


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INDIAN SECURITY
POLICY*Sumit Ganguly*

India's security policy is in a state of transition as the country attempts to secure its position as an emergent power in Asia and beyond. The willingness on the part of Indian policy-makers to accept the use of force as a critical element of national power represents a profound shift from the ideational outlook that had influenced Indian policy-making in the immediate post-independence era. The task before them now involves making judicious choices about military commitments, deployments, and accordingly appropriate levels of defence spending.

The scholarship on India's security policy is limited and mostly dated (Cohen and Dasgupta 2012; Gordon 1995; Kavic 1967; Thomas 1986; 1978). Such a lacuna in the literature is puzzling because of India's overt acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1998, its abandonment of its commitment to non-alignment after the Cold War, and its growing significance as an Asian power (Ganguly 2006). Despite the profound changes of late, scholarship on Indian security policy continues to be dogged by a lack of attention.

This chapter will trace the origins, evolution, current state, and future directions of the country's security policy since its emergence as an independent state following the collapse of the British Indian Empire in 1947. It will look at the impact of critical political choices on the part of the country's leadership, the role of regional security threats, and India's relative lack of importance to the global rivalry during much of the Cold War era. The chapter will deal with the intellectual rationale for India's initial security policies, their re-evaluation and transformation in the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, its conflicts with Pakistan, its quest for nuclear weapons, its responses to internal uprisings, and its attempts to extend its reach beyond the confines of the subcontinent.

Post-independence concerns

In the immediate aftermath of India's emergence as an independent state in 1947 following the end of the British colonial empire in South Asia, Indian policy-makers adopted an ideational foreign policy which sought to de-emphasize military preparedness. A number of factors shaped India's defence policies in the post-independence era. Most importantly, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, the principal architect of India's foreign and security policies, was acutely concerned about the significant opportunity costs of defence spending (Cohen 1971). Simultaneously, he feared that a large military establishment could also encourage Bonapartist ambitions and

undermine India's nascent democracy (Ganguly 1991). Finally, he also hoped to contribute to a world order where the use of force was proscribed in international politics.

Nehru's wishes notwithstanding, almost immediately after its independence, India found itself embroiled in a war with Pakistan over the status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir (Ganguly 2001). The war ensued because of Pakistan's attempts to exploit a tribal rebellion in the western reaches of this state (Hodson 1969; Khan 1975). In keeping with their faith in multilateral institutions and acting on the advice of Lord Louis Mountbatten, the last viceroy, India's political leadership referred the Kashmir dispute to the United Nations Security Council (Gupta 1966). The war came to a close on 1 January 1949, when the Security Council imposed a cease-fire as multilateral negotiations to resolve the dispute began.

The Indian military possessed sufficient capabilities to cope with the threat from Pakistan. However, it was fundamentally ill-equipped to deal with the threat that arose from the People's Republic of China (PRC) over a disputed border along much of India's Himalayan frontier (Hoffmann 1990). Prime Minister Nehru and his defence minister, V. K. Krishna Menon, believed that the threat from the PRC could be contained through diplomacy and conciliation. To that end, India made significant concessions to the PRC. It resorted to the mildest criticism of the Chinese invasion and occupation of Tibet in 1950, even though China's move meant the end of a strategic buffer (Sen 1960). Specifically, at the behest of the PRC, the Indian government eschewed all extra-territorial rights in Tibet that it had inherited as holdovers from the British colonial period.

More to the point, Nehru was convinced that the great powers would not remain passive in the event of a Sino-Indian conflict and thereby moved to promptly contain the tensions. As it turned out, this assumption proved to be completely flawed. Negotiations aimed at resolving the border dispute broke down in 1960. Worse still, India, despite its inadequate military capabilities, embarked upon a strategy of compellence. This strategy involved sending in lightly armed Indian troops in 'penny packets' to display India's resolve to hold territory that the Chinese had claimed. When the PRC chose to attack these Indian packets, they proved no match for the battle-hardened People's Liberation Army (PLA). The Indian troops lacked adequate clothing, firepower, and logistical support. Worse still, the Indian military reinforcements that were abruptly moved from the plains were not acclimated to high-altitude warfare and, consequently, faced multiple and crippling health hazards. This short but brutal war proved to be a military and diplomatic debacle for India. Militarily, the Indian armed forces suffered a stinging defeat, and diplomatically India found itself bereft of support apart from some limited assistance from the US and the UK.

The aftermath of 1962

In the wake of this conflict, India's policy-makers were forced to re-evaluate India's military preparedness to cope with ongoing threats from both Pakistan and, more importantly, the PRC. Since India had acquitted itself adequately against Pakistan in the 1947-8 war, the principal threat it had to contend with involved the PRC. To that end, Indian policy-makers chose to embark on the creation of a 45-squadron air force equipped with supersonic aircraft, a million-man army with ten new mountain divisions trained in high-altitude warfare, and a modest programme of naval modernization (Thomas 1978).

The Indian fixation on countering the potential security threat from the PRC and the concomitant rearmament programme provoked Pakistani anxieties. From the Pakistani standpoint, India's increased military capabilities could make a crucial difference in a future Indo-Pakistani conflict. Fearing that a window of opportunity might be closing to reclaim the disputed territory of India's Jammu and Kashmir state through the use of force, the Pakistani politico-military elite

fashioned an elaborate strategy to seize Kashmir militarily (Ganguly 1989). The plan had two distinct phases. In the first phase, code-named 'Operation Gibraltar', Pakistani troops disguised as locals would infiltrate the Kashmir Valley and seek to sow discord amongst the population. Exploiting these disturbances that they had successfully stirred, Pakistan would launch a full-scale invasion of Kashmir ('Operation Grand Slam') and seize it in a short war.

To the dismay of the Pakistani war planners, none of their assumptions proved tenable. Though some Kashmiris were discontented with Indian rule, they nevertheless evinced little interest in assisting the Pakistani infiltrators. Instead, they alerted Indian authorities who promptly moved to seal the Cease-Fire Line. Despite the loss of strategic surprise, the Pakistani leadership went ahead with its war plans and launched an assault on Kashmir in early September 1965. The Indian forces were prepared for this attack and succeeded in blunting the Pakistani onslaught. The war lasted for about three weeks and was brought to a close through a United Nations Security Council resolution. Since the US demonstrated little interest in promoting a post-war accord, the Soviet Union stepped into the breach. Moscow persuaded the adversaries to return to the status quo ante and also to abjure the use of force to settle the Kashmir dispute (Brines 1968).

Despite this commitment to refrain from the use of force to settle bilateral disputes, India and Pakistan became involved in a third war in 1971. This conflict stemmed from the exigencies of Pakistani domestic politics and the emergence of Bengali sub-nationalism in East Pakistan (Jahan 1972; Zaheer 1994). However, after negotiations in the wake of Pakistan's first free and fair national elections broke down, the Punjabi-dominated Pakistani military resorted to a brutal crackdown in East Pakistan. In the face of widespread repression, close to ten million Bengalis fled to India. Burdened with this significant refugee influx, Indian policymakers, having exhausted the diplomatic alternatives, fashioned a politico-military strategy designed to break up Pakistan (Jackson 1975; Jacob 1997). Indian military planners trained, armed, and provided sanctuaries to an indigenous guerrilla movement, the 'Mukti Bahini' (literally 'liberation force') and ultimately provoked the Pakistani regime to launch a military assault on India in early December 1971. Indian forces, which had been carefully arrayed to respond with a 'blitzkrieg strategy', managed to bring the war to a successful close within three weeks (for a discussion of the Indian blitzkrieg strategy, see Mearsheimer 1983). The war led to the break-up of Pakistan and the creation of the independent state of Bangladesh. Following this war, India emerged as the pre-eminent military power in the subcontinent. Also, given India's military preponderance, a long peace ensued on the subcontinent until the outbreak of an indigenous insurgency in India's disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1989.

The nuclear conundrum

Contrary to many analyses,¹ the origins of the Indian nuclear weapons programme can be traced quite clearly to the country's perception of the threat emanating from the PRC. Within two years of India's disastrous defeat at the hands of the PRC, the Chinese had tested their first nuclear weapon at Lop Nor. The Chinese nuclear test set off a firestorm of controversy in the Indian parliament (Mirchandani 1968). Segments of the Indian right wing wanted the country to abandon non-alignment and seek a nuclear guarantee against the PRC from the Western world. Others wanted India to develop its own nuclear weapons capabilities to cope with this emergent threat from the PRC. After considerable debate, the leadership chose neither to disperse with non-alignment nor to pursue a nuclear weapons programme. Instead, it made a feeble effort to seek a nuclear guarantee from the great powers, notably the UK, the Soviet Union, and the US. In the event, all three states rebuffed India (Noorani 1967).

In the wake of this failure to obtain a nuclear guarantee, India embarked upon the Subterranean Nuclear Explosions Project (SNEP). Simultaneously, at the international level, it maintained its spirited opposition to the drafting of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in Geneva. India's opposition was straightforward: it contended that the treaty was inherently inequitable. It sought to prevent the *horizontal* spread of nuclear weapons while urging good-faith efforts to curb *vertical* proliferation (Kapur 1976).

Not surprisingly, India chose not to accede to the NPT when it was passed and entered into force on 1 January 1970. As a consequence of its refusal to join the NPT regime, India found itself isolated from global nuclear commerce. Despite its inability to participate in international nuclear activities, India went ahead with both its peaceful and its military nuclear programmes. In May 1974, it tested its first nuclear weapon in the Rajasthan desert and promptly faced a series of bilateral and multilateral sanctions (Ganguly 1982). Given the country's parlous economic conditions, its leaders chose not to carry out further tests, but work on the nuclear weapons programme proceeded apace, even though individual Indian governments chose to either retard or accelerate the programme (Tellis 2000).

Crossing the nuclear Rubicon

In the late 1990s, as a consequence of developments at the global, regional, and national levels, India chose to dispense with its policy of nuclear ambiguity and crossed the nuclear Rubicon in May 1998. Specifically, four factors influenced the Indian decision to end its nuclear restraint. The first two factors were located at the global level. First, at the NPT Review Conference in May 1995, the US managed to persuade the vast majority of UN members to extend the NPT indefinitely and unconditionally. Second, it sought to pass the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1998, despite vigorous objections from India and a handful of other states to one particular clause in the CTBT that required forty-four states with ongoing nuclear power programmes to ratify the treaty before September 1998 to enable it to enter into force.

The significance of the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT and the requirement that a sub-set of states ratify the CTBT to enable its entry into force was not lost on Indian policy-makers. They correctly concluded that the widespread global support for the NPT in the wake of the 1995 Review Conference placed India in an extremely isolated position and thereby subjected it to potentially acute pressures to accede to this global regime. Additionally, they realized that inexorable pressure would mount on them to sign and ratify the CTBT before September 1998.

Apart from these two global considerations, two other factors played critical roles in compelling India's policy-makers to depart from their commitment to nuclear abstinence. First, with the end of the Cold War and the Soviet collapse, India's policy-makers realized that they could no longer count on the Soviet security guarantee that was embedded in the twenty-year Indo-Soviet treaty of 'peace, friendship, and cooperation', even if it were to be renewed (Horn 1982; Racioppi 1994). Consequently, India could no longer expect Russia to act as a brake on possible Chinese revanchism. Second, they also concluded that in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the PRC had made Pakistan its virtual strategic surrogate in South Asia through the transfer of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology (NTI 2008).

Given these global and regional considerations, India's policy-makers determined that they could not afford to abandon the nuclear weapons option. With the seemingly inexorable movement toward the conclusion of a CTBT, Indian policy-makers feared that their ability to carry out nuclear tests would be foreclosed, leaving India in a strategically vulnerable position.² In the aftermath of the nuclear tests, India faced widespread international condemnation and a new raft

of US-initiated sanctions. However, through patient and deft diplomacy, it managed to get the bulk of them lifted within a span of about two years (Talbot 2004). Despite its failure to persuade India (and Pakistan) to foreswear their nascent nuclear weapons capabilities, the Clinton administration left office convinced that nuclear weapons in the region were a deeply destabilizing force.

A seismic policy shift

A significant policy shift occurred under the administration of George W. Bush. Initially, it was concerned about Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. However, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the US needed to engage Pakistan. Apart from its interest in ensuring the security and safety of the Pakistani nuclear weapons infrastructure, the Bush administration evinced little interest in rolling back Pakistan's capabilities. Simultaneously, it did little to pressure or persuade India to abandon its nuclear weapons programme. On the contrary, in 2005, the Bush administration started negotiations with India on a comprehensive civilian nuclear agreement that would enable India to maintain its nuclear arsenal and also participate in global nuclear commerce (Ganguly and Mistry 2006). Protracted and difficult negotiations ensued over the next three years. In October of 2008, after considerable spirited debate in both the US and India, a deal was finally agreed. Under the terms of this agreement, India can now engage in normal nuclear commerce without being subjected to the bilateral and multilateral sanctions that had been imposed on it in the aftermath of its first nuclear test in 1974 (Mistry 2014).

Is the region more stable as a consequence of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan? There is a growing and vigorous debate on this subject (for arguments for nuclear stability, see Ganguly and Hagerty 2004; for an alternative view, see Kapur 2007). The proponents of stability contend that the mutual possession of nuclear weapons has all but eliminated the prospect of full-scale war in the region as both sides understand the consequences of the nuclear revolution (on the significance of the nuclear revolution, see Jervis 1989). Others contend that given Pakistan's revisionist ambitions, the region has actually become more war-prone. They contend that Pakistani decision-makers are more likely to provoke India, secure in the knowledge that India has no viable conventional military options because of Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons and the concomitant fears of escalation to the nuclear level. Given their fundamentally divergent premises about the effects of nuclear weapons on the likelihood of war, the two sides drew vastly different inferences from the Kargil conflict of 1999. The proponents of nuclear deterrence argue that the looming presence of nuclear weapons prevented the horizontal escalation of the conflict. Their critics, however, contend that Pakistan felt emboldened to make an intrusion into Kargil because of its acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability.

The Kargil war and after

In 1999, India and Pakistan became involved in the third war over Kashmir. Pakistan initiated this conflict. The precise origins of the war remain controversial, but there is little question that it stemmed from the successful infiltration of Pakistani forces across the Line of Control in the Kargil region in the spring of 1999 (for various discussions of the Kargil conflict, see Bajpai et al. 2001; Chari and Mehta 2001; Malik 2006; Singh 2001; Swami 1999).

What prompted Pakistan to undertake this 'limited probe'?³ There is no clear-cut answer to this question. However, it appears that the Pakistani military leadership was keen on jump-starting the insurgency in Kashmir, which had started to flag thanks to the success of India's sustained counter-insurgency campaign. To that end, Pakistani military planners undertook a probing action designed to test the extent of India's commitment. At another level, they were no doubt

aware that if they succeeded in breaching the Indian defences in the region, they would be able to interdict India's principal link from the Kashmir Valley to the northern region of Kashmir, Ladakh. The initial Pakistani intrusion into this sector was extremely successful for a number of reasons. The most notable of these was the Indian conviction that in the aftermath of the peace process that had been initiated in February 1999, any offensive Pakistani operations in Kashmir were unlikely. As a consequence, both Indian civil and military intelligence organizations had lowered the level of vigilance along the Kashmir border (Kargil Committee Report 2000).

Despite the initial failure to detect the Pakistani intrusions, the Indian military acted with alacrity and vigour to stem them. To that end, India brought considerable firepower to bear in a concentrated fashion. It also utilized its air force, but placed significant constraints on the use of air power. Specifically, the air force was explicitly forbidden from crossing the Line of Control for fear of provoking a wider war. The reasons for Indian restraint were straightforward. This was the first Indo-Pakistani conflict since the two countries had acquired nuclear weapons. Indian decision-makers were acutely aware of the dangers of nuclear escalation (Ganguly 2008; for an alternative view, see Kapur 2008).

Shortly after the Kargil war, Indian defence planners sought to formulate a military doctrine and strategy that would enable them to respond to Pakistani probing actions without risking full-scale war. To that end, various Indian military officials – most notably General Ved Prakash Malik, a former chief of staff of the Indian Army – called for a doctrine of 'limited war under the nuclear umbrella' (Malik 2006). Details about this strategy, however, are mostly lacking in the public domain. Most of the discussions and criticisms of the strategy have focused on its feasibility and the dangers of escalation (Raghavan 2001). These concerns were further reinforced due to the lack of any militarily viable options when India faced another crisis with Pakistan in the wake of a terrorist attack on the Indian parliament on 13 December 2001. In an attempt to induce a change in Pakistani behaviour, India mobilized its substantial conventional forces and embarked upon a massive and prolonged exercise of coercive diplomacy, but to little effect (Ganguly and Kraig 2005).

In the aftermath of these two episodes, Indian military planners focused on developing a doctrine of swift mobilization and calibrated response to limited Pakistani-sponsored terrorist attacks. This doctrine, dubbed 'Cold Start', envisages responding with speed and vigour against a future Pakistani terrorist provocation. However, some scholars who have examined the premises of the doctrine and India's capabilities question its strategic assumptions and operational features (Ladwig 2007).

Coping with internal conflicts

In addition to the two major external security threats from Pakistan and the PRC, the Indian state's security policies have also included a series of domestic counter-insurgency operations (Chadha 2005). The vast majority of these insurgencies are due to Indian domestic politics. Several of them stem from ethnic and religious tensions, although one particular insurgency, the Naxalite Rebellion, is due to class conflict (Chakravarti 2008). However, external involvement in these insurgencies has expanded their scope, increased their intensity, and prolonged their duration. In a number of cases, Pakistan and the PRC played vital roles in sustaining these insurgencies.

Apart from this class-based insurgency India still faces a series of simmering conflicts in its north-east. The origins of most of these insurgencies are indigenous and have deep historical roots. However, both Pakistani and Chinese involvement in those insurrections has kept them alive and has expanded their scope. To compound matters the presence of sanctuaries in Bangladesh and Burma (Myanmar) has hobbled India's ability to suppress them (Lintner 2015).

The Indian state has successfully, albeit at considerable cost, defeated every insurgency barring one. The Kashmir insurgency, which erupted in 1989, has been contained but has yet to be suppressed (Ganguly 1997). There are compelling reasons for India's failure to end the Kashmir insurgency. Kashmir, unlike the other cases, involves a significant territorial dispute. Also, since Kashmir is contiguous to Pakistan, the Pakistani state has been able to provide the Kashmiri insurgents with weaponry, training, logistics, and above all, sanctuaries. It has also organized, trained, and directed a series of insurgent groups to enter and wreak havoc in Indian-controlled Kashmir (Byman 2005; Swami 2007). Apart from Pakistani support, unlike the vast majority of the other insurgencies where disaffection with the Indian state was limited, the Kashmir conflict is fuelled by alienation from India on the part of many Kashmiris. Consequently, the Indian state has had considerable difficulty in interdicting this significant insurgency.

Apart from these insurgencies that have wracked the country, India has faced a renewed spate of ethno-religious violence in recent years. The sources of this discord are complex, but have much to do with growing levels of political mobilization, the decline of political institutions, and the exploitation of internal grievances by external actors (Ganguly 2008).

A recent episode underscored the seriousness of the threat from Pakistan. On 26 November 2008, a group of ten terrorists attacked two prominent hotels, a major railway station, and several other crowded venues in the city of Bombay (Mumbai). Over the next two days they battled local police and national commandos. After a two-day siege they were finally overpowered but after considerable loss of life. Based upon electronic intelligence intercepts, Indian officials asserted that the terrorists belonged to a notionally banned Pakistani terrorist group, the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Despite widespread public anger the government of India chose to exert concerted diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to end its involvement with terrorist organizations and chose not to use military force. Whether or not this strategy will yield the desired results remains an open question.

Current and future directions

All three branches of the Indian armed forces are now in the midst of a major modernization drive. Thanks to a growing economy, India is able to devote a greater share of its resources to defence spending and military modernization. Expanded defence spending is determined by a number of factors. First of all, the shelf-life of various weapons systems that the Indian armed forces had acquired in the 1980s and earlier is now expiring. Consequently, a new generation of weapons systems is required. The replacement of major weapons systems is most urgent in the Indian Air Force, which still relies on the obsolescent MiG-21 fighter. Attempts to acquire a new, Medium Multi-Range Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) have long stalled (Tellis 2011). Even after protracted negotiations with France to purchase 126 Rafale fighters the deal was not finally consummated. However, on a state visit to the country in April 2015, Prime Minister Modi chose to acquire 36 Rafale aircraft in a government-to-government agreement (Bagchi 2015).

In the meantime, despite significant cost overruns and an abject failure to develop an indigenous engine, the first version of India's domestically produced Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), Tejas, was handed over to the Indian Air Force (IAF). However, it will be at least another two to three years before the aircraft receives its final operational clearance and a full squadron is inducted into the IAF (Kumar 2015). Second, despite cosmetic improvements, the Indo-Pakistani relationship remains fraught despite some limited and fitful progress in the waning days of the Musharraf presidency. More to the point, as argued earlier, since the 2001–2 crisis, India has been seeking a new military doctrine designed to deal with Pakistani provocations short of provoking a full-scale war. Third, Indian military planners are still faced with growing and improved

Chinese military capabilities. In the absence of a settlement of the border dispute, the military considers it prudent to invest in the maintenance of an effective conventional deterrent force along the Himalayan border. Fourth and finally, India's defence modernization is also a product of its desire to protect its littoral regions and especially sea-lanes leading to the Persian Gulf. The protection of these sea-lanes is of critical importance to India because 70 per cent of India's oil is imported from the Persian Gulf region (Ganguly and Pardesi 2008).

Conclusion

Indian security policy is driven by certain constant factors, including the stand-off with Pakistan over Kashmir and the disputed border with the PRC. Beyond these factors, however, India is now also involved in a wider competitive relationship with the PRC. Indian policy-makers, fearful of provoking the PRC, are usually loath to admit publicly to the existence of such a competition. Nevertheless, India's force acquisitions clearly suggest that a revanchist PRC remains the country's principal long-term security concern. Such concerns have been exacerbated with increased Chinese naval activity in the Indian Ocean littoral and its growing presence in Myanmar (Burma) (for a discussion of Indian concerns about Chinese naval activity in the Indian Ocean, see International Institute of Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey, 2008). Unfortunately, past naval acquisitions continue to hobble India's naval ambitions. The former Soviet-era *Admiral Gorshkov*, acquired at considerable cost and after significant delays, was finally inducted into the Indian fleet in early 2015. However, shortly thereafter, the vessel, re-named the I. N. S. *Vikramaditya*, ran into operational problems thereby limiting its range (Anandan 2015).

Apart from these bilateral security concerns, given India's recent spurt in economic growth, its policy-makers now visualize a larger role for India in Asia (on India's economic prospects, see Panagariya 2008). India demonstrated its capability as a regional actor when its naval forces acted in concert with those of the US, Japan, Singapore, and Australia to provide relief to Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Indonesia after the tsunami in December 2004.

In the nuclear arena, India will continue to make modest investments in its incipient nuclear capabilities to pursue a secure but robust nuclear deterrent (Basrur 2006). Despite bureaucratic and scientific pressures, it is unlikely that Indian policy-makers will pursue a substantial nuclear arsenal. Such an arsenal would provoke regional adversaries and also place an undue burden on the Indian exchequer. This argument can be asserted with some authority, based upon India's propensity for fiscal prudence in matters of defence spending and its orientation towards incremental decision-making.

What is more disturbing, however, is the bureaucratic-scientific-technological momentum that seems to be driving India's quest for ballistic missile defence (BMD). India's policy-makers, in turn, appear to have seen the pursuit of BMD as a technological panacea to the strategic conundrum that Pakistan's reliance on asymmetric forces poses to its national security. With a deployed BMD capability, they believe that India can call Pakistan's bluff if it threatens to resort to nuclear weapons when faced with an Indian conventional response in the wake of a Pakistan-sponsored terrorist attack.

Unfortunately, given the high level of mistrust that pervades Indo-Pakistani relations, Pakistan's security establishment has construed India's quest for BMD as an attempt to establish escalation dominance. Not surprisingly, Pakistan has sought to diversify its nuclear arsenal and has started to invest in tactical nuclear weapons, thereby lowering the nuclear threshold. These developments, if not checked in tandem, could help undermine strategic stability in the region (O'Donnell and Joshi 2013).

Notes

- 1 E.g. Sagan (1996) traces the origins of the nuclear programme to what he terms the 'domestic politics model'.
- 2 For a detailed discussion, see Ganguly (1999).
- 3 On the concept of a 'limited probe', see George and Smoke (1974).

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