


This article was downloaded by: 10.3.97.143

On: 01 Apr 2023

Access details: *subscription number*

Publisher: *Routledge*

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK



Routledge Handbook of Security Studies

Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Thierry Balzacq

China's Rise: Counterproductive Fearmongering

Publication details

<https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315753393.ch22>

Jium Bang, David C. Kang

Published online on: 13 Jul 2016

How to cite :- Jium Bang, David C. Kang. 13 Jul 2016, *China's Rise: Counterproductive Fearmongering from:* Routledge Handbook of Security Studies Routledge

Accessed on: 01 Apr 2023

<https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315753393.ch22>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT

Full terms and conditions of use: <https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms>

This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

PART III

Regional (in)security

This Page is Intentionally Left Blank

22

CHINA'S RISE: COUNTERPRODUCTIVE FEARMONGERING

*Jiun Bang and David C. Kang**

Can China rise peacefully? For many, the answer is clearly *no*. In fact, John Mearsheimer (2014: 410–11) admits that his assessment is ‘downright depressing’ and hopes that actual developments will ‘contradict my theory and prove my predictions wrong’. For others like Zhu Feng (2008: 54), ‘China is a satisfied, cooperative, and peaceful country’. Indeed, China’s four decades of unprecedented economic growth and diplomatic dynamism have prompted tremendous diverging speculation about the regional and global implications (Goh 2007/8; Kang 2007; Ross 2006; Womack 2006). Although two balance-of-power blocs are unlikely to characterize contemporary East Asia, neither has China regained its place at the top of the regional hierarchy. Perhaps the most important question, then, regarding China’s emergence is whether contemporary China – operating in a Western-derived, Westphalian world order – can find a place for itself within this larger order that is both stable and legitimate.

The real tragedy here, of course, is that time has passed considerably since the first fearmongering about China’s ascent, and yet we are still stuck asking the same misleading question. *China has, in fact, already risen*. In this chapter, we show what this power transition entails in three parts. In the first, we describe Chinese regional dominance in general terms. In the second, we look at the aspect of armament in the region, a main factor for fears of instability in East Asia. We show that, contrary to many predictions, there is no arms race happening, and that the power transition, overall, is taking place peacefully. In the third, we focus on China’s regional and global economic impact, which further cements the picture of an overall peaceful power transition.

Power transition: general aspects

Although China has not passed the United States (US) on a global scale, by many measures China has already completed an Asian regional power transition. China’s share of regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1988 was 7.4 per cent; today it is 46 per cent, while Japan has fallen from 72 per cent of regional GDP in 1988 to 24 per cent today (Figure 22.1). In 1988, China’s share of East Asian trade was 6.6 per cent, while Japan’s share was 47 per cent (World Bank 2013). Today, China’s share of regional trade is 40 per cent, and Japan’s share is 12 per cent. Furthermore, despite decades of pessimistic predictions about the end of Chinese economic growth, China continues to grow at a higher rate than its neighbours (Goldstone 1995; Chang 2001).




Figure 22.1 China's and Japan's share of East Asian GDP, 1988–2013. Countries: Australia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam

Source of data: World Bank development indicators.

As for US–China relations, at almost any time since 1978 the US could have identified China as the most likely challenger to US hegemony, prompting a preventive war by the US. After all, China in 1988 produced 5.8 per cent of US GDP and today produces 55 per cent. Within less than thirty years, China has become second globally to the US in GDP and military expenditure. This growth was transparent, obvious, and massive.

China has already risen to regional dominance, and has done so without major war. Three decades of leaders in these countries have seen China's military and economic growth and have decided year after year not to contest that growth and not to prepare their militaries for war. It is probably unrealistic to argue that the US and East Asian governments have been so myopic that a generation of their foreign policy, political, and military leaders have been unable to see China's growth as a dominant East Asian actor and a potential challenger to the US. In short, while 'just wait' for East Asian balancing might have been a credible expectation in the mid-1980s or even the 1990s, that regional power transition is now complete. There is no doubt about which country will be the most powerful or have the largest economy. Rather, the only question in the region is *how big* that gap between China and its neighbours will become. If East Asian states were going to compete with China and attempt to keep up, they should have started long ago. Those who still expect a balancing or containment coalition to arise against China in the future instead need to explain why this has not yet occurred.

Although China's ascent carries global implications, its impact is felt most directly, and most immediately, in East Asia. While China may have achieved regional pre-eminence, it clearly has not yet become a global force similar to that of the US. Not surprisingly, some notable scholars in China have had no problems with roughly equating China's regional strategy to that of its

grand strategy given its 'very limited global interests' (Zhang and Tang 2005: 48). It is easy to play up China as a donor of aid – particularly to countries in Africa – and easy to forget its dual role as a recipient. In fact, China is eligible for World Bank lending as one of twenty-four developing countries identified in East Asia and the Pacific (alongside Fiji, North Korea, and Palau), and has loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) totalling a sum (original principal) of \$571.5 million in the three-month period ending on 31 March 2015 (World Bank Group 2015).

Nevertheless, while US leaders might have ignored China's growth for the time being, it is now clear that China is the most likely long-run challenger to the US. One reason that a preventive war or even major tensions between China and the US have not occurred lies in the fact that the two are negotiating a different issue from those typically identified by rationalists. Although, in theory, states can negotiate over any issue that involves revising the status quo, Powell (2002: 8) notes that it is 'usually about territory'. The US and China do not have territorial disputes, nor do they debate the gains from trade (Gartzke 2007; Lake 2010/11; Powell 1999). While the US and China might bicker about economic issues such as China's monetary and trade policies, the US has made no attempt to sanction China, nor has it attempted to slow Chinese economic growth in any way. In fact, the US has been an important element in supporting China's generation-long economic growth. The only major issue between the US and China involves *status* – which country is the East Asian leader? Which country is the global hegemon? What status is, how it is measured, and how it is achieved is much more nebulous than disputes that are normally studied in the context of war.

What arms race?

East Asia has numerous factors that many pundits and scholars identify as dangerous for rivalry and war. In fact, there is increasing discussion that East Asia is experiencing an arms race, that the regional security dilemma is intensifying, and that balancing against China is in the offing. Coupled with a muscular US rebalancing effort toward the Pacific, many view the developments in the region to be unsettling and ripe for rivalry (Friedberg 2011; Goldstein 2013; Liff and Ikenberry 2014; Mearsheimer 2010, 2014).¹ Indeed, the debate over whether China's rise will provoke fear in its East Asian neighbours and concomitant balancing behaviour has been raging for at least two decades (Acharya 2007, 2014; Betts 1993; Fravel 2012; Friedberg 1993; Johnston 2012, 2013; Swaine and Fravel 2011; Taylor 2014; Womack 2009).

On the one hand, there are the traditional power transition theorists, who have described American strategic thinking as 'stale' for being too consumed by the conflicts in Iraq and the Middle East, when it really is the US–China dyad that has the singular potential for major war (Tammen and Kugler 2006). This is coupled with threat-based arguments as espoused by Friedberg (1993, 2011), Goldstein (2013b), and Mearsheimer (2010, 2014) that give structural reasons for why China inevitably will challenge the status quo, the US, and regional peace and security architecture.

There is strong belief in a steadfast positive correlation between expansion in material capabilities and national interests in ways that may raise the likelihood of a US–China confrontation, so that 'Today's environment might be even more dangerous [than the Cold War]' (Goldstein 2013a). Though less emphatic, others, like Betts (1993), still choose to emphasize the importance of the balance of power and assess potential scenarios for instability that are based on the number of 'poles' present (unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity), and Tellis (2014: 17) cautions against the internal factors that could be disruptive, such as pernicious nationalism.

Nonetheless, there are a number of scholars who see more possibility for continued regional and global stability. They focus on the choices that China and other countries will make, rather than structural characteristics of size or some endogenous destabilizing quality possessed by the

actor. For example, Acharya (2003/04; 2014) believes that tendencies such as market liberalism, economic interdependence, and security multilateralism (along with the US hub-and-spokes model) have been quite underestimated, and these dynamics are what differentiates the current security landscape from that of the immediate aftermath of the Second World War.²

Johnston (2003, 2008, 2013) makes a lucid argument for why China actually has limited aims and is increasingly a status quo power despite accusations to the contrary, which is in part echoed by others like Swaine and Fravel (2011) who weigh in on the ‘assertive or not’ debate with their finding that there has not been much alteration in China’s long-standing strategy on maritime sovereignty disputes: ‘such actions have not constituted unilateral attempts to resolve a particular issue by force or otherwise reject a preference for negotiation. When possible, Beijing has attempted to maintain an emphasis on bilateral negotiation and avoid conflict’.

On several occasions, Fravel (2010, 2011, 2012) has used the rationalist logic to make it clear that China’s strategic goals for its military are largely conservative rather than expansionist, mostly because the likely benefits from expansion are low, and so in the end, it does not really pay for China to engage in aggression. Some (Huang 2013a, 2013b) have chosen a more norms-driven framework by examining the process of socialization and avenues for status-enhancing, which may serve to tame China’s ambitions and mediate potentially disruptive outcomes.

One way to begin adjudicating between these two approaches is to explore what East Asian states are actually doing in response to China’s rise. If East Asian states are not, in fact, arming themselves as much as is widely believed, and if they are thus not in fact balancing China, then major




Figure 22.2 East Asian and Latin American defence spending, 1988–2013 (% of GDP). East Asia: Australia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam. Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela

Source of data: Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), <http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>, 2014.

contours of the debate about China's rise and East Asian security need to be seriously re-evaluated. It so happens that data on the East Asian defence effort reveals that East Asian military expenditures have declined fairly significantly over the past quarter-century. As shown in Figure 22.2, the eleven major East Asian countries (including China) devoted an average of 3.35 per cent of their economies to military expenditures in 1988, but by 2013 that average was 1.86 per cent of GDP (SIPRI 2014). Furthermore, the gap between East Asian and Latin American spending has narrowed considerably. In 2013, Latin American countries devoted an average of 1.72 per cent of their economies to the military.

Even measured in absolute terms, recent Japanese defence expenditures rose only 27 per cent over 25 years when adjusted for inflation, and Japanese Prime Minister Abe's proposed increases will total only 5 per cent by 2018 (Figure 22.3). In fact, Japan (-0.2 per cent), Taiwan (-2.6 per cent), and Australia (-3.5 per cent) all *decreased* defence spending slightly in 2013, despite the knee-jerk reaction to assume some military build-up is ongoing. Vietnam's increase in 2013 was 2.4 per cent, Singapore's 2.1 per cent.

A common explanation for low military expenditures and threat perceptions in East Asia emphasizes the reassuring character of the US security presence in the region. It is widely believed that US military presence in the Pacific dampens regional conflicts, reassures allies, and deters regional states from seeking hegemony. For example, Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth (2012: 37) argue that US retrenchment would lead to greater regional insecurity, which 'could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Jordan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all choose to create nuclear forces'. Stephen Walt (2006) argues for less US commitment abroad precisely because he believes US allies are spending less than they would otherwise.




Figure 22.3 China's rivals 2001–2013

Source of data: SIPRI 2014.

With that said, is there empirical evidence that US allies are under-spending because a US security umbrella allows them a free ride on defence? If this were the case, we would expect that non-US allies would spend more on their militaries than US allies. However, East Asian countries with a US alliance (as identified by the US State Department) and those lacking a US alliance have similar military expenditures (Figure 22.4). While there was a notable difference in defence spending at the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, defence expenditures quickly became similar.

While it is plausible that the US would defend its treaty allies from direct threats to their national survival, it is far less clear that the US would engage in a major war with China over maritime disputes in which it has no direct stake. This arises because of moral hazard in alliances: too clear a US commitment to its allies may embolden them to take risky actions because they believe the US will support them, drawing the US into a war that it does not want to fight (Kelly 2014). The US is thus careful about clarifying or extending its security guarantees to its alliance partners.

This point is also picked up by Hugh White (2012), who has suggested a ‘third way’ rather than either unconditional US support or retreat from the region, by creating a power-sharing scheme as represented by a ‘Concert of Asia’ that resembles the Concert of Europe that existed from the 1800s to the early 1900s. From the perspective of East Asian states, the US alliance system may be reassuring about national survival, but it is unlikely to ever be a complete military guarantee against all contingencies. The fact that there are voices within the US that call for negotiating a ‘grand bargain’ that involves the US ending its commitment to defend Taiwan against possible Chinese aggression in return for a peaceful resolution of the land and maritime disputes in the South China and East China Seas, along with Chinese acceptance of a long-term US military role in East Asia, is testament to the illusion of blanket guarantees (Glaser 2015).




Figure 22.4 US allies and non-allies. Allies: Australia, Japan, Korea, Philippines, Thailand, non-allies: China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan, Vietnam

Source of data: SIPRI 2014.

In sum, the data reveal that, measured as a proportion of their economy, the East Asian defence effort in 2013 was almost half of what it was in 1988. With rapid economic growth outpacing other regions of the world over the past generation, East Asian absolute expenditures on defence have increased. Yet East Asian governments appear to have chosen to increase their expenditures at a lower rate than Latin America, despite achieving higher economic growth. The real surprise in the data, however, is the *lack* of response by China's regional neighbours. In short, by almost any measure, East Asia looks like Latin America in terms of military expenditures.

The explanation for continued low military expenditures and a peaceful power transition in East Asia is actually quite simple: few states fear for their survival, and hence they are not arming as if they do. Competing maritime claims in the South China Seas do not deny the right of any state in the region to exist, except for Taiwan. The US and China may be facing off over regional hegemony, but few other states feel the necessity to choose sides. Given that the stakes are actually fairly low, it is not surprising that few states appear willing to make the costly domestic and economic trade-offs that would be required for major and sustained investments in militaries. In fact, some (Christensen 2006: 120) have even noted that in the wake of 9/11, 'US-Indian strategic cooperation has apparently catalysed Sino-Indian cooperation and confidence building', because China takes a proactive and accommodating position on economic interaction. Hence, it is misleading to think that states are necessarily forced into different camps or that such alignments may automatically entail negative implications.

China's global economic impact

Compared to the Soviet challenge of the twentieth century, which posed an ideological and economic alternative to the West, China poses at most a potential military challenge, and one that will occur far in the future. In fact, even the most pessimistic of predictions regarding China's military intentions do not envision a direct threat to the US itself. Rather, those who see a military conflict between the US and China envision disputes over interests in the western Pacific. This is not to discount the potential military threat that China poses to the US and to its ability to project power in East Asia – that potential is real. Rather, compared to the military threat presented by the Soviet Union, China as yet does not pose the same type of threat.

Economically, China has become what it is today by embracing essentially a free market system, beginning with the 1978 economic reforms in which Deng Xiaoping declared that 'to get rich is glorious'. China experienced over thirty-five years of astounding economic growth, not by competing with capitalism, but rather by embracing it. As such, although there is some discussion of a 'Beijing consensus', the reality is that a fundamental reliance on market forces and decentralized production and consumption – the roots of market capitalism – is what drives the Chinese economy (Pei 1994).

Most importantly, neither the Chinese state, nor even the Chinese Communist Party, presents an alternative ideological or normative belief system in contrast to the reigning Western orthodoxy. Communism remains the state ideology in name only. Perhaps the greatest issue facing the Chinese leadership and people in the future will be the articulation of a set of values and beliefs that can animate both domestic politics and its foreign policies, and that other countries and peoples find legitimate. Today, China's beliefs do not exist in any coherent form (Gill and Huang 2006).

Is Chinese power rising in economic and social relations? During the Cold War, the US placed an embargo on trade with the Soviet Union because it felt there were security externalities to trade – that is, international trade would benefit the Soviet Union. In the case of China and its neighbours, the opposite has occurred: all regional countries are rapidly increasing their economic relations with China. In fact, what is most surprising is not that China has become

the largest trading partner of South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, but the speed with which the transition took place. Less than twenty years ago Chinese trade was little more than 3 per cent of South Korean trade, whereas by 2011 it had become over 20 per cent of total trade. In contrast, US shares of Korean total trade dropped from 28 per cent in 1990 to under 10 per cent by 2011, with similar declines in Japan's share of Korea's total trade. The Japanese and Taiwanese patterns are just as dramatic: Japanese trade with China was 3 per cent in 1990 and over 20 per cent by 2011; while US trade with Japan dropped from 28 per cent in 1990 to less 12 per cent in 2011. Taiwan shows a similar pattern, and again, China's share of trade has come directly at the expense of the US and Japan. Japan's trade deficit with China in 2013 – US\$52 billion – is expected to grow even larger in 2014.

Investment, trade, and financial flows between north-east Asian countries and China continue to increase rapidly, despite political rivalry that dominates the headlines. Over one million Taiwanese now conduct business in mainland China – almost 5 per cent of the entire Taiwanese population (Richburg 2010). Thus, while there is fear about potential Chinese economic domination, regional firms and individuals have clearly voted with their feet, and there is no hint of any move in South Korea to limit or retard economic interactions between the two countries.

The movement of people is also illuminating. For instance, South Koreans flock to the US to study, but they are increasingly also going to China. In 2012, 33 per cent of all foreign students in China came from South Korea, or 62,855 South Korean students; this number is close to the 72,000 South Korean students currently studying in the US (Yonhap New Agency 2013). Although the overall number of Japanese students studying abroad has declined during the past two decades, according to Japan's Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) (2015), from a total of 60,138 Japanese nationals studying overseas in 2012, 21,126 were studying in China (an increase of 2,637 from the previous year) compared to a slightly lower figure of 19,568 in the US (a decrease of 398). According to the Japan National Tourism Organization (JNTO), a record 13.4 million foreign tourists travelled to Japan in 2014 (up from 10.8 million the previous year), with visitors from China representing 2.4 million, which marks an increase of 83 per cent. In fact, there were so many Chinese tourists flocking to Japan that Laox, a Chinese-owned duty-free chain catering to Chinese visitors to Japan, witnessed an increase of 1,400 per cent on its stock since 2012 (Minter 2015).

Yet China's global economic role is not limited to East Asia. Perhaps, most dramatically, founding members of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) included India, Vietnam, the Philippines, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Germany. While India and China have not resolved their border dispute, they also have a complex and multifaceted relationship. Both are facing similar pressures, being placed in the top five annual net importers of oil, with China surpassing the US to become number one in 2014, and India at fourth (US Energy Information Administration 2015). China, out of sheer necessity, will need to navigate its relations beyond its immediate regional neighbourhood, especially as it has diversified its sources of crude oil imports, so that the six countries that make up just over 60 per cent of China's total imports represent different parts of the world: Saudi Arabia (19 per cent), Angola (13 per cent), Russia (11 per cent), Oman (10 per cent), Iraq (9 per cent), and Iran (9 per cent) (US Energy Information Administration 2015). Even as South African president Jacob Zuma was cancelling his scheduled appearance at the Asian-African Conference in Indonesia (19–24 April 2015) to address ongoing anti-immigration riots at home, China was emphasizing the spirit of trans-continental cooperation at the summit, as well as lodging a protest with the South African police and asking them to ensure the safety of the Chinese people (Mkhize 2015). Like it or not, China will be pulled in multiple directions, reinforcing the incentive to figure out its role and impacts on a global platform.

Conclusion: power transitions and post-hoc arguments

Although China remains more a regional than global actor, China is increasingly the gravitational centre of East Asia. In many areas, East Asia looks more politically stable, economically prosperous, and integrated than it did a quarter-century ago. However, while the longer-term regional trends are all positive, the point of disconnect needs to be identified. First, regional multilateral architecture has developed, providing greater confidence in the region's ability to manage differences in the post-Cold War era. Second, China's phenomenal economic growth has propelled it into the role of regional hub of economic investment and trade, and this has produced even greater and less costly opportunities for the economies of Asia. The evidence on military spending leads to the conclusion that although the region does contain potential flashpoints, countries are seeking ways to manage relations with each other that emphasize institutional, diplomatic, and economic solutions rather than purely military solutions. However, identifying whether and when this rather reassuring vision of the region may erode will be important.

For China, sceptics have been predicting an end to rapid Chinese economic growth ever since it began under Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s (Chang 2001). There is no doubt that China's economic model faces tremendous challenges, and Minxin Pei wrote in 2012 that, 'The latest news from Beijing is indicative of Chinese weakness: a persistent slowdown of economic growth, a glut of unsold goods, rising bad bank loans, a bursting real-estate bubble, and a vicious power struggle at the top, coupled with unending political scandals'. East Asia remains in flux, and far from having deeply stable relations among all the countries in the region.

Today, as China increasingly appears poised to 're-emerge' as the most materially powerful country in East Asia, there is a corresponding question about whether or not China can enjoy the normative power that it once held. China has a long way to go before becoming a leader. Although China may already be – or may soon become – the largest economic and military power in East Asia, it has virtually no cultural or political legitimacy as a leading state. The difference between China at the height of its hegemony five centuries ago and China today is most clearly reflected in the fact that nobody today thinks that China is still the civilizational centre of the world: few contemporary East Asian states or peoples look to China for cultural innovation or for practical solutions to present problems.

Given the changes in the international system and the central place of the US, there is almost no chance that China will become the East Asian regional hegemon, much less challenge the US globally. Too much has changed for that to happen, and the US – even as it adjusts to changing circumstances – is not going to disappear from the region. Perhaps the more important question is whether the US and China can come to some type of accommodation and agreement on each other's roles and their relations with each other. While, to date, both the US and China are working to accommodate each other and stabilize their relations, that process is far from complete. How these two countries manage East Asian leadership, the status they accord each other, and how other regional countries come to view them will be central aspects of whether or not the future of East Asian international relations is one of increasing stability.

Admittedly, there are countries in the region that are starting to feel that they are having to make decisions on mutually exclusive issues that have come to represent 'sides', e.g. the case of South Korea, regarding the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) by the US and joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) led by China. It may be that some day East Asian countries will make a clear choice and openly ask for US primacy, and begin outright to balance against China. China and the US may indeed divide up the region into two blocs. But neither has yet happened, and until it does, scholars might be wise to consider carefully the possibility that the future of East Asia may lie between these two extremes.

The more solemn voices may be right, and – just wait – the region may be heading towards a classic bipolar confrontation where containment, blocs, and military deterrence are at the forefront. However, the evidence on military spending leads to the conclusion that although the region does contain potential flashpoints, countries are seeking ways to manage relations with each other and with China that emphasize institutional, diplomatic, and economic solutions, rather than purely military ones. It may be useful to end with some caution on the follies of mischaracterizing the dynamics surrounding China and the region and reading too much into something that is not necessarily there. As Fravel and Twomey (2015: 183) have nicely pointed out, ‘the tendency of “memes” [on China] to reverberate in a charged domestic political echo chamber in the US is large and counterproductive’. The same goes for those that abound at the international level.

Notes

* Research was partially supported by the MacArthur Foundation and Korea Foundation.

1 For a counter-argument, see Fu (2015).

2 Short of claiming that there will be peace of the ‘positive’ variant, he does state that there is potential for constraining the power-maximizing behaviour of China while restraining extreme balancing/containment by the US and its allies.

References

- Acharya, A. (2003/04) ‘Will Asia’s Past Be Its Future?’, *International Security* 28(3): 149–64.
- Acharya, A. (2007) ‘The Emerging Regional Architecture of World Politics’, *World Politics* 59(4): 629–52.
- Acharya, A. (2014) ‘Power Shift or Paradigm Shift? China’s Rise and Asia’s Emerging Security Order’, *International Studies Quarterly* 58(1): 158–73.
- Betts, R. K. (1993) ‘Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War’, *International Security* 18(3): 34–77.
- Brooks, S., Ikenberry, J. G., and Wohlforth W. (2012) ‘Don’t Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment’, *International Security* 37(2): 7–51.
- Chang, G. (2001) *China’s Coming Collapse*, New York: Random House.
- Christensen, T. (2006) ‘Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and US Policy toward East Asia’, *International Security* 31(1): 81–126.
- Feng, Z. (2008) ‘China’s Rise Will Be Peaceful: How Unipolarity Matters’, in R. S. Ross. and Z. Feng (eds.) *China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 34–54.
- Fravel, M. T. (2010) ‘International Relations Theory and China’s Rise: Assessing China’s Potential for Territorial Expansion’, *International Studies Review* 12(4): 505–32.
- Fravel, M. T. (2011) ‘China’s Strategy in the South China Sea’, *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 33(3): 292–319.
- Fravel, M. T. (2012) ‘All Quiet in the South China Sea: Why China is Playing Nice (for Now)’, *Foreign Affairs*, March 22. Online. Available HTTP: <<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2012-03-22/all-quiet-south-china-sea>> (accessed 6 June 2016).
- Fravel, M. T. and Twomey, C. P. (2015) ‘Projecting Strategy: The Myth of Chinese Counter-Intervention’, *The Washington Quarterly* 37(4): 171–87.
- Friedberg, A. (1993) ‘Ripe for Rivalry’, *International Security* 18(3): 5–33.
- Friedberg, A. (2011) *Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia*, New York: W. W. Norton.
- Fu, R. T. (2015) ‘Correspondence: Looking for Asia’s Security Dilemma’, *International Security* 40(2): 181–204.
- Gartzke, E. (2007) ‘The Capitalist Peace’, *American Journal of Political Science* 51(1): 166–91.
- Gill, B. and Huang, Y. (2006) ‘The Sources and Limits of Beijing’s Soft Power’, *Survival* 48(2): 17–36.
- Glaser, C. L. (2015) ‘A US–China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation’, *International Security* 39(4): 49–90.
- Goh, E. (2007/08) ‘Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies’, *International Security* 32(3): 113–57.

- Goldstein, A. (2013a) 'China's Real and Present Danger', *Foreign Affairs* 92(5): 136.
- Goldstein, A. (2013b) 'First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in US–China Relations', *International Security* 37(4): 49–89.
- Goldstone, J. (1995) 'The Coming Chinese Collapse', *Foreign Policy* 99: 35–42.
- Japan Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) (2015) 'The Number of Japanese Nationals Studying Overseas and the Annual Survey of International Students in Japan', 27 February. Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.mext.go.jp/english/topics/1357495.htm>> (accessed 20 May 2015).
- Japan National Tourism Organization (JNTO) (2014) 'Foreign visitors and Japanese departures'. Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.jnto.go.jp/eng/ttp/sta/PDF/E2014.pdf>> (accessed 20 May 2015).
- Johnston, A. I. (2003) 'Is China a Status Quo Power?', *International Security* 27(4): 5–56.
- Johnston, A. I. (2008) *Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Johnston, A. I. (2012) 'What (if Anything) Does East Asia Tell Us about International Relations Theory?', *Annual Review of Political Science* 15: 53–78.
- Johnston, A. I. (2013) 'How New and Assertive is China's New Assertiveness?', *International Security* 37, 4: 7–48.
- Kang, D. C. (2007) *China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Kelly, R. E. (2014) 'Moral Hazard: Japan–South Korea Relations and International Relations Theory', *The Interpreter*, 16 January. Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/01/16/Entrapment-vs-moral-hazard-in-US-alliances-in-Asia.aspx?COLLCC=976462795&>> (accessed 20 May 2015).
- Lake, D. (2010/11) 'Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War', *International Security* 35(3): 7–52.
- Liff, A. and Ikenberry, J. (2014) 'Racing toward Tragedy?: China's Rise, Military Competition in the Asia Pacific, and The Security Dilemma', *International Security* 39(2): 52–91.
- Mearsheimer, J. (2010) 'The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia', *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 3: 381–96.
- Mearsheimer, J. (2014)[2003]) *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Minter, A. (2015) 'Why Chinese Tourists Love Japan', *Bloomberg View*, 25 March. Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-03-25/why-chinese-tourists-love-japan>> (accessed 20 May 2015).
- Mkhize, D. (2015) 'Update: 4–Anti-Immigrant Unrest Hits S. Africa as Zuma Condemns Violence', *Reuters*, 16 April. Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/16/safrica-violence-idUSL5N0XD2MF20150416>> (accessed 15 May 2015).
- Pei, M. (1994) *From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and the Soviet Union*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Powell, R. (1999) *In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Powell, R. (2002) 'Bargaining Theory and International Conflict', *Annual Review of Political Science* 5: 1–30.
- Richburg, K. (2010) 'Despite a Government Standoff, People of China and Taiwan Increasingly Mingle', *Washington Post*, 20 July. Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/07/19/AR2010071905247.html>> (accessed 20 May 2015).
- Ross, R. (2006) 'Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia', *Security Studies* 15(3): 355–95.
- Stockholm Institute for Peace Research (SIPRI) (2014) 'SIPRI Military Expenditure Database'. Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>> (accessed 20 May 2015).
- Swaine, M. and Fravel, M. T. (2011) 'China's Assertive Behavior, Part Two: The Maritime Periphery', *China Leadership Monitor* 35: 1–29.
- Tammen, R. and Kugler, J. (2006) 'Power Transition and China–US Conflicts', *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 1: 35–55.
- Taylor, B. (2014) 'The South China Sea Is Not a Flashpoint', *Washington Quarterly* 37(1): 99–111.
- Tellis, A. J. (2014) *Balancing without Containment: An American Strategy for Managing China*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- US Department of State (n.d.) 'US Collective Defense Arrangements'. Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/collectivedefense/>> (accessed 20 May 2015).

- US Energy Information Administration (2015) 'China', 14 May. Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ch>> (accessed 20 May 2015).
- Walt, S. (2006) *Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy*, New York: W. W. Norton.
- White, H. (2012) *The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power*, Sydney: Black.
- Womack, B. (2006) *China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Womack, B. (2009) *China among Unequals*, Singapore: World Scientific.
- World Bank (2013) 'World Development Indicators Online'. Online. Available HTTP: <<http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>> (accessed 20 May 2015).
- World Bank Group Finances (2015) 'Country Profile on China'. Online. Available HTTP: <<https://finances.worldbank.org/en/countries/China>> (accessed 20 May 2015).
- Yonhap New Agency (2013) 'S. Korean Students in China Quadruple in 11 Years', 2 October. Online. Available HTTP: <<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/10/02/25/0302000000AEN20131002002500315F.html>> (accessed 20 May 2015).
- Zhang, Y. and Tang, S. (2005) 'China's Regional Strategy', in D. Shambaugh (ed.) *Power Shift China and Asia's New Dynamics*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 48–68.