


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GLOBAL SECURITY GOVERNANCE

*Thomas J. Biersteker**

Although governance at the global level is certainly not new, the subject has become a central preoccupation in public policy and scholarly discourse over the past twenty-five years. Despite the growing interest, however, global governance remains a permissive concept. The frequency with which global governance is invoked in scholarly literature and policy practice far exceeds the number of times it is defined. As a result, the term is applied to a wide variety of different practices of order, regulation, systems of rule, and patterned regularity in the international arena. It is permissive in the sense that it gives one license to speak or write about many different things, from any pattern of order or deviation from anarchy (which also has multiple meanings) to normative preferences about how the world should be organized.

This chapter has four main parts. The first contains a survey of recent discussions of global governance followed by a synthetic definition that builds on them, with particular reference to the governance of security affairs. In the second part, it considers Inis Claude's classic three-fold typology for addressing the subject of power and international relations (Claude 1962), in which he distinguished analytically between different ways of governing security affairs: balance-of-power systems, collective security arrangements, and world government. In the third part, it will discuss how global governance is managed, from the international society of states (Bull 1977), to arguments about the importance of hegemony for order and governance (Gilpin 1975, 1981), international regimes (Keohane and Nye 1977), institutions (Keohane and Martin 1995; Martin 1992), international law (Abbott and Snidal 2000), global norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Katzenstein 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998), private authority (Cutler et al. 1999; Hall and Biersteker 2002), or codes and routines (Sylvan 2013). In the fourth part, the chapter looks at the increased salience of different institutional actors, particularly non-state actors, involved in contemporary global governance.

Five core elements of global governance

Global governance first emerged in the early 1990s, with the pioneering introduction of the concept 'governance without government' by James Rosenau and E. O. Czempiel (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). Rosenau defined global governance in very general terms as 'an order that lacks a centralized authority with the capacity to enforce decisions on a global scale' (Rosenau 1992: 7). His conception of global governance was that of a purposive order that is created for

the management of global interdependence in the absence of a global state. The definition has relatively little to say about who makes decisions. It also has very little analysis of precisely how enforcement takes place or very much detail about the structures or mechanisms of governance. It is important, however, because it presciently identified an important emergent phenomenon and opened the way for subsequent theoretical reflection and analysis.

We do not lack detailed and more precise definitions of global governance today. In fact, we probably have too many. Still, the different conceptions and definitions of global governance (for some important ones see Weiss 2009 on the scope of issues and range of actors involved; Abbott and Snidal 2009, 2010 on regulatory issues; Held 2012 for a normative dimension; de Burca et al. 2013 for types of governance; Ruggie 2014 on guiding principles) offer a great many insights.

As diverse as they are, several key elements are common to all definitions: foremost is the centrality of the idea of rules, systems of rules, and/or rule-governed behaviour at the global level. These rules can be either formal or informal, and they can range from being formally legalized to being widely accepted norms involved in regulating behaviour. Institutions, whether of a formal organizational sort or as a more informal set of practices, are also common to all. As will be discussed more fully below, global governance arrangements increasingly involve a broad range of different actors, both public and private.

Altogether, there are five core elements for global governance. First, it requires some form of *patterned regularity* or recurring order at the global level (a necessary, but hardly sufficient condition). Second, following Rosenau, and with acknowledgement of Hedley Bull's important contribution to the study of order in international politics (Bull 1977), global governance must be *purposive* and/or oriented toward the achievement of some goal or goals. In this sense, and integrating it with the first element, global governance is order, plus intentionality, at the global level.

Third, governance connotes a *system of rule*, or rules. These rules can either be formal and embodied within formal institutions, or they can be informal and reside intersubjectively among a population or a set of key institutional actors. There can be different degrees of institutionalization associated with different forms of governance, and both formal and informal institutions may be necessary for governance (Stone 2011). It is not required, however, that these rules be universally recognized as legitimate, but only that they be widely shared, recognized, and practised on a global scale (on multiple continents) by relevant and important actors. Most actors tend to be norm-takers or norm-shapers, rather than norm-makers.

Fourth, the system of rule implied by global governance is *authoritative*, in the sense that there is a social relationship between the governed public or key institutional players and some governing authority. That is, there is a recognized set of 'rules of the game' that key players acknowledge and recognize as authoritative in a particular issue domain. Governance requires acceptance by a significant portion of some relevant population and therefore is 'as dependent on intersubjective meanings as on formally sanctioned constitutions and charters' (Rosenau 1992: 4). Governance requires the effective performance of some functions for its systemic persistence, which is why it is associated with the functions of government, rather than its formal institutional processes.

Even though much of the literature emphasizes the steering aspect of governance, global governance can also exist in the absence of an easily identifiable agent deliberately steering the direction of governance arrangements. Just as an engine can be said to be regulated and kept from overheating by a governor, so too can a governance arrangement be regulated independently of deliberate actions taken by someone steering the process (Börzel and Risse 2010). This is an important distinction, and it opens up space for exploring different bases of governance, including *self-regulation*. In this sense, a market, a set of market mechanisms, a network, or a widely used standardized code can also be said to govern, be allowed to govern, or be relied upon

to govern in instances and some issue domains. The market can be constituted as authoritative by the public statements (speech acts) of leaders of important states and private institutions when they suggest that they are 'governed' by its behaviour. Alternatively, a network may be open to those who have a certain minimum level of technical expertise and through their actions reproduce its informal rules and norms.

Governance arrangements in global security affairs

In *Power and International Relations*, Inis Claude differentiated among three heuristic ways to manage power in international relations – balance-of-power systems, collective security arrangements, and world government (Claude 1962). He placed the three alternatives on a continuum, ranging from the least formally institutionalized arrangement (balance-of-power) on one end of the spectrum, to the most formally institutionalized (world government) on the other. Collective security arrangements were placed in the middle of the continuum. Each of the ideal types he sketched provides a basis for global governance of security affairs. They differ primarily according to their degrees of formal institutionalization.

In his analysis of the evolution of international society, Adam Watson developed a similar continuum to describe the spectrum of international systems, from absolute independence of individual states at one end of the spectrum to absolute empire at the other (Watson 1992: 13). Following in the tradition of Hedley Bull, Watson argued that order promotes peace, but it does so at the price of independence and constraints on freedom of action of states (due to its association with greater degrees of institutionalization). Independence, however, also has its price, in terms of economic and military insecurity and, as a result, states must form and rely upon alliances to provide for their security. Hegemony – where some power (or small group of powers) is able to 'lay down' the law – and suzerainty – where members of international society accept that hegemony as legitimate – are intermediate forms of global governance. Dominion and empire exist at the other end of Watson's continuum.

The principal basis for differentiation in both of these conceptions is the degree of institutionalization entailed in the governance arrangement. They are also differentiated by the principal mechanism of governance. Thus, both balance-of-power systems and state independence as arrangements for global security governance at one end of the continuum have relatively low levels of formal and informal institutionalization, and are essentially regulated by a form of market mechanism. They are governed or regulated principally through the separate actions of individual state actors pursuing their own security interests.

At the other end of the continuum – whether it is in the form of dominion, empire, or a world government – the systems of governance are essentially hierarchical, top-down, and highly institutionalized. They entail governance principally by governments (a single state in cases of dominion or empire, or a unitary government, in the case of a world state). In dominion, imperial authority determines the internal government of other communities, but they maintain their identity. Empire exists when the direct administration of others is carried out from a unitary imperial centre. Both require high levels of institutionalized authority. The same would obviously be true of world government.

In between these two extremes of complete state independence and world government are a large variety of informal institutions, complex combinations of formal and informal institutional arrangements, and a wide range of different social networks. Rather than being regulated principally by market mechanisms or hierarchical institutions, these systems of governance are regulated by networks composed of key institutional actors, who share a common concern with a particular issue domain, but not necessarily a common approach or method for addressing it.

Table 39.1 Framework for characterizing types of global security governance arrangements

<i>Inis Claude</i>	<i>Balance-of-power systems</i>	<i>Collective security arrangements</i>	<i>World government</i>
Adam Watson	Independent states	Hegemony Suzerainty	Dominion Empire
Degree of formal and informal institutionalization	Low	Medium	High
Principal mechanism of governance	Market	Network	Hierarchy

Their authority is sometimes contested, and different governance arrangements can often contradict one another, such as in regime complexes. Networks are ideally ‘forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 8), but there are also aspects of hierarchy in many networks. The recent popularity of the idea of public–private partnerships in global governance constitutes one contemporary form of networked governance.

Hierarchical governance is probably the most efficient form, but it is relatively rare in the international system. Market governance is more widespread, but less guided, steered, or reliable. Networked governance is the most common form of contemporary global governance, but its effectiveness and reliability are also highly variable and uncertain. Table 39.1 summarizes this analytical framework for characterizing different global governance arrangements. Different periods in time may be associated with the general predominance of one or another of these forms of global security governance. However, in any given period, there is typically a complex blend of overlapping forms of global security governance, with different systems and elements of different systems coexisting in complex, and sometimes contradictory, ways (Biersteker 2014a).

Different bases of global governance

Much of the theoretical and policy debate about forms of global governance revolves around the different (and often complexly interrelated) underlying bases of governance. As mentioned above, there is variation in the principal governance mechanisms (market, network, hierarchy) as there is in degree of formal institutionalization (low, medium, high). The different bases for identifying and comprehending forms of contemporary global security governance are the society of states, hegemony, regimes, institutions, law, norms, private authority, and standardized codes. Global governance in most issue domains is provided by a complex combination of these different bases, rather than by any single one of them, but they illustrate well the complexity of the subject, as well as the range of institutional players involved. Table 39.2 compares and contrasts the different bases of global governance, which are discussed below.

Society of states

For Hedley Bull, the principal basis of global governance was found in the *society of states*. He terms this ‘the anarchical society’, because its core units are independent states coexisting in a systemic situation of anarchy (Bull 1977). The system of diplomatic rules and practices that regulates interstate interaction (reciprocal acceptance of practices of diplomatic recognition, diplomatic immunity, and the exchange of ambassadors) governs international society. Christian Reus-Smit

Table 39.2 Comparing different bases of global governance

<i>What governs?</i>	<i>International society</i>	<i>Hegemony</i>	<i>Regimes and institutions</i>	<i>Law and norms</i>	<i>Private authority and codes</i>
Who governs?	States (exclusively)	State(s)	States (primarily)	States and NGOs	Firms, NGOs, non-state armed groups
Principal governance mechanism	Network	Hierarchy	Hierarchy and market	Hierarchy and networks	Networks and hierarchy
Degree of formal institutionalization	Low	High	Medium	Medium	Low

develops Bull's concept of the international society of states (Reus-Smit 1997), arguing that contractual international law and multilateralism constitute deep structural elements underlying contemporary international society. While constitutional structures at the international level may have originated within the domestic cultures of dominant states (like the US after the Second World War), once embedded in the practices of other states, the values inherent within those constitutional structures condition the behaviour of all states and provide a basis for global governance.

Hegemony

State *hegemony* provides another basis for global governance. Both the hegemony of Great Britain in the nineteenth century and the hegemony of the US in the twentieth provided global leadership and underwrote the provision of collective goods, backed by their considerable political, economic, and military resources. State hegemony is a relatively hierarchical basis for global governance, maintained by structural power (Strange 1986), indicated by leadership, and occasionally operating with ideological hegemony, where direct coercion is rare and the leadership of the hegemon is widely accepted by other states (Cox 1987). Thus, hegemony has three meanings: capabilities, leadership, and ideological dominance. For Charles Kindleberger, writing about the governance of the global economy (Kindleberger 1973), and for Robert Gilpin, who extended Kindleberger's conception to the governance in the global security domain (Gilpin 1981), the essence of hegemony is political leadership of the hegemonic state and is indicated by its willingness to underwrite the costs of maintaining the governance of the economic, political, and/or military order.

International regimes and institutions

The concept of *international regimes* is best understood within the context of the debate about hegemonic decline and hegemonic stability. While Robert Gilpin worried about the consequences of US hegemonic decline and/or the potential temptation for the US to become a rogue hegemon, liberal institutionalists like Robert Keohane argued that international regimes could provide a basis for global governance even without a hegemon (Keohane 1984). Processes of path dependence ensured that once the institutions of global governance had been created by a hegemon, it would take a great deal to dismantle them. As long as the demand for regimes was sustained, they would continue. It is easier to maintain existing international regimes than to create new ones, but it was possible to imagine that new regimes could also be created to govern different issue domains, even after hegemony.

Regimes are defined as ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations’ (Krasner 1983b: 2). International regimes are widely associated with the governance of the global economy, but the concept has been extended into the security domain, with consideration of the non-proliferation, arms control, peacebuilding, sanctions, and counterterrorism regimes. There has been a great deal of debate about the direct and indirect influence of international regimes, measured principally in terms of their effects on individual states (Haggard and Simmons 1987). Regimes constrain states by increasing the costs of defection from agreements enforced by regimes, and they therefore provide an institutionalized basis for global governance.

Closely related to the operation of international regimes are *institutions*, and when defined broadly (Keohane 1988; Young 1992), they are nearly identical. Robert Keohane defines institutions as ‘related complexes of rules and norms, identifiable in space and time’ (1988: 383). Institutions provide a system of authoritative rules at the global level and can provide a basis for governance by defining, constraining, and shaping actor expectations in different domains. Broad institutions such as multilateralism can provide solutions to a variety of different dilemmas of strategic interaction (Martin 1992: 766). One of the best indicators that institutions matter to states is that governments continue to invest in them (Keohane and Martin 1995: 40–1). Institutionalists do not restrict their claims to the international political economy and argue that institutions play a critical role in providing information in both economic and security relations (Keohane and Martin 1995: 43–4). Institutions reduce incentives for states to defect, lower transaction costs, link issues, and provide focal points for cooperation.

International law

Although it is widely viewed as a principal component of international regimes, *international law* (which constitutes a formalization of rules) can serve as a basis for global governance. International law codifies rules governing the behaviour of major actors, particularly of independent states. In their work on law in international governance, Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal distinguish between what they term ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law (Abbott and Snidal 2000). Hard law refers to legally binding obligations that are precise and restrict behaviour and sovereignty. EU law, which is backed by the European Court of Justice, is an example of hard law. Soft law refers to a weakening of hard law along one (or more) of three dimensions: obligation, precision, or delegation (Abbott and Snidal 2000: 422). If obligation, precision, and/or delegation are absent, as they often are in practice, there is still a form of legalization present. Abbott and Snidal make this distinction not only to illustrate the variety in degrees of legalization, but also to illustrate how widespread legalization has become globally. The UN Charter’s injunction against state aggression, the international Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the activities of the International Criminal Court are all examples of soft international law that govern the security domain.

Norms

Global *norms* are another component of international regimes that can provide the ideational or normative underpinnings for governance. Adherence to norms is one of the best empirical indicators of the presence of global governance. Norms are standards of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). Finnemore and Sikkink distinguish between different categories of norms: regulative, constitutive, and prescriptive. Regulative norms both order and constrain behaviour and are most closely associated with conceptions of

global governance. Constitutive norms create new actors, interests, identities, or categories of actors. Prescriptive norms establish what 'ought' to be done.

Neta Crawford makes a distinction between norms as common practice and normative beliefs based on ethical prescriptions, but correctly notes that 'international relations theorists frequently use "norms" to denote both senses' (Crawford 2002: 40). If norms are internalized within major players, they become an authoritative base for a system of rules that operate at the global level. International norms are widespread and increasingly visible in the governance of the security domain – from justifications for the use of force and proportionality in war (derived from just war theory and practices) to proscriptions against the use of torture, norms against the first use of nuclear weapons, and in support of the idea of sovereign responsibility to protect. These norms are often contested, but they provide a basis for global governance (considered as an intersubjectively recognized, purposive order at the global level).

Private authority

Most of the different bases of global security governance considered up to this point (with the possible exception of global norms), are based on relations between states or evaluated predominantly in terms of their influence on state behaviour. Private, non-state actors can also provide a basis for governance, typically in association with states, but occasionally on their own (Daase and Friesendorf 2010). *Private authority* in the global political economy ranges from self-binding codes of conduct and standards setting schemes to coordinated lobbying efforts, independent rating and assessment agencies, and private regimes (Cutler et al. 1999).

Private authority has also emerged in the realm of global security governance (Avant 2005; Hall and Biersteker 2002). A great variety of non-state actors are engaged in global security governance, from advocacy networks like the International Campaign to Ban Landmines to public policy think tanks, private military companies, militia groups and warlords, transnational movements engaged in the commission of acts of terrorism, and, in some instances, even mafias and vigilante groups. They can be said to be authoritative because they establish standards, provide social welfare, enforce contracts, maintain security for certain populations, and offer an alternative basis for governance. Private authority in the security domain emerges when states delegate it, enable it, or passively allow it to develop. It can also emerge in spaces where the state has abdicated from its responsibilities, and in some instances, authority can be seized from the state.

Standardized codes

The creation or existence of a standardized *code* or mutually agreed-upon routine for regulating a particular domain can also provide a basis for governance (Sylvan 2013). Codes are often developed by private sector actors for self-regulating their behaviour to improve collective efficiencies and/or to reduce costs. Commonly accepted standards create a basis for the interoperability of complex systems, and the governance of the Internet provides a good illustration of the phenomenon. The standards developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), an open network of technical specialists drawn almost entirely from the private sector, enables the 'network of networks' that constitutes the Internet to operate (Gahnberg 2014).

In a related way, the SWIFT code, developed originally by private financial institutions to improve the efficiency of their inter-bank transactions, not only governs international financial transfers, but has served as a basis for the financial surveillance being carried out in the name of global counterterrorism. Accessing the SWIFT database became a key priority of US Treasury

Department officials immediately following the attacks of 11 September 2001 in their effort to identify the networks behind the attacks by sifting through their financial transactions. This form of financial surveillance has been extended beyond countering the financing of terrorism to other security domains – countering proliferation, enforcing international sanctions, and prosecuting transnational crime.

The complexity of contemporary global security governance

During the past two decades, a great deal of innovative research has explored the role of non-state, private, and/or transnational actors engaged in contemporary global governance. Whether the phenomenon is described as the ‘emergence of private authority’ (Cutler et al. 1999; Hall and Biersteker 2002), the ‘global public domain’ (Ruggie 2004), the role of ‘transnational advocacy groups’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998), the emergence of ‘trans-governmental networks’ (Slaughter 2004), the growth of ‘public–private partnerships’ (Andonova 2010, 2014), the development of ‘multi-stakeholder initiatives’ (Jerbi 2012), ‘transnational new governance’ (Abbott and Snidal 2009), or the ‘new power politics’ (Avant and Westerwinter, forthcoming), there is a growing consensus that it is no longer possible to focus exclusively, or even predominantly, on states and their interactions in inter-governmental institutions to comprehend, understand, and analyse contemporary global governance. As de Burca, Keohane, and Sabel point out, we have moved well beyond the model of principal–agent relationships between states and hierarchical international organizations associated with the first generation international regimes, into a far more complex system of global governance (de Burca et al. 2013).

For example, Jonas Tallberg and his colleagues have documented empirically the growth in the formal access of non-state actors to the deliberations and activities of formal international organizations (Tallberg et al. 2013). They have identified a secular increase in the formal access of non-state actors, beginning from 1970 in the case of United Nations organizations, and from the early 1990s in the case of all international organizations considered together. While there is significant variation in access by issue domain, there is evidence of greater formal access by non-state actors in global security organizations over time (particularly after 2000).

Securing formal access is significant, but as Cecilia Cannon has pointed out, the kinds of influence exercised by non-state actors, particularly in transnational advocacy campaigns, tend to vary over time (Cannon 2013). Cannon examines the influence of non-state actors in different phases of the policy process, differentiating initial issue definition from agenda setting, advocacy, public information, and standards creation. She finds that the influence of non-state actors appears to be greatest in earlier stages of transnational advocacy campaigns (in defining issues, in agenda setting, and advocacy), and that states re-emerge as more influential at the later stages of drafting common standards, monitoring, and of course, in legal codification. This pattern is clearly discernible in the recent negotiation over the convention to limit private military and security providers.

At times, the ‘authority of expertise’ exercised by some of these non-state actors enables them to play an active role in governance itself (Hall and Biersteker 2002: 14). The independent assessments of non-governmental human rights organizations are important for evaluating (and potentially challenging) existing inter-governmental governance arrangements routinely conducted largely by states. There are many other examples of non-state actors exercising authority in contemporary global governance, either jointly or alone, from the activities of ICANN in the governance of Internet domain names or the IETF in Internet governance to the independent evaluations of private bond rating agencies like Standard and Poors, who exercised their independent private authority in 2011 when they downgraded US public debt.

Non-governmental actors participate in contemporary global governance in a variety of different ways, sometimes through participations in ‘transnational policy networks’ (Biersteker 2014b). Transnational policy networks are broadly analogous to Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of a specialized ‘field’ of expertise (Bourdieu 1990) with a structured social space with its own rules, roles, hierarchies, and range of legitimate views. They are constituted by a group of individuals who share a common expertise, a common technical language to communicate that expertise, broadly shared normative concerns, but not necessarily agreement on specific policy alternatives. Transnational policy networks might include individuals from non-governmental organizations associated with advocacy, but they are more technical in orientation and tend to avoid explicit engagement with advocacy. They are similar to trans-governmental networks and certainly include them (Slaughter 2004), but transcend them to include actors other than state officials – actors from the private sector, from international organizations, from international legal practice, and sometimes from academia. They are less formally institutionalized than most public–private partnerships and even most multi-stakeholder initiatives, and they are more focused on policy formation and the development and reform of policy instruments than on regulatory activities (that are the principal concerns of non-state market-driven regulatory systems and multi-stakeholder initiatives).

Transnational policy networks are not visible in the form of governance provided by ‘the international society of states’ and are largely absent in the governance arrangements provided by an individual state’s hegemony or by many international regimes, but they are often major players in the production of new international norms and institutions in emerging domains of global security governance. Many governance initiatives at the global level begin with private standard-setting arrangements, but they are not able to sustain themselves because they lack public legitimacy. As a result, they turn increasingly to transnational advocacy networks to gain legitimacy, sometimes morphing into multi-stakeholder initiatives including states. Only at later stages do states or inter-governmental organizations try to come back into the process with greater formal regulation of activities, as seen recently in the cases of the 2013 convention on private military companies and in 2014 debates about Internet governance.

Conclusion

Global governance is a multifaceted concept: a lot of different definitions exist. With regard to the mechanisms of governance, there is again a range – from hierarchy in hegemonic systems to networks in governance by global norms and international society. Private authority, international law, regimes, and institutions as bases of governance tend to be governed by a combination of both hierarchy and network.

With regard to degree of formal institutionalization, there is again wide variation, both between different bases of governance and within them. International society and private authority operate with relatively low levels of formal institutionalization at the global level, while most forms of hegemony are associated with high degrees of formal institutionalization. Regimes, institutions, law, standardized codes, and norms tend to operate at an intermediate level of formal institutionalization, with a mix of formal and informal institutional arrangements.

The variety of different bases for identifying and comprehending forms of contemporary global security governance – the society of states, hegemony, regimes, institutions, law, norms, standardized codes, and private authority – illustrate well the complexity of the subject, as well as the range of institutional players and mechanisms involved. In spite of all of the disorder and complexity associated with global security issues, however, there is a great deal of purposive and authoritatively rule-governed order present in the contemporary international system. It is not

always a very just or efficient system of governance, but it is governance nevertheless, and is central to any understanding of attempts to address contemporary security challenges.

Note

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