


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### **Organized Crime**

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# 14

## ORGANIZED CRIME

*Adam Edwards*

‘Organized crime’ is now a major focus for public policy, as exemplified in the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (Edwards and Gill 2003; UNODC 2004) and, in Europe, its prominence on the EU’s agenda for creating an ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’. In turn, this agenda has generated a whole new genre of policy-oriented learning, the ‘threat assessment’ of organized crime, which endeavours to provide policy-makers with an understanding of current organized crime patterns, in particular concerns about ‘transnational’ crimes resulting from the greater mobility of people and goods across borders, and to inform the targeting and coordination of efforts at prevention (EU OCTA 2006 and *passim*; EU SOCTA 2013; EU iOCTA 2014). As such, threat assessments of organized crime exemplify the more profound logic of security, to anticipate and prevent especially serious threats to public safety, as contrasted with the retrospective logic of criminal justice which seeks guilt for predicate offences after the fact of their commission. This policy shift from criminal justice to security, from prosecution on the facts to the prevention of threats yet to be realized, is controversial both for its challenge to principles of due process and because of concerns over the unintended consequences of pre-emptive interventions.

In the social science research community, however, the very concept of organized crime is controversial. Some consider it to be little more than a political construct, used by policy elites in the liberal democracies to depict themselves as primarily the victims of ‘alien’ threats from a familiar rogues’ gallery of organized crime groups (OCGs): ‘Cosa Nostra’, ‘Columbian cartels’, ‘Chinese triads’, ‘Russian Mafiya’, etc. (Woodiwiss 2003; Woodiwiss and Hobbs 2009). Others identify a self-referential bureaucratic politics at play in the construction of organized crime threats as problems of law enforcement implying law enforcement solutions, including innovations in confiscating the proceeds of crime (Sheptycki 2003; van Duyne and Vander Beken 2009).

Counterpoised to the threat assessment industry and its sceptics, however, is an emerging field of research which focuses analysis on the organization of serious crimes, including the opportunities for their commission and the social relations which these imply (Edwards and Levi 2008). This analytical shift has generated an energetic research programme concerned with the ‘crime scripts’ or *modus operandi* employed by criminal organizations to commission different types of crime (Cornish and Clarke 2002; Levi and Maguire 2004), the ‘scenarios’ which are more or less conducive to the organization of these crimes (Vander Beken and Verfaillie 2010), the normative, as well as empirical, inquiry into the ‘social harms’ that qualify certain types of crime as ‘serious’

Table 14.1 Organised crime policy trends and their analytical focus

<i>Trend</i>	<i>Analytical Focus</i>
The actor-orientation (1): conspirators	Organised crime groups (OCGs)
The actor-orientation (2): illegal entrepreneurs	Illicit networks
The actor-orientation (3): poly-criminals	'Potpourri' of 'threat indicators': OCGs SOCs (Serious organised crime areas) CRFs (Crime-relevant factors) Effects of OCGs + SOCs on EU society
Organisation of serious crimes: commissioning	Scripts, scenes, and scenarios

priorities for governmental action (Greenfield and Paoli 2010), and the conditions or 'scenes' in which these scripts are played out.

This analytical shift has had an impact on policy trends, partly influencing the European Council's 2006 decision on the remit of Europol (the European Policing agency) to shift the scope of its work from 'organized crime' to 'serious crime' (Dorn 2008). The primary location of this shift in thinking has, however, been in the academy and its pressure on policy-makers, as in the Royal United Services Institute's programme of research on organized crime (RUSI 2013). To place this more recent trend in context and as a precursor to discussing its implications for the policy-research relationship, it is possible to distinguish three other dominant policy trends, each with their own distinctive analytical focus (see Table 14.1). This chapter has four main parts, one on each trend.

### **The actor-orientation (1): conspirators**

Histories of the definition of 'organized crime' as an official category and focus for policy identify its origins in American law enforcement (Woodiwiss 2003). One of the earliest uses of the concept has been traced back to the 1896 report of the New York Society for the Prevention of Crime into racketeering, gambling, and prostitution. Both here, and in the US National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (the Wickersham Commission 1929–31), the problem is defined in terms of the political and economic conditions generating racketeering, including the corruption and collusion of public officials in municipal government (Smith 1991; Woodiwiss 2003).

Post-Second World War, however, historians identify a major shift in policy discourse. 'What' questions about the kinds of crime that were being organized and how they were organized became less important than questions about 'who' was doing the organizing, in particular concerns about the influence of foreign career criminals (Smith 1991). Critics of this analytical shift refer to the new concept of organized crime as an 'alien conspiracy theory', epitomized by the proceedings of the 1950 Kefauver Senate Investigating Committee (on 'organized crime in interstate commerce') which was preoccupied with the organization of criminal conspiracies around ethnic groups, in particular those emanating from the Italian-American community. Whilst the Kefauver Committee continued the Wickersham Commission's concern with the role of officialdom in the facilitation of criminal enterprises, it promoted the now familiar distinction between the 'upper world' of legitimate commerce and government and the 'underworld' of criminal conspiracies (Paoli and Fijnaut 2004).

The Kefauver Committee popularized the idea of 'a nationwide crime syndicate known as the Mafia, whose tentacles are found in many large cities' (United States Senate 1951: 131).

Mafia imagery subsequently dominated policy discourse in the US. The concept of organized crime as the consequence of ethnically based syndicates with international connections was given academic credibility through Donald Cressey's contribution to Lyndon Johnson's 1967 Presidential Task Force on Organized Crime. Cressey's (1969) landmark text, *Theft of a Nation*, represented organized crime in the US as a shadow state, mirror-imaging the hierarchically-organized rational bureaucracies of the law enforcement agencies charged with tackling 'it'.

These core aspects of the Cressey model also clarify the purposes of the principal law enforcement instrument that came out of the Johnson Task Force, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupted Organizations (RICO) statute of 1970, to prosecute membership of criminal enterprises involved in predicate offences. The analytical preoccupation with OCGs received a 'pluralist' revision in Ronald Reagan's Presidential Commission on Organized Crime, which retained a focus on the threat posed by ethnically based conspiracies but broadened the scope beyond the Mafia to accommodate the perceived impact of 'Colombian cartels', the Japanese Yakuza, and Russian groups, etc. It was also under the auspices of the Regan Commission that a strict dichotomy between the upper world of legitimate finance and public administration, and the underworld of criminal conspiracies was consolidated, with negligible attention given to the role of corporations and officialdom in the facilitation of organized crime (Potter 1994).

The lineage of the alien conspiracy theory continues through to present representations of 'transnational' organized crime in other regions, particularly in Europe post-Soviet Union, and can be discerned in the EU's threat assessments (see below). Within the American 'home' of the concept of organized crime, however, this theory has been challenged by those arguing that much illegal market activity, particularly in the narcotics markets, operates in a 'disorganized way' and is better conceptualized in terms of marketplace dynamics (Naylor 1997; Reuter 1983).

### **The actor-orientation (2): illegal entrepreneurs**

Conceptualizing organized crime in terms of illicit enterprise has also been a defining characteristic of much European policy activity in relation to organized crime. The analytical concern with enterprise has the advantage of shifting policy change and learning away from the blunt, ethnocentric, and potentially bigoted focus on ethnically defined groups (without denying that ethnicity and kinship can be employed as resources for organizing illicit markets). It accommodates looser partnerships of co-offenders and consequently acknowledges the phenomenon of project crimes arranged by networks of illicit entrepreneurs brought together by 'criminal contact brokers' for the purposes of commissioning particular offences (Hobbs 2001; Klerks 2003). The use of social network analysis to conceptualize and explain such project crimes has become a key focus of academic research, for example on human trafficking (Campana 2015) or gun crime (Oatley and Crick 2015).

Even so, analysis of the structural properties of organized crime problems, in particular their accomplishment through social networks of entrepreneurs, still privileges a focus on particular co-offenders rather than the assemblage of these actors and the necessary resources for organizing serious crimes in conditions that are conducive. As a consequence, there is a danger of repeating the reductionist explanation of conspiracy theorists only this time reducing the policy problem to the structural properties of 'the network' of entrepreneurs rather than 'the syndicate' of alien conspirators.

In addition, the looser definition of organized crime as illicit entrepreneurship has attracted criticism for simply adding to the ambivalence of a policy construction that accommodates activities ranging from tax fraud through to drugs trafficking and terrorist activity and actors as diverse as the Italian Cosa Nostra through to youth gangs (Fijnaut et al. 1998). Paoli and Fijnaut (2004: 41) conclude their history of the concept of organized crime by arguing:

Its very plurality of meanings, explaining its recent success in world public debate, and making it a catchy label to signify popular anxieties and foster legislative changes, hinders the full transformation of organized crime into a clear-cut legal category. Despite the definitional efforts made by several domestic governments and international organizations, organized crime [...] remains a vague and ambiguous catchphrase, the application of which inevitably entails varying – but usually high – degrees of arbitrariness.

### The actor-orientation (3): poly-criminals

One response to this definitional problem has been to replace the search for an all-encompassing definition with evolving content definitions of emerging threats and risks. This approach can be discerned in the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and, more explicitly still, in the European Union's annual Organized Crime Threat Assessments (the 'OCTA'), which commenced in 2006 and concluded in 2011 before being replaced by the current EU Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment (the 'SOCTA'), first published in 2013 covering the 2013–2017 period with an 'interim assessment' expected in 2015.<sup>1</sup>

Reviewing the journey from OCTA to SOCTA provides a means of tracing the evolution of thinking about organized crime in elite European policy-making circles over the past decade and, within this thinking, the particular importance of the threat assessment as a new genre of policy-making. The replacement of the EU Organized Crime Situation Reports (OCSR) by the OCTA in 2006 was justified on the grounds that transnational OCGs were outwitting and outflanking the capacities of national police and intelligence agencies, and this warranted both a transnational response from European-wide agencies such as Europol and one that aimed to anticipate and pre-empt, not simply react to, problems of transnational organized crime. In these terms the ambition of the OCTA was to inform the anticipatory governance of transnational organized crime problems and to justify pre-emptive interventions. As such it is a significant shift in governmentality from 'criminal justice', the retrospective detection and prosecution of suspects 'on the facts' of offences already committed, to 'security' and the justification of pre-emptive interventions against suspects yet to offend. Given the gravity of this shift for due process and allied risks of miscarriages of justice, it is worth reflecting on developments in threat assessment and the fitness for purpose of this policy genre in warranting pre-emptive intervention.

Whilst adding to the range of factors considered in threat assessments, this policy trend has continued the tendency in other actor-oriented accounts to treat organized crime as a collective noun, a singular thing, rather than a variegated process. As a consequence, more elaborate content definitions of this thing have only resulted in a 'potpourri' of factors to be considered, rather than their assemblage into something that realist social scientists would recognize as resembling an explanation with a clear explanandum (the thing to be explained) and related explanans (the premises that explain 'the thing' and their antecedent conditions) (Keat and Urry 1981: 10, 248–9).

The absence of clear explanatory thinking in the policy process for security strategies premised on pre-emptive intervention ought to provoke considerable concern. It would be disconcerting enough if, in Paoli and Fijnaut's (2004) terms, policy-oriented learning about retrospective law enforcement continued to be 'arbitrary', but in the context of legitimating the *prejudice* of security strategies it is surely indefensible. If the building of predictive machines to warrant pre-emptive intervention is to remain a possible and desirable policy goal then the methodology of threat assessment is justifiably a core concern for anyone interested in the politics and jurisprudence of security strategies.

### **From OCTA to SOCTA**

The journey from OCTA to SOCTA can be characterized as one in which actors, the OCGs, remain central but are represented as more sophisticated ‘poly-criminals’ in that they diversify into a range of criminal activities that can complement one another, such as trafficking in people as well as narcotics, and enabling illegal migration as well as shipping forced labour into the vice markets and sweatshops of Western Europe.

This first threat assessment argued that, whilst the OCSR that preceded the OCTA provided a descriptive account, the OCTA ‘puts an emphasis on the qualitative assessment of this complex and multi-faceted phenomenon’, noting ‘a need for a close attention on key criminals [...] asking the question what they are doing and how, rather than who they are’ (OCTA 2006: 6). In these terms the OCTA recognizes different kinds of organized groups, including ‘flexible and fluid patterns of association between individual criminals’, and emphasizes the importance of understanding ‘the conditions under which patterns of criminal association and co-offending emerge and exist’ (OCTA 2006: 12).

Reference is also made to the principal activities of these groups, specifically drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings and illegal immigration, fraud, Euro counterfeiting, commodity counterfeiting and intellectual property theft, and money laundering. The OCTA (2006: 17–22) also identifies ‘key facilitating factors with regard to criminal markets’ – such as problems of globalization and ease of movement across borders – which provide OCGs with opportunities for commissioning serious crimes, including document forgery and identity theft, misuse of the transport sector, and exploitation of the financial sector.

Even so, the assessment proceeds from an identification of OC actors to their activities and their consequences, rather than taking the accomplishment of particular criminalized activities as the analytical focus, in which the mobilization of different actors is but one part. The admixture of the indicators, categories, regional patterns, principal activities, and facilitating factors used to define the threats posed by organized crime groups has been criticized for producing a confused analytical tool (cf. van Duyne and Vander Beken 2009: 274).

Mindful of the confused picture emerging out of the OCTA, the first assessment notes that, ‘Weighting crime areas against one another is inherently difficult. This too, has less to do with analytical insights than value statements, reflecting different priorities in the MS [Member States of the European Union] and beyond’ (2006: 25). It is acknowledged that, ultimately, the intelligence on which the OCTA is premised is gleaned from, ‘years of political and law enforcement experience’ (2006: 26), a dependence that is reinforced by the key methodological instrument of threat assessments: surveys of police forces’ perceptions of organized crime activity (Gregory 2003; van Duyne and Vander Beken 2009).

Without wishing to dismiss the relevance of political and law enforcement-based assessments of threat, there is a danger that these bracket-off other kinds of expertise about organized crime (for consequences see Edwards and Levi 2008: 372–4). Whilst cataloguing OCG actors and activities, threat assessments remain very obtuse and abstract about the explanation of organized crime problems and consequently how remediable they are. There is little sense of how serious crimes are actually organized and what this tells us about the possibilities for crime reduction. Whilst subsequent iterations of the annual OCTA have refined the discussion of its core concepts, the ramifications of its law enforcement-centred strategy remain.

### **SOCTA 2013–2017**

The establishment of the EU SOCTA for the 2013–17 period was promoted by the incumbent Director of Europol, Rob Wainwright, as a significant development in thinking that takes

policy-making about organized crime beyond the OCTA. The SOCTA is premised on 'a new methodology' that was developed over the course of 2011–12 (SOCTA 2013: 42), which contains the refining of indications of OCGs and augmenting these with indices of serious organized crime areas (SOCs), their effects on EU society, and the identification of various crime-related factors (CRFs) in the environment which can either facilitate or inhibit OCGs and SOCs.

In a novel development, the SOCTA methodology is also accompanied by a response from three academic researchers interested in organized crime (SOCTA 2013: 44–5). These academics identify key challenges in the methodological conundrum of prediction in future-oriented approaches to threat assessment. As predictive models are invariably premised on the extrapolation of historical data, they condemn analysts to fight the last battle rather than genuinely anticipate and effectively intervene against novel criminal practices. As a response to this conundrum they suggest, but don't explain, the need for 'continuous crime trend scanning, extending the SOCTA approach to support a more proactive approach' (SOCTA 2013: 45). They also note a conceptual need to recognize the mobility of multi-commodity poly-criminal actors across national and administrative boundaries, and the need to avoid the kind of mirror-imaging that has debilitated previous security strategies (see also Sheptycki 2003). They argue that global crime problems require global policy responses, otherwise security agencies bound by national and other administrative boundaries are destined to be outflanked by the increasingly 'flat' networked and distributed organization of criminal activity. Finally, the experts discuss the implications of these future trends for the process, as well as the content, of threat assessment, arguing that it will have to be more dynamic, flexible, and responsive than previous exercises that were too slow and bureaucratized to keep pace with adaptations in criminal organization. The last point echoes a long-established criticism of the policy response to organized crime by researchers noting the 'proteiform' qualities of serious crime in which adaptations are fuelled by an ongoing 'arms race' between perpetrators and preventers to outwit and outflank each other (Dorn 2003; Ekblom 2003).

However, it is not clear if the indices of OCGs, SOCs, effects and CRFs defined in the SOCTA methodology actually tell us much about the drivers of serious crime or, more prosaically, how serious crimes are actually organized (cf. RUSI 2014). The failure to pose this basic question remains the most remarkable characteristic of the politics and jurisprudence of security in this policy area. Indeed it can be argued that it is the jurisprudential preoccupation with criminal law enforcement rather than crime and harm reduction that explains much of this basic theory failure in the policy response to organized crime. In this regard, and notwithstanding the preoccupation with the flat, networked, and distributed organization of criminal activity, the actor-oriented legacy of Kefauver and Cressey remains strong in SOCTA 2013. Whilst not wishing to doubt the importance of the criminal prosecution of serious offenders for heinous crimes, realizing the difference between criminal law enforcement on the one hand and crime and harm reduction on the other remains important for innovations in the future development of the policy–research relationship.

### **The organization of serious crimes: commissioning processes**

The distinction between law enforcement and crime reduction does not preclude the role of the former in the latter, only the treatment of the two as synonymous. If crime reduction is more than law enforcement, what else is it? Concepts taken from volume crime reduction, of household burglary and automobile thefts for example, have been used by criminologists to rethink the organization of serious crimes (Cornish and Clarke 2002; Ekblom 2003; Felson 2006; Levi and Maguire 2004; Levi 2007, see also Greenfield and Paoli 2010; Vander Beken and Verfaillie 2010). Although marginal to the policy process, which remains dominated in Europe, North America, and the UN by the various actor-oriented accounts considered above, it is possible to

identify a number of core propositions about the commissioning of serious crimes, whose synthesis provides an alternative conceptual framework in which the dilemmas of security responses, particularly pre-emptive intervention, to organized crime could be re-thought.

*Reducing serious crimes entails an analytical focus on the commissioning of offences*

The attributes of perpetrators, in particular their ethnicity, are of concern only in so far as they help explain the commissioning process, such as the use of kinship networks as vehicles for the production and exchange of illicit goods and services, and as insulation against law enforcement operations, as in the trafficking of Moroccan hashish from the Rif into Western European capitals (Edwards 2005). By contrast, the offence-focus implies a concern with specific types of crime and a presumption (to be corroborated and refined through comparative empirical research) that different types of crime necessitate different commissioning processes or, to use a criminological term, they necessitate different ‘crime scripts’<sup>2</sup> which break down any crime into the particular sequence of activities through which it is accomplished. For example, the scripts entailed in the production and distribution of crystal methamphetamine from the sourcing of precursor chemicals, the construction of drug manufacturing labs, the storage and distribution of the product, the collection and reinvestment of proceeds from the sale of the product, and so on (Chiu et al. 2011).

*Understanding the commissioning of serious crimes entails an analytical concern with the interactions of offenders, victims, and guardians in specific social contexts*

Contrary to the dramatic focus on the pursuit and prosecution of ‘crime bosses’, ‘kingpins’, and ‘core nominals’, a concern with the commissioning process also reveals the routine interactions between offenders, their targets, and the presence or absence of capable guardians that consequently create opportunities for serious crime. A concern with these interactions can broaden understanding of the social contexts of commissioning to include transnational markets and e-commerce through the Internet, and help to anticipate future ‘scenarios’, including the likely consequences of different policy responses for escalating or reducing crime rates. Renowned examples include the impact of law enforcement operations against drug dealers generating violent turf wars for the share of markets freed-up by the successful removal of particular dealers, and the likely consequences of decriminalizing illicit drug use for public health and safety (Vander Beken and Verfaillie 2010).

*The harmful effects, the ‘seriousness’, of serious crime entails normative as well as empirical analysis and interpretation, as well as measurement in the prioritization of the policy response*

Another implication of the distinction between law enforcement and crime reduction is to shift the focus of policy outcomes from successes or failures in the prosecution of offenders for predicate offences – the volume of their criminal assets that are confiscated, or the volume of illicit goods that are captured – towards reductions in the harmful consequences of these offences. The presumption here is that incapacitation or disruption of particular offenders does little to alter or debilitate the commissioning process or its harmful impact, particularly in highly lucrative markets such as the trade in narcotics, where there are many recruits waiting to step into the shoes of incarcerated or otherwise incapacitated offenders.



Establishing the relative harm of different types of serious crime entails challenges that are both normative ('what constitutes a harm and from whose perspective?') and empirical (whether to calculate harms in terms of gross figures or net of possible benefits, for example the therapeutic benefits that are believed to accrue from cannabis use for those suffering neurological complaints, see Greenfield and Paoli 2010: 8–9). As such, attempts have been made to develop a 'risk assessment matrix' that ranks harms according to their 'severity' (on a scale from negligible to catastrophic) and their 'probability' (from unlikely to frequent). Although not without some interpretative flexibility, this matrix at least provides the analyst with a systematic starting point for prioritizing the seriousness of certain activities relative to others from one extreme (frequent and catastrophic) to another (unlikely and negligible) (Greenfield and Paoli 2010: 16).

*Analysis of the scripts, scenarios, and harmful effects of organizing serious crimes implies a more concrete identification of weak points or 'vulnerabilities' in the commissioning process for specific types of crime and their prioritization in policy responses*

Emerging work in this field identifies border controls, shipping routes, and visa applications as notable weak points in trafficking human beings and transporting stolen vehicles (Levi and Maguire 2004: 428–9). Other examples of weak points identified through script analysis include the ease with which payment card fraud could be commissioned prior to the introduction of 'chip and pin' cards (Levi and Maguire 2004: 433–8), or the ease with which vehicle identification numbers (VINs) could be switched from legal but wrecked automobiles to stolen vehicles for the purposes of resale (Tremblay et al. 2001: 568). Allied to the harm-reduction framework, the analysis of commissioning informs a policy response that can prioritize the investment of resources in targeting weak points and in accordance with judgements about the severity and probability of any given crime type, which is likely to be attractive in an 'age of austerity' in public expenditure and limited resources for crime prevention.

*A crime reduction strategy premised on the targeting of weak points in the commissioning process implies a broadening of the policy response from law enforcement to include other public authorities, the involvement of private organizations, and public-private partnerships*

The identification of crime promoters, as well as intentional co-offenders (conspirators, entrepreneurs, and poly-criminals), in the commissioning process broadens the scope of crime reduction beyond law-enforcement measures targeting known offenders. Allied to normative and empirical judgements about the harms associated with different crimes, this approach begins to suggest a rationale for a division of labour amongst public and private sector 'preventers', and opportunities for public-private partnerships in which the effort and costs of sustainable crime reduction are shared (Levi and Maguire 2004: 417–23). In addition to charging public authorities other than the police (such as vehicle licensing authorities) and private organizations (such as solicitors and accountants) with surveillance and enforcement duties in relation to the commission of serious crimes, this policy trend generates a wider repertoire of policy choices. It might, for example, be argued that scarce public resources are better concentrated on crimes that are more frequent and more critical (if not catastrophic) for a higher proportion of the public (Greenfield and Paoli 2010). Whilst highly controversial, not least because of its explicit prioritization of policy responses and targets, the harm-reduction approach provides a normative, as well as an empirical, framework for the politics and jurisprudence of group offending. It enables deliberation

about the necessary prioritization of alternative policy agendas for criminal, restorative, and social justice and for risk management and their relationship to sustainable public protection in contexts of austere public expenditure (Edwards and Hughes 2012; Edwards et al. 2013).

*This broadening of the policy response also implies a concern with the conditions or 'scenes' in which scripts are played out, resulting in more or less harmful scenarios. The concept of scenes alerts us to the importance of an analytical concern with the conditions that can enable or frustrate security scripts and their rewriting*

Continuing the dramaturgical metaphor, it can be acknowledged that scenes provide possibilities for improvisation in the script and are not crudely deterministic of performance. Even so, they suggest a certain narrative progression in the script which actors are disciplined to follow and do not completely rewrite each time they perform. Disambiguating improvisation and narrative in serious crime scenes is in part a question for 'concrete', empirical research, requiring access to the accounts that can be elicited through qualitative interviews with offenders, victims, control agents, and other researchers and their construct validation, including the scripts, scenarios, and scenes that emerge from cross-examination in court proceedings (Levi 2008). As a precursor to this it is, however, it is also possible to engage in abstract research entailing thought experiments about the necessary and contingent social relations that render serious crimes possible (Edwards and Levi 2008; also Felson 2006).

## Conclusion

There is a need to challenge the language and assumptions of crime 'analysts' allied to the policy process and to rehabilitate an older language of social research that renders explicit the different practices necessary at various stages of social scientific work (Keat and Urry 1981: 248–9). Researching, rather than 'analysing', the organization of serious crimes alters the relationship between social scientists and the policy community. This shifts the policy-research relationship away from a view that social scientists ought to be enrolled into agendas set by policy-makers to service their technical refinement or better communication to broader publics. Conversely, the language of research locates social scientists as constructive critics of these agendas, inhabiting a culture of organized scepticism that can pose alternative visions of control. These alternatives may, for example, entail counter-intuitive (for law enforcement agencies) forms of non-enforcement, such as triggering self-regulation (Edwards and Gill 2002).

## Notes

- 1 Unreleased at the time of writing this chapter.
- 2 A concept initially developed by Cornish and Clarke (2002) to augment rational choice analyses of organized crimes, and subsequently elaborated and applied by Levi and Maguire (2004) to understand other practices in the *modi operandi* of organizing and preventing serious crimes. The concept is employed in this chapter in this later, broader, sense.

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