


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RESILIENCE

David Chandler

This chapter seeks to introduce the paradigm of resilience and to contrast it to the liberal internationalist understandings of reactive international intervention to secure people threatened by conflict, deprivation, or disasters. Resilience is defined here as the capacity to positively or successfully cope with, adapt to, and recover from security crises, and is widely employed as a framework for addressing a broad range of interrelated security threats stemming from conflict, poverty, and environmental concerns. Resilience thus concerns the capacities of societies, communities, and individuals as the targets of security interventions rather than attempting to deal with security crises merely at the level of their manifestations – i.e. the provision of post-hoc aid or humanitarian relief or military intervention to remove war criminals or dictatorial regimes. Resilience seeks to address security questions at the deeper level of social causation in order to provide sustainable solutions enabling communities to understand, to cope with, and to successfully manage security threats.

This chapter has four parts. In the first, the resilient subject with its ascription of vulnerability is introduced. In the second, resilience is posited as a post-interventionist paradigm, where the agency for security lies with the resilient subject itself, which signifies a shift from a state-based to a society-based understanding of security practices. In the third, the chapter contrasts security interventions within the resilience paradigm with older modes of governance. In the fourth, the chapter illustrates the shift from liberal internationalist understandings of security to the post-intervention paradigm with a few examples.

The resilient subject

The resilient subject (at both individual and collective levels) is never passively conceived (as in the case of post-hoc or reactive paradigms of victims requiring saving interventions) but is an active agent, capable of achieving security goals through self-transformation. Resilience is a normative or ideal concept, and is a goal rather than a final state of being, and therefore can only be measured or calculated as a comparative or relative quality. Some individuals or communities may be understood to be more resilient than others, but none can be understood to be fully resilient. While we are aware that our fixed understandings, derived from the past, are a barrier to resilience we are also aware that our thought-processes and cultural and social values continue to bound or limit our openness to the need to adapt. We can only ever be somewhere

along the continuum of resilience, and therefore ultimately are all in need of enabling to become more resilient. Resilience is thus conceived as a process, through which security problems and threats are dealt with through building capacities that enable threats to be managed rather than responded to after the event.

Subjects believed to lack the capacities for resilience are held to be vulnerable. The ascription of vulnerability suggests that the subject lacks the capacities for resilience. Polit and Beck, in a medical practice context, define vulnerability in terms of 'being incapable of giving informed consent' or 'at the high risk of unintended side-effects' (Polit and Beck 2004). This draws out the distinction between vulnerability as an internal attribute, in relation to the capacity to make reasoned choices, and vulnerability as a product of objective circumstances or susceptibilities (cf. Kottow 2002). In this sense vulnerabilities constitute our 'unfreedoms' or the restrictions, both material and ideological, which prevent us from being resilient (cf. Sen 1999). The interpellation as vulnerable can be applied to individuals – the 'at risk', the 'socially excluded', or the 'marginal' – as well as to communities – the 'poor', the 'indigenous', or the 'environmentally threatened' – as much as to states themselves – the 'failing', 'failed', 'fragile', 'low income under stress', or badly governed.

Post-intervention

Resilience provides a paradigm for international intervention aimed at securing societies and communities which can be seen as post-interventionist. This is because the securing agency is not the external actor but the community itself, seen to require intervention in order to secure itself. The conceptual framing of post-interventionism seeks to demarcate international security frameworks from those of humanitarian intervention, based on the reaction to abuses and the protection of victims; in a post-interventionist–resilience paradigm the emphasis is on prevention rather than intervention, empowerment rather than protection, and work upon the vulnerable rather than upon victims (cf. Chandler 2010a; Foucault 2008; Joerges 2010; Walker and Cooper 2011).

In articulating international security in terms of resilience and post-intervention, this chapter develops some of the themes in recent work, highlighting the links between discourses of resilience and the shift from a state-based to a society-based understanding of security practices (Braslet and Vaughan Williams 2011; Briggs 2010; Bulley 2011; Coaffee et al. 2009; Edwards 2009; Lenzos and Rose 2009; O'Malley 2010; UK Cabinet Office 2011). It seeks, in particular, to emphasize the shift to the agency of the objects of the interventionist discourse rather than that of the ostensible interveners. Discourses of resilience do not centrally focus upon protection as provided by external actors, nor the material attributes (military equipment, technology, welfare provisions, etc.) that can be provided through government as a way of protecting populations or responding after an event. Resilience concerns the inculcation of the agency of the other.¹ For this reason, discourses of resilience do not fit well with the liberal internationalist framings of security practices, which were dominant in the 1990s, as reactive post-hoc interventions.

The post-interventionist order is conceptually very different from that of the 1990s debates, which pitched human-centred against state-centred approaches. The post-interventionist world order no longer juxtaposes external intervention to sovereignty as if this were a zero-sum game, or articulates intervention in the language of a clash of rights or as a problem which needs a legal solution. The interventionist policy practices operating under the paradigm of resilience cannot be grasped in terms of the clash of liberal rights, in the formal spheres of law or politics. Using an entirely different register, resilience operates conceptually by reinterpreting external intervention as productive of capable and securing subjects.

In this paradigm, the external management of, or intervention in, post-conflict or post-colonial state policy-making is understood as a process of empowerment, of capacity- and capability-building. This shift is reflected well in discussions of intervention as bridging the 'sovereignty gap' (Ghani et al. 2005) and in Stephen Krasner's view of 'domestic sovereignty' being built up (or co-produced) by external actors on the basis of giving up 'Westphalian/Vattelian sovereignty' (Krasner 2004: 87–8; see further, Chandler 2010a). Despite the increased regulatory engagement, the discourse is one of prevention and the building of sovereignty, not of intervention and the denial of sovereignty. This policy emphasis on prevention, resilience, and empowerment is dominant in discourses of international regulation and intervention today.

The resilience paradigm as an articulation of an alternative or more progressive framework of security depends for its radical status upon the critique of liberal discourses of intervention posed in terms of sovereignty and rights. With the shift away from the liberal discourse of intervention privileged in the 1990s, resilience claims to offer an alternative to mainstream approaches – through emphasizing prevention, empowerment, and the agency of the post-conflict and post-colonial subject. There are three key distinctions: first, the discourse of resilience always operates preventively, never reactively or in the post-hoc manner of liberal international intervention. Second, the subject of international security practices is always the vulnerable subject in need of enabling agency to become resilient; never the passive victim, in need of external securing agency for protection. Third, the inculcation of resilience is a necessity, never an option, because the starting assumption is the lack of capacity of the subject to secure itself in the future unless its securing agency is empowered (see Table 40.1).

The framework of resilience is presented as a radical democratization of security, where the most dangerous threats are to the most vulnerable, who therefore need external intervention in order to enhance their capacities for security. This framework is that of intervention to protect through empowerment rather than through external sovereign intervention. The discourse of resilience inverts a traditional liberal understanding of sovereign securing power. The emphasis is no longer upon the intervening external sovereign or international actor as a securing agent; the

Table 40.1 The resilience paradigm

<i>Liberal internationalism</i>	<i>Resilience</i>
Liberal	Neoliberal / Post-liberal ¹
Intervention	Post-intervention
Rights / Law	Capabilities / Capacities
Post-crisis	Pre-crisis
Victims	Vulnerable
Coercive	Empowering
Consequences addressed	Causes addressed
Direct provision / responsibility	Indirect provision / responsibility
External agency	Internal agency
Top-down	Bottom-up
Sovereign power	Dispersal of power
Western responsibility	Western facilitation
State sovereignty undermined	State sovereignty strengthened
Endpoint exit / status quo ante	Ongoing process / open-ended

¹The distinction between the paradigm of resilience articulated here as central to understandings of human security and 1990s liberal internationalist discourses of intervention has parallels with that established by Foucault, in terms of neoliberal or biopolitical framings which he understood as 'inverting' and 'transforming' traditional liberal doctrines (2008:118) and is further explored in relation to the practices of post-liberal governance in Chandler (2010a).

discourse of vulnerability, empowerment, and resilience insists that the emphasis must be upon a 'bottom-up' understanding of security. This is a far cry from the social contract framing of liberal modernity with the collective constitution of securing agency at the level of the state, tasking the sovereign with the post-hoc duty of intervention to correct any problematic outcomes of the free interplay of market forces or of democratic contestation.² Security discourses of resilience work in reverse. Rather than securing power being transferred to the sovereign, this securing power is decentralized or dispersed back into society (UNDP 1994: 33):

An actor-oriented, agency-based resilience framework . . . reframes resilience from a systems-oriented to a people-centred perspective. It starts by considering social actors and their agency, arenas and respective agendas in the transformation of livelihoods in a resilient way. The framework proposes a normative context of entitlements, capabilities, freedoms and choices or, even more broadly, of justice, fairness and equity. An agency-based framework measures resilience in terms of how peoples' livelihood vulnerability can be reduced or, to put it more broadly, in terms of their human security. Mechanisms for *resilience-building*, from this perspective, are first and foremost about *empowering the most vulnerable* to pursue livelihood options that strengthen what they themselves consider to be their social sources of resilience.

(Bohle et al. 2009: 12, emphases added)

In this dispersal of securing power, the task of the state (or external interveners) is to focus on empowering those held to be least able to secure themselves – least capable of securing themselves and adapting to potential security threats. In this way, no conceptual distinction is made between the empowering practices of the domestic state and of international interveners as both are constructed as pursuing the same tasks of dispersing the power or agency to secure, rather than as acting as securing actors per se.

In this framing, the understanding of failed and failing states as a security threat is precisely that they are vulnerable subjects in need of external policy interventions to build resilience capabilities. The existing regimes of liberal rules of law and democracy are often held to be problematic in the post-colonial world, precisely because of the lack of capacities at both individual and societal levels. For this reason, the problematic of the inculcation of resilience has been at the centre of academic security discourses. From Nobel prize-winning development theorists, such as Amartya Sen and Douglass North, to leading security theorists, such as Paul Collier, the problem of security has been seen to be that of the difficulty of facilitating better choice-making capabilities through intervention capable of empowering both individuals and societies (Collier and Hoeffle, 2004; Collier et al. 2006; North 1990; 2005; Sen 1999; see also Chandler 2010b).

Empowerment is therefore at the centre of the problematic of resilience. In the post-interventionist framework, the West no longer has the responsibility to secure, to democratize, or to develop the non-Western world. This is always the lesson learned from experiences of 1990s-style interventions and their corollary of the formalized external processes of international statebuilding, where responsibility is directly assumed by international actors. It is for these reasons that resilience approaches can easily mesh with the concerns of 'post-liberal' approaches to peacebuilding, where the emphasis is squarely placed upon 'the capacity of people to decide their own future' (Martin and Owen 2010: 223; see also Chandler 2010a; Richmond 2011). The regulatory mechanisms of empowerment, prevention, and capacity-building are premised upon the understanding that there can be no clash of rights between sovereignty and intervention: no inside and no outside. Responsibility once again stops at the boundaries of the sovereign state but this is a state understood as incapable of managing its autonomy without the help of external facilitators.

‘Organic’ versus ‘political’ understandings of intervention

Western policy-interveners increasingly claim that they are not thereby taking over decision-making processes and increasingly argue that they are also not setting external goals or even measuring progress using universal external yardsticks. Rather than the external provision of policy solutions or the use of ‘conditionality’ to guide states in specific directions, international actors are more likely to understand security interventions within the resilience paradigm in terms of enabling organic systems and existing knowledges, practices, and capacities. This model forwards more homeopathic forms of policy-intervention designed to enhance autonomous processes rather than undermine or socially engineer them (see, for example, Drabek and McEntire 2003; Kaufmann 2013 on emergent responses to disasters). Resilience approaches thereby problematize security interventions that seek to act merely at the level of the appearance of problems and crises, arguing that these approaches are often superficial, counterproductive, and unsustainable, failing to touch the real issues and relations at the societal level.

The shift from intervention at the level of surface appearances to addressing the underlying societal capacities has been predominantly discussed in relation to the need to take into account the ‘law of unintended consequences’. Previous approaches which assumed that security problems were discrete and separable from social processes are thereby understood as too reductionist and mechanistic in their approach – failing to grasp the interrelations between different aspects of security. Resilience thereby takes a more ‘holistic’ and interconnected approach to security, which minimizes ‘unintended consequences’. This heralds a profound shift in the understanding of the importance of social relations to international security intervention, and can be understood as a generalized extension of Ulrich Beck’s view of ‘risk society’ with the determinate causal role of ‘side effects’ or of Bruno Latour’s similar analysis of today’s world as modernity ‘plus all its externalities’ (Beck 1992; Latour 2003). It seems that there is no way to consider intervention in terms of intended outcomes without considering the possibility that the unintended outcomes will outweigh these.

While, in 2002, the US State Department was focusing on extensive statebuilding operations to address the crucial question of state failure, in 2012, a decade later, the US Defense Strategic Guidance policy is illustrative of a different set of assumptions: that US forces would pursue their objectives through ‘innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches’ rather than the conduct of ‘large-scale, prolonged stability operations’ (DSG 2012: 3, 6). In 2013, discussion over potential coercive intervention in Syria was dominated by fears that the unintended outcomes would outweigh the good intentions of external actors (Ackerman 2013). General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned that policy caution was necessary as: ‘we must anticipate and be prepared for the unintended consequences of our action’ (Ackerman 2013; see also Phillips 2013).

As Michael Mazaar argued in the influential US foreign policy journal *Foreign Affairs* in 2014, securing US goals of peace, democracy, and development in failing and conflict-ridden states could not, in fact, be done by instrumental cause-and-effect external policy-interventions: ‘it is an organic, grass-roots process that must respect the unique social, cultural, economic, political, and religious contexts of each country . . . and cannot be imposed’ (Mazaar 2014). For Mazaar, policy would now follow a more ‘resilient mindset, one that treats perturbations as inevitable rather than calamitous and resists the urge to overreact’, understanding that policy-intervention must work with, rather than against, local institutions and ‘proceed more organically and authentically’ (Mazaar 2014). This shift is also reflected by high-level policy experts in the US State Department; according to Charles T. Call, senior adviser at the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, current US approaches seek not to impose unrealistic external goals but instead to facilitate local transformative agency through engaging with local ‘organic processes and plussing them up’ (cited in Chandler 2014).

Security interventions, today, are increasingly understood to be problematic if they are based upon the grand narratives of liberal internationalism, which informed and drove the debate on international intervention in the 1990s, when issues of intervention and non-intervention in Africa and the Balkans were at the centre of international political contestation. International policy-intervention is not opposed per se or on principle, but on the basis of the universalist and hierarchical knowledge assumptions which informed policy-interventions and produced the hubristic and reductionist promises of transformative outcomes (see, for example, Mayall and Soares de Oliveira 2011; Mazaar 2014; Owen 2012; Stewart and Knaus 2012).

The focus therefore shifts away from international policies (supply-driven policy-making) and towards engaging with the internal capacities and capabilities that are already held to exist. In other words, there is a shift from the agency, knowledge, and practices of policy-interveners to that of the society, which is the object of policy concerns. As the 2013 updated UK Department for International Development, Growth and Resilience Operational Plan states: 'we will produce less "supply-driven" development of product, guidelines and policy papers, and foster peer-to-peer, horizontal learning and knowledge exchange, exploiting new technologies such as wiki/huddles to promote the widest interaction between stakeholders' (DfID 2013: 8).

'Supply-driven' policies – which often assume universal solutions to security threats which are seen in isolation from their social, cultural, and political context – are understood to operate in an artificial or non-organic way, and to lack an authentic connection to the deeper societal relations which need to be accounted for. The imposition of external institutional and policy frameworks has become increasingly seen as artificial and thereby as having counterproductive or unintended outcomes. Resilience approaches seek to move away from the 'liberal peace' policy-interventions – seeking to export constitutional frameworks, to train and equip military and police forces, to impose external conditionalities on the running of state budgets, to export managerial frameworks for civil servants and political representatives or to impose regulations to ensure administrative transparency and codes of conduct – which were at the heart of international policy prescriptions in the 1990s and early 2000s (ActionAid 2006; Eurodad 2006; World Bank 2007).

It is argued that the 'supply-driven' approach of external experts exporting or developing liberal institutions does not grasp the complex processes generative of instability or insecurity. Instead, the 'top-down' model of liberal intervention is seen to create problematic 'hybrid' political systems and fragile states with little connection to their societies (Mac Ginty 2010; Millar 2014; Richmond and Mitchell 2012; Roberts 2008). The imposition of institutional frameworks, which have little connection to society, is understood as failing, not only in not addressing causal processes, but as making matters worse through undermining local capacities to manage the effects of problems, shifting problems elsewhere, and leaving states and societies even more fragile or vulnerable. This approach is alleged to fail to hear the 'message' of problematic manifestations or to enable societies' own organic and homeostatic processes to generate corrective mechanisms. Triggering external interventions is said to shortcut the ability of societies to reflect upon and take responsibility for their own affairs, and is increasingly seen as a counterproductive 'over-reaction' by external powers (see further, Desch 2008; Maor 2012). There is an increasingly prevalent view that, contrary to earlier assumptions, policy solutions can only be developed through practice by actors on the ground.

Examples of policy shifts

As noted above, conceptualization of security policy-interventions in terms of vulnerability, empowerment, and resilience evades the traditional disciplinary understanding of intervention as an exercise of external political power and authority. It does this through denying intervention as

an act of external decision-making and policy-direction as understood in the political paradigm of liberal internationalist discourse. This can be illustrated through highlighting some examples of policy shifts in key areas of international security concern: conflict and the rule of law; development; and democracy and rights.

Conflict and the rule of law

Policy-interventions are increasingly shifting in relation to the understanding of conflict. As the UK government argues, in a 2011 combined DfID, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence document, conflict per se is not the problem. The problem which needs to be tackled is the state's or society's ability to manage conflict: 'in stable, resilient societies conflict is managed through numerous formal and informal institutions' (DfID et al. 2011: 5). Conflict management, as the UK government policy indicates, is increasingly understood as an organic set of societal processes and practices, which international policy-intervention can influence but cannot import solutions from outside or impose them. This understanding very much follows the approach long advocated by influential peace theorist, Jean Paul Lederach, who argued that: 'the greatest resource for sustaining peace in the long term is always rooted in the local people and their culture' (1997: 94). For Lederach, managing conflict meant moving away from universalist liberal internationalist forms of external intervention which see people as 'recipients' of policy, and instead seeing people as 'resources', integral to peace processes (1997: 95). One of the central shifts in understanding conflict as something that needs to be 'coped with' and 'managed' rather than something that can be 'solved' or 'prevented' is the view that state-level interventions are of limited use. Peace treaties can be signed by state parties, but unless peace is seen as an ongoing and transformative inclusive societal process these agreements will be merely superficial and non-sustainable (Lederach 1997: 135).

Just as peace and security are less understood as able to be secured through cause-and-effect forms of intervention, reliant on policy-interveners imposing solutions in mechanical and reductive ways, there has also been a shift in understanding the counterproductive effects of attempts to export the rule of law (Cesarine and Hite 2004; Chandler 2014b; Zimmermann 2007). The resilience approach is driven by a realization of the gap between the formal sphere of law and constitutionalism and the social 'reality' of informal power relations and informal rules. This perspective has also been endorsed by Douglass North, the policy guru of new institutionalist economics, who has highlighted the difficulties of understanding how exported institutions will interact with 'culturally derived norms of behavior' (1990: 140). The social reality of countries undergoing post-conflict 'transition' is thereby less capable of being understood merely by an analysis of laws and statutes. In fact, there increasingly appears to be an unbridgeable gap between the artificial constructions of legal and constitutional frameworks and the realities of everyday life, revealed in dealings between individual members of the public and state authorities.

Development

A key policy area where the shift to resilience approaches to security has had an impact has been in the sphere of developmental and environmental security threats. Coping with poverty and with disasters is clearly a very different problematic from seeking to use development policy to reduce or to end extreme poverty. However, discourses of disaster risk reduction have increasingly displaced those of sustainable forms of development because of the unintended side effects of undermining the organic coping mechanisms of communities and therefore increasing vulnerabilities and weakening resilience (see, for example, IRDR 2014; UNDP 2014). Claudia

Aradau has highlighted the importance of the UK Department for International Development (DfID) shift in priorities from poverty reduction strategies to developing community resilience, which assumes the existence of poverty as the basis of policy-making (Aradau 2014). As she states: 'resilience responses entail a change in how poverty, development and security more broadly are envisaged'; this is clearly highlighted in DfID's 2011 report outlining the UK government's humanitarian policy:

Humanitarian assistance should be delivered in a way that does not undermine existing coping mechanisms and helps a community build its own resilience for the future. National governments in at-risk countries can ensure that disaster risk management policies and strategies are linked to community-level action.

(DfID 2011: 10, cited in Aradau 2014)

As George Nicholson, Director of Transport and Disaster Risk Reduction for the Association of Caribbean States argues explicitly: 'improving a person's ability to respond to and cope with a disaster event must be placed on equal footing with the process to encourage economic development', highlighting the importance of resilience to disaster risk as an increasingly key security policy area (Nicholson 2014). Whereas development approaches put the emphasis on external policy assistance and expert knowledge, disaster risk reduction clearly counterposes an alternative framework of intervention, where it is local knowledge and local agency that count the most. Disaster risk reduction strategies stress the empowerment of the vulnerable and marginalized in order for them to cope and to manage the effects of the risks and contingencies that are concomitant with the maintenance of their precarious existence.

Democracy and rights

As emphasized above, the resilience approach does not seek to assert sovereign power or Western hierarchies of power and knowledge; in fact, resilience operates as a challenge to and reaction against universalist liberal internationalist framings, dominant until the last decade. These points are highlighted, for example, in Bruno Latour's critical engagement with modernist modes of understanding: arguing that Western societies have forgotten the lengthy processes which enabled them to build liberal institutions dependent on the establishment of a political culture, which has to be steadily maintained, renewed, and extended and cannot be exported or imposed (Latour 2013: 343).

This shift away from formal universalist understandings of democracy and human rights is increasingly evidenced in the shifting understanding of human rights-based approaches to empowerment. Understanding empowerment in instrumental cause-and-effect terms based upon the external provision of legal and political mechanisms for claims is increasingly seen to be ineffective. Rights-based NGOs now seek not to empower people to access formal institutional mechanisms but to enable them to empower themselves. The resilience approach places the emphasis on the agency and self-empowerment of local actors, not on the introduction of formal frameworks of law, supported by international human rights norms (Moe and Simojoki 2013: 404).

The approach of 'finding organic processes and plussing them up' (as articulated by the US State Department policy advisor, cited earlier) has been increasingly taken up as a generic approach to overcome the limits of liberal peace approaches. A study of Finnish development NGOs highlights that rather than instrumentally selecting groups or civil society elites, new forms of intervention deny any external role in this process (Kontinen 2014). A similar study notes the importance of being non-prescriptive and avoiding and 'unlearning' views of Western

teachers as ‘authorities’ and students as passive recipients (Gillespie and Melching 2010: 481). Policy-intervention is articulated as the facilitation of local people’s attempts to uncover traditional practices and in ‘awakening’ and ‘engaging’ their already existing capacities: ‘by detecting their own inherent skills, they can more easily transfer them to personal and community problem solving’ (Gillespie and Melching 2010: 490). These processes can perhaps be encouraged or assisted by external policy-interveners but they cannot be transplanted from one society to another, and even less can they be imposed by policy-actors.

Conclusion

The shift in understanding policy-intervention from reactive impositions of external policies to that of resilience – focusing on the problem society’s own capacities and needs and internal and organic processes – has been paralleled by a growing scepticism of attempts to export or impose Western models. The approach of resilience therefore marks a fundamental departure from hierarchical universalist approaches of liberal internationalism, where international security actors were seen as securing, rescuing or saving the non-Western other. Rather than bringing specific resources, knowledge, or solutions, security threats and risks are understood in much more organic ways. Interventions of this sort require no specialist knowledge and, in fact, tend to problematize such knowledge claims, and instead could be understood to require more therapeutic capacities and sensitivities, more attuned to open and unscripted forms of engagement, mutual processes of learning, and unpredictable and spontaneous forms of knowledge exchange (see for example: Brigg and Muller 2009: 130; Duffield 2007: 233–4; Jabri 2007: 177).

Notes

- 1 As Miller and Rose astutely note, this ‘ethical a priori of active citizens in an active society is perhaps the most fundamental, and most generalizable, characteristic of these new rationalities of government’ (2008: 215; see also Dean, 2010: 196–7).
- 2 See, for example, Foucault’s discussion of the liberal problematic of intervention, or ‘liberal economy of power’ (2008: 65).

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