Routledge Handbook of Naval Strategy and Security

Joachim Krause, Sebastian Bruns

American Naval Policy, Strategy, Plans, and Operations in the Second Decade of the Twenty-First Century

Publication details


Peter M. Swartz

Published online on: 21 Dec 2015


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AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY, STRATEGY, PLANS, AND OPERATIONS IN THE SECOND DECADE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Peter M. Swartz

Overview

This chapter seeks to explain broadly U.S. Navy policy, strategy, plans, and operations in the second decade of the twenty-first century. It does so by discussing some basic fundamentals, and then the Navy’s three major operational activities: peacetime engagement, crisis response, and wartime combat. For each activity, it describes the Navy’s ends, ways, and means.

The approach taken is deliberately specific, that is, it tries to present the actual application of concepts rather than just discussing the concepts themselves. While concepts are important, true understanding of the uses of naval power requires some explanation of actual operations, organizations, and systems.

Fundamentals

Some important underlying propositions must be understood first, in contemplating and analyzing American naval power today and its relationship to that of other nations and non-state actors:

• The United States is a nation of laws, and the Navy and its uses are deeply rooted in – and subordinate to – American law. The Constitution of the United States of America – the supreme law of the country – designates the U.S. President as the “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,” and gives the power to the U.S. Congress to “provide and maintain a Navy,” as well as to “make Rules for the Government and regulation of the land and naval Forces.” It is important to remember that, at the end of the day, the U.S. Navy is not an independent actor, but clearly subject to the direction of the President.

• The United States has used its Navy as an important tool of national security policy since the very earliest days of the Republic. The Navy has participated significantly in all the
nation’s wars, since the American Revolution through Operation Enduring Freedom. It has also served as a significant tool of American diplomacy and international economic policy during times of prolonged peace. America is used to thinking of its Navy as one of its leading institutions, and calling upon it to carry out a wide range of diplomatic, information, military, and economic policies. These are fundamental bases of the American use of naval power – and while not unique in the world, they differ markedly from the experience of many other nations.

• The U.S. Navy seldom operates alone. America has many other such institutions with related mandates, and expects the Navy to coordinate and cooperate with them in its activities and operations. In the nineteenth century, U.S. Navy commanders coordinated their peacetime operations closely with the U.S. Consular Service, and in wartime with U.S. Army commanders. In the twentieth century, the Navy became increasingly integrated into a joint U.S. military system, evolving from the creation before World War I of the Joint Board of the Army and the Navy, through establishment during World War II of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and joint theaters of operation, through the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, the creation of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act in 1986 and subsequent related legislation. U.S. naval operations today are typically embedded in inter-agency and joint operations – the culmination of decades of increasing U.S. national security agency and inter-service integration – directed by the President and the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and under the command of a designated joint Combatant Commander (supported by the forces of other appropriate combatant commanders). Meanwhile, the organizing, manning, training, equipping, and maintaining of U.S. naval forces is the responsibility – under the President and Secretary of Defense – of the civilian Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations (the uniformed head of the Navy), and the bureaus, offices, and commands of the Department of the Navy, the Navy Shore establishment, and the Fleet – all with funds authorized and appropriated (in some detail) by the U.S. Congress each year.

• The U.S. Navy seldom operates without allies and/or partners. U.S. naval forces relied on forward French, Spanish, and Dutch bases and assistance in the American Revolutionary War against Great Britain; and on British and Neapolitan bases in the Republic’s early wars with France, Tripoli, and Algiers. The U.S. Navy used British Hong Kong as a base in America’s war with Spain, fought as part of an international force during the Chinese “Boxer” Uprising, and integrated into Royal Navy and other allied naval formations in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean during World War I. During World War II, the United States and Royal Navies achieved probably the most intimate naval alliance ever known, with numerous other allied navies integrated with them to varying degrees. During the Cold War, the Free World’s alliance system provided the backdrop for a system of close U.S. Navy relationships with the navies of NATO and Rio Pact nations, as well as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and others. Since the end of the Cold War, many of those relationships have, if anything, been enhanced – at sea, on planning staffs, in classrooms, and in laboratories.

• By virtue of its geographical and geo-political situation in the world, America has mostly used its naval power forward, across the seas, far from its own shores. This has been as true in times of peace as in times of war. Whether protecting American merchants, missionaries, and diplomats in the nineteenth century or storming European and South Pacific beaches in the mid-twentieth century, the U.S. Navy – in conjunction with other elements of American power and influence – has been called upon to operate at a great distance from the North American continent, and for long periods of time. America’s leaders and populace have come to expect that forward
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and sustained operations are central to its naval posture. Again, while America is not unique in this regard, this experience is different from that of many other countries.

- Since the very beginnings of the nation and its Navy, that forward presence has been global, reflecting the global interests of the United States. America’s very earliest wars were fought in the North and South Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Southeast Pacific, and the waters of Indonesia. The American Civil War saw both “American” navies deployed in the Atlantic and the Far East, and Confederate raiders operating throughout the globe—from the Cape of Good Hope to the Bering Sea. The Spanish–American War was fought in the Caribbean and the Far East; World War I throughout the world but especially in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean; and World War II famously throughout the Atlantic, Pacific, and Mediterranean. The Cold War saw the creation of vast U.S. Navy fleets designed to contest, control, and use the North Atlantic, the Caribbean and Mediterranean, the North Pacific and even the Indian and Arctic Oceans. The United States sees the post–Cold War environment as necessitating a continuation of that global deployment pattern, albeit with far fewer individual warships in the force.

- Within that global pattern, however, the U.S. Navy has often had to focus on one or more specific theaters of the world, as directed by the President. These focal seas have often shifted, reflecting and demonstrating a vital deployment flexibility that has always characterized the force. Before and during World War I, the preponderance of U.S. naval power shifted to the North Atlantic. After that war—and throughout World War II—the bulk of U.S. fleet strength was deployed forward in the Western Pacific. After that war, the fleet was again weighted in favor of the North Atlantic and Mediterranean, and today we are seeing yet another “rebalance” toward the Pacific. It should be pointed out that as all of these shifts occurred, one constant for almost 200 years has been the necessity for a permanent U.S. Navy force far forward in the Pacific, due to the political, diplomatic, economic, and societal interests of the United States in that region since its earliest days—well before it had even acquired its own Pacific seacoast. Before modern Imperial Japanese or Qing Dynasty Chinese fleets existed, an American East India Squadron was operating in the Western Pacific.

- The U.S. Navy is—and usually has been—a “full-service navy,” capable of conducting a wide range of peacetime, crisis, and wartime tasks—from humanitarian assistance through combating piracy through anti-submarine warfare to strategic nuclear deterrence—and using a wide variety of specialized warship and aircraft types and weapon systems. There are few areas of naval endeavor or naval ship types that the U.S. Navy has not been proficient in at one time or another. At various times in its history, however, the Navy neglected one or more areas: battle-line war at sea and sealift for the Army during most of the nineteenth century, for example, and riverine warfare during most of its history (except for the American Civil War, the Vietnam War, and the decade since the 9/11 Al Qaeda terrorist attacks on New York and Washington). Nevertheless, the Navy normally seeks to provide a wide range of options to the President. A key debate throughout its history has been what is the optimum balance among the wide variety of tasks and ship, aircraft and weapon system types, given available resources. This debate is quite active today, both within and outside the Navy.

- America has been a rich, technologically advanced, and innovative country—especially at sea—from its very beginnings. Since its origins as 13 British colonies, America has always had a reservoir of highly competent seafarers to officer its warships, and—somewhat more recently—to man them. American warships were sufficiently well constructed and equipped to battle and defeat Royal Navy warships during the American Revolution. The “super-frigates” of the early American republic were a technological marvel. The American Civil War saw innovative use—by both sides—of revolutionary new technologies: iron
armor, gun turrets, submarines, mines, and more. That technological prowess — indeed, superiority — has continued through the present day, with American naval architects, engineers, and operators leading the world in naval technologies as diverse as aircraft carrier design, nuclear propulsion, cruise missiles, high-performance jet aircraft, sonar, electronic warfare, and ballistic missile defense. The U.S. government and American defense industry maintain a massive naval industrial base, concentrated heavily in the shipyards, factories, and laboratories of the Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, Raytheon and other corporations, and the U.S. Navy itself.  

- Above all, the U.S. Navy has been an operational Navy: a ready, sea-going, and tactically proficient professional Navy.  

Peacetime, crises, and war

With a firm understanding of the foundations and characteristics of U.S. naval power, we can now turn to its uses: Just what is it that this forward-deploying, sea-going, global, technologically advanced force is supposed to do?

An easy way to consider this is to discuss it in terms of three major conditions and activities: peacetime readiness and engagement, crisis response, and wartime combat. And for each of those, to describe the Navy’s ends, ways, and means.

Peacetime readiness and engagement

Ends

The role of the U.S. Navy in peacetime is to help preserve the security, freedom, commerce, and economic well-being of America and its people, at home and abroad, and of its friends and allies.

Ways and means

To help achieve these ends, the President and Secretary of Defense use the U.S. Navy for a variety of peacetime tasks, heavily focused on deterrence, reassurance of friends and partners, and readiness for possible future combat. In joint U.S. military parlance, many of these operations fall under the first and second phases (“Phase 0,” or “shaping”; and “Phase I” or “deterring”) of an often useful joint six-phase planning model.

There are eight main ways in which the Navy serves the nation and the broader international community during times of peace: through strategic nuclear deterrence, ballistic missile defense, deterrence of conventional crises and war (through naval readiness and engagement), maritime safety operations, maritime security operations, humanitarian assistance operation,
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naval diplomacy, and support to science. The Navy’s capabilities in all these areas provide the
President, the Secretary of Defense, and the U.S. joint combatant commanders with a wide
range of options to implement national policy.

The United States government believes that purposeful global forward deployment of its
naval forces, in various regions, with tailored forces capable of accomplishing relevant tasks,
helps underpin world political, economic, and social stability, to the great benefit of the United
States and, indeed, all of the world’s nations. The United States also believes that its naval forces
cannot – and should not – be the only naval forces directed to carry out such activities; and
seeks to coordinate and cooperate with naval partners – and especially with its highly capable
European and East Asian allies – wherever possible, to share in providing a level of maritime
security that benefits them as well.

Strategic nuclear deterrence

The nation’s strategic nuclear policies and posture are designed specifically to help deter possible
Russian and Chinese strategic nuclear attack on the United States and its allies and partners. The U.S. Navy’s contributions to the nation’s strategic nuclear triad have two main elements: 14
treaty-limited Ohio-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) capable of
launching Trident II D-5 sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs); and a small fleet of land-based
Boeing E-6B Mercury airborne command post and relay aircraft. Several of these submarines
are on patrol at any one time, in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. These submarines are
undetectable while on patrol, and are therefore the most survivable leg of the triad. American
SSBN and SLBM plans and programs are carried out in close cooperation with those of the
United Kingdom and its four Royal Navy Vanguard-class SSBNs. Planning is currently under
way for 12 U.S. Ohio follow-on replacement SSBNs, including close coordination and cooper-
ation with the Royal Navy’s own SSBN replacement program.

Ballistic missile defense (BMD)

U.S. combatant commanders routinely request and deploy U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers
capable of ballistic missile defense forward in the Northwest Pacific, Persian Gulf, and Eastern
Mediterranean, as components of the U.S. 5th, 6th, and 7th Fleets, to help deter ballistic missile
attacks and to defend if necessary against a short-warning North Korean or Iranian ballistic mis-
sile attack on U.S. or allied and friendly nations or forward U.S. forces in the theater. Some
BMD-capable warships are homeported forward in Japan and Spain, while those in the Persian
Gulf rotate routinely forward from bases in the continental United States. Several allied and
friendly navies deploy similar sea-based ABM systems, including Spain, the United Kingdom,
Australia, the Netherlands, Germany, Japan, and South Korea. U.S. Navy cooperative engage-
ment with these allies on ballistic missile defense systems interoperability and operations is close
and frequent. Since 2014, the U.S. Navy has also manned a forward Aegis Ashore facility in
Romania, as part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to ballistic missile defense.

Deterrence of conventional crises and war, through
naval readiness and engagement

Readiness

A central and continuous role of the U.S. Navy in peacetime is deterrence of possible conven-
tional crises and wars. That role is exercised through a program of personnel, material, and

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operational readiness, to provide combat-ready forward-deployed and surge forces in response to Presidential direction. The operational elements include constant at-sea work-ups and exercises, as well as global intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations (ISR). All of these at-sea operations are conducted in accordance with longstanding international law.

The central ways and means by which the U.S. Navy contributes to peacetime deterrence of crisis and war are through the permanent forward deployment of the U.S. 5th and 7th Fleets, in the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific. These are the most combat-ready, balanced, and capable conventional forces in the U.S. Navy. In the absence of crisis or war tasking—which has actually been the norm—their powerful forward deterrent presence is seen by the United States as an important contributor to the peace and stability of those regions. Ships of these fleets are maintained forward through a variety of methods: Rotation of ships and crews from the United States; forward basing of ships and crews; hull swaps in which crews remain forward and ships are rotated for them to serve on; and crew swaps, in which ships remain forward and crews are rotated to serve on them.

Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs), ships on BMD patrols, Amphibious Ready Groups/Marine Expeditionary units (ARG/MEUs), and attack and conventional cruise missile submarines (SSNs and SSGNs) all routinely rotate forward from the continental United States (CONUS) to the 5th Fleet to maintain a powerful permanent and ready in-theater forward presence. An Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) and smaller units are permanently forward-based in-theater, with crews rotating in and out to serve on them. 5th Fleet ship maintenance capabilities are also available at the U.S. Navy facility on the British Indian Ocean Territory island of Diego Garcia.

Meanwhile, the CSG, ARG/MEU, submarines, and mine warfare ships of the US 7th Fleet are largely forward-based in Japan and Guam, and new U.S. Navy Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) have been operating out of forward facilities at Singapore, with four planned to do so in the future.

In European and African waters, the U.S. Navy permanently deploys the U.S. 6th Fleet, including a forward fleet flagship and land-based maritime patrol aircraft; as well as the above-mentioned permanent forward afloat BMD capability in the Eastern Mediterranean. The fleet periodically swells with intermittent warships transiting the Mediterranean to and from Arabian Sea, available to exercise with European and North African navies and to respond to crises or war requirements.

Rebalancing

Since the end of the Cold War, the geographic focus of U.S. Navy forward presence readiness has shifted. And it continues to shift. The Western Pacific has remained as important as it did during the Cold War. Perhaps more so. But presence—including combat operations—in the Arabian and adjacent seas became even more important than previously, with increasing demands on U.S. naval resources, especially due to Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and later Inherent Resolve. Meanwhile, U.S. naval presence has already declined considerably in Atlantic and European waters and littorals, since the Soviet threat disappeared. The contemporary 6th Fleet is much smaller than its Cold War antecedent, despite a greatly expanded area of responsibility, beyond the Mediterranean. U.S. Navy bases in Maine, Newfoundland, Bermuda, Iceland, the Azores, the United Kingdom, Sardinia, and elsewhere have closed.

Much of the American (and western European) draw-down from European and Atlantic waters had already taken place in the decades preceding the Obama Administration announcement of a rebalancing of U.S. defense posture toward the Western Pacific. The current
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rebalancing is more a rebalancing to the Western Pacific from the continental United States and Southwest Asia, than from Atlantic and European waters. The U.S. naval presence in European waters and at European bases has been stable for years, and in fact has been increasing with the forward homeporting of U.S. Navy Ballistic Missile Defense destroyers at Rota, Spain in 2014.

Should a future President decide on a different rebalance of U.S. forces globally, U.S. naval forces should be able to respond quickly and with relative ease, given their inherent flexibility and mobility.

Force protection

Even in times of peace, real threats exist to U.S. naval forces. These include crime, terrorism, intelligence gathering, and cyber attack. The 2000 Al Qaeda terrorist suicide attack on the guided missile destroyer USS Cole (DDG-67) while she was refueling in the port of Aden, Yemen, demonstrated the importance of peacetime protection to the nation’s warships as they patrol the seven seas. The Navy subsequently instituted a range of force protection measures surrounding U.S. Navy port calls and ship visits – domestic and forward – including port vulnerability assessments, changed rules of engagement (ROE), the use of floating barriers and small boat patrols, and close coordination between the Navy’s Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) agents and local police and harbor security authorities. The U.S. Navy also maintains U.S. 10th Fleet network defense units, a Coastal Riverine Force, and other elements to protect itself from these threats.

Experimentation

Ongoing U.S. Navy experimentation at sea is also a part of fleet readiness, but geared more to the future than the present. As ideas for new systems to deter or wage war occur to naval planners and designers, the Navy tries to put them to sea during peacetime, to experiment with them and foster their development, if the experiment proves successful. The Sea Shadow (IX-529) experimental stealth ship that operated from the 1980s through the first decade of the twenty-first century is one of the more striking examples of this.

Engagement

Many of these operations involve intense engagement with foreign navies and other military forces. The U.S. Navy needs to – and does – collaborate with a broad spectrum of partners, many of which have very limited naval means, while remaining committed to longstanding U.S. allies – most of which have deployed more robust naval forces. Naval engagement can help improve international relationships and build international trust and confidence, while enabling the exchange of skills and information that could prove vital should the navies have to operate alongside each other during a crisis or war. Bilateral and multilateral exercises at sea have been a principle means to engage positively with allied and friendly navies, to practice cooperation, transfer skills, and establish and maintain professional personal relationships. Many multilateral and bilateral exercises have become major recurring events, such as:

- NATO exercises in European waters, such as Noble Justification, Proud Manta, and Brilliant Mariner;
- exercises with European navies, such as the United Kingdom’s multinational Joint Warrior;
- BALTOPS in the Baltic Sea;
• Sea Breeze and other exercises with Black Sea navies;
• Noble Dina, in the Mediterranean, with the Greek and Israeli navies;
• PhoeniX Express with North African navies;
• Cutlass Express with East African navies;
• Obangame Express with West African and European navies (and the Brazilian Navy);
• International Mine Countermeasures Exercise (IMCMEX) in the Persian Gulf region;\(^{43}\)
• Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) and Southeast Asia Cooperation
  Against Terrorism (SEACAT) in Southeast Asia;
• Balikatan and PHIBLEX in the Philippines;
• Malabar with the Indian Navy in the Indian Ocean (in 2014 and 2015 with the Japanese
  Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) also);
• Talisman Saber in the Southwest Pacific;
• Cobra Gold off Thailand;
• Naval Engagement Activities (NEA) with Vietnam;
• Foal Eagle and Ulchi Freedom Guardian in Korea;
• Keen Edge with Japan;
• Pacific Bond with Australia and Japan;
• Chilemar with the Chilean Navy;
• PANAMAX to practice protection of safe passage through the Panama Canal;
• Southern Partnership Station with Latin American and European navies;
• Trident Fury in the Pacific with Canada;
• Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) off Hawaii;\(^{44}\)
• Bold Alligator;\(^{45}\)
• Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercises.\(^{46}\)

Other engagement means include port visits, personnel exchanges, staff talks, and war games
with close U.S. allies and partners, as well as various bilateral and multilateral material acquisition
and research programs.\(^{47}\) The U.S. Navy routinely hosts officers and enlisted students from
allied and friendly nations at its schools and training events.\(^{48}\) Since 1969, the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) has hosted an International Seapower Symposium (ISS) at the Naval War
College in Newport every two years: 155 heads of the world’s navies or their representatives
participated in the last event, in 2011, and the next meeting is scheduled for September 2016.
The CNO also hosts bilateral visits to Washington from selected counterparts, and reciprocates
in foreign capitals and naval headquarters as well.

In the case of NATO allies and Korea, longstanding integrated naval command structures
have been evolving since the end of the Cold War. Common NATO doctrine, tactics, tech-
niques, and procedures – in the development of which the U.S. Navy has participated – are
widely and routinely practiced and used, including by several non-NATO navies, improving
global naval interoperability.

Longstanding NATO institutions provide a framework for continuing multilateral approaches
at sea by the U.S., Canadian, and European navies, and have allowed the navies of post-Cold War
NATO members in the Baltic and the Balkans to integrate their operations and practices with
those of older alliance members.\(^{49}\) The U.S. Navy encourages this multinational activity, seeing
it as a force-multiplier when future international naval coalitions need to be deployed at sea.\(^{50}\)
Prior to the Ukrainian Crisis of 2014, the U.S. regarded the NATO area as a zone of relative
peace, and its NATO allies as potential “exporters” of security – alongside U.S. forces – to areas
beyond the North Atlantic Treaty area, especially Middle Eastern and African waters, where
both the interests and capabilities of most NATO nations often converge.\(^{51}\)
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No such multinational alliance framework exists, however, in the Middle East or the Indo-Pacific, and the U.S. Navy – within the limits set by U.S. foreign policy – actively encourages increased multi-nationalism at sea among its allied, partner, and friendly navies in those regions. For example, U.S. Navy engagement activity tries to help make the Indian, Australian, Japanese, and South Korean navies more interoperable, as well as the navies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Southwest Asia. The U.S. Navy has been especially active in fostering trilateral naval approaches among the U.S., Japanese, and South Korean navies; and among the U.S., Japanese, and Australian navies. The U.S. Navy also has routinely engaged in exercises with Ukrainian and Georgian naval forces in the Black Sea.

Brazil has been a traditional American naval partner. The navies were co-belligerents during the two World Wars, and allies during the Cold War. That partnership continues, as a sub-set of the overall relationship between the two large sovereign American nations. The U.S. Navy hopes that the naval partnership will deepen, as Brazil becomes a major world power. Recently, a Brazilian Navy diesel-electric submarine helped a U.S. Navy carrier strike group work up before deploying overseas. Likewise, the highly capable Chilean Navy also has provided diesel-electric submarine training services to U.S. Navy fleet units.

In the Eastern Mediterranean, the U.S. Navy continues its traditional but low-key engagement with the Israeli Navy. This includes the annual Noble Melinda exercise, focusing on explosive ordnance disposal, diving, and salvage operations.

More dynamic has been the growing peacetime partnership between the U.S. Navy and the Indian Navy, manifested through the Malabar exercise program, increased sales of American naval equipment to the Indian Navy, research and development cooperation, and other activities.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Navy was the chief potential wartime opponent of the U.S. Navy, and U.S. Navy policy, strategy, tactics, and equipment all had a heavy anti-Soviet Navy focus. This is no longer the case. While U.S. relationships with Russia – the main successor state to the Soviet Union – are hardly as warm as those with America’s various allies, partners, and friends, U.S. Navy peacetime relationships with the Russian Navy had been cordial and often cooperative (until the Ukrainian Crisis of 2014). The Russian Navy participated in annual post-Cold War FRUKUS exercises with the navies of the United States, Britain, and France; in many of the annual U.S. Navy-sponsored multilateral Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) exercises; and in bilateral Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) talks with the U.S. Navy and several other navies since the middle of the Cold War. The Russian Navy was represented at the U.S. Navy-sponsored International Seapower Symposium (ISS) in Newport in 2011, participated in BALTOPS 2012, and engaged with the U.S. Navy and other navies in the U.S.-sponsored RIMPAC 2012 exercise off Hawaii – the world’s largest multinational naval exercise. The Russian and U.S. Navies – along with many others – have operated with each other closely at sea in the multinational anti-piracy offensive in the Arabian Sea. U.S. Navy ship visits to Vladivostok and other Russian ports before 2014 were routine. There have been worrisome disagreements, however, between the Russian and Western governments – exacerbated recently over Russia’s 2014 actions in Ukraine. In any event, the U.S. Navy stands ready as a tool of U.S. national security, to engage or deter as required.

The U.S. Navy likewise engages the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in peacetime cooperative efforts. As discussed above, the U.S. Navy has been no stranger to the China Seas. Indeed, the U.S. 7th Fleet used Tsingtao as its main forward operating base from 1945 to 1949. Mutual port visits between U.S. Navy and PLAN warships took place throughout the 1980s, and sporadically ever since. PLAN warships have operated with U.S. Navy and other Western warships as part of the anti-piracy efforts in the Arabian Sea, and recently exercised closely with U.S. Navy warships, including surface combatant helicopter cross-decking

As with the Russian Navy, the U.S. Navy aspires to a cordial and mutually beneficial relationship with the PLAN, in East Asia and throughout the world. The Navy has made efforts to demonstrate its respect for the emerging Chinese power, while maintaining its traditional strong views on the benefits that accrue to all to respect customary international law.

There are only a handful of nations with which the U.S. Navy does not engage, North Korea being the main example. While formal U.S. Navy engagement with the various naval forces of Iran does not exist, the two sides normally avoid confrontations in the Persian Gulf (although as recently as 2008, Iran engaged in aggressive maneuvers toward transiting U.S. Navy warships in international waters near the Strait of Hormuz). A former U.S. Navy 5th Fleet commander has floated the possibility of an agreement to improve Iranian–American ship-to-ship communications in the Gulf, as a confidence-building measure and to avoid unwanted crises.

Maritime safety

This is an area that is primarily the domain of the world’s coast guards, but here too the U.S. Navy has certain important roles to play, engaging international partners. One key aspect of this issue area, for navies, is submarine escape and rescue. The U.S. Navy has been a strong participant in and supporter of the International Submarine Escape and Rescue Liaison Office (ISMERLO), established in 2003 at Norfolk, Virginia by NATO’s Submarine Escape and Rescue Working Group (SMERG) to assist in the global coordination of international rescue operations. Inspired in part by the tragic sinking of the Russian submarine Kursk (K-141) in 2000, ISMERLO has evolved into a world–wide network within which navies engage to share equipment and procedural standards, to better come to the rescue of each other’s stricken submarines. In a related initiative, the U.S. Navy participates (alongside the Russian, Chinese, Indian, Pakistani, and 17 other navies) in the Asia Pacific Submarine Conference (APSC), in which submariners from every navy in that region engage each other, to share submarine rescue technologies, procedures and lessons learned.

Maritime security operations

Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of Defense have demanded more from the U.S. Navy than preparation for global or regional wars at sea. Responding to national direction, the U.S. Navy has become increasingly involved – and adept – in conducting a wide range of peacetime maritime security operations, including counter-drug operations (especially in the Caribbean), counter-piracy operations (especially in the Arabian Sea), and counter–terrorist operations (globally, but especially in the Arabian Sea and the Mediterranean). These operations are often conducted in cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard and/or foreign naval forces and coast guards. Of particular note have been the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) operations, to counter the shipment by sea of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). U.S. Navy units operating in the Caribbean and other Latin American waters are organized as the U.S. 4th Fleet. Typically, maritime security operations utilize surface combatants and/
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or amphibious ships (which operate sea-based small craft, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) vital to these missions, and land-based maritime patrol and surveillance aircraft (MPSA) and UAVs. New U.S. Navy littoral combat ships (LCS) and expeditionary fast transports (EPF) are being integrated into these operations as they join the fleet.

A critical skill set – largely introduced since the end of the Cold War and required for many of these operations – is visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS), using U.S. Navy sailors, naval special warfare teams (SEALS), Coast Guardsmen or Marines, depending on the situation, deploying directly from ships, small craft, or helicopters.

Mature navies with similar skill sets to those of the U.S. Navy often complement U.S. Navy vessels and aircraft in these operations, with command of the entire operation often vested in a non-U.S. Navy commander. Developing navies are often involved as complementary forces, ship-riders, and trainees, to help enhance their own indigenous capabilities, especially in maritime law enforcement.

In 2006, the U.S. Navy formed a navy expeditionary combat command (NECC), in large part to focus and expand its existing capabilities in certain maritime security operations, including combat construction, mobile dive and salvage, riverine, coastal, and harbor patrol and combat operations afloat; explosive ordnance demolition, force protection operations, expeditionary logistics support, and theater security cooperation. This effort has been aimed largely at less developed regions of the world, where indigenous naval capabilities might be low or lacking, and in need of engagement and assistance. New skill sets in maritime civil affairs and security force assistance were added as well. NECC commands routinely deploy small teams of specialists forward to engage and train local navies and others – often alongside colleagues from the U.S. Coast Guard, other U.S. services, civilian agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other mature navies in Europe, North America, Asia and elsewhere.

Examples of recent U.S. Navy Maritime Security Operations, usually with allied and partner navies, include: NATO’s operation active endeavor in the Mediterranean (counter-terrorism since 2001); straits of malacca ship protection operations (in 2002); Africa Partnership Station (APS) (since 2007); Southern Partnership Station (SPS) in Latin American waters and ports (since 2008); and operation Martillo in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific (counter-drug operations since 2012). The 2013 APS deployment to West African ports was on board a Royal Netherlands Navy ship, and included U.S., British, Dutch, and Spanish marines. Certainly the most widely publicized U.S. Navy maritime security operation has been its participation in the intensive and extensive multinational cooperative counter-piracy operations in the Arabian Sea (since 2009).

Counter-piracy operations in the Arabian Sea

This remarkable multinational Maritime Security Operation merits special mention. It shows the international naval community at its finest. Not only has the United States sent its ships, aircraft, sailors, and Marines to carry out United Nations resolutions and help the world’s shippers and merchant seamen against the depredations of Somali pirates, but so too have NATO (in operation ocean shield), the European Union (in operation Atalanta), Russia, India, China, and numerous other countries. Many have joined in a multinational combined task force (CTF 151), the command of which has rotated among participating nations. Others – including the NATO and EU squadrons – have cooperated with CTF 151 under the auspices of the Shared Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE) initiative – an ad hoc mechanism of informal meetings in-theater aimed at coordinating and de-conflicting naval operations to the benefit of all. As with other maritime security operations in the area, the command organization is loose, based more on cooperation than direction. The effort has had a host of salutary spin-offs: providing
much-needed operational and leadership experience at sea for the world's navies; introducing
the Chinese to the concepts and issues of international maritime endeavor; and providing a
venue for European contributions to Middle Eastern security and East Asian experience in
multinational military constructs.

Humanitarian assistance operations

Naval humanitarian assistance operations have attracted a great deal of international attention
lately, but they are not particularly new. U.S. Navy – and especially U.S. Coast Guard – ves-
sels and aircraft have been conducting these operations for years, in the wake of natural and
man-made disasters. These operations provide assistance to populations in dire need, in part
due to simple concern for fellow human beings in distress and to help ensure that detrimental
political instability does not result from the misfortune that had just befallen them. U.S. Navy
sailors on port visits have routinely sought out opportunities for humanitarian assistance, from
painting schoolhouses to providing medical aid. Following the Cold War, the Navy's two hos-
pital ships and large amphibious ships – although originally designed for national defense pur-
poses – have proven particularly useful in that regard, with entire operations structured around
their humanitarian assistance capabilities.

Naval diplomacy

Navies have long been tools of their nations’ peacetime foreign policies, and the U.S. Navy has
been no exception. Peacetime U.S. Navy ship movements are routinely directed to “show
the flag,” at sea or in port, to demonstrate diplomatic friendship or – in some instances – dis-
pleasure. Navy ships at sea are also routinely used to assert and maintain the rights granted to
U.S. warships under international law, including the right of innocent passage. U.S. Secretaries
of Defense and State frequently find afloat U.S. Navy commanders to be useful participants in
forward U.S. diplomacy.

Support to science

Warships, airplanes, and weapons systems are all applications of the findings of scientists, engin-
eers, and other technologists. Consequently, the U.S. Navy has had a long history of fostering
scientific endeavors that have potential naval applications – from metallurgy to ballistics to aero-
nautics to nuclear engineering to meteorology and oceanography. The Navy can and does,
however, periodically use its capabilities and highly trained people to aid in scientific endeavor
that does not have an obvious direct naval link. The Navy has a long history of supporting sci-
cific exploration in the Antarctic, and Navy ships have been used to recover astronauts for years.
The Navy has also supported scientific research in the Arctic, in support of U.S. policy. In
2014, after a break of almost 40 years, a U.S. Navy warship was once again employed to recover
a space capsule – an unmanned NASA Orion crew module – from the oceans.

“A global force for good”

In sum, the U.S. government believes that the global forward presence at sea of the U.S. Navy –
carrying out all of the above activities and more – helps foster a climate of free and unimpeded
transit of goods and services on the high seas that benefits all the nations of the world. It is one
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of the pillars of the global Bretton Woods world economic system from which all have benefitted, despite financial crises and the recessions.

Crisis response

Ends

Should peacetime operations fail to help stem international crises from occurring, Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, and joint Combatant Commanders expect the Navy to be ready to respond to crises as they occur, to provide them with a wide range of options, to help dampen or resolve them, as the American national interest requires, and cooperate when necessary with the navies of like-minded allied and partner nations in so doing. The inherent flexibility, scalability, mobility, and multiple capabilities of U.S. naval forces provide the President with a wide range of useful options during a crisis, to use as he calculates is warranted.

Ways and means

As crises loom or unfold, the United States and like-minded nations typically gather together in “coalitions of the willing,” normally under the auspices of a United Nations mandate and often by invoking alliance or other ties. If peacetime naval engagement has been productive, the U.S. Navy and other navies will be ready to operate together effectively at sea under crisis conditions, should the political leaders of coalition members so direct. They will understand each other’s capabilities and capacities, and know how to communicate with each other quickly and securely, divide maritime tasks among themselves, formulate options for the political leadership to consider, and then combine to carry out coalition directives under stressful conditions.

Positioning and shows of force

Political leaders have used naval force movements to try to help defuse, stabilize, and resolve crises for centuries. Recent examples of U.S. presidential use of the U.S. Navy in this fashion include the movement of two American carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Straits area in 1996 and the deployment of U.S. Navy warships into the Black Sea in the wake of the Russo–Georgian War of 2008, and during the Ukrainian crisis of 2014.

Forward naval presence and crisis response

Some regions are more prone to crises of direct U.S. concern than others. In addition to contributing to regional stability and enabling engagement with allies and partners, permanent forward-deployed U.S. naval forces ensure that ready U.S. forces can be on scene to help dampen or resolve crises on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. During the Cold War, the forward deployed and ready U.S. 6th and 7th Fleets were able to respond quickly to crises in the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea, the Western Pacific, and adjacent waters. In the post-Cold War environment, the same is true for the 5th and 7th Fleets in the Arabian and China Seas. The 6th Fleet as well, although greatly reduced in ship numbers, nevertheless retains this function in the Eastern Mediterranean today, as evidenced by its role in the 2013 Syrian chemical weapons crisis and the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. For quick response to Caribbean crises, the U.S. Navy can easily surge from its home bases on the American coasts.
Avoidance of unintended incidents at sea

While U.S. naval forces are often used to dampen and defuse crises, they must also ensure that they do not inadvertently (or willfully) exacerbate a crisis—or cause one to occur. To this end, U.S. Navy commanders and their crews are trained in the rights and responsibilities of warships under the Laws of War and the Law of the Sea. In 1972, the United States Navy and the Soviet Navy signed an “Incidents at Sea” (INCSEA) agreement that has served as an example for other similar agreements between other countries (and which is still in force between the U.S. and Russian navies). In April 2014, the U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations was a party to the signing of a “Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea” (CUES) in Qingdao, China, at a meeting of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS).

Non-combatant evacuations (NEO)

U.S. Navy–U.S. Marine Corps amphibious forces are particularly suited to conduct NEOs from countries experiencing crisis conditions, as was demonstrated in Liberia in 2003 (Operation Shining Express) and Lebanon in 2006, especially in situations where air or road evacuation is too impractical or dangerous.

Disaster response operations

U.S. Navy—and especially U.S. Coast Guard—vessels and aircraft have responded to crises triggered by natural and man-made disasters for years, providing rapid assistance to populations in dire need. Recent disasters such as the 2004 tsunami in Asia, the 2007 cyclone in Bangladesh, the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the 2011 tsunami in Japan, the 2013 typhoon in the Philippines, and the 2014 Korean ferry disaster occasioned rapid surges of U.S. Navy ships and aircraft to the affected regions, bringing badly needed medical, transportation, and security forces.

Forward deployed and easily surged U.S. Navy aircraft carriers and amphibious ships have proven especially valuable during disaster response operations, due to their availability and high state of readiness, capacity to conduct significant helicopter operations, ability to transport large quantities of materials, and organic medical facilities on board.

Special crisis responses

The roll-on/roll-off container ship MV Cape Ray was put under U.S. Navy command in 2014 to neutralize Syrian chemical weapons, illustrating the utility of imaginative sea-basing in certain crisis situations.

U.S. Navy crisis response attributes

Attributes that enable the U.S. Navy to respond effectively to crises, when tasked, include:

- on-scene combat readiness, and repositioning and surge capability, globally;
- modulated combat capabilities, up and down the ladder of possible appropriate force responses;
- man-made and natural disaster response capabilities;
- well-established, inter-operable relationships with allied and friendly navies and their commanders, both in the region in question and available to deploy there as coalition forces from outside the region;
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- command structures adaptable to joint direction, participation by U.S. sister services, and rapid situation changes;
- flexible, experienced, educated, and well-trained leaders capable of leading on-scene in fast-moving, complex, high-stakes crisis environments, and supporting American diplomacy.

Combat

Ends

The President and the American people expect that U.S. naval forces will fight skillfully and prevail in combat, to prevent and resist military attacks on the United States and its friends and allies, and their forces and populations. The U.S. Navy is a combat force. “Warfighting First” was the very first of a recent Chief of Naval Operations’ three basic tenets (the others being “Operate Forward” and “Be Ready”).

Peacetime engagement and coalition combat

As in crises, the United States and like-minded nations also often gather together for war in “coalitions of the willing,” normally under the auspices of a United Nations mandate and often by invoking alliance or other ties. If peacetime naval engagement has been productive, the U.S. Navy and other navies will be ready to operate together effectively at sea in combat, should the political leaders of coalition members so direct. As in crises, they will understand each other’s capabilities and capacities, and know how to communicate with each other quickly and securely, divide maritime tasks among themselves, formulate options for the political leadership to consider, and then combine to carry out coalition directives under wartime conditions.

Ways and means

In discussing the U.S. Navy’s ways and means of achieving the nation’s ends through combat at sea, it is useful to lay out the warfare areas that comprise modern naval combat (and the capabilities that enable operations in each), as well as the phases of such combat.

Warfare areas

If directed to fight and win in combat, the U.S. Navy has developed a wide array of complementary capabilities necessary to prevail in 13 necessary warfare areas. The spread of these areas ensures that no enemy will be able to identify and exploit a glaring vulnerability, and provides a complete range of options for war at sea and from the sea to the President as commander-in-chief of the U.S. armed forces and to joint and combined operational commanders.

Those warfare areas include strike warfare, amphibious warfare, naval special warfare, anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare, ballistic missile defense, anti-surface warfare, blockade, mine warfare, navy expeditionary combat, naval electronic warfare, ship protection, and strategic sealift – all supported by naval combat logistics and information dominance operations. With the exception of blockade, the U.S. Navy exercises continuously at sea to establish, maintain, and improve war-winning proficiency in all of these warfare areas.

Strike warfare

In strike warfare, Navy sea-based strike aircraft, land-attack missiles, and naval gunfire attack and destroy targets ashore. Precision is a principal attribute. The primary sea-based strike aircraft is
the F/A-18 Hornet (which comes in a half-dozen variants: A through F), attacking from one or more of the Navy’s nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs). The reach of Navy strike aviation is greatly enhanced through use of long-range U.S. Air Force tanker aircraft. The principal land-attack weapon is the Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile (TLAM), a precise, long-range, all-weather cruise missile launched from nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) and guided missile submarines (SSGN), cruisers (CG), and destroyers (DDG). Navy cruisers and destroyers mount guns that provide Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) against targets ashore. U.S. Navy long-range carrier strike operations from the Arabian Sea into Afghanistan and Iraq were ongoing in 2015 in support of U.S., Afghan, and Iraqi forces. Land-based U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and allied and friendly forces also can and do conduct strike operations, in coordination with the Navy, under joint and allied command.

Amphibious warfare

In amphibious warfare, the U.S. Navy combat loads U.S. Marines, gets them to their objective area, lands them on hostile shores, and continues to support them from the sea in order to assault and seize a beachhead, raid, divert attention, evacuate troops or civilians, or any of a host of other amphibious tasks. The Navy provides three specialized types of large amphibious warships: amphibious assault ships (LHD), amphibious transport docks (LPD), and amphibious landing docks (LSD). Naval close air and gunfire support from Navy carriers, cruisers, and destroyers provides fire support to Marines ashore during the operation as necessary. Depending on the scope and scale of the operations, Marines organize into one of several possible forms of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), landing with their own infantry, armor, artillery, helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, and utilizing a mix of Navy and Marine Corps landing craft and connectors.

The U.S. Marine Corps has also prepositioned equipment forward on two squadrons of U.S. Navy Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) in the Western Pacific and at Diego Garcia, and ashore in Norway. The MPS ships deploy to a port near the scene of intended action, and the Marines fly in to meet their prepositioned equipment at those ports. The Marine Corps also deploys combat-ready Special Marine Air-Ground Task forces (SPMAGTFs) by air in situations where U.S. amphibious ships may be unavailable, and is considering other deployment options. The U.S. Navy also supports the US Army in loading and unloading Army cargoes from ships in friendly or non-defended areas where there are no fixed port facilities. The two services annually exercise this capability, known as Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS).

Naval special warfare

The U.S. Navy’s Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) can insert US Navy SEAL Teams ashore from U.S. Navy warships, especially from specially configured guided missile submarines (SSGN). NSWC also operates a variety of small Special Warfare Combatant Craft (SWCC), especially SEAL Delivery Vehicles (SDVs) and Mark V Special Operations Craft (SOC). Navy SEALs and special warfare craft are totally integrated into joint U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) operations.

Anti-submarine warfare (ASW)

Anti-submarine warfare is a highly complex, technologically sophisticated form of naval warfare. To find and kill enemy submarines, Navy commanders orchestrate the coordinated
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operations of a wide array of platforms and systems, including attack submarines (SSN), ASW helicopters deployed on aircraft carriers, guided missile cruisers and destroyers (CG and DDG), land-based maritime patrol aircraft (P-3C and new P-8A aircraft), and fixed and mobile undersea surveillance systems. Submarines, surface ships, and aircraft deploy various types of sonar and other listening devices to find and identify hostile submarines and torpedoes to destroy them. An ASW module is under development as one of three inter-changeable modules for new U.S. Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) “seaframes.”

Anti-air warfare (AAW)

In anti-air warfare, U.S. Navy commanders use missile-firing F/A-18 strike fighter aircraft to engage enemy aircraft, as well as a variety of surface-to-air missiles launched from guided missile cruisers (CG) and destroyers (DDG). Some of these missile systems are designed to kill at a great distance; others are to destroy close-in air threats. The centerpiece of cruiser-destroyer anti-air warfare capabilities is the Aegis combat system, with its radar tracking, missile, and other elements. The U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps have significant complementary land-based aircraft and missile AAW capabilities.

Ballistic missile defense (BMD)

BMD is a relatively new naval warfare area, established to destroy or neutralize incoming enemy ballistic missiles from the sea. Many of the U.S. Navy’s inventory of guided missile cruisers (CG) and destroyers (DDG) have a ballistic missile defense capability, capable of protecting themselves, other warships at sea, and adjacent land areas. Their systems represent an expansion of the Aegis anti-air warfare combat system, using enhanced radar and missile technologies. As discussed earlier, the U.S. Navy routinely deploys BMD ships forward in peacetime (and operates an Aegis Ashore facility in Romania) to deter ballistic missile attacks “out of the blue” on forward U.S. forces and U.S. allies, but BMD is also an important and integrated component of the U.S. Navy’s arsenal in case of fuller, wider war.

Anti-surface warfare (ASUW)

This classic naval warfare area seeks to neutralize or destroy enemy surface combatants, using missiles and gunfire from Navy strike-fighter aircraft, cruisers, destroyers, and patrol coastals (PCs); and torpedoes from aircraft, surface ships, and submarines. An ASUW module has been developed and deployed on the new LCS seaframes. U.S. Air Force aircraft have a certain ASUW capability as well. Anti-surface warfare can also be conducted against civilian merchant ships, and includes blockade and anti-commerce warfare on the high seas.

Blockade

In blockade operations, naval commanders seek to close down an enemy’s ports and at-sea commercial shipping activity through the threatened and actual use of force at sea. Against small hostile nations with few ports and little merchant shipping, mounting these operations do not present an onerous problem. For enemy nations with extensive coastlines, large merchant fleets, and powerful naval forces of their own, the problem is much more difficult and complex. The U.S. Navy participated in a “quarantine” — a form of blockade — around Cuba
during the Cuban Missile Crisis with the Soviet Union in 1962. During the Vietnam War, U.S. Navy carrier aircraft sowed thousands of sea mines to blockade North Vietnamese ports in 1972. Blockade to enforce international sanctions was also an element in Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector against the Ghaddafi regime in Libya in 2011. There is now a burgeoning open literature debating the virtues of blockade in a hypothetical future U.S. war with China. 101

Mine warfare

Mine warfare includes the laying of mines in the sea, as well as detecting and neutralizing, sweeping, or destroying them (i.e. mine countermeasures). The U.S. Navy has the capability of sowing mines from its aircraft, surface ships, and submarines, and the U.S. Air Force can use its bomber aircraft for this purpose as well. Mine countermeasures are conducted by specialized Avenger-class mine countermeasures (MCM) ships. A mine warfare module is under development for the new LCS seafames, and the U.S. Navy’s large fleet of sea-based MH-60S helicopters has an airborne MCM capability. 102 Because America’s allies often have superb mine countermeasures capabilities, in coalition operations the U.S. Navy often cedes much of the responsibility for this warfare area to them. 103

Navy expeditionary combat

Navy expeditionary combat – as discussed earlier – comprises a variety of naval capabilities, including combat construction, mobile dive and salvage, riverine, coastal, and harbor patrol and combat operations afloat; explosive ordnance demolition; force protection operations, expeditionary logistics support, and theater security cooperation. These capabilities are routinely applied in peacetime during forward Maritime Security Operations to enhance theater security cooperation and stability. They can also be, however, of great utility in wartime, especially where the combat area includes major coastal or riverine geography – as was the case historically during the American Civil War in the West, the Philippine Insurrection, and the Vietnam War. It can be expected that Navy expeditionary combat capabilities would be deployed and sent into battle as ancillary naval forces, should the situation call for them. 105

Naval electronic warfare

Naval electronic warfare is used to jam, deceive, blind, or spoof enemy electronic systems, rendering ineffective any weapons they control. 106 Virtually every ship and aircraft in the U.S. Navy deploys with some form of electronic warfare capability. Without it, offensive strike warfare and other warfare areas would be difficult or impossible to implement, given the sophistication of current and expected hostile weapons systems. In particular, the U.S. Navy deploys new EA-18G Growler airborne electronic attack (AEA) aircraft as integral components of its carrier air wings. 108 As the EA-18Gs enter the fleet, the Navy is retiring its venerable EA-6B Prowler AEA aircraft. Joint U.S. commanders used the EA-6B heavily in U.S. operations over Iraq and Afghanistan throughout the past decade. 109

Ship protection

Sea control and power projection cannot be achieved if warships cannot protect themselves from hostile action. U.S. Navy warships are built to demanding naval architectural standards
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and incorporate numerous features to enable damage control in the event they are hit. U.S. Navy damage control training is demanding, frequent, and sophisticated.110 Numerous combat systems are installed on board Navy warships to protect against incoming torpedoes, cruise missiles, fast-attack craft, and other threats.111 The U.S. Army and U.S. Navy periodically experiment with using U.S. Army attack helicopters to protect U.S. Navy ships from enemy fast-attack craft.112 The Navy has also begun to protect its ships against cyber attack.113

Strategic sealift

Through its Military Sealift Command (MSC), the Navy maintains, contracts for, and deploys the nation’s strategic sealift and forward maritime prepositioning forces, to help support the rapid and effective projection of U.S. ground and land-based air power in a combat theater. Army and other services’ combat equipment can be rapidly transported forward from the U.S. on government-owned, civilian-manned Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off ships (LMSR), other Roll-on/Roll-off ships (RO/RO), and container ships, as well as domestic and foreign commercial ships chartered for the purpose. The MSC also maintains the nation’s fleet of Maritime Prepositioning Ships, which store U.S. Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, and some Navy cargoes in far forward locations in the Western Pacific and at Diego Garcia. The U.S. Air Force provides a similar service for U.S. all-service military airlift, through its Air Mobility Command (AMC). American troops fly to forward theaters from the United States on military or civilian-chartered aircraft to meet up with equipment that has been prepositioned or transported there by sea.

Combat logistics support

Operating routinely tens of thousands of miles from North America, for months on end under demanding conditions, in peacetime and combat, has been a hallmark of the U.S. Navy. This is accomplished through building robust sustainability into American warships, as well as provision of a naval logistics support system capable of providing routine supply, maintenance, repair services, as well as surges for crises and wars. The U.S. Navy is also well served by a large and sophisticated private and public naval industrial base at home, and a network of vital forward bases and “places,” as well as the transportation services of the Military Sealift and Air Mobility Commands.114

Underway replenishment (UNREP)

Particularly important is the Navy’s large fleet of government-owned, civilian-crewed Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ships, capable of underway replenishment of U.S. Navy warships alongside, at sea. This fleet includes Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ships (T-AKE), Fast Combat Support Ships (T-AOE), and Fleet Replenishment Oilers (T-AO). It provides the fuel, food, ordnance, spare parts, mail, and other critical supplies that keep U.S. Navy warships combat-ready – or in combat – for extended periods of time.

The Navy also forward deploys two submarine tenders (AS), normally based in peacetime at Guam and Diego Garcia, but periodically deploying to ports in the Philippines, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, India, and elsewhere to provide resupply, maintenance, and repair services to forward-deployed U.S. Navy submarines and sometimes other types of warships.115 They too would have wartime support roles.
“Navy information dominance” support

This is a new U.S. Navy term that includes Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR), as well as the rapidly expanding area of cyber warfare.\textsuperscript{116} Classically, often the hardest part of naval combat was finding the enemy, and prowess (and luck) in “scouting” was as important as firepower in determining the outcome of sea battles. The Navy has recently created an “Information Dominance Corps,” comprising its specialists in naval intelligence, cryptology, cyber warfare, information systems, information operations, and related specialties, to try to improve the synergies among them and deliver their outputs faster and clearer to naval combat commanders.\textsuperscript{117}

Combat phases

It is useful to discuss U.S. naval forces engaged in combat at the behest of the President and under joint and combined operational commanders as proceeding through three phases: “Transition to War,” “Seizing the Initiative,” and “Carrying the Fight to the Enemy.”\textsuperscript{118}

During the Transition to War, naval forces already forward in the potential combat theater(s) maneuver into advantageous positions and increase their combat readiness. Ready naval forces in or near U.S. ports will surge forward to join them, as may other U.S. forward forces from unaffected theaters. Foreign governments that have joined in the military effort with the United States may surge their forces forward as well, usually in close consultation with other governments, any multinational command structures that may be involved (e.g. NATO), and U.S. and other naval commanders. Consultations to de-conflict Rules of Engagement (ROE) will be intense. Forward Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations – especially in the affected theater – will intensify, including forward repositioning of land-based Navy maritime patrol aircraft. U.S. Navy Military Sealift Command wartime prepositioning and strategic sealift ships in support of U.S. Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force forward deployments would also move toward the affected theater. Navy demands on U.S. Air Force satellite, strategic airlift, and tanker aircraft support are bound to increase, as well as inter-service coordination on anti-air warfare and missile defense.

To Seize the Initiative, U.S. naval forces – in conjunction with other joint and allied forces – will strive to establish sea control as quickly as possible, seeking to identify and neutralize or destroy enemy aircraft, surface ships, submarines, and land-based anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems – at the direction of higher U.S. political and military authority, within any constraints that those authorities might set, using kinetic and non-kinetic means.\textsuperscript{119} Naval electronic warfare systems will play a vital enabling role during this phase. Joint tactics and systems developed to implement the Air–Sea Battle concept – especially in conjunction with the U.S. Air Force – will be used during this phase as necessary.\textsuperscript{120}

Anti-ballistic missile ships will maneuver into optimum intercept position and seek to destroy any incoming hostile missiles. Surge forces will continue to flow into the theater, bolstering the forces already present and engaged in combat. Should circumstances so dictate, a blockade against enemy ports and shipping may be instituted. Information dominance operations – including cyber operations – will play an important role.

In Carrying the Fight to the Enemy, U.S. naval forces – under joint or combined direction and alongside other U.S. services and the forces of allied nations – will seek to carry out the ultimate neutralization and destruction of enemy forces in all domains – on land, at sea, in the air, and in space and cyberspace – so as to achieve the goals of the war as set by the President and political allied leaders. Sea control operations will continue as necessary. U.S. naval forces will assist in the success of the ground campaign primarily through powerful power projection.
operations, including carrier air strikes, surface combatant and submarine missile strikes, offshore naval gunfire, and landings of potent amphibious and special operations ground forces. If these operations are successful, all hostile forces will be defeated and war termination will be achieved on terms favorable to the United States and its allies.

Note that the sequencing of these notional phases, while useful to deconstruct and explain the thinking behind U.S. naval combat operations, is not etched in stone. In some cases they might even need to be executed simultaneously.

**Post-combat**

When war is terminated, U.S. naval forces typically are reduced in strength and return to some variant of their pre-war peacetime posture and activities. But this seldom happens cleanly and without unanticipated significant post-war follow-on operations. In short, “when it’s over, it’s not over.” It can be anticipated that following any future combat operations, the same phenomenon will hold, and that the Navy will have to be ready to flex in unanticipated ways before regaining any semblance of a peacetime posture. The Navy’s recently organized Navy Expeditionary Warfare Forces – adept at riverine, coastal, and harbor patrol; civil affairs; construction; psychological operations; and related skills – should prove useful in this phase.

**Future combat: why and where**

The U.S. Navy is prepared to apply these ways and means globally, wherever tasked by the President, under joint or combined operational command, in furtherance of United Nations resolutions and/or U.S. defense commitments to its allies and partners, as well as in defense of its own national interests. But in particular, the Navy is poised to help defeat any North Korean aggression on South Korea; to ensure that the Strait of Hormuz remains open to commerce, especially oil shipments, in the face of potential hostile Iranian actions; and to defend its forces and allied and partner nations from North Korean or Iranian ballistic missile attack. Should the President so direct, in accordance with the U.S. Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, the Navy must also be able to provide him with options to help resist should China attempt to use force to take over Taiwan. The Navy also must plan to participate in operations against terrorists hostile to the United States and its friends and allies – state-supported and non-state actors – and to conduct armed NEOs and counter-piracy operations.

These contingencies differ from those of the Cold War and prior decades, and may well differ from those of the future. The inherent range of capabilities, flexibility, mobility, and scalability of U.S. naval forces enable them to adapt to changing national requirements as they evolve.

The Navy has no particular desire to participate in war, and expends a great deal of effort in engagement, deterrence, crisis response, and other activities designed to reduce the likelihood of war. But should the President decide the country must go to war, the U.S. Navy has a responsibility to be ready – a responsibility it takes most seriously.

The political leaders of the United States do not hunger for war. Neither do most men and women of the U.S. Navy – officers and enlisted. What they do hunger for is a world at peace, with increasing political freedom, economic prosperity, and social stability for all. They are grateful that they have been joined in this quest for decades by the nations and navies of their allies and partners, in Europe, the Americas, and the Indo-Pacific. They hope this partnership at sea will continue, even during the inevitable stresses of war.
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy’s combat capabilities have been honed in battle. Recent significant combat operations have included the ongoing Operations Enduring Freedom against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan (since 2001); Iraqi Freedom and New Dawn against the Saddam Hussein regime and insurgents in Iraq (2003–11); Operation Odyssey Dawn against the Gaddafi regime’s attacks on its own people in Libya (2011); participation in the follow-on NATO operation Unified Protector (March–October 2011); and Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (since 2014). In all of these instances, the U.S. Navy has fought alongside its sister U.S. services under joint command, and alongside coalition forces with which it had previously closely engaged and trained. Should those coalitions fray and should those forces dissipate, both America and the international order that most nations depend on for their security and prosperity will be the losers.

More on the means: U.S. naval forces

Ship numbers

The U.S. Navy fleet includes ships assigned to and not assigned to the Ship Battle Force, both civilian and military-manned. The number of ships in the Ship Battle Force is often used in discussing the size and composition of the fleet, and in comparing it to foreign fleets and those of past U.S. Navy eras. The Ship Battle Force, however, represents only a portion of U.S. naval power. In November 2014, the Ship Battle Force stood at some 289 ships, including 10 aircraft carriers, 94 surface combatants, 73 submarines, 31 amphibious warfare ships, 8 mine warfare ships, 30 civilian-manned combat logistics ships, 26 fleet support ships, 3 auxiliary support ships, 10 combatant craft, and 4 Naval Reserve Force frigates.

The number of Battle Force ships has been greatly reduced from Cold War force levels, although the capabilities of the individual warships have been markedly improved. U.S. Navy ships not assigned to the Ship Battle Force include dozens of civilian-manned Military Sealift Command ships for service support, special missions, sealift, and afloat forward prepositioning of military equipment.

The Navy forms only one part, however, of the U.S. “National Fleet,” which also includes some 90 or so U.S. Coast Guard cutters, as well as ships in the U.S. Maritime Administration’s National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF).

The U.S. Navy also comprises more than 3,700 manned aircraft, with capabilities across all the Navy’s warfare areas. These aircraft include F/A-18 sea-based strike fighters, a large number of various types of helicopters, land-based P-3C and new P-8A maritime patrol aircraft, and other aircraft types. Recently, a variety of new types of unmanned aircraft have also been introduced into the fleet, including the X-47B Unmanned Aircraft demonstrator.

Aggregation and disaggregation

Many types of U.S. Navy warships routinely combine to form task forces comprising more than one ship and more than one ship type, the better to achieve synergies necessary to conduct combat operations forward at sea. Should combat operations not occur, those task forces can disaggregate, to enable joint force commanders to conduct peacetime forward presence operations in more than one place at a time, albeit with reduced combat capability.

Numbered Fleets exist in the Eastern Pacific (3rd Fleet); Latin American waters (4th Fleet); the Arabian and Red Seas and the Gulf (5th Fleet); European and African waters (6th Fleet); and the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans (7th Fleet). The commander of the U.S. 10th Fleet...
conducted global cyber operations. Geographic numbered fleet commanders command naval forces in peacetime, crises and war as part of a joint regional command structure, utilizing Maritime Operations Centers (MOCs), and responsive to geographical combatant commanders. Fleet units are allocated to the numbered fleet commanders by various management mechanisms in the Pentagon, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense and with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the joint combatant commanders.

Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) typically consist of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN), a carrier air wing (CVW), a guided missile cruiser (CG), and three or four guided missile destroyers (DDG). The air wing includes squadrons of strike fighter, electronic warfare, airborne early warning and logistics airplanes, as well as anti-submarine, anti-surface, and mine warfare helicopters. Amphibious Ready Groups and Marine Expeditionary Units (ARG/MEUs) typically consist of three U.S. Navy amphibious warships in the ARG (an amphibious assault ship (LHD), an amphibious transport dock (LPD), and a landing ship dock (LSD); and about 2,200 Marines in the MEU, including command, ground combat, air, and logistics elements armed with combat airplanes, helicopters, tanks, artillery, and small arms. Surface combatants (cruisers and destroyers) can also be aggregated as Surface Action Groups (SAGs). CSGs, ARG/MEUs, and SAGs work up off the east and west coasts of the United States to acquire the capability of operating as cohesive combat units. Then they deploy forward to joint theaters of operations where they are often disaggregated, but retain the capability to coalesce again if required to do so.

When CSGs coalesce, they can simultaneously conduct combat strike, AAW, ASW, EW, and other operations using a command and control construct called the Composite Warfare Concept (CWC). When ARG/MEUs coalesce, they conduct combat and other amphibious operations using a different command and control construct.

In the calendar year 2013, the Navy worked up and deployed five CSGs and three ARG/MEUs to the Western Pacific, Arabian Gulf, North Arabian Sea, and Mediterranean Sea. For most of the year, the Navy kept two or three of those CSGs deployed forward, and one or two ARG/MEUs. The calendar year 2012 deployment pattern had involved an additional CVBG and an additional ARG/MEU.

Since 1995, U.S. Navy CSGs occasionally have included allied surface combatants, which have worked up and deployed as integral units of the CSG. Canada, Spain, Argentina, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Australia have each provided surface combatants to CSGs at various times. In the spring and summer of 2013, the German frigate Hamburg (F220) fully integrated and deployed with the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN69) carrier strike group, primarily providing important air defense capabilities.

Submarines typically work up and deploy forward alone, but nuclear-powered attack and cruise missile submarines (SSNs and SSGNs) can operate to complement or supplement CSGs or SAGs. Some destroyers deploy forward alone as well.

The Navy also deploys rotating detachments of its land-based Maritime Patrol and Surveillance Aircraft Squadrons (VP) forward. In 2013, detachments rotated through airfields in Italy, Spain, Djibouti, Qatar, Bahrain, Japan, El Salvador, and elsewhere.

Platform and force package issues

The forces and force packages just discussed are the product of a considered U.S. Navy predilection for building large, robust, multi-capable ships and deploying them forward in even larger and more robust force packages. Several critics, however, have questioned this focus on “big ships” and instead have advocated “flotilla” concepts of forward-deployed warships that might prove – in varying degrees – lighter, faster, cheaper, more expendable, and less vulnerable – with
their lethal power distributed among many very small ships rather than a small number of large, robust vessels.¹⁴³

**Ongoing and anticipated introduction of new platforms within the next decade or less¹⁴⁴**

These include:

- beginning to replace the Ohio-class Trident strategic nuclear SSBN force;¹⁴⁵
- F-35 Joint Strike fighter “Lightning II” variants (F-35B US Marine Corps LHD- and shore-based short takeoff and landing (STOL) variant; and F-35C U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps carrier-based variant);¹⁴⁶
- EA-18G “Growler” electronic warfare aircraft;
- E-2D advanced “Hawkeye” early warning aircraft;¹⁴⁷
- P-8A “Poseidon” land-based maritime patrol and surveillance aircraft;¹⁴⁸
- CVN-78 Ford-class carriers;¹⁴⁹
- DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class destroyers;¹⁵⁰
- unmanned systems:¹⁵¹
  - airborne
  - surface
  - sub-surface;¹⁵²
- Independence- and Freedom-class Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) seaframes, with mine countermeasures, A5W, ASUW modules;¹⁵³
- Spearhead-class Expeditionary Fast Transports (EPF);¹⁵⁴
- new LX(R) amphibious ships,¹⁵⁵
- Expeditionary Transfer Docks (ESD) and Expeditionary Mobile Bases (ESB);¹⁵⁶
- Mark VI patrol boats;
- Ship to Shore Connectors: the next generation landing craft;¹⁵⁷
- T-AO(X) fleet Oilers and other combat logistics ships;¹⁵⁸
- V-22 “Osprey” Carrier On-board Delivery aircraft;¹⁵⁹
- laser weapons;¹⁶⁰
- rail guns;¹⁶¹
- continued procurement of Virginia-class attack submarines and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, and modernization of existing ships and aircraft;¹⁶²
- Small Surface Combatants (SSC), based on upgraded variants of the LCS.¹⁶³

**Funding**

The U.S. Navy’s budget has been robust, in both absolute and relative terms.¹⁶⁴ It could not have been otherwise, in order to deploy the ships, aircraft weapons systems, and personnel enumerated and discussed above.

Due to U.S. government funding constraints imposed in 2011, however, the service had to temper its future plans. In September 2013, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral John Greenert, noted that the Navy’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 budget reduction had been $11 billion, causing cancellations of five ship forward deployments and a reduction in surge capacity by about two-thirds.¹⁶⁵ In March 2014, he noted that his budget submission for FY 2015 was $31 billion dollars less than he had earlier anticipated asking for.¹⁶⁶ Nevertheless, the U.S. naval arsenal will remain formidable for the foreseeable future.
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Force design and balance

Given all the U.S. Navy has to do in peacetime, crises and war, the nation and the Navy struggle with the issue of balance: given finite resources and a changing global environment, what is the proper balance to be achieved among the Navy’s various warfare tasks, platforms, and systems? Where should emphasis be placed? Where can more risk be accepted? The Navy’s programming and budgeting processes – embedded in the larger Defense Department Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) system are the mechanisms whereby the Navy Department seeks to achieve appropriate balance and trade-offs in its acquisition programs and deployment policies.\(^{167}\)

Conclusion

Again, to remind, this prodigious inventory of naval forces does not exist in a vacuum. It has been bought and deployed by the American government, on behalf of the American people, to ensure the country’s economic prosperity, military security, and political freedom – and that of its friends and allies – through maintenance and defense of a mutually beneficial global system.

Notes

1 The opinions expressed here are those of the author and should not be construed as those of CNA, the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, or of the United States government.


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7. For a view that a forward force posture may no longer be sustainable, under certain budget conditions, see “Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work on the Asia-Pacific Rebalance” (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, September 30, 2014).


9. There is a large contemporary literature asserting that the fundamentals of American power – and the bases for American naval power – are in decline. For a carefully argued counter-argument, see Robert Lieber, Power and Willpower in the American Future: Why the United States is Not Destined to Decline (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).


12. The focus of this chapter is therefore on U.S. Navy deployment and employment strategy, not on its – usually congruent – declaratory strategy. For studies of recent U.S. Navy declaratory strategy, see the 17 volumes of the U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies series by Peter Swartz with Karin Duggan (Alexandria, VA: CNA, 2009–12) and available on line at www.cna.org/research/capstone-strategy-series; the three edited volumes by John Hattendorf on U.S. naval strategies of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, published by the Naval War College Press in their “Newport Papers” series; CAPT Peter D. Haynes USN,


While parsing naval actions by “peace, crises, and war” is a useful explanatory device, the real world is often far messier. In an era with a total global war being conducted – like today’s global war on terror – the U.S. Navy may well be simultaneously conducting wartime operations in one theater, responding to a crisis in another theater, and conducting peacetime operations in two or three other theaters.

This chapter recognizes the difference between “ends,” “ways,” and “means” and the importance of distinguishing among them. Discussions of “ways” and “means” are combined throughout, however, so as to improve the flow of the narrative, which would otherwise be too stilted, choppy, and repetitious – as are many such papers that seek to rigidly apply the “ends–ways–means” construct. In particular, discussions of Navy “ways” without immediate discussion of the “means” to implement those ways are often at an impenetrable level of abstraction. This chapter’s listing of “ways” and “means” – organized by “peacetime,” “crises,” and “war” – reflects the author’s judgment and experience. Joint Publication 3-32: Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations lists some 20 “specific maritime operations,” but does not organize them in a “peacetime, crises, and war” (or any other) typology.


Other elements of the U.S. strategic triad include U.S. Air Force long-range nuclear bomber aircraft, land-based at U.S. airfields, and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), capable of being launched from silos in the United States. For inter-relationships among these elements (and arms control issues), see Amy F. Woolf, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues, RL 33640 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress Congressional Research Service (CRS), July 14, 2013 and subsequent editions).

For an argument that the United States should cancel replacement of its SSBNs, and rely instead on anti-ballistic missile defense as a strategic deterrent, see Maxwell Cooper, “The Future of Deterrence? Ballistic Missile Defense,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 139 (September 2013), 52–7. See also Peter Dombrowski, “Strategic Stability and SSBNs: Arms Control May be the Answer,” The Interpreter, October 2, 2014.


The U.S. Army also deploys ground-based ballistic missile defense systems – radars and/or missiles – forward in Japan, South Korea, Israel, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, Turkey. Several U.S. allies
in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia also deploy Patriot missiles, including a NATO deployment to Turkey.


For an assessment of global missile forces, see *Ballistic & Cruise Missile Threat*, NASIC-1031-0985-13 (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), 2013).


This “two forward hub” posture has characterized U.S. Navy deployment strategy more or less for over 60 years. For a discussion of its future tenability (and other options) in the face of declining U.S. defense budgets and changing world conditions, see Daniel Whiteman, Michael Price, Neil Jenkins, and Peter Swartz, *The Navy at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake?* CAB D0022262. A3/1ReV (Alexandria, VA: CNA, March 2010).


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36 In the fall of 2013, the U.S. Navy’s 10th Fleet successfully defended the unclassifi ed Navy–Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) against a foreign hostile hacking attack. For a press report of the incident, see Julian Barnes and Siobhan Gorman, “U.S. Says Iran Hacked Navy Computers,” Wall Street Journal (September 27, 2013).


40 For a rigorous analysis of the effect of such engagement on a U.S. ally’s sovereignty, see CDRE Eric Lehre RCN (Ret) PhD, At What Cost Sovereignty? Canada–US Military Interoperability in the War on Terror (Halifax, NS: Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2013).

41 Exercise Noble Justifi cation was a recent signifi cant NATO maritime exercise, taking place in the Mediterranean and Atlantic Ocean in October 2014. It involved more than 20 warships and several submarines and aircraft from the United States and 13 other NATO nations, plus two NATO partners – Sweden and Finland. It was under the command of VADM Peter Hudson RN, NATO’s Maritime Commander. See “NATO Naval Drills Begin in Mediterranean Sea, Atlantic Ocean,” NATO News (October 16, 2014).

42 The 2014 Sea Breeze exercise – in the wake of the Ukraine crisis – included warships from Ukraine, Georgia, Romania, Turkey, Canada, Spain, and the United States See “NATO Ships Take Part in Multinational ‘Sea Breeze’ Exercise in Black Sea,” NATO News (September 9, 2014).

43 IMCMEX 2014 was a massive exercise involving 40 nations, 38 ships, and 19 unmanned underwater vehicles – the largest of its kind in the world. See VADM John Miller USN, “More Than 40 Nations

44 RIMPAC is the world’s largest multinational naval warfare exercise. Sponsored by the U.S. 3rd Fleet, RIMPAC exercises began in 1971 and included naval forces from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States (the “AUSCANTUKUS” nations). Twenty-three nations participated in RIMPAC 2014, including the original five, Norway, and the People’s Republic of China (for the first time). See Daniel P. Taylor, “The Main Event,” SeaPower 57 (December 2014), 34–6.

45 Bold Alligator 14, off the coasts of Virginia and North Carolina, was a major U.S. Navy–U.S. Marine Corps amphibious exercise, with participation by ships from the Netherlands, Denmark, Mexico, and Peru. See Megan Eckstein, “Exercise Bold Alligator,” Defense Daily (October 30, 2014).


47 The U.S. Navy has, naturally, particularly close ties to the navies and other military forces of America’s formal allies, including the navies of all the NATO maritime nations, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and Thailand. Very cooperative naval relations also exist with the navies of close U.S. military partners in the Middle East, especially Israel, Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Morocco, and others. For an example of international participation in U.S. Navy war games, see U.S. Naval War College Global 2013 Game Report (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, March 11, 2011).

48 A good example of such classroom engagement is the U.S. Navy’s long-running International law of Military Operations (ILOMO) course, attended by legal advisors from dozens of nations. See Bob Krekorian, “International Military and Civilian Legal Advisors Graduate from DIILS,” NNS130619-5, Navy News Service, June 19, 2013. See also David F. Manning, Global Arms of Seapower: The Newport Connection: The International Officer Programs of the United States Naval War College (October 29, 2014).


50 A recent example of this policy has been the assignment of an American admiral to lead NATO’s Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 and a U.S. Navy cruiser as the force command ship. See LTJG Timothy Dover USN, “USS Vicksburg Deploys to Support NATO,” NNS141204-10, Navy News Service (December 4, 2014).


54 The Russian Navy, however, declined an invitation to participate in RIMPAC 2014.


57 See VADM Kevin Cosgriff USN (Ret) and Ellen Laipson, “Testing the Waters for Normalizing U.S.–Iran Relations” (posted on Defense One, September 9, 2013).


63 For an argument that the U.S. Navy should pay more attention to Latin American waters, see RADM Sinclair Harris USN, “South is Forward,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 141 (February 2015), 18–23.

64 For a European view on maritime security operations, see VADM Lutz Feldt FGN (Ret), Dr. Peter Roell, and Ralph D. Theile, Maritime Security – Perspectives for a Comprehensive Approach (Berlin: Institut für Strategie- Politik- Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsberatung (ISPSW), April 2013).


66 For an argument that NATO’s considerable naval activities are all but unknown in the United States, even among policy elites, see Jacob Stokes and Nora Bensahel, NATO Matters: Ensuring the Value of the Alliance for the United States (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, October 2013). On Operation Martillo, see John C. Marcario, “Pooling Resources,” Seapower 57 (December 2014), 50–1.


72 For example, annual Pacific Partnership (since 2006) and Southern (i.e. Caribbean) Partnership Station deployments.


82 On the INCSEA agreement, see David Winkler, *Cold War at Sea: High-Seas Confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000).


84 On the operational and tactical aspects of these operations, see CAPT Cathal O'Connor USN, “Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster-Relief Operations: Lessons Learned and Best Practices,” *Naval War College Review* 65 (Winter 2012), 153–60.


86 Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Jonathan Greenert USN, CNO’s *Sailing Directions* (Washington, DC, undated (but 2011)).


91 The U.S. Marine Corps is a large and powerful naval armed service unlike any other in the world. Like the U.S. Navy, it is a separate service within the U.S. Department of the Navy – one of the three service departments of the U.S. Department of Defense. Navy–Marine Corps relationships are close – especially in entry-level officer education and amphibious warfare. On Navy–Marine Corps relations, see Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert USN and Commandant of the Marine Corps General James F. Amos USMC, “A New Naval Era,” U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 139 (June 2013), 16–20. On recent exercises designed to re-invigorate the capabilities of the two services to conduct amphibious warfare operations, see Otto Kreisher, “Crisis Response: Amphibious Exercise Showcases Navy–Marine Teamwork, Engages International Coalition,” *Seapower* 56 (September 2013), 16–18; and Lance M. Bacon, “Bold Alligator is Back,” *Navy Times* (October 18, 2014). For a discussion of ways to bring the services even closer, see Col. Bradley E. Weisz USMC, “Optimizing the Blue-Green Team,” *Marine Corps Gazette* 97 (September 2013), 50–4.


96 For a recommended new approach to U.S. Navy anti-air warfare, see Bryan Clark, *Commanding the Seas: A Plan to Reinvigorate U.S. Navy Surface Warfare* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), November 2014).

97 On naval Ballistic Missile Defense, see CAPT George Galdorisi USN (Ret) and Dr. Scott Truver, “Leading the Way in Ballistic Missile Defense,” U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 139 (December 2013), 32–8. On the future of U.S. naval Ballistic Missile Defense see, for example, U.S. 7th Fleet Public
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Anti-commerce warfare was once a central feature of naval warfare. For an argument that its importance may well return, see Douglas C. Peifer, “Maritime Commerce Warfare: The Coercive Response of the Weak?” Naval War College Review 66 (Spring 2013), 83–109.


For one of the few analyses in the open literature, see Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorist Operations: Background and Issues for Congress, RS22373 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service (CRS), July 31, 2014 and subsequent editions).


See, for example, RADM Edward Masso USN (Ret), “Our Aircraft Carriers are not Sitting Ducks,” Forbes (August 4, 2014).

See, for example, “Army Aviators, Sailors Team up in 5th Fleet,” Navy Times (September 9, 2013).


118 This construct was used to great positive effect in explaining the U.S. Navy’s “Maritime Strategy” of the 1980s. It also corresponds well to the three central phases of the current U.S. joint operational phasing model: “Deter” (Phase I), “Seize Initiative” (Phase II), and “Dominate” (Phase III). See John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz (eds.), U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, Newport Paper 33, December 2008) and Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operation Planning, II–42–III–43. For how naval operations map to contemporary joint U.S. military phases, see Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare (NDP 1), 49–57.

119 For a comprehensive discussion of anti-access warfare operations and ways to overcome them, see CAPT Samuel Tangredi USN (Ret), Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013).


121 For example, following World War II, the great forward fleets that had helped defeat Germany, Italy, and Japan were called home, and reconstituted in American ports and waters as (greatly reduced) surge fleets akin to the Navy’s pre-war deployment posture. Small forward stations were kept on in the Mediterranean, Northern Europe, and Northeast Asia, akin to the pre-war U.S. Asiatic Fleet and Squadron 40-T. Following the Vietnam War, the Navy stripped the 7th Fleet of much of its wartime strength, and rebalanced its global force again in favor of the Mediterranean and North Atlantic, as had been the case before the Vietnam War.

122 Examples abound. Immediately following the American Civil War, in 1865, U.S naval combat forces had to immediately but briefly deploy off Texas in the face of the Imperial French attempt to sustain the Emperor Maximilian on his Mexican throne against the wishes of the vast majority of the Mexican people. No sooner was the Spanish–American War ended in 1898 – and the Spanish Philippines ceded to the United States; to transport hundreds of thousands of Nationalist Chinese troops to North China to fight the Communist Chinese; and to provide naval combat support for two divisions of U.S. Marines assigned ashore in northern China. U.S. military withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973 was followed two years later by operations to evacuate U.S. embassy personnel and others from South Vietnam and Cambodia.

123 The current U.S. joint operational phasing construct recognizes the existence of post-combat phases as well, including a “Stabilize” (Phase IV) and “Enable Civil Authority” (Phase V), but the discussion...
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is informed largely by the American experience in ground warfare and counter-insurgency during the past decade, and not by many of the types of post-combat naval operations cited above. See Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operation Planning, III-43–III-44.

124 For an argument that the United States is actually threatened by very little, see Christopher Preble and John Mueller (eds.), A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and National Security (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2014).


129 On any given day, the size of the U.S. Navy’s Ship Battle Forces can be found on the website of the Naval Vessel Register (NVR), published by the U.S. Navy’s Naval Sea Systems Command.


131 For a discussion of the National Fleet concept, and further references, see Bryan Clark, Commanding the Seas: A Plan to Reinvent U.S. Navy Surface Warfare (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), November 2014), 39.

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For the most recent U.S. Navy policy on the composition and capabilities of CSGs, ARG/MEUs, ESGs, and SAGs, see OPNAVINST 3501.316B “Policy of Baseline Composition and Basic Mission Capabilities of Major Afloat Navy and Naval Groups” (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, October 21, 2010).

For the Composite Warfare Commander concept, see Joint Publication 3-32: Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 7, 2013).

For U.S. doctrine on amphibious operations, including command and control, see Joint Publication 3-02: Amphibious Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 18, 2014).

Naval Aviation News 96 (Summer 2014) 26, 32–3.


163 On the SSC, see “Statement by Secretary Hagel on the Littoral Combat ship” (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, December 11, 2014).


167 For an argument that the U.S. Navy must reconsider its over-arching design strategy for new ships and aircraft – or risk drastic reduction in both – see CAPT Arthur H. Barber III (Ret), “Rethinking the Future Fleet,” U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 140 (May 2014), 48–53.