


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Love, sex and relationships

Mike W. Martin

Erotic (or sexual) love unites two highly celebrated goods, sex and love. Sex, according to Michel Foucault (1980–88: 1.156), is the pathway to identity and individuality, and “over the centuries it has become more important than our soul, more important almost than our life”. Love, proclaims Simon May (2011: 6), is “the rapture we feel for people and things that inspire in us the hope of an indestructible grounding for our life”. Combining these themes of identity and grounding, Robert Solomon (1988: 195) depicts erotic love as “the attempt to find another person who will give us a sense of our ‘true’ selves and make us feel complete, once and for all”. In highlighting the importance of erotic love, such glowing statements intimate the perplexities about how sex and love are connected, and should be connected. Their successful union requires both luck and the virtues, in myriad combinations.

Moral issues concerning sex arise at several levels, including: (a) standards of social justice governing permissible forms of sexual expression, (b) religious and cultural ideals and practices, and (c) personal ideals and choices about relationships and good lives. These levels are distinct but interact. Conservative perspectives typically canonize a narrow range of cultural ideals as permissible or preferable, whereas liberal movements such as sexual liberation, gay liberation and feminism target prejudice at all three levels (Okin 1989; Mohr 2007). In this chapter I will sketch a moderate position regarding personal choices and ideals of sexual love, devoting special attention to marriage. I begin by affirming a mostly liberal framework of social justice within democracies: a framework that leaves room for conservative, liberal and moderate ideals at the levels of individuals and religions. I also take note of issues surrounding how “love’s virtues” are to be understood and how they relate to some broader issues about the nature of morality.

SOCIAL JUSTICE

Can virtue ethics, that is, ethical theories that makes the virtues fundamental in ethical theory, provide a theory of social justice that is preferable to human rights ethics, duty ethics and utilitarianism? Perhaps it can, whether in some version of perfectionism (Hurka 1993) or communitarian thought (MacIntyre 1988, 2007). Yet, I have doubts. In contrast to the virtue ethics approach, I take the virtues seriously within virtue theory: that is, a moral outlook that highlights character and good lives without making the virtues more fundamental than principles of justice. In particular, a theory of the virtues complements rather than competes with democratic theories of social justice, explicating virtues of respect for persons, tolerance and reciprocity in terms of both general moral principles and specific negotiated rules. Specifically, I favour integrating a theory of the virtues with a suitable version of rights ethics and with elements of John Rawls's (1999) theory of justice.

Martha Nussbaum (1999) develops such an integrated view and applies it to a wide range of issues concerning sexual ethics. Her "capabilities approach" aims to modernize, democratize and globalize Aristotle's ideas of human flourishing and good lives. In order to flourish an individual needs access to some threshold level of capabilities to obtain the "primary goods" that rational persons value (Rawls 1999). These capabilities and goods include a normal lifespan, bodily health, bodily integrity, abilities to perceive, emotions, practical reason, affiliation (which includes caring and love), concern for other species, play, and control over one's environment (Nussbaum 1999: 41–2; 2011b). The virtues enable individuals to exercise these capabilities, as do supportive social practices and institutions. Social justice implies recognizing the dignity of each person, as a bearer of equal human rights to pursue well-being: rights that in turn require political structures to advance the acquisition of human capabilities at some morally acceptable level.

Nussbaum endorses a broad but bounded pluralism regarding religious ideals of erotic love and families. She celebrates a multitude of religious practices within limits set by human rights in exercising human capabilities. Practices such as coercive dowries, female genital mutilation and *sati* (the immolation of widows upon the death of their husbands) violate human rights to life, bodily integrity, affiliation and equal opportunity. More controversially, Nussbaum defends the rights of sex workers to earn a living in everything from pornography to prostitution, although she calls for dramatically improving the conditions of women so they have a better range of alternatives. In opposition to Nussbaum, other feminists join conservatives in regarding prostitution as exploitative and degrading to women and men, or at least strongly incompatible with their personal ideals of how love and sex should be connected. They make a convincing case, to my mind, that legalized prostitution tends to corrupt important values surrounding human dignity and sex by sending an official symbolic message that selling sex is like selling any other commodity (Sandel 2012: 111–12). Democratic societies are justified in making it illegal or in other ways limiting and discouraging it, without the laws themselves becoming harshly oppressive. Clearly, the moral line between injustice and permissible discouraging of selective sexual practices is both unclear and open to reasonable compromise within democracies. Equally blurry is the line between unjust prohibition and social privileging, as in debates over encouraging monogamy while tolerating informal polygamous arrangements. In any case, I invoke Nussbaum not to resolve all disagreements about social justice but rather

to highlight the importance of those disagreements in providing a democratic framework for reflecting on erotic love and the virtues.

PERSONAL IDEALS AND CHOICES

Virtue theory makes its greatest contribution with regard to personal choices and ideals concerning sexual love. The resurgence of both virtue theory and virtue ethics in contemporary philosophy initially had a conservative bent. Aristotle was invoked to defend narrow accounts of “the normal” or “natural” pathway to sexual maturity that denigrated essentially all sexual acts outside of heterosexual marriage, including premarital intercourse, homosexual acts, oral sex and masturbation. This denigration was usually found in religious traditions that make love a paramount virtue, although versions less directly dependent on religious faith were also developed (Scruton 1986; Anscombe [1972] 1993). Moreover, during the culture wars in the United States conservative thinkers co-opted virtue talk to defend traditional views of human sexuality and sexual love. Today, however, all world religions are engaged in lively debates about sexual ethics (Machacek & Wilcox 2003), extending controversies that emerged throughout their histories (Browning *et al.* 2006).

As Nussbaum illustrates, virtue theory has been reworked in more liberal directions that employ broader conceptions of human nature. These liberal theories rightly take into account momentous cultural developments such as birth control technologies, changing roles for women, and the new health sciences. In general, liberal approaches to sexual ethics predominate in contemporary philosophy (Vannoy 1980; Halwani 2007; Soble & Power 2008; Baker *et al.* 2009). Liberal and especially libertarian views celebrate maximum freedom, including the freedom to entirely separate sex and love, within the constraints of respect for partners’ consent and for nonmaleficence – the absence of coercion, violence and exploitation, including rape, child abuse, spouse battering and sexual harassment. Other views celebrate maximum freedom while emphasizing how love adds value to relationships. Raja Halwani (2003) develops a virtue-ethics approach to sex and love with an eye to maximizing freedom and celebrating diversity. He understands caring as the central virtue defining sexual love, and other virtues as enabling sexual love to succeed in well-lived lives. He also defends myriad forms of sexual expression that need not involve love, including casual sex, sex work and extramarital affairs in open marriages (marriages where partners mutually consent to such affairs). Earlier, Alan Soble (1990) rethought traditional virtues such as caring, constancy and reciprocity in more liberal directions, emphasizing sex as a wellspring of pleasure.

Conservatives disagree with liberals on many issues, but no area of disagreement is more heated than homosexuality. Some areas of debate leave room for compromise, for example concerning whether laws that exclude gays and lesbians from marrying should be rethought to give all people access to legally defined domestic partnerships, and defining “marriage” as a distinct relationship that each religion or couple can define as they choose. Nevertheless, the core issue of whether homosexual acts are morally objectionable is less open to compromise. Many conservatives attempt to affirm the equal moral worth of gays, lesbians and bisexuals as persons while condemning sexual acts expressing their sexual orientations. I find this disjunction utterly implausible and morally objectionable, given

how closely sexual orientation is linked to personal identity. Conservatives also argue that sex has one primary natural function, procreation, and its secondary function as a “pleasure bond” is appropriate only when linked somehow to procreation. According to the Vatican (1975: 109–11), which mixes a virtue-oriented language of love with natural law doctrine, “every genital act must be within the framework of marriage”, where marriage is defined as between a man and a woman; “masturbation is an intrinsically and seriously disordered act”; and homosexual acts are a “serious depravity”, due either to an improper education or to a pathological condition. This doctrine is open to the moral objection that it is inhumane (Corvino 1999), and it is at odds with psychiatry and other health sciences that no longer regard homosexuality, much less masturbation, as a disorder (Bayer 1987). If anything, the relevant disorder is homophobia – the irrational fear, hatred and anxiety in response to homosexuality. In moral terms, it constitutes prejudice that is at odds with the virtues of respect, tolerance and love. Moral and mental health perspectives combine, then, in rejecting homophobia, just as these perspectives interweave at many other junctures (Martin 2006: 132).

Except where social justice and fundamental rights enter in affirming the equal worth of persons, many issues concerning sexual love are best approached in terms of personal and group ideals of good lives. Personal ideals concerning sexual love are virtue-guided perspectives that individuals and couples adopt concerning their relationships. Personal ideals reflect personal tastes, temperament and sexual orientation, but they also reflect “moral particularity” – the ways in which our morally pertinent history, commitments, interests and aspirations enter into moral self-definition and understanding of a good life for us (Walker 2003). Just as commitments to orthodoxy as a Jew, Muslim or Mormon involve accepting special restrictions on clothing, food and activities, there are myriad religious and secular ideals concerning sexual love that individuals adopt in guiding their relationships. Typically these ideals attach strong moral meanings to sexual intercourse, rendering it “making love” in the sense of expressing and confirming the couple’s love. These ideals will in part incorporate special understandings and applications of the virtues. Personal ideals can be stringent in their requirements for the couple and yet be accompanied by tolerance for other persons’ ideals. In any case, ethical pluralism tolerates or celebrates many ways of implementing the virtues and achieving the goods of sexual love in good lives (Solomon & Higgins 1991; Stewart 1995). Ethical pluralism also acknowledges multiple aspects of good lives, including moral decency, moral goodness, meaningfulness, self-fulfilment, health and happiness – each of which take myriad forms and can be in tension with the others (Martin 2011).

In the relevant sense, personal ideals are not unrealistic aspirations to perfection. The ideals and their corresponding virtues are best understood in terms of “satisficing” with an eye to coping, not in terms of “maximizing” with a rosy eye to perfection (Swanton 2005). Moreover, although some individuals maintain stable ideals of sexual love throughout their lives, others do not. Again, an ideal might be stable while building in a temporal pattern. For example, a possible ideal might include a time for sexual experimentation during early adulthood, a period of “hooking up” and casual sex during college years, a committed exclusive partnership during marriage, and indeterminacy in the event of divorce or the death of a spouse. Hopefully individual ideals are based on self-knowledge and informed by relevant scientific information, including human biology and “positive psychology” (Peterson & Seligman 2004).

MARRIAGE

I am especially interested in the virtues and personal ideals concerning marriage, understood as moral relationships based on long-term (or at least temporally indefinite) mutual commitments, whether or not formalized in wedding ceremonies. My thinking is influenced by scholars who have conducted historical, cultural and psychological studies of love. Stephanie Coontz (2005: 247), for example, reminds us that marriage is an evolving set of practices. Love became the primary basis for marriages only around 1800; before then economics and social status were primary factors. I am influenced even more by the history-oriented philosopher of love, Irving Singer (1984–7). Singer attempts to understand the unity and variety of love across millennia by understanding love in terms of valuing. Sexual love interweaves two ways to value a person, and (within relationships) to be valued in return. One way is “appraisal”, the largely self-interested assessment of the goods one seeks from the other person, for example sex, affection or money. Another way is “bestowal”, whereby one freely gives singular worth to the beloved. Details aside, Singer applies his distinction between appraisal and bestowal to explore the interweaving of self-interest and altruism in sexual love within different cultures and historical periods.

Of course, details matter. The idea of bestowal as creating value is not altogether pellucid, and it reflects ambiguities surrounding Christian doctrines about divine love (*agape*) as creating value (Nygren 1982). Singer’s idea of bestowal reminds us that love is not reducible to deriving benefits from the beloved, based on self-interested appraisals of their features. Yet even bestowal seems rooted in the value experienced and responded to in the beloved – value that is already inherent in the person rather than something we create, and also conditional on at least some of the beloved’s perceived features. This experienced value includes moral value but also every other type of value that leads us to respond with delight and joy to the beloved (Badhwar 2003). Certainly it includes the values we commit to in sharing the pursuit of a good life with the beloved – a braided life that transforms individual pursuits into shared pursuits of happiness, meaning, fulfilment and moral decency (Bingham 2008; Martin 2011: 119–29).

Like Singer, I understand erotic love as a way of valuing persons, as well as an attitude (emotional disposition) and a relationship, that combines self-interest and singular caring for the beloved (Martin 1996). As such, erotic love is a great good, both inherently and in the goods it contributes to, such as meaningful lives, emotional stability and children. At the same time, its role in a good life is open to innumerable variations. Good lives and “true love” cannot be understood in morally neutral terms. Some mandatory level of the virtues specifies moral decency, but ideals of virtue also support all other dimensions of good lives.

Most virtues support and shape love in some way. As in all domains of life, cardinal or “executive” virtues enable love to flourish, including prudence and responsibility, courage and perseverance, faith and hope, self-control and temperance. Some virtues enter into the very definition of love, and as those virtues are understood in different ways by couples they shape different types of loving relationships. How the virtues are understood, applied and valued within loving relationships has wide and legitimate variations, and to some degree must be negotiated by couples (R. C. Solomon 1988: 238). Certainly these variations arise in regard to caring, respect, faithfulness, sexual fidelity, honesty, fairness and responsibility, which I comment on next.

LOVE'S VIRTUES

Caring is so central that it is often taken as a synonym for “love”. The relevant “deep caring” implies valuing the partner in a positive, sustained and singular manner, actively promoting his or her well-being and happiness as integral to one’s own. Mutual caring often, although not always, leads to sharing a life together, which includes sharing the pursuit of self-fulfilment and happiness. Caring also implies responding to the beloved as having singular importance in one’s life. Many issues arise about how to understand caring. Sometimes it is thought to be entirely selfless, but it is better conceived as a mixture of selfless and self-interested elements. Again, is caring always a virtue or only when it is not accompanied by self-destructive tendencies and other extreme harms? (Similar issues arise concerning all virtues; for example, is courage a virtue when it is found in the Nazi soldier and other crusaders for evil causes?)

Love is sometimes conceived as a generic caring, implying that sexual love is essentially sexual attraction mixed with a dollop of caring – caring of a generic sort that is also manifested in parental love, sibling love, self-love, divine love, love of nature or love of sports. The idea is usually espoused in religious terms, but Erich Fromm (1956: 38–9) develops it in a secular direction: “Love is not primarily a relationship to a specific person; ... If I truly love one person I love all persons, I love the world, I love life”. This claim is implausible, although it reminds us that love’s rapture sometimes does radiate throughout an entire life. The claim also conflicts with Fromm’s emphasis on the need for intimate knowledge of the person we love. The most striking feature of sexual love is that it is highly specific and not generic humanistic love, which helps explain why it is so gratifying to be loved. There is the question, however, whether we can love only one person at a time or perhaps several, as in polygamous love. The answer is in part empirical, but it is in part normative in that it further specifies the ideal of love we hold.

Respect implies high regard for partners, including admiration for (at least some aspects of) their character, in addition to generic affirmation of their moral worth as a person. It implies valuing the partner’s autonomy in cooperatively shaping the relationship. As with other general virtues, respect is highly contextualized. To respect strangers might simply require leaving them alone, not violating their rights, or providing help to them only in emergencies. In contrast, to respect oneself implies caring about and having due regard for one’s good and for meeting duties to oneself to develop one’s talents. Respect for the beloved is closer to self-respect, in that it blends with caring. Far from merely leaving the beloved alone (except when one’s partner needs “some space”), respect implies active engagement and coordination with the beloved’s interests and choices. Inevitable tensions arise, as partners accommodate, sacrifice and expand their choices to include the desires of the beloved (R. C. Solomon 1988). Yet love includes elements of willing submission, whereby the beloved’s desires become reasons for one’s own choices (Frankfurt 2004). In committing to long-term relationships, partners share their autonomy as well as their well-being: “They limit or curtail their own decision-making power and rights; some decisions can no longer be made alone” (Nozick 1989: 71).

Faithfulness, understood as constancy in love, is an explicit commitment made by spouses, either formally as part of wedding vows or informally on the basis of shared understanding. The promise to love, honour and cherish, in sickness and in health, is often construed as a promise to sustain the love unconditionally. Most spouses do undertake

momentous commitments to sustain the caring relationship by nurturing the conditions for its flourishing. These conditions include everything from emotional openness and empathy to economic responsibility. Yet, all love has tacit conditions, ranging from one's spouse not becoming a spouse- and child-abuser to sustaining their love towards us. Moreover, how long love lasts is not entirely up to us, any more than who we love is entirely a matter of voluntary choice. There is a considerable element of (moral) luck when relationships are both good and endure for a lifetime. When love makes one or both partners irremediably miserable, divorce is virtually expected, at least after entering couples therapy or obtaining some comparable form of help – and this is true for conservatives and liberals alike in Western democracies (Cherlin 2009: 183).

Sexual fidelity is that particular form of faithfulness required for living up to commitments and shared understandings about how sex is expressed by partners. Its positive aspects include keeping sex alive in the relationship, and maintaining some shared understanding about sex as an expression of love. Most discussions of sexual fidelity, however, focus on avoiding adultery, as signalled in traditional wedding vows by “forsaking all others”. Halwani (2003: 135) contends that sexual fidelity is not a virtue but instead a counsel of prudence for some relationships. He bases the contention on the questionable view that virtues have universal and mandatory content: “virtues are universal human traits and so their moral value and importance do not vary from one individual to another or from one society to another” (*ibid.*), whereas it is permissible for couples in open marriages to renounce sexual fidelity. In contrast, I think of sexual fidelity as a virtue whose exact requirements depend on the specific understanding, commitments and personal ideals embraced by partners as defining what love means to them. The same can be said of other forms of fidelity, such as trust and fidelity in dealing with money and other shared resources in the relationship.

Honesty has two distinct facets that interweave in nuanced ways: trustworthiness and truthfulness. Both facets bear on adultery, in so far as adultery involves both betrayal and deception. Equally important, however, is broader emotional honesty, which includes openness in expressing emotions and beliefs, and also honesty in financial matters (R. Taylor 1997). Love, especially in its early stages of “falling in love”, often involves illusions, self-deception and idealization. At the same time, intimate relationships elicit exceptional degrees of honesty and insight with which lovers perceive and appreciate valuable features of each other, indeed the full worth of each other as individuals (Nussbaum 1990a). In practice, couples work out implicit limits about exactly what should be revealed – for example, concerning spending habits or sexual fantasies about other people.

Fairness refers to balance of benefits and burdens within relationships. A formal, procedural criterion for fairness is the mutual consent of partners; fair results are simply whatever couples agree to voluntarily. Feminism introduced a more substantive criterion, and thereby transformed contemporary relationships: balanced distributions that promote the mutual fulfilment of partners, without unduly lopsided arrangements of power and grossly unequal patterns of benefits and burdens (Okin 1989). At the same time feminists highlighted the nuanced ways in which economic and tacit power differences undermine voluntary consent. By making fairness an essential virtue in understanding love, feminists have redefined what love is for most couples, although feminist views vary, reflecting the freedom of reasonable persons to negotiate exactly what fairness means in their relationship. In any case, the criteria of consent and substantive balance are in tension.

Responsibility is the virtue of conscientiousness in meeting our obligations. As such it is an umbrella virtue, much like integrity, which connects with all a lover's other virtues. It deserves separate mention because it connotes accountability to one's partner for sharing how the relationship unfolds. It also connects with prudence and practical wisdom, for example in how time and money are spent. And, like all of love's virtues, it underscores that love is not an amoral domain separable from common decency, contrary to the aphorism that all is fair in love and war. As Hazel E. Barnes writes of her six-decade relationship with Doris Schwalbe, some of the most mundane virtues sustain and advance love: "independence, self-sufficiency, individualism, but also personal responsibility, empathic concern for others, the importance of justice, and, above all, accountability, absolute honesty and integrity: all those old-fashioned virtues that sound so dreary but turn out to be life-sustaining in a relationship" (1997: 275).

In addition to other-directed virtues, self-directed virtues have great importance in love, in particular self-respect and authenticity. *Self-respect* is the virtue of properly valuing oneself. It implies not losing one's identity in destructive or otherwise harmful relationships. The risks of doing so arise from the sacrifices called for in love, but even more so from the potent longing to be one with the beloved. The risks are compounded by myths about merged identities that permeate Romantic literature and were recounted by Aristophanes in Plato's *Symposium* (1989). Love is morally better, at least in one regard, when it weds distinct personalities without destroying individual identities (I. Singer 1994: 25).

Authenticity suggests both discovery and creation of our better self in relation with the beloved (R. C. Solomon 1988). It emerged as a cultural value with the rise of individualism, especially during the Romantic era. Jean-Paul Sartre (2007) construed it in largely subjective terms, as simply creating ourselves in full awareness of our radical freedom and without self-deception or "bad faith", and in his novels and plays depicted love as a self-defeating struggle between two wills, each of which seeks both freedom and intimacy. A more plausible interpretation is that authenticity has subjective aspects and yet also needs to be understood in terms of the full horizon of values (C. Taylor 1992). Subjectively, it implies freely choosing who we become, both in general and in sexual relationships, in ways that contribute to happiness and a sense of meaning. Objectively, it implies self-acceptance and self-affirmation of one's deepest, strongest and most valuable aspirations, which for many people includes a fulfilling relationship involving sexual love. Authenticity is a multifaceted virtue and it is connected with additional virtues, for example, honesty with oneself (including about our sexual needs), accepting and respecting oneself, and self-realization.

LOVE AND THE NATURE OF MORALITY

Good judgement is needed in exercising all the preceding virtues. Such judgement has a highly personal dimension. It connects at various points with broader moral perspectives, in particular with theories of social justice. And it also connects with five broader issues about morality, several of which have already been alluded to.

First, how do self-interest and selflessness, and happiness and morality, combine or conflict in general? Christian theologians contrast *agape* (divine and divinely inspired

altruistic love) and *eros* (physical and self-interested love) (Nygren 1982). Yet erotic love is better conceived as a blend of self-interest and caring for the beloved for her or his sake, as Singer attempts to elucidate with the concepts of appraisal and bestowal. Another illuminating approach is to envision love as transforming the self, thereby redefining self-interest in terms of the love (Badhwar 1993). Either way, love is often in tension with other aspects of self-interest, whether employment opportunities in a location disliked by one's partner, a fervent desire to have a child not desired by one's partner, or a new love or sexual attraction for a third party. To explore love requires exploring good lives in all their complexity and major domains.

Second, how far are love and love's virtues under our control? Biology, temperament, sexual tastes, perceptions of beauty, and social conditioning all play important roles. We do not have complete direct control over our emotions, much less over the deep emotional dispositions that enter into sexual love. Yet we do have capacities to responsibly maintain or irresponsibly undermine the conditions that help love flourish – conditions that range from how we spend our time, how we deal with money, and how we exercise our sexual imagination, to how we attend to the emotions and needs of people we love. Usually when couples make vows of constancy they do so on the foundation of a love that is already present. The promises are designed to do everything they can to keep that love alive and enable it to flourish. Luck also plays a role, including moral luck (Statman 1993; Card 1996). The belief that love conquers all has enduring appeal, but surely it needs to be limited by humility about the limits to control over our emotions and over what makes us happy. Yet, responsible and intelligent choices are also essential in sustaining love and exercising the virtues that advance love.

Third, morality has egalitarian and non-egalitarian aspects, which are sometimes in tension. Its egalitarian aspect centres on issues of social justice: each person is morally important, deserves respect and has equal human rights. Its non-egalitarian aspect includes duties to ourselves to develop our talents and be responsible for our lives, and it includes the highly selective personal relationships of friendship and love.

Fourth, how do the virtues limit each other and otherwise interact in love, and how do love and the virtues become corrupted, or perhaps corrupt the virtues in other domains of life? Love is notoriously vulnerable to erosion of caring as well as innumerable confusions, misunderstandings and anxieties (Reeve 2005). Unequal power can cause as much harm here as anywhere else in life, and often far more so (Foucault 1980–88). Needless to say, because love often reshapes identities – both our sense of who we are and our sense of self-worth (R. C. Solomon 1988) – loss of a partner's love can cause deep depression and hostility. Yet even when love flourishes, partners might manifest high degrees of caring, honesty, fairness and other virtues within their relationship while joining together to be uncaring, dishonest, unfair, in other areas of their lives – the Bonnie and Clyde syndrome. Love is fertile ground for exploring the highly contextual expression of the virtues (Flanagan 1991; Doris 2002).

Finally, sceptics recommend abandoning marriage as a cultural practice. Given both the difficulties in making marriages work and the constrictions of freedom they involve, marriages and more generally exclusive “coupling” is in their view a harmful practice and cultural anachronism, best abandoned (McMurtry 1984). It might well be that faith is a virtue deserving exploration in light of increasing economic pressures of contemporary life – faith not only in one's partner and oneself, but faith in the cultural practice of

marriage, not to mention faith in the importance of morality in general. Equally deserving of attention are social biases against women (and some men) who live single lives, including those who shape their lives in morally creative ways that contribute greatly to communities (De Paulo 2011).