoleon accepted a proposal to commence peace negotiations. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Castlereagh was appointed to give a single voice to the three emissaries currently representing British interests with the Austrians, Prussians, and Russians. By January, allied troops were on French soil, and the lengthy war appeared to be nearing an end.

The realization of just how little influence Britain wielded with its allies, Austria, Prussia, and Russia was tempered by the weight of British financial aid, its contribution of 100,000 men in Iberia, and its naval power. The general acceptance by the European powers that Napoleon had to be removed was an important victory. For now, the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies was consumed with that goal and with the additional duties for foreign affairs, leaving responsibility for the war in America largely in the hands of Undersecretary Henry Goulburn.

Henry Bunbury's poor health favored this arrangement. Following his appointment to the Colonial Office in 1807, Bunbury, whom Goulburn described as a "conscientious" man with a "talent for business," took to his duties with a zeal that eventually threatened his health and nearly resulted in his resignation in 1812.⁴ Bunbury's continued health problems and frequent absences on the continent necessitated Goulburn's deeper involvement in military matters than his duties would normally have required. Thus it was Goulburn and not Bunbury, who, in the middle of one night in October 1812, was awoken by a special messenger carrying an account of the British victory at Detroit. Later that year, Goulburn ensured that the request Sir George Prevost made for the assignment of the Royal Navy to the Great Lakes was satisfied. In 1813, the Undersecretary supported a more aggressive campaign on the Atlantic coast, and it was Goulburn who detailed the objectives in the June 1814 "Secret Orders" sent under Bathurst's signature to Prevost that now placed Britain on the offensive. Finally, Goulburn was nominated to complete the three-member British commission destined to negotiate the treaty that concluded the war. Goulburn, who received responsibility for the final arrangements of frontiers, fisheries, and maritime rights, owed his appointment to the rejection of the government's first choice, George Hammond, who had aroused much hostility while he was British minister to Washington.

The course of war in the Canadas frustrated Goulburn. The British naval defeat on Lake Erie dumbfounded him, given the dispatch of nearly 1,000 experienced seamen to North America. He




Figure 3.3 While better known as a member of the British commission that negotiated the Treaty of Ghent, Undersecretary (Colonies) Henry Goulburn played a prominent part in military matters in the War of 1812. Not only did he gain the commitment of the Royal Navy to play a role in the Great Lakes, but he also drafted the “Secret Orders” of June 1814 that placed Britain on the offensive in North America.

(Engraving by R. A. Artlett after George Richmond, 1851, No. 22988, © Victoria and Albert Museum)

found Prevost’s claim of the inadequacy of the resources provided to him and his call for additional reinforcements unexpected and smacking of the governor’s excessive caution. Little did Goulburn realize that less than half of the sailors sent to Halifax made it to Kingston and that even fewer reached Lake Erie, while the four regiments sent to Prevost in 1813 were insufficient given the scale of American offensive operations. Prevost related as much to Bathurst, when he wrote in 1813 that improvements in the leadership and training of the American army and the unprecedented expansion of their inland naval force offered Prevost “difficulties of a new and imposing character,” which were exacerbated by his not being “honoured with a single instruction from His Majesty’s Government upon the mode of conducting the campaign since it opened to this late period.”⁵

For his part, Goulburn's lack of military expertise and experience—he had once been a captain of volunteers and, as Undersecretary of State at the Home Department, had held responsibility for the administration of the militia and volunteers—left him inadequately equipped to manage a war being fought in a vast geographic expanse over 3,000 miles away. Nonetheless, from the outset of hostilities, Goulburn accepted that the “detail fell to the Colonial Department,” and his attention was given to “scratch around for additional supplies for the heavily outnumbered forces in North America.”⁶ To increase the manpower available for military service, he encouraged colonial volunteerism by authorizing Prevost to offer 100 acres to each man who enlisted. Then, in August 1814, following the completion of the “Secret Orders,” Goulburn left the Colonial Office for the peace talks on the continent, leaving Bathurst with a single, sickly and sometimes absent Undersecretary of War as his sole assistant.

During late 1812 and early 1813, Undersecretary of State for War Colonel Henry Bunbury was abroad to convey instructions to the Swedish government, and at the beginning of 1814, he was in France to discuss with Wellington logistical and financial details for the upcoming campaign. The only appreciable influence Bunbury exerted on the Anglo-American War was in his opposition to the proposed expedition to New Orleans. He argued, unsuccessfully, that it be delayed until the spring of 1815, once the progress of the peace negotiations in Ghent was clear. Postponing the operation would also release troops to quell potential disturbances in Ireland and England and to defend the Netherlands until peace with France was assured.

Meanwhile, Bathurst attended to establishing the peace and the security of Europe. During 1814, while dealing with the pressing requirements of the Peninsular Army in France, the establishment of a British garrison in the recently liberated Kingdom of the Netherlands, and arranging a proposed dynastic union between the Houses of Hanover and Orange, Bathurst assumed responsibility for the foreign office. In February 1814, with his Undersecretary of War absent, his Colonial Undersecretary unfamiliar with military affairs, the Foreign Secretary on the continent, and the allied armies within reach of Paris, Bathurst chose to consult with Britain's pre-eminent field commander on how to settle matters in North America. In response to Bathurst's proposal to send 20,000 men to North America, Wellington opined that the defence of Canada “depends upon the navigation of the lakes,” and that “any offensive operation founded upon Canada must be preceded by the establishment of naval superiority on the lakes.” Wellington doubted Britain could not “do more than secure the points on those lakes at which the Americans would have access.” Consequently, military operations by large forces “are impracticable, unless the party carrying them on has the uninterrupted use of a navigable river, or very extensive means of land transport, which such a country can rarely have.”⁷

Wellington had succinctly summarized the conditions that would achieve nothing more than the retention of Britain's North American colonies. Although Britain could have sent the necessary military and naval personnel, foodstuffs, fodder, and specie for military operations that would attempt to achieve more in North America than Wellington had proposed, British officials were unwilling to do so because of deteriorating conditions in Europe.

Security for British North America

The orders to Sir George Prevost that Bathurst signed on June 3, 1814 signaled a fundamental shift in British strategy in North America. Offensives to be mounted from the Canadas were to achieve control of the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain, reestablish the alliance severed with the Western Confederacy in 1813, and impede American attacks against the Canadas. Other operations in the Chesapeake would consist of diversionary raids to assist in the defense of Lower and Upper Canada, while the only territorial ambition expressed in this new strategy was the occupation of the Territory of Massachusetts (Maine) to improve communication between New Brunswick and Lower Canada. Once these objectives were secure, the security of British North America would then be confirmed

diplomatically at the forthcoming peace talks. Operations against the Gulf Coast were not part of this plan and will be considered later.

The narrow objectives and the forces allocated to these offensives reveal they were not intended to replicate the invasions envisioned in 1777 to end the rebellion in America by carving up the Province of New York or pursued in the southern American colonies from 1779. Prevost was to remain close to the frontier and avoid “such forward movements into the Interior of American Territory as might commit the safety of the force placed under your command,” while in the Chesapeake, Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane and Major General Robert Ross were not to “advance” their force “so far into the Country as to risk its power of retreating to its embarkation.”⁸

In the event, the late arrival of Bathurst’s orders at Quebec and incomplete naval preparations on the Great Lakes caused the postponement of most of the offensives until the following year, leaving Prevost with the prospect of mounting two operations designed to secure the frontier of Lower Canada: the destruction of the enemy naval establishment on Lake Champlain and the occupation of an advanced position on the frontier at Plattsburgh, New York. This offensive, the primary British effort in the north for that year, ended with the defeat of the British naval squadron on Lake Champlain and the withdrawal of the still intact division back to Lower Canada, from whence it continued to guard the frontier.

The raids in the Chesapeake culminated with the occupation and burning of Washington; Cochrane, elated with the results, then proposed to attack Baltimore. Although the discomfort Ross expressed toward Cochrane’s zeal in destroying American urban centers was shared by others, it must also be remembered that Baltimore was simply another objective in strategy directed toward raiding the enemy. The city was too large and the terrain too difficult for such a small force to succeed, and the repulse of the attackers should not be remembered solely for its inspiring the American national anthem, for the attack on Baltimore also coincided with the government’s decision to shift offensive operations to the Gulf Coast.

In response to the receipt of letters from the Admiralty on September 17, 1814 that outlined plans for Louisiana and the Mississippi Territory, Cochrane abandoned his plans for an attack on the northern coast of the United States. Leaving Rear Admiral Pulteney Malcolm temporarily in command in the Chesapeake with orders to resume the blockade, Cochrane departed for Halifax to make preparations for the new campaign. Malcolm, who was later joined by Captain Robert Barrie, RN, continued with patrols and raids and also occupied islands in Maryland. A considerable portion of the fleet was also withdrawn for Cochrane’s use. While these events unfolded, the British occupation of Maine was well under way.

In June 1814, Lieutenant General Sir John Sherbrooke, the Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia and commander of the forces in the Maritime Provinces, acted upon instructions to “occupy so much of the District of Maine, as shall ensure an uninterrupted [overland] communication between Halifax & Quebec,” by sending a regiment of foot and a detachment of artillery and warships to take several islands off Eastport, Maine.⁹ The rapid surrender of the American garrison prompted Sherbrooke to use recently arrived reinforcements to extend the occupation to include that portion of Maine that impeded communication between New Brunswick and Lower Canada. By September, with much of the territory under British control, Sherbrooke was recommending to the government that a new boundary between New Brunswick and Maine be fixed at Penobscot. While the United States made no challenge to the occupation, nothing came of it, and it was not until March 1815, following ratification of the Treaty of Ghent, that British forces finally withdrew from Maine.

The Gulf Coast Expedition

The decision to mount an expedition against New Orleans came as the British cabinet was confronted with an unstable situation in France, where the restored and feeble monarchy induced a

Napoleonic revival, while in North America, the successful occupation of Maine was tempered by the setback at Plattsburgh and the death of Ross at Baltimore. Facing criticism from its European allies, the government made a renewed effort toward an agreeable conclusion to the American war. Thus, a recommendation by Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane to mount a major expedition against New Orleans received a favorable response in London, where the cabinet saw another opportunity of acquiring territory that could provide it with leverage at the peace talks. In September 1814, Cochrane learned that the objectives of the campaign were to "obtain command of the embouchure of the Mississippi, so as to deprive the back settlements of America of their communication with the sea" and to "occupy some important and valuable possession, by the restoration of which the conditions of peace might be improved, or which we might be entitled to exact the cession of, as the price of peace."¹⁰

Difficulties in raising troops limited the expedition to 8,000 men. Rather than appointing a senior lieutenant-general to command it, the appointment fell initially to Major General John Ross. Following his death, command of the Forces in the Southern and Western parts of America went to Major General Sir Edward Pakenham, then in Britain. As the government questioned the legality of the Louisiana Purchase, Pakenham was to determine "if the inhabitants of New Orleans and part adjacent should be disposed to take an open part against the Government of the United States, either with a view of establishing their own Independence, or of again placing themselves under the Spanish Government."¹¹ Before he sailed for the South Atlantic in November 1814, Pakenham requested Henry Bunbury to arrange a meeting with Rear Admiral William Johnstone Hope at the Admiralty, where they both agreed that the force destined for the expedition would be concentrated at Bermuda before sailing for the Gulf.

While he awaited the arrival of Pakenham from his base at Jamaica, Cochrane continued to probe the enemy's defenses in the Gulf. In September, Cochrane was repulsed at Fort Bowyer at the mouth of Mobile Bay. Then, in late November, the independently minded Cochrane left Jamaica for New Orleans, followed by 5,498 officers and men in transports. Two weeks later, Pakenham arrived off Jamaica, identified in his orders as the designated rendezvous for the expedition. After conferring with his two brigade commanders, he hurried for Louisiana where, on Christmas Day, when the army lay eight miles outside of New Orleans, he finally took command. The campaign ended in January 1815 with Pakenham's death and the defeat of his army. The army rejoined the fleet, and in February, following the capture of Fort Bowyer, the entire force departed for the West Indies, having received confirmation the war was over.

Ghent and Vienna

The signing of the Treaty of Ghent came as the allied congress in Vienna entered its fourth month. The first attempt to end the Anglo-American war came in 1812, when in response to mixed messages from the Madison administration, Britain repealed the Orders-in-Council that had restricted American trade with Europe. The American President was both astonished by this act and unmoved by it, as it did not include a fundamental change in the British position on impressment, and the war continued.

In 1813, Russian interest in reestablishing access to American grain and its desire to terminate the diversion of British troops to Canada from Spain, where they were tying down French forces who might otherwise fight against the Russian army now in central Europe, led Czar Nicholas to offer mediation to end the Anglo-American war. A similar proposition had been made in September 1812 but was not pressed until the following spring, when the Russian minister in Washington made a formal proposal. This offer came at an opportune moment as Madison was facing military reverses and domestic troubles. Believing Russia shared views similar to America on maritime rights, he welcomed the Czar's initiative. Furthermore, as Napoleon's retreat from Russia presented a possible conclusion

to the war in Europe, releasing thousands of British soldiers for service in America, Madison hoped a negotiated settlement might avoid a disaster and agreed to talks before confirming the British position.

The question of maritime rights “which forms the principal object in the dispute between the two states” was so important to Britain that Lord Cathcart, the British representative at the Czar’s headquarters, dismissed the possibility of an ally interfering with such a critical subject.¹² Castlereagh agreed that Great Britain and the United States alone should settle their differences, and Britain must avoid “mixing a question purely domestic between Great Britain and America with the settlement of Europe.”¹³ The British foreign minister then proposed direct negotiations for the restoration of peace, with the United States in London or Gothenburg. Eventually both parties agreed that Ghent, in the United Provinces of Holland, which also incorporated Belgium, afforded better communication and made it the preferred location. Britain and the United States had shared interests in the Netherlands.

Commercial competition and military threats emanating from the Low Countries had influenced British policy toward the Low Countries for over a century. In February 1793, Britain joined the war against Revolutionary France arising from the French threat to Flanders. In 1809, French domination of the Low Countries and fears of a growing naval threat from Antwerp prompted the ill-fated Walcheren Expedition. In response, France annexed the country. Following the evacuation of the French from Amsterdam in November 1813, Holland rose in revolt and a provisional government was formed. The Prince of Orange, who had been residing in England, was quickly loaded on a transport and accompanied by Lord Clancarty, the newly appointed British ambassador to The Hague, sailed to the Netherlands. They were followed by the lead elements of a 5,500-man force sent to protect British interests. The United States also had diplomatic and economic relations with the Netherlands.

Between 1782 and 1810, a treaty had regulated trade between the United States and the Dutch Republic. Following the restoration in 1813, both Clancarty and Castlereagh supported the establishment of a new Dutch-American treaty recommended by Sylvanus Bourne, the former Consul General of the United States in Amsterdam. This convinced Dutch officials that Britain wanted to make peace with the United States, with the Netherlands acting as intermediary. Clancarty denied this notion, and instead of seeking Dutch mediation, Castlereagh proposed direct talks with the United States.

The course of the negotiations between the American and British commissions that opened at the Lion d’Or on August 8, 1814, is well known and will not be examined here; instead, attention will be given to the British management of outcomes in American and Europe and the relationship between the negotiations in Ghent and Vienna.

In September 1814, the American commission’s rejection of the most recent British proposals and its refusal to forward them to their government revealed that the talks had effectively broken down. At issue was the refusal “to include the Indians in the treaty of peace” and grant them an independent buffer state. Instead, the Americans proposed to combine “their case with that of disaffected citizens, or subjects, who may have taken arms against their respective governments.”¹⁴ The second obstacle was British dominion over the Great Lakes. Securing a resolution to both points was complicated by the isolation of the American delegation, which had to wait up to five weeks to receive instructions from Washington, whereas the government in London or Castlereagh in Paris could formulate a response and communicate with its commission within days. Given the stalemate in the talks and the lack of instructions from Washington, the Prime Minister believed there was not much hope of the negotiations proceeding at present.

With the talks stalled, the growing unpopularity of the Anglo-American war in Britain and the potential alienation of its European allies due to the ongoing naval blockade of the United States, both Castlereagh and Bathurst decided to act. On September 4, and before receiving the results of the offensives in North America, Bathurst outlined to the British commissioners that “we are certainly anxious to make Peace before this next campaign [a reference to the Gulf Coast Expedition],” and “our first object is to make a good Peace now.”¹⁵ Armed with new instructions, the British

plenipotentiaries eased their position and declared that the "Indian Nations . . . must be included" in the terms "and restored to all rights, privileges and territories which they enjoyed in the year 1811."¹⁶ They also expressed their willingness to discuss the naval command of the lakes from Lake Ontario to Lake Superior, as a *sine qua non* for continuing the negotiations. In their reply, the American commissioners wrote that the natives could not be included in a treaty; however, they were satisfied enough to "meet any proposition from the British Plenipotentiaries . . . to contribute to the restoration of peace."¹⁷ Much had been surrendered and thus the talks were kept alive.

Nonetheless, by November, the many differences between the American and British negotiators—including boundaries, concession of territory, navigation on the Mississippi, and fishing rights—continued to plague the talks, while in Vienna, progress was stalled over the questions of Polish independence and the fate of Saxony. Unless Russia relaxed its insistence on controlling a Polish puppet state, Liverpool feared a new war would erupt. Lines were drawn with Britain and Austria on one side, and Russia and Prussia—the latter being lured to support Russia by the offer of a portion of Saxony—on the other. France, meanwhile, used the division between the allies to enhance its role in the negotiations, while Britain came to realize the necessity of restoring France as an influential power in central Europe. Britain now faced the dilemma of a renewed war in Europe, while talks to conclude the war in North America dragged on.

Prime Minister Liverpool concluded that "our war with America will probably now be of some duration" and that Britain should "not make enemies in other quarters if we can avoid it, for I cannot but feel apprehensive that some of our European Allies will not be indisposed to favour the Americans."¹⁸ The Prime Minister was worrisome of the "prodigious expense" of its interests in Europe and the American war: "if we had been at peace with all the world, and the arrangements made at Vienna were likely to contain anything very gratifying to the feelings of this country," Britain could, "in addition to all the burthens which the American war will bring on," meet its other obligations.¹⁹ Liverpool estimated that if it were allowed to continue, "the American war will not cost us more than 10,000,000 £ in addition to our peace establishments, and other expenses."²⁰

To meet its commitments, above the compensation to be paid to Britain's continental allies for ending the slave trade, Liverpool estimated the need for a loan of £28 million. He was also concerned that the expiration of the Bank Restriction Bill in March 1815—which suspended specie payments to preserve its dwindling bullion reserve—and the property tax in April would weaken the government's credit and place it at a disadvantage in the House, especially if it did not provide sufficient time to debate its continuance before the Christmas recess. Liverpool anticipated the opposition would exploit the unpopularity of the American war to emphasize that the renewal of the tax would be for the purpose of securing a better frontier for the Canadas while avoiding any mention of its being needed to support the attainment of Britain's goals in Europe. As the government wrestled with these challenges, additional problems arose that further complicated its position.

In Paris, plots against the restored monarchy necessitated safeguards to protect the royal family, while threats against Wellington, who was British ambassador, led the cabinet to momentarily consider sending him to Canada to replace Prevost; however, Castlereagh's inability to wrest Poland from Alexander's grip and the possible collapse of the alliance ensured that Britain's greatest commander could not be spared, despite the advantages the announcement of his appointment to North America might have had on the negotiations at Ghent. Liverpool delayed the decision, for if the negotiations at Ghent ended "satisfactorily, the command [in North America] will, of course, cease." Alternatively, if "the course of events [on the continent] should render your [Wellington] continuance in Europe at that time necessary," and the talks at Ghent dragged on, "we should have sufficient grounds for making some new arrangement as to the command in America." To Liverpool, "in the present war," American "independence is not threatened," and the "contest" at Ghent "is a contest only for terms of peace."²¹ Once more, the Anglo-American war gave way to the European diplomatic, political, and military imperative.

Pressure on the government also came from the press. In America, the publication of official correspondence from the negotiations at Ghent, including the emasculated proposals offered to the Americans in October and the republication of American accounts of the talks in London papers, placed the government's actions under public and parliamentary scrutiny. This assault on the government emanated from the Whigs, who, as Liverpool predicted, claimed the American war was being prolonged unnecessarily for the alteration of the boundary at the cost of British lives.

In November, Bathurst outlined the implications of these events to Goulburn, including details of petitions made against the income tax and of the protests by manufacturers in Birmingham. Bathurst explained, "we are as anxious as ever to bring the Treaty to a conclusion," and by the end of the month, nearly coincident with the arrival of similar instructions for the American delegation from Washington, the British commission had instructions to abandon all territorial claims. With peace in their grasp, a draft protocol was completed and a treaty signed on December 24, 1814. News of this event reached Castlereagh six days later.

When Castlereagh discussed the implications of Britain being freed from the war in America with French diplomat Prince de Talleyrand and Austrian statesman Prince Metternich, the former underscored the "great effect" that news of the peace had at Vienna, by calling the Treaty of Ghent "*la paix sterling*."²² At a dinner that evening Castlereagh responded to congratulations offered by the Russian Czar on the signing of the treaty, with the words, "*Il commence L'Âge d'Or*," a veiled threat that now freed of the American war, Britain could, if needed, commit a sizeable army to the continent and offer subsidies to her continental allies in a coalition against Russia. Castlereagh then achieved "a feat of diplomatic ingenuity" that had been initiated beforehand, and on January 3, 1815, he concluded a secret Treaty of Defensive Alliance with France and Austria, a pact of mutual support, should one of them be attacked.²³ Castlereagh's goal was to wrest Prussia from Russia's grasp; the alliance also, as Talleyrand announced, ended France's isolation from Europe. Castlereagh confidently reported to Liverpool that he had every reason to believe the alarm of war was over.

Despite receiving the Prince Regent's approval for the "firm and decided manner" in which Castlereagh had "expressed the sentiments of H.R.H. Government," and the support of Liverpool, who also agreed the Treaty of Defensive Alliance was "advantageous," as it "will secure the Low Countries and give more *éclat* to Castlereagh's presence in Vienna," the Foreign Secretary had, as Lord Harrowby, the Lord President of the Council complained, committed the government to preparing for war without reference to the cabinet or parliament.²⁴ Clearly, the government was in a difficult position, and in January, fearing the ground the government had lost in the House of Commons, Liverpool threw aside concerns over the failure to reach an agreement in Vienna and instructed Castlereagh to return to London for the parliamentary debates on the negotiations that were expected to commence in March. In early February, Wellington replaced Castlereagh in Vienna, and the Foreign Secretary departed for London, landing at Dover on March 3, 1815. Almost two weeks later, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presented a defense of his actions to the House.

On March 20, 1815, ten days after the news of Napoleon's escape from Elba reached London, Castlereagh responded to a lengthy criticism of his actions in Vienna from Samuel Whitbread, a radical Whig and Bonapartist known for the vehemence of his speeches and anxious for demilitarization and retrenchment at home. Castlereagh's four-hour long account of the negotiations at Vienna dismissed the criticisms leveled against the government. Not all Whigs were consumed by the same admiration for Napoleon as Whitbread, and several members of the opposition rallied behind the government. Despite the pressure the opposition maintained on the Liverpool ministry during April and May, the government survived three divisions with a comfortable majority. Tough questions were also asked about the Treaty of Ghent.

On April 11, 1815, at a well-attended session, John William Ponsonby, second cousin of the cavalry commander later slain at Waterloo, accused the government of having caused an "unnecessary delay in the conclusion of peace" that resulted in the "unnecessary and unprofitable waste of treasure" at

New Orleans and of the loss of "so many distinguished and heroic officers, and of such numbers of brave, loyal, and experienced troops." Goulburn found he "could not remain silent after the animadversions" from the opposition and came to the defence of the British commission by explaining the "delay in the negotiation" did not arise "from the pretensions of the British commissioners"; rather, the slowness of the negotiations resulted from their being "bound to proceed with caution and circumspection in their view of the interests of the country."²⁵ Castlereagh lent his support to Goulburn, and despite the rancor in the House, the government comfortably survived a vote condemning its actions.

It was not until June 9, 1815, nearly a week before Napoleon crossed into Belgium, that the Acts of the Congress of Vienna were signed. Lord Clancarty, the ambassador to the Netherlands, was pleased and considered that the terms reached in Vienna achieved British objectives as first outlined by Prime Minister William Pitt in 1805, which had since formed the basis of British policy in Europe. The goals Pitt identified included the liberation of those countries absorbed into the French Empire and the return of France's boundaries to those existing in 1793; securing the territories liberated from France from future threats; the creation of a system for mutual security and the reestablishment of public law in Europe. Britain achieved these results through its Eurocentric policy, which was applied consistently after 1812 and that had been established in Paris in 1782–83, when the primacy of its European objectives had outweighed imperial considerations; the generous concessions granted to the Americans allowed Britain to secure a prompt conclusion of the American War of Independence and focus on its negotiations with France. As Metternich so aptly surmised upon learning of the Treaty of Ghent, financial might had helped Britain in achieving its diplomatic goals.

Public Finance

British fiscal policy, government borrowing, taxation, and specie are lightly explored in the historiography of the War of 1812. Historians have generally painted the British financial situation during 1814 as grim, with a shortage of specie and massive public debt combined with growing social unrest forcing the government to seek a prompt conclusion to the American war. This perspective is evidenced by the correspondence of Prime Minister Liverpool, who in November 1814 cited all three factors as having a bearing on British policy towards the Anglo-American war. The near exhaustion faced by the British financial system predates the War of 1812, and by early 1815, its recovery allowed Britain to finance the renewed war against Napoleon by offering £30 million in bonds, floating a £95 million loan in Europe, and increasing its army on the continent—requiring an immense quantity of specie—while continuing the payment of subsidies to Russia, Prussia, Austria, and others, amounting to £1 million a month.

It is impossible to separate British financial operations in the Great Global War of 1793 to 1814—and its brief renewal in 1815—from the American War of 1812 to 1815. By 1816, the accumulated national debt amounted to £816 million, more than 250 percent of national income and significantly greater than the national debt of £243 million accrued from *all* of Britain's wars between 1701 and 1783. During the Napoleonic Wars, the navy and army were the government's largest expenditures, and their requirements reached a peak in 1813, when campaigning in Europe was at its heaviest. Considerable financial support, in the form of subsidies, was given to several European states allied with Britain. Expenses grew dramatically from the government's commitment of troops to the Iberian Peninsula, which required cash remittances to support Wellington's army in the field.

This situation changed dramatically soon after Napoleon's abdication, when following the redistribution of army units and naval vessels to North America, the government cashed in on the peace and commenced reductions to both services. The large-scale expenditures between 1803 and 1814 presented the government with profound challenges that forced it to accumulate far larger deficits over a longer period of time than in any previous conflict. The military expenditures; the funds allotted to

the army, militia, commissariat, and ordnance services; war expenses in East India; and funding for the navy, in each fiscal year, which ended on January 5, during the final three years of the Napoleonic Wars and Anglo-American war, reveal the growing scale of this expenditure (figures in parentheses are for total government expenditure):

Year ending January 5, 1813: £58,834,551 (£94,804,061)

Year ending January 5, 1814: £74,180,385 (£111,143,446)

Year ending January 5, 1815: £72,473,100 (£112,917,641)

In contrast, funding for military activities ending on January 5, 1808, some months before Britain commenced its intervention in Iberia, amounted to £41,021,747, with a total government expenditure of £73,268,871.

Britain faced its worst economic crisis of the Napoleonic Wars beginning in 1810, following a time when Britain was in search of a strategy to defeat France, having heretofore attempted to achieve victory indirectly through colonial conquest, and the autumn of 1812, by which time it was firmly preoccupied in Europe. During this crisis, imports and exports declined, speculation ruined many merchant houses, and government stocks declined in value. Bankruptcies doubled and low yields from the harvests in 1811 and 1812 created food shortages. At the same time, war expenditures exceeded income, while the cost of food imports increased. Rising unemployment was accompanied by violence in the Midlands, and industrial areas faced unrest from the Luddites, who protested the introduction of the power loom. A dramatic reversal to this trend came in 1812—coincident with the opening campaigns of the Anglo-American War—following the unraveling of the Continental System and the opening up of markets, resulting from weakened French domination of the continent in the wake of the disaster in Russia.

The financing of wartime expenditures followed a policy introduced in 1688 and known as tax smoothing, which entailed borrowing on the London capital market to meet immediate requirements, leaving budgetary surpluses to service the debt in peacetime, and allowing the government to borrow in even greater amounts in succeeding wars. This model operated satisfactorily until 1798, when the massive scale of expenditures had doubled the national debt, forcing the suspension of specie payments, momentarily forcing Britain off the gold standard and giving greater flexibility in the supply of paper money and credit. The introduction of an income tax in 1799 was enacted to sustain the country's credibility as a debtor.

Tax revenue came from several sources, including inland (excise) and border (customs) revenue, and by direct, stamp and property taxes. The successful widening of the tax base was not the result, as might be expected, of the impressive economic growth experienced in Britain between 1793 and 1815, but rather was due to the political and administrative management that allowed the indirect expropriation of funds. Revenues rose faster than national income, and rising taxes were matched by a compliant body of taxpayers—with the loudest opposition coming from the press and the government's critics in parliament—who did not promote large scale social upheaval, other than the evasion, fraud, and corruption one might expect. Between 1793 and 1815, taxation raised £542 million. The income tax, which levied two shillings to the pound on those with incomes over £200 and less than two shillings per pound on incomes between £60 and £200, raised £155.6 million, or 28 percent of the total from all taxes.

Borrowing made up a significant portion of the government's revenue and relied on the close relationship between the government and the financial markets in London that included a large number of continental merchants that had escaped the Napoleonic blockade.

Bankers monitored the government's credit to ensure that paper money, first issued after 1797, would maintain its value and to confirm that tax revenue would cover the sums payable for interest on the loans. In early 1813, these same bankers tapped into an increasing supply of European capital

as Napoleon's weakening control of Europe witnessed several countries shake off the yoke of French control. The financial pressure Napoleon hoped to impose on Britain did not come to pass, and even during the height of French dominance of the continent, the government continued to borrow at interest rates below 5 percent. The supply of specie, or coin, was another matter.

Precious metals, including gold and silver, were the preferred means of payment on the continent, whether as subsidies paid to allies or to finance naval and military operations, including the payment of soldiers and the purchase of foodstuffs, forage, and fuel. British loans did not require the transfer of specie and were arranged using drafts guaranteed by the government. By 1809, the shortage of specie was so severe that William Huskisson, the Junior (Financial) Secretary at the Treasury, who was responsible for securing its supply, advised Prime Minister Perceval that the existing funds would be exhausted within three months. Eventually, Huskisson was able to obtain £9 million in specie from Mexico. Despite these efforts, securing sufficient quantities of specie to support its forces in Iberia, British North America, and in other theaters and to also pay the subsidies to allied governments proved elusive. Subsidies were paid by specie sent from Britain or purchased locally using negotiable treasury bills. In the case of Spain, payment was made in treasury bills.

Specie met the needs of the army on campaign, which were prodigious, and between 1808 and 1814, £54 million was applied to expenses, mainly for supply and transport in Portugal and Spain alone. Shortages of specie could affect the conduct of military campaigns, such as in 1809, when delaying remittances in coin forced Wellington to delay marching on Talavera for five weeks. One reason for the deficiency in coin was the limited supply of specie in England, which forced the army to rely increasingly on credit and caused the government to purchase coin on expensive overseas markets in greater amounts.

One should not conclude that the government was without cash, as paper money was used to pay for warlike stores produced in Britain; instead, it was short of precious metals, the global supply of which had been drained by the war in Iberia, the revolt of the Spanish colonies, the Anglo-American War, the maritime economic war with France, and Napoleon's invasion of Russia. The government did all it could to meet the demands for specie. Bathurst overcame the shortfall in part by exploiting the successes Wellington enjoyed over the summer of 1812, through a simple order-in-council that required the Bank of England to surrender all of the foreign gold which it held. Bathurst also commandeered silver dollars from captured American ships and used a legal loophole to override a 1797 Act that outlawed the export of guineas to supply the troops abroad. Bathurst authorized Wellington to use the money sent to him in whatever way would be useful to his army, a bold decision which the Earl of Harrowby, a fellow minister in the cabinet, considered a "vigour beyond the law to enable Lord W[ellington] to pursue his successes," and for which Bathurst would "not lose his head for your dealings with the bank."²⁶ In British North America, other solutions were found to combat the shortage of specie.

The Anglo-American war ended the supply of coin Upper and Lower Canada normally obtained from New York and Boston. The importation of coins from Halifax and through the sale of bills of exchange in the West Indies failed to meet the growing wartime demand for coinage. The absence of a colonial financial institution and currency caused the provincial governments in 1812 to issue a form of paper money. In July 1812, the passage of the Army Bill Act by the Executive Council of Lower Canada allowed the issue of £250,000 in paper money. Small bills of \$4 were redeemable for cash, whereas bills of \$25 denomination and higher were redeemable in cash or in bills of exchange on London. The act, which made it illegal to export coin and gold from British North America, provided immediate relief, and as it surpassed Sir George Prevost's sanguine expectations, the issue amount was doubled in 1813 and in 1814 increased to £1.5 million. In 1813, the army bills were made legal tender in Upper Canada.

The new paper currency was generally well accepted, although its value fluctuated with military fortunes. In 1813, the American raid on York and the occupation of the Niagara Peninsula depreciated

the value of the paper money, forcing the commissariat to use specie instead and compelling Prevost to demand coinage from London. This state of affairs in the Niagara persisted in 1814, as farmers preferred payment in coin over paper for their produce. Quaker farmers in Upper Canada, who refused payment by paper money, citing the moral claim that the army bills were the result of war, readily accepted gold. In June 1815 £1.2 million in army bills remained in circulation, and that amount steadily declined until August 1817, when colonial guarantees on the bills expired. Nonetheless the army bills provided great advantages and it had made £1.8 million available for the use of the Commissariat, allowing it to use specie to pay for smuggled produce from the United States. Following the war, the success of army bills inspired the creation of the first chartered and private Canadian banks.

Conclusion

During its lengthy war with France and the shorter Anglo-American war, Britain concentrated its military, naval, and fiscal efforts in Europe. When the United States declared war on Britain in 1812, Great Britain had been at war for nearly 19 years. Nearly 100,000 of its soldiers and almost 300 of its warships were employed in the European and Mediterranean theaters, while fewer than 10,000 troops and 18 warships were based in North America. While some historians have postulated that a successful outcome of its invasion of Russia might have renewed France's position in Europe and have aided American arms by forcing Britain to redirect additional resources to the continent at the cost of reinforcing the Canadas, the disaster in Russia served to rejuvenate the allied cause, and Britain expanded its role in Europe, while it sent additional resources to North America at the same time.

The War of 1812 added to the complexity of Britain's war effort by further stressing its supply of manpower and money. Fortunately, the pre-war assumption that Upper Canada would quickly fall was not realized, and the defensive strategy Britain followed between June 1812 and the summer of 1814, necessitating the provision of modest reinforcements, was successful. Afterward, when it chose to strike offensively against the United States, it did so with reinforced but not overwhelming naval and land forces; the setbacks at Baltimore and Plattsburgh and the subsequent misfortune at New Orleans did not end the British presence on the Atlantic or Gulf Coasts of North America. British forces had occupied part of Massachusetts, continued raiding the Atlantic coast, and maintained the naval blockade of the United States, while 37,000 British regular troops guarded the frontiers of British North America, and the most powerful naval squadron ever to appear on the Great Lakes dominated strategically important Lake Ontario.

Britain secured a favorable outcome from its wars with France and America due to its tested war cabinet, the mobilization of its industrial and human resources, and a flexible fiscal strategy. This did not come easily and Britain endured its darkest moments before 1812, while thereafter, it exploited the reopened markets on the continent to direct a coalition that led to Napoleon's defeat in 1814, repeating this performance in 1815.

Although Britain attempted to keep the wars in North America and Europe separate, the two overlapped in several ways. The final push against Napoleon following the Russian debacle dictated that a defensive strategy be employed in the Canadas, and once the war ended in Europe, the sizeable contingent of troops and sailors dispatched to North America proved insufficient in number to achieve all British objectives in the time remaining that year. Concurrently, garrisons were maintained in Europe, the East and West Indies, Africa, and elsewhere in the Empire, while in England, reductions to the army and navy were under way. As several of its European allies began to sympathize with the Americans, and the unpopularity of the North American war grew at home, the government concluded that the best means of achieving its diplomatic goals in Vienna was in its being freed from the American conflict, and it abandoned most of the demands it had made at Ghent. By setting its strategic priorities, Britain achieved a dominant position in Europe and preserved its British North American colonies.

British fiscal strategy was equally impressive. The increased tax burden did not bring widespread social unrest, while the government pushed aside parliamentary criticism and retained power. Whereas five ministries had held office between 1803 and 1812, the Liverpool government lasted nine years. It was the military commitment to Iberia during the Napoleonic Wars and not the war in North America that had stressed the British fiscal system and its supply of specie; fortunately the secretaries of states, treasury and bank officials, and colonial governments were able to ease deficiencies in the supply of specie through Orders-in-Council and legislation. They were also assisted by the breakdown of Napoleon's Continental System, which opened new financial markets. Economic and fiscal troubles persisted, but the worst was over by 1812. Once peace had returned, Britain commenced paying down the largest debt accumulated by a government to that point.

By 1815, Britain had painfully secured its position as the premiere global power. The value of its trade had expanded sixfold from 1793; it possessed the largest fleet of naval and merchant ships, a workforce of skilled seamen, and the greatest shipbuilding capacity in the world. An island country with a littoral empire of coastal territories and islands—the exception being the inland provinces of British North America—had defeated Europe's greatest power, retained its interests in North America, and gained for itself the pinnacle of international prestige and power.

Notes

NAUK = National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew.

1. The quote in the chapter title is taken from Lord Liverpool to Henry Goulburn, October 21, 1814, in Charles D. Young, *The Life and Administration of Robert Banks Jenkinson, Second Earl of Liverpool, K.G.*, 3 vols. (London, 1868), 2:71.
2. Hart Davis, Address on the Treaty of Peace with America, House of Commons, April 11, 1815, in <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1815/apr/11/address-on-the-treaty-of-peace-with>, 30:cc501.
3. Henry Clay, quoted in Brian Jenkins. *Henry Goulburn, 1784–1856: A Political Biography* (Kingston, ON, 1996), 88.
4. Jenkins, *Henry Goulburn*, 69.
5. Prevost to Bathurst, September 15, 1813, in Colonial Office Papers, Special Collections, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, 42/150:168; Jenkins. *Henry Goulburn*, 79–81.
6. Jackson, *Henry Goulburn*, 77.
7. Wellington to Earl Bathurst, February 22, 1814, in John Gurwood, ed., *The Dispatches of . . . the Duke of Wellington*, 12 vols. (London, 1837–39), 11:525–26.
8. Bathurst to Prevost, in Colonial Office Papers, NAUK, 43/23, 156. Croker to Cochrane, April 4, 1814, in William S. Dudley and Michael J. Crawford, eds., *The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History*, 4 vols. (Washington, DC, 1985–), 3:71.
9. Bathurst to Barnes, May 20, 1814, in Dudley and Crawford, *Naval War of 1812*, 3:72; Bathurst to Ross, [ca. May 1814], in War Office Papers, NAUK, 6/2, 1.
10. Admiralty to Cochrane, August 10, 1814, in War Office Papers, NAUK, 1/141, 8.
11. Bunbury to Bathurst, October 22, 1814, in Francis Bickley, ed., *Report on the Manuscripts of Earl Bathurst, Preserved at Cirencester Park* (London, 1923), 300.
12. Lord Cathcart to Count De Nesselrode, September 1, 1813, and Castlereagh to Secretary of State, November 4, 1813, in U.S. Congress, *American State Papers: Foreign Relations*, 6 vols. (Washington, DC, 1833–59), 3:621–22; J.Q. Adams to John Adams, September 3, 1813, quoted in Patrick C.T. White. *A Nation on Trial: America and the War of 1812* (New York, 1965), 144.
13. Lord Cathcart to Count De Nesselrode, September 1, 1813, and Castlereagh to Secretary of State, November 4, 1813, in U.S. Congress, *American State Papers: Foreign Relations*, 3: 622.
14. Liverpool to Bathurst, September 30, 1814, in Binkley, *Report of the Manuscripts on the Earl Bathurst*, 294.
15. Liverpool to Commissioners, September 4, 1814, quoted in Robin Reilly, *The British at the Gates: The New Orleans Campaign in the War of 1812*, rev. ed. (Toronto, 2002), 169.
16. Gambier, et al. to the United States Ministers, September 19, 1814, in William R. Manning, ed., *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States: Canadian Relations, 1784–1860*, 3 vols. (Washington, DC, 1940–45), 1:662.

17. Adams et al. to the British Commissioners, September 25, 1814, in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 1:669.
18. Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28, 1814, in Charles K. Webster, ed., *British Diplomacy, 1813–1815: Select Documents Dealing with the Reconstruction of Europe* (London, 1921), 220.
19. Liverpool to Castlereagh, November 2, 1814, in Webster, *British Diplomacy*, 222.
20. Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28, 1814, in Young, *Robert Banks Jenkinson*, 2:47. This section of the letter was omitted in the transcript in Webster, *British Diplomacy*, 220.
21. Liverpool to Goulburn, October 21, 1814, in Young, *Robert Banks Jenkinson*, 2:71.
22. Apsley to Bathurst, January 5, 1815, in Binkley, *Report on the Manuscripts of Earl Bathurst*, 320.
23. John Bew, *Castlereagh: A Life* (Oxford, 2012), 385.
24. Bathurst to Castlereagh, November 27, 1814, in Webster, *British Diplomacy*, 247; Liverpool to Bathurst, January 18, 1815, in Binkley, *Report on the Manuscripts of Earl Bathurst*, 326.
25. Address on the Treaty of Peace with America, House of Commons Debates, April 11, 1815, in <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1815/apr/11/address-on-the-treaty-of-peace-with-30:cc517>.
26. Harrowby to Bathurst, September 17, 1812, in Binkley, *Report on the Manuscripts of Earl Bathurst*, 214. Harrowby was the Lord President of the Council, an officer of the state who was responsible for no department but often presented government business to the monarch for approval.

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