


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### **Israel–Palestine: An Archipelago Of (In)Security**

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# ISRAEL–PALESTINE: AN ARCHIPELAGO OF (IN)SECURITY

*Nada Ghandour-Demiri*

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is one of the most central ones in the Middle East. This enduring and seemingly insolvable conflict has had dreadful effects on the lives of Palestinians and Israelis, and on the security of the whole region, for over six decades now. In addition to the competing claims for sovereignty over the land by Jews and Palestinians, there are also several strategic, political, economic, and religious interests that hinder the resolution of the conflict.

The dominant security modality in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) nowadays is the coexistence of an archipelago and enclaves. In the archipelago, people and goods move relatively freely and smoothly. The enclaves, however, are spaces of exception where the rule of law and the emergency procedure merge into indistinction (Agamben 2005). The archipelago/enclaves typology is helpful to understand the complexity of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and it is one of main reasons the conflict remains unresolved. The architect Alessandro Petti explains:

[on] the one hand, we have an elite that is managing the space of flows, living in an archipelago-type world which it perceives as the only world, with no exterior to it; while on the other, the suspension of the rules of the archipelago creates legal and economic vacuums that make the enclave system a black hole, a shadowy area.

(2008: 11)

This conceptualization of this particular urban and political reality is characteristic of the situation in the West Bank: settlements and Israeli bypass roads belong to an archipelago in which circulation is smooth and uninterrupted, while Palestinian villages and towns are enclaves characterized by containment, policing, and minimal circulation (if not immobility).

The coexistence of these two different forms of circulation is well depicted on the imaginary map *L'archipel de Palestine orientale* (The Archipelago of Eastern Palestine) created by the French cartographer Julien Boussac (2009) where the area controlled by Israel (area C) is depicted as a blue sea and in it there are many islands illustrating either Palestinian enclaves or Jewish settlements and military bases. The resulting fictional archipelago connects certain islands (i.e. Jewish settlements and Israeli military bases), while it disconnects others (i.e. Palestinian enclaves). Thus, graduated forms of circulation are governing the fragmentation of space. In addition, space is fragmented according to what needs to be secured (i.e. protected and included) and what needs to be confined (i.e. contained and excluded). The territorial fragmentation based on the

archipelago/enclaves typology is maintained by a number of (in)security mechanisms, two of which will be discussed in this chapter (i.e. the Wall and the blockade on Gaza). I use the term '(in)security' in reference to these mechanisms because, as it will be demonstrated below, they are meant to provide security for a certain group of people, while at the same time they create insecurity for others.

The chapter will explain the current situation of an archipelago of (in)security in the OPT. It will first provide a brief historical overview of the conflict. Then, the chapter will focus on two Israeli security mechanisms that have played a key role in maintaining the coexistence of an archipelago and enclaves: the Wall and its associated closure regime, and the blockade on the Gaza Strip. In analysing each of these mechanisms, the typology of archipelago and enclaves will be clarified, and the ways in which these mechanisms contribute to the insecurity of Palestinians will be demonstrated. Finally, the chapter will conclude by considering the implication of this security typology for the unsolvability of the conflict and for its proliferation in other parts of the world as well.

## **Historical background**

### ***The origins of the conflict***

The conflict between Palestinian Arabs and Jews dates from the late nineteenth century. Although these two groups have different religions, religious differences are not the major cause of the conflict. Rather, the problem lies in the ownership of the land. On the one hand, the Jews claim that this land has been promised to them since biblical times, and due to an increase in anti-Semitism around the world, they have the right to return to 'Eretz Israel' (the Hebrew name for the biblical land of Israel, Zion). On the other hand, the Palestinian Arabs' claims are mostly based on their continuous residence on the land for hundreds of years and, hence, their right to remain in their homeland.

At the turn of the twentieth century, Zionism, the Jewish nationalist movement, emerged due to increased discrimination and persecution of the Jews in Europe. Zionists supported the self-determination of the Jewish people and the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine (Avineri 1981). With the establishment of the World Zionist Organization in 1897 by Theodore Herzl, this vision started to become increasingly popular. The realization of this project was becoming evident by the rising number of Jewish people immigrating to Palestine. The large immigration waves increased tensions in the region.

European geopolitics in the Middle East at that time contributed to the instability of the region. In 1915, Britain promised Sharif Hussein of Mecca that it would support the establishment of an Arab state, in return for an Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire. The following year, Britain reached a secret agreement, known as the Sykes-Picot agreement, with France to divide the Middle East into spheres of influence. According to this agreement, Palestine was to be placed under international control. Furthermore, in 1917, the British foreign minister at that time, Lord Arthur Balfour, issued a declaration (known as the Balfour Declaration) announcing the support of its government for the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Therefore, Palestine was promised several times during that period, and behind all three texts was an underlying sense of double-dealing and betrayal (Shlaim 2005). This lack of trust towards the British (from both Arabs and Jews) did not vanish during the British Mandate of Palestine (1922–48).

Palestinian resistance to British control and Zionist settlement climaxed with the Arab revolt of 1936–9, which Britain suppressed with the help of Zionist militias. During the Second World War, Jewish immigration to Palestine increased dramatically, leading to a rise in the number of Jewish settlements. After the Second World War, clashes between Arabs and Jews and between the

Zionist militias and the British army forced Britain to relinquish its mandate over Palestine. As a result, the future of Palestine was in the hands of the United Nations.

### ***The creation of the state of Israel and the beginning of the conflict***

The United Nations partition plan (1947) divided the country in two states, one Arab and the other Jewish, and the city of Jerusalem became an international zone. The Jewish minority received the majority of the land. Consequently, this partition led to the escalation of hostilities between the two parties. All these events led to the establishment of the state of Israel, the Palestinian *Nakba* (Arabic for ‘catastrophe’), and the first Arab–Israeli war, in 1948. Israel came out successful from this war. It became an important power in the region, after defeating most Arab armies and occupying even more land from the Palestinians. The country was divided into three: Israel included 77 per cent of what was once known as Palestine, Egypt controlled the Gaza Strip, and Jordan occupied East Jerusalem and the West Bank (Beinin et al. 2000: 5). Therefore, the UN partition planned was never implemented. Another important consequence of this war was the displacement of many Palestinians and the creation of the refugee problem. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were obliged to flee their houses and become refugees throughout the Middle East and around the rest of the world.

As the crisis in the region continued, in June 1967 Israel pre-emptively attacked Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. This war lasted only six days and was an unprecedented success for Israel and a humiliating defeat for the Arab states. Israel acquired key lands: the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. As a result, Israel became the dominant military power in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had been established in 1964 to organize Palestinian nationalism. The PLO was composed of various political and military groups holding different ideological beliefs. After the six-day war Yasser Arafat (the leader of Fatah – the largest political group) became chairman of the organization. With time, the organization became recognized by the Arab states and the UN as the representative of the Palestinians.

### ***The first intifada and the 1993 Oslo Agreement***

In 1987, a mass uprising against the Israeli occupation started in the West Bank and Gaza. This uprising, or *intifada* (meaning ‘shaking off’ in Arabic), was a popular mobilization that drew on the civil society organizations that had developed under occupation. The intifada involved hundreds of thousands of people, including children and women, and it was based primarily on acts of civil disobedience, such as demonstrations, general strikes and boycotts of Israeli products (King 2007; Smith 2007: 419).

The intifada lasted until 1993, but it drew unprecedented international attention to the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. Due to international and internal pressure, the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and his cabinet were forced to change their political agenda and start negotiations with Arafat and the PLO. These negotiations led to the Oslo Agreement that was signed in 1993 between the two parties. According to the Oslo Agreement, Israel would withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho, and then from further unspecified areas of the West Bank during a five-year interim period. During this period, the PLO would form a Palestinian Authority (PA) with ‘self-governing’ (i.e. municipal) powers in the areas from which Israeli forces were redeployed (Beinin et al. 2000: 12).

The most important consequence of the Oslo Accords was the division of the West Bank into three non-contiguous areas A, B, and C. In area A (17.2 per cent of the West Bank), the

PA has (theoretically) civil jurisdiction and security control, while Israel controls movement in and out of the area. In area B (23.8 per cent of the West Bank), the PA has civil authority and responsibility for public order, whereas Israel maintains security presence and superseding security responsibility. Area C (59 per cent of the West Bank) is under full civil and military Israeli control (*Le Monde Diplomatique* n.d.). However, apart from the division and diversified allocation of power, each area lacks territorial contiguity. For example, area A, rather than being a contiguous territory, is further divided into small 'islands'. As a result, in order to pass from one 'island' of Area A to the other, Israeli permission is necessary. Therefore, practically, the PA has no real control over any territory and the West Bank has been turned into an archipelago of enclaves, each one with different levels of security.

The Oslo Agreement has been very controversial. It has been criticized by both sides. By many Palestinians, it was considered as a one-sided accord that benefited only Israel, since it gave Israel control of most of the land, water, roads, and other resources. For the rightist Jews, a withdrawal from parts of the West Bank would deny them their biblical heritage. In addition to these disagreements, many of the provisions of the agreement were not carried out by either side. All these controversies and the inability to find a workable solution led to an increase in violence, and finally the eruption of the second intifada.

### ***From the second intifada until today***

The difficulties and humiliations experienced by Palestinians in their daily lives due to the occupation, as well as the corruption within the PA, were the main reasons that led to the second intifada in September 2000. This uprising was more violent than the first one. Israel used severe repression from the very beginning to avoid a prolonged civil uprising. During that period, Palestinian armed operations and suicide bombings increased.

In the meantime, Israel started implementing plans for a more concrete and radical separation. The main justification for these separation measures was the protection of Israeli civilians from security threats (e.g. suicide bombings targeting Israeli civilians). One of the clearest examples of this separation policy was the construction of the Wall in the West Bank that began in 2002 and is still ongoing. This security mechanism and its associated closure regime will be analysed in the next section of this chapter.

In 2003, the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announced the 'disengagement plan' from the Gaza Strip. This plan was portrayed as a bold Israeli move towards peace and a way to increase Israeli citizens' security. The Israeli withdrawal from the Strip was implemented in 2005. However, this move was done unilaterally and it meant an increase in settlement construction in the West Bank. Moreover, while the Strip was evacuated by settlers and soldiers, it did not become free of Israeli control; in fact, Israel tightened the control and surveillance of the Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip.

After Arafat's death in 2004 and Mahmood Abbas' ascent to the leadership of the PLO, Palestinian internal political divisions worsened. In 2006, the Islamist party of Hamas won the elections, leading to a setback in all negotiations, since it was viewed by Israel and many other countries as a terrorist organization. Since these elections, the PA has been experiencing an internal conflict that has fragmented Palestinian society and, as a result, has hindered the peace negotiations with Israel. As a punitive response to Hamas's victory, Israel imposed a blockade on the Gaza Strip – that is still ongoing.

Meanwhile, the Israeli occupation has grown more sophisticated, using advanced military techniques, weapons, and a more complex occupation policy that not only maintains the occupation of the Palestinian Territories, but also makes a two-state solution impossible to implement

on the ground (due to the increased number of settlements and the fragmentation of the OPT). Apart from these important factors, in the last nine years Israel has also launched a series of deadly military incursions on the Gaza Strip that have stalled peace efforts.

## Israeli (in)security mechanisms

### *The wall*

‘Good fences make good neighbours’. The former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak was very much in favour of this proverb. It influenced his 1999 election campaign motto: ‘Peace through Separation: we are here, they are there’. The slogan brought back the idea of a physical blockade between Israel and the West Bank. This idea started being materialized in 2002 by Ariel Sharon.

The official Israeli position for the erection of a physical barrier separating Israel from the West Bank is the prevention of terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians. The Israeli government labels its fortified fence as the ‘anti-terrorist fence’ or ‘security fence’ (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004). In contrast, Palestinians and critics of the fence call it ‘apartheid wall’, ‘wall of shame’, or ‘separation barrier’ (see HSRC 2009; Lentin 2008; Shihab-Eldin 2009).

While Israel is claiming that the Wall is being built to protect Israeli citizens, there are other subtler, but more important, reasons for its construction. One of the main purposes of the Wall is the connection of settlements to Israel, and their dissociation from the Palestinians (B’Tselem et al. 2005; Weizman 2007: 168). In fact, the Wall encircles seventy-one settlements (comprising 85 per cent of the settlers), and connects them physically to Israel (OCHA 2013b). Another reason, often mentioned by the critics of the Wall, is the appropriation of more Palestinian land in order to expand the state of Israel (or minimize even more the OPT) (see B’Tselem et al. 2005: 6; Gordon 2003; Koury 2005: 49; OCHA 2007). While the Wall was supposed to be built on the Green Line (the 1949 armistice lines), it started ‘invading’ more and more of the West Bank. That is, nearly three-quarters of the total projected fence route runs inside the West Bank, and not along the Green Line (B’Tselem 2011; OCHA 2010). This means that it is not a single continuous line but it is curling around areas of interest, such as settlements. In other words, it represents *de facto* annexation. Moreover, the Wall has proved to be (together with other mechanisms, such as settlements, road networks, checkpoints, etc.) an essential spatial mechanism contributing to the fragmentation of the West Bank, reinforcing the creation of an archipelago of enclaves (Petti 2008: 9; Sorkin 2005: xix; Weizman 2007: 178).

The Wall is approximately 712 kilometres long (OCHA 2013b). Its majority is fence-like, made up of a series of electronic fences, patrol roads, ditches, and razor wire up to 70 metres wide (Müller 2006: 18). The main element of the Wall is ‘a touch-sensitive, “smart”, three-meter-high electronic fence, placed on a 150-centimetre-deep concrete foundation (to prevent digging under it) and topped with barbed wire (to prevent climbing over it)’ (Weizman 2007: 292). It is also equipped with day/night vision video cameras and small radars. In some places, especially within and around Palestinian urban areas, the electronic fence is replaced by an enormous concrete wall up to 8 metres high (Müller 2006: 18). In addition, along the Wall there are watch-towers for Israeli soldiers to keep an eye on the Palestinians.

The Wall and its bureaucratic apparatus (e.g. checkpoints) create different population groups. On the one hand, there are Israeli citizens and West Bank settlers, and on the other, diverse categories of Palestinians (see Tawil-Souri 2011). The aim of the mechanisms of the occupation is to prevent any contact between these different population groups. In addition, the Wall creates its own cartographic reality, investing in its own spatial partitioning by dividing the West Bank into different areas. The Wall has created two types of space: on the one hand, there is a continuous and



fluid Israeli space that is full of certainty and predictability, where Israelis (including settlers) can move quickly and easily (i.e. archipelago). On the other hand, there is a fragmented Palestinian space full of obstacles that generate unpredictability and uncertainty, which severely impede Palestinians' movement (i.e. enclaves) (Parizot 2009: 3).

This management of population flow and fluidity of space is further maintained by a discriminatory roads regime. Israel has imposed on Palestinians what B'Tselem calls a 'Forbidden Roads Regime' (2015). Since 1967, Israel has built a large network of roads within the West Bank which is intended almost completely to serve and perpetuate the Jewish settlements. These roads link the settlements and connect them to Israel proper, while they separate Palestinians. In the late 1970s, during the settlement push, the notion of bypass roads was developed: bypassing Arab villages and towns. With the Oslo Agreement the idea of bypass roads and the forbidden roads regime gained momentum. Since then, Israel totally prevents Palestinians accessing certain roads, also known as 'sterile routes' (B'Tselem 2004: 44). There are roads partially open for Palestinians, while others are mainly for Palestinians, since Israeli civilians are prevented from accessing those. The main mindset behind this regime is that Palestinians are perceived as threats to the security of Israeli civilians, and hence any contact with them needs to be minimal or absent. Yet, there is no law or official documentation explaining this policy, apart from Route 443, and the prohibitions on Palestinian travel are based on 'verbal orders' given by Israeli soldiers along the roads or at checkpoints (B'Tselem 2015; Groag 2006).

The Wall and its associated gate and permit regime violates international law according to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Gross 2006; ICJ 2004; OCHA 2007: 46). More specifically, the Wall violates Palestinian access to health care, education, work, agricultural land, and family life (ICJ 2004). Nevertheless, and despite its illegality, Israel continues its construction.

### ***The Gaza Strip blockade***

The Gaza Strip has been subject to an ongoing blockade for almost nine years now. Israel has gradually tightened its control of the area following its disengagement and the subsequent institutionalization of Hamas rule. In September 2005, Israel completed the so-called 'disengagement plan', which entailed the dismantling of all Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip, the evacuation of their residents to Israeli territory, and the withdrawal of all Israeli army forces from the area. There is a wide literature on the disengagement written both by its supporters and its opponents. Those in favour tend to perceive (or to portray) the redeployment as an opportunity to bring a certain kind of peace to the political impasse between Palestinians and Israelis (Caplen 2006; Roy 2005: 65). Moreover, Israel is depicted as a civilized state that is willing to make great sacrifices (especially regarding the suffering of Jewish settlers removed from the Strip) for peace (Falah 2005: 1348; King and Kahan 2006). Embedded in the early debates was also the assumption that after the disengagement Palestinians would be free to build their own democratic state in the Strip and that if they failed the responsibility would be theirs and theirs alone (Caplen 2006: 715–16; Roy 2005: 65).

Yet many are critical of this Israeli withdrawal from the Strip, and especially of what this move really meant (see Li 2006; Mari 2005; Scobbie 2006; Yiftachel 2005). The disengagement plan was a *unilateral* plan decided and executed by Israel alone, rather than an *agreement* between Israel and other parties. Furthermore, it is not to be taken in the literal sense of the term: while Israel did indeed remove its settlements and military bases from the Gaza Strip, it did not give away its control over it.

Israel's control over Gaza was tightened further when Hamas took power. In January 2006 Hamas secured a majority of seats in the Palestinian legislative elections – a result that was not

accepted by the United States, the European Union, or Israel, despite the democratic and transparent character of the elections (Goerzig 2010: 17). The rise in support for Hamas has been attributed to the organization's civil service provisions and firm political and military leadership in a context of continuous fragmentation in Palestinian politics (especially since the second Intifada) and widespread Palestinian disillusionment after years of Fatah's corruption and misrule of the Palestinian Authority (Bhungalia 2010; Tamimi 2007; Usher 2006: 21). After the elections, internal clashes erupted between Fatah and Hamas, leading to Fatah's military defeat and Hamas taking control over Gaza in June 2007. Since then, Qassam rockets have been intermittently launched from Gaza into southern Israeli territory. Citing these attacks as motive, Israel's security cabinet declared Gaza a 'hostile territory' in September 2007 and intensified the sanctions policy to an unprecedented degree (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007). From then on, Israel has maintained a three-dimensional blockade on Gaza by controlling its territorial borders, as well as its air and sea space. For example, Gazans are not allowed to exit or enter the Strip except in rare cases (usually deemed humanitarian) and the movement of goods into and out of the Strip is strictly controlled (Bhungalia 2010; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007).

The sanctions policy was complimented by a series of military incursions, such as: Operation Summer Rains (started in June 2006); Operation Cast Lead (27 December 2008 – 18 January 2009); Operation Pillar of Defense (14–21 November 2012); and Operation Protective Edge in 2014. Indicatively, during Operation Cast Lead, 1,385 Palestinians were killed, 762 of whom did not take part in the hostilities (including 318 children), and more than 5,300 Palestinians were wounded (B'Tselem 2009). Apart from the high death toll, these operations are characterized by the bombing of civilian infrastructure and incursions into crowded population areas – cities in particular.

According to an OCHA report, in January 2011 it was estimated that approximately 200–300 tunnels were operating on a regular basis, about half the number of that operated the year before (OCHA 2011a: 7). In 2009, approximately 90 per cent of Gaza's economic activity was devoted to smuggling (Roy 2009: 1). The tunnels have become the main lifeline for Gaza's population: essential food and medicine, construction material, animals, and even weapons, are smuggled into Gaza from Egypt. For Palestinians, tunnels have become an instrument of resilience, through which they can avoid extinction. For Israel, they are an informal regulatory mechanism to maintain the humanitarian situation in the Strip at the level of crisis rather than absolute catastrophe. This is the main reason Israel tolerates the tunnels between Gaza and Egypt (when it does not bomb them under the excuse of weapon smuggling).

In addition to the tunnels, Gazans mainly receive their basic needs for survival through humanitarian agencies. In fact, humanitarian aid is the main way through which Palestinians in Gaza are kept alive. In 2013, 80 per cent of the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip was aid-dependent and 57 per cent was food-insecure (OCHA 2013a). Therefore, in Michel Agier's words, an entire population is kept artificially alive through an international 'transfusion' provided by international organizations (2008: 47). Despite this obvious aid dependency of an entire population, Israel's policy-makers continue to deny that there is a humanitarian crisis (see Government of Israel 2011; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010; Ravid 2009). At the same time, however, Israel is imposing a strict policy of caloric determination to prevent a humanitarian disaster (i.e. the death of thousands of Palestinians) by barely keeping them alive (Bhungalia 2012). According to Gisha (the Israeli Legal Centre for Freedom of Movement), this policy has been 'articulated informally by Israeli officials as one of 'no development, no prosperity, no humanitarian crisis' – allowing the minimum needed for survival, but no more' (2010: 4). This imposed policy of bare survival severely inhibits Gazans' capacity to conduct a full or normal life. All this attests to the significant role humanitarian considerations have come to play as an integral part of the machinery of the occupying power.



In addition to the denial of a normal life, Israel is denying Palestinians the right to development. The Israeli siege has resulted in what Sara Roy has termed 'de-development' of the Gaza Strip. De-development refers to 'the deliberate, systematic, and progressive dismemberment of an indigenous economy by a dominant one – and by extension, societal potential is not only distorted but denied' (Roy 2007). It is shaped and advanced by policies reflecting the ideological imperatives of Zionism: expropriation and dispossession, integration and externalization, and de-institutionalization. According to Roy, these policies are essential to the process of de-development in that they dispossess Palestinians of critical economic resources or factors of production needed to create and sustain productive capacity, create extreme dependency on employment in Israel as a source of GNP growth, and restrict the kind of indigenous institutional development that could lead to structural reform that is economic, social, and political. Hence, unlike underdevelopment, which allows some form of development, de-development's main aim is the prevention and denial of development.

The Gaza Strip has therefore turned into an enclave where its 1.8 million population live in a constant state of insecurity. The three-dimensional blockade forbidding the free movement of people and goods, the violent military incursions, and policies such as de-development, deny Gazans a secure life. The Gaza Strip has been turned into the biggest 'exemplary' enclave, where the rule of law is suspended and the state of exception has become the norm.

### **Conclusion**

The coexistence of an archipelago and enclaves is currently the dominant security modality in the OPT. The aim of this chapter was to explain the archipelago and enclaves typology, and argue that it does not provide security in the long term as it creates further insecurity for the occupied and makes the creation of a viable Palestinian state impossible.

Because of its policies, Israel has recently emerged as a unique global exemplar of urban militarism and securitization (Graham 2011: 143). Apart from the sophistication of the military and surveillance equipment that Israel is exporting, it is using the 'combat-proven' status of its security systems and warfare machinery to its advantage. Gaza and the West Bank are used as laboratories of urban warfare and surveillance to test in real-time technologies and weapons (Gordon 2011: 162; Graham 2011: 138).

Hence, Gaza and the West Bank are 'exemplary [fields] in the experimentation of new architectures, geographies and technologies of control-at-distance, which are becoming widely imitated and exemplified elsewhere' (Graham 2011: 142). The architecture of occupation found in Israel is now common across the world (Zureik et al. 2011: xviii). By being exported globally, 'these Israeli practices and technologies have connected the uniqueness of the conflict with worldwide predilections to address security anxieties through "circulation management"' (Weizman 2007: 154).

The archipelago and enclaves paradigm created in the West Bank by Israel is found in many places around the globe (e.g. gated communities, prisons, camps, ghettos, quarantined zones, etc.): not only in the global South or in colonial and occupation regimes, but, in fact, also in the global North, including metropolises such as New York, London, and Paris. Mark Duffield's idea of bunkers and camps is particularly insightful in this respect: while contemporary bunkers take many forms, they all share a basic characteristic in that they are 'defended spaces that can be hermetically sealed against a threatening and unknown environment' (2011: 764).

The politics of inclusion, protection, and fortification characterizing the Jewish settlements and Israeli military bases are reflected in the idea (and reality) of bunkers, and the exclusion and abandonment of the Palestinian enclaves are found in today's camps across the world. Gated communities (e.g. Jewish settlements, elite residential compounds, and UN and other humanitarian

agencies' compounds in the developing world) are a typical example of bunkers. The side-by-side coexistence of over-protected (almost sterilized) gated communities (or bunkers) and camps of undesirables is now becoming a globalizing phenomenon. Israel's role in the globalization of this phenomenon is crucial in the sense that it is a microcosm of bunkers and camps and the technologies that sustain them.

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