


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Integrity

Damian Cox, Marguerite La Caze and Michael Levine

Integrity is prized in public office and private life. To remark on a person's lack of integrity is to criticize the person's character in some way. To remark on a person's possession of integrity is to praise at least some aspect of their character. Thus integrity appears to be a virtue. But exactly what kind of virtue might it be? We speak of attributes such as professional, intellectual and artistic integrity. However, we also use the term "integrity" to describe a feature of general character, and philosophers have been especially concerned to understand this latter use of the term. What is it for a person to exhibit integrity throughout life? What is it to be a person *of* integrity? In this chapter we offer an answer to these questions. We arrive at our answer by way of contrast. An obvious candidate answer is that integrity is the virtue of achieving or maintaining an integrated self. We argue that this account is wrong, but wrong in a very revealing way. We develop an account of integrity – integrity as the virtue of successfully taking one's life seriously – on the basis of our criticism of the idea of integrity as self-integration, as well as our critical appraisal of other accounts of integrity offered in the philosophical literature.

INTEGRITY AS SELF-INTEGRATION

It is natural to turn to the etymology of the term "integrity" for clues as to the nature of the concept. There appear to be two distinct strands in the term's etymology. One etymology dictionary summarizes the etymology of "integrity" in this way:

c.1400, "innocence, blamelessness; chastity, purity", from O.Fr [Old French]. *integrité* or directly from L. [Latin] *integritatem* (nom. *integritas*) "soundness, wholeness, blamelessness", from *integer* "whole". Sense of "wholeness, perfect condition" is mid-15c. (Online Etymology Dictionary: www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=integrity [accessed August 2013])

Etymologically, then, “integrity” is tied both to a moral condition (blamelessness, innocence, purity) and a structural or formal condition (wholeness, soundness, intactness). Contemporary analyses of the concept of integrity tend to emphasize one of these features at the expense of the other.¹ Self-integration accounts of integrity emphasize the latter. On the self-integration view of integrity, integrity is a matter of persons integrating various parts of their personality into a harmonious, intact whole. Self-integration is an achievement rather than a quality or disposition. Nonetheless, it is possible to translate a judgement of self-integration into what appears *prima facie* to be a virtue judgement. A person has the virtue or virtues corresponding to self-integration if they have, among other things, a disposition to work towards an integrated self and the skill to progress towards such a thing even when it is difficult to do so.

How should the integration of the self be described? An influential attempt to describe it is made by Harry Frankfurt (1987). Frankfurt works with a rather spare account of the elements of the self and describes their integration in terms of coordination between desires and volitions (willings). According to Frankfurt, desires and volitions fall into a natural hierarchy. First-order desires are desires for various actions and outcomes. For example, a person may want to apologize to a friend they have quarrelled with. This is a first-order desire because it takes as its object an action. Second-order volitions are desires that one act on particular first-order desires. Second-order volitions are important because first-order desires often drive us in incompatible directions. A person may desire to apologize to a friend they have been quarrelling with, but also desire to carry the quarrel on. Second-order volitions are desires that one act on one first-order desire rather than another. In this case, it may be the desire to act on the desire to apologize rather than the desire to carry on the quarrel. The mere existence of a second-order volition is hardly decisive, however. One may experience ambivalence at a second-order level, just as one experiences it at a first-order level. Thus a person might at the same time desire to act on their desire to apologize and desire to act on their desire to carry on the quarrel. A person, for example, may want to listen to their more accommodating angel, but also want to listen to their more assertive nature, to defend their side in the quarrel. They may both want to be a peacemaker and an argument winner; or they may both want to be a good friend and a person of intellectual resolve (who will not back down in an argument just because it would make things easier for all concerned). It will not do to try to resolve this second-order ambivalence by appeal to a third-order volition, for ambivalence can exist at any order of volition.

To break this potential regress, Frankfurt introduces the concept of identification. Agents, he thinks, are able to identify with particular second-order volitions and this identification halts the possibility of regress. When an agent identifies with a second-order volition, they make it their own and make the corresponding first-order desire an object of their will. The concept of identification employed by Frankfurt is hard to clarify. It is not the same thing as endorsement. It is possible to identify with a desire and thus make it a constituent of one’s will without accepting it as right or justified. One can identify with desires one does not endorse. Identification is a kind of ownership. We identify with some aspects of our motivational state and outlaw others, alienating them from our will. Thus an agent may identify with her apologizing self, not her quarrelling alternative self, making her desire to apologize a constituent of her will and her quarrelling alternative self a stranger to her will. She might end up quarrelling anyway, but if she does, she will see

this as a failure of her will. It will appear to her as the usurpation of her will by an alien or heteronomous motive; a failure to do what she really wants to do.

Wholeheartedness is Frankfurt's term for self-integration and wholeheartedness is not undone by self-conflict; it is undone by ambivalence. Ambivalence is a condition of the will in which there is no resolution of conflict between second-order volitions. An ambivalent person lacks the resources to identify with second-order volitions and outlaw volitions in conflict with them. In the example just given, ambivalence would leave the agent unable to say honestly which of her second-order volitions is her own. Whether she quarrels with her friend or apologizes to her, both are a reflection of her conflicted will. Conflicts of desire are a part of ordinary life. According to Frankfurt, conflicts of will are symptoms of flawed agency. As Frankfurt puts it: "Wholeheartedness does not require that a person be altogether untroubled by inner opposition to his will. It just requires that, with respect to any such conflict, he himself be fully resolved. This means that he must resolutely be on the side of one of the forces struggling within him and not on the side of any other" (1999: 100). Self-integration, on this account, is a matter of driving out ambivalence of will by resolutely identifying with a consistent set of second-order volitions.

Frankfurt does not offer his account of wholeheartedness as an analysis of the concept of integrity, but if integrity is a matter of maintaining or working towards self-integration, his account represents a good way of developing such an analysis. There are two principal objections to the analysis. First, integrity is being given a wholly formal characterization. The aspect of integrity that documents a moral condition of some kind (such as blamelessness or innocence) is left out of the picture altogether. This makes the analysis one-sided at the very least. Second, it is unclear whether ambivalence invariably undermines integrity. Unreasonable ambivalence about important matters probably undermines integrity, but could there be cases in which agents have good reasons to maintain and accept ambivalence? We think that there are.

In our example above, a person has a second-order volition to act on her desire to end a quarrel and a second-order volition to act on her desire to see the quarrel through. In most circumstances, there would be a sensible way of resolving this conflict – one that preserves what the agent holds to be most valuable in the situation. However, it seems there are situations in which values clash and there is no reasonable way to resolve the clash. In circumstances like this, to identify with one value rather than another value would be to make an arbitrary determination of the will. There are at least two potential problems here. One is with arbitrariness itself. It might seem that an arbitrary determination of the will could sometimes be a rational response to ambivalence: it facilitates action where action is better than inaction; it preserves the good order and effectiveness of one's agency. Nonetheless, the will seems to be the wrong point at which to introduce arbitrariness. If action is needed in the face of ambivalence, then an arbitrary choice of action can be made without an arbitrary determination of the will. One may toss a coin or just undertake one action rather than another in what feels like a spontaneous and unchosen way. Arbitrarily determining one's will would be like tossing a coin to decide which of two values are to be more deeply your own and there is something troubling about this approach.

Second, arbitrarily resolving ambivalence sells values short. Ambivalence can be a defect of the will – the result of an agent's unwillingness or inability to sort out which values should take priority for them. But the cure in this case is not to arbitrarily resolve ambivalence but to reason the matter through. When ambivalence is a response to an experience

of incommensurable values, however, it is not a defect of the will but an acknowledgement of incommensurability. If realization of two clashing values cannot be ranked on non-arbitrary grounds, then to identify with one of the pair and alienate the other on no other grounds than that one's agency runs more smoothly and efficiently without ambivalence is to fail to properly acknowledge the force and validity of the alienated value. It is to sell this value short. It is hard to see how integrity ought ever to be a matter of selling values short. Thus wholeheartedness – that is, the driving out of ambivalence – is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for integrity.

A defender of the view that integrity involves wholeheartedness might object to this argument by denying the incommensurability of values. They may insist that there are always reasons for prioritizing one value over another in concrete circumstances. Consider our example of ambivalence over a quarrel. In general, a person may value both being peaceable and standing up for themselves in an argument. However, given enough details of the situation, it should eventually become clear which of these values ought to take precedence in the circumstances. If this is right, then it should be possible to resolve ambivalence about the second-order volitions in a non-arbitrary way. The agent might realize, for instance, that the quarrel is not important enough to carry on with at the risk of enmity. These are grounds for her to alienate her desire to carry on the quarrel. By alienating her desire to carry on the quarrel, she has not abandoned her commitment to standing up for herself in argument. Rather, she has understood the limits of her commitment and the fact that the value of standing up for oneself in an argument is outweighed in the circumstances by the value of being a peacemaker and avoiding unnecessary enmity. Cases of this kind seem very common, but the putative defence of integrity as wholeheartedness requires more than an illustration of a common case. It requires the case to fully generalize so that clashes of value are *always* resolvable in this sort of way. Clashes of value are always resolvable if there is no such thing as incommensurability of value. However, we think there is such a thing as value incommensurability and illustrate it with a case introduced by Joseph Raz.²

Raz (1986: 332) describes a case in which a person faces the choice between two careers, both of which promise to be successful: one as a lawyer and the other as a clarinetist. One career does not (supposedly) seem better than the other, but nor do they seem equally good. If they were equally good, then any slight improvement to one would make it better than the other. For example, a slightly improved version of the legal career would be better than the musical career. But this does not seem right. The two careers are not things that just happen to fall together in a value-ranking as if they attract equal measures of the good stuff (whatever that is). They are good in such different ways that a minor improvement to one would not displace the other. If this is right, there is nothing on the basis of which one could rank the careers: either one on top of the other or both at equal rank. The legal career and the musical career are incommensurably valuable.

Raz's example seems plausible. How would it play out were you to seek to act wholeheartedly? In Frankfurt's terms, a wholehearted career choice would involve the alienation of desires and volitions associated with the unchosen alternative. You decide to become a lawyer, for example, and identify with all the motivations driving you towards a legal career and dissociate from whatever motivations were driving you towards a musical career. As this process becomes fully realized, you find yourself constituted as a lawyer, not a musician. You are wholeheartedly a lawyer and as much as you might admire musicians and love music, you reject any residual desire for a musical career. You may occasionally feel

the desire, but you do not identify with it. The path not taken does not belong to you. It is alienated from your will and your sense of self. Any future regret you may experience for the musical career you might have had would be irrational. It no more makes sense for you to regret not being a musician than it makes sense for anyone else to regret not being a musician. While you are prone to occasionally feel a desire for a musical life, this desire does not belong to you in the right way to ground regret. You may occasionally feel the pain of unsatisfied desire, but that desire is not part of the structure of your will. What you experience is the sting of an alien, unsatisfied desire, not the felt lack of a value unrealized.

Now it seems to us that this way of thinking gets the phenomenon of regret wrong. Regret marks a response to values. To regret something is, among other things, to keep track of what is important to you. Much regret may be foolish and overblown, but there are sources of regret than merit the response of regret. Regret can be the response of someone who is fully open to the reality of what is important and valuable to them. To fail to feel regret in this way is to close yourself off from the reality of what is important to you. To fail to feel any regret at all for paths not taken is to have closed yourself off from the values that would have been realized in them. It is to treat these unrealized values as if they have nothing to do with you. It is to treat yourself as if you were a piece of motivational machinery with a convenient set of “off” buttons. Sensitivity to paths not taken and the consequent experience of regret are not inimical to integrity. On the contrary, it is a key part of integrity to be fully open to the reality of the values encountered in life and to respond to them with full seriousness. This requires that we retain something of the ambivalence with which we choose a path through life’s incommensurable alternatives. The key problem with Frankfurt’s admonition to live wholeheartedly, therefore, is that it amounts to an admonition not to live seriously.

We think that the case against Frankfurt generalizes to all accounts of integrity as integration of the self. The problem as we see it lies not with Frankfurt’s description of the process of self-integration, but with the goal of self-integration. All things being equal, an integrated self is better than a fragmented self. But things are not always equal. Frankfurt’s account has the merit of making explicit what must be involved in any attempt to fully integrate the motivational structure of the self given the fact of incommensurably clashing values and incommensurable realizations of value. What it shows is that the urge to integrate the self comes into conflict with the urge to take seriously encountered values: to accept their reality and their call upon us. Having shown that integrity cannot be a matter of self-integration, we consider the possibility that integrity is not a virtue.

IS INTEGRITY A VIRTUE AT ALL?

Bernard Williams claims that integrity is not a virtue because:

while it is an admirable human property, it is not related to motivation as the virtues are. It is not a disposition which itself yields motivations, as generosity and benevolence do; nor is it a virtue of that type, sometimes called “executive” virtues, which do not themselves yield a characteristic motive, but are necessary for that relation to oneself and the world which enables one to act from desirable motives in desirable ways – the type that includes courage and self-control. (1981c: 49)

Williams also contends that integrity does not dispose its possessors towards a characteristic thought – there is nothing in particular that integrity leads those who possess it to attend to. He writes: “If integrity had to be provided with a characteristic thought, there would be nothing for the thought to be about but oneself – but there is no such characteristic thought, only thoughts associated with the projects, in carrying out which a man may display his integrity” (*ibid.*). Is Williams right about any of this? There are two claims made in these passages, one about the motivational character of integrity and the other about the cognitive character of integrity. Behind this is an assumption about the way virtues relate to motivation and cognition. The assumption seems to be that virtues are qualities of character that make a distinct contribution to the motives and thoughts of moral agents. Virtue possession makes a difference – a distinct and broadly specifiable difference – to the motivational and cognitive life of a person. If something is to count as a virtue, then possession of it must entail something distinct about the sorts of things that a person is apt to do or something distinct about the way a person is apt to do what they do. Also, if something is to count as a virtue, then possession of it must affect the way a person thinks in some distinct way. Presumably, this is what Williams means by a virtue’s characteristic thought. Let us accept this assumption, presented in the general form we have just given. The question, then, is whether Williams is right to claim that integrity makes no distinct contribution to thought and motivation.

Integrity certainly makes a difference to thought and motivation, even by Williams’s own lights. According to Williams, integrity is a strong disposition to remain true to one’s identity-conferring commitments. Identity-conferring commitments (Williams also calls them “ground projects”) are commitments that people identify with most deeply, as constituting what they consider their life to be fundamentally about. If integrity is about the maintenance of identity-conferring commitments, then possession of it would make a clear and distinct contribution to motivation. A person of integrity would be someone motivated to stay true to identity-conferring commitments even in the face of difficulties and in the face of temptations to abandon them. Of course, such a motivational state of affairs will vary from person to person, as identity-conferring commitments vary. But there is nothing remarkable about this variation. The motivations of a benevolent person, for example, vary from person to person and from situation to situation. The benevolent are motivated to help specific others in specific ways, depending upon their opportunities, capacities, experiences and other contingencies. All such motivations have in common the quality of seeking to help others; but what counts as seeking to help a person in one circumstance might count as seeking to harm them in another circumstance. Benevolent motivations are person and situation relative. Similarly, motivations to maintain identity-conferring commitments are person and situation relative; they depend on what one’s identity-conferring commitments happen to be and what would constitute maintenance of them. Characteristic thoughts are also person and situation relative. The benevolent characteristically look to what may help another. The identity-preserving characteristically look to what advances their ground projects.

Williams has an additional concern about a motivation to advance one’s integrity: the motivation threatens to become a form of what he calls moral self-indulgence. The motivation appears on the face of it to be directed at the wrong sort of object. Say that a person has an identity-conferring commitment to living a particular kind of religious life. What ought to motivate them on this basis are values intrinsic to such a life, not the idea

that one's integrity is bound up with living it. Integrity makes a difference to the motivations of one who has it, but the relevant motivation is not to have integrity. That would be a self-indulgent motivation. It is also one that might easily become self-undermining. For example, to be motivated to live a religious life because this is the best way that you can live with integrity is probably to fail to live an authentically religious life. Williams is right to be troubled by the phenomenon of moral self-indulgence, although the problem of moral self-indulgence only comes to the fore when motivations to have a particular virtue replace motivations intrinsic to that virtue. For example, to be motivated to become benevolent is no substitute for wanting to help another because you see they need help. There seems to be nothing wrong with experiencing the motivational pull of becoming a better person as long as the motivation *to be* virtuous does not replace the motivations *of* virtue.³ Benevolence makes a difference to the motivations of the virtuous, but it does not follow that the virtuous are primarily motivated by a wish to be benevolent. In the same way, integrity makes a difference to the motivations of those who possess it, but it does not follow that a person of integrity is primarily motivated to maintain their integrity. The motivational structure of integrity does not fundamentally differ from the motivational structure of benevolence. Since benevolence is an uncontroversial example of a virtue, integrity does not have a motivational structure at odds with the requirements of virtue, at least as Williams conceives integrity.

On Williams's own account of integrity, his case against the proposition that integrity is a virtue fails. But Williams's account of integrity also fails. It is much too narrow. It overlooks the integrity or lack of integrity with which identity-conferring commitments are formed and revised, and overlooks the way in which integrity can be implicated in aspects of life other than identity. It overlooks the social aspects of integrity and it denies that integrity has moral implications. So we are left with the question: if integrity is a virtue, what is it a virtue of?

VIRTUES OF A SERIOUS LIFE

Apart from self-integration and maintenance of identity, there are four main suggestions about the nature of integrity developed in the philosophical literature. Cheshire Calhoun (1995) argues that integrity is primarily a social virtue, one that is defined by a person's relations to others. The social character of integrity is, Calhoun claims, a matter of a person's proper regard for their own best judgement. Persons of integrity stand for something: they stand up for their best judgement within a community of people trying to discover what is worth doing in life. This appears to be an important part of the story, but only a part of it. Integrity is not only a virtue of the relation between deliberators in a community, it is also – indeed it is fundamentally – a virtue of one's relation to oneself. Integrity seems to be a matter of being true to oneself not just in social settings, but also in private.

Greg Scherkoske (2012) claims that integrity is an epistemic virtue. Of course, this is not a promising account of integrity unless a very broad conception of epistemic virtue is proposed. Scherkoske spells out integrity as (a) a disposition to develop and maintain convictions in an epistemically responsible way; (b) self-awareness of the quality of one's judgement in matters of conviction; (c) a disposition to do justice to one's convictions

in action. This last feature may not seem like an epistemic virtue *per se* but, according to Scherkoske, the reasons one has to form a conviction are also reasons to act on that conviction, and it is an epistemic virtue of an agent that they accord full value to these reasons in practical matters (*ibid.*: 199). In Scherkoske's resonant phrase: to achieve all this is to live a convincing life.⁴ Again, this seems to be a promising account of part of the story. Scherkoske is wrong, we think, to categorize the processes of according full value to one's reasons in practical affairs as an aspect of epistemic virtue. Epistemic virtues take as their objects belief, warrant, justification, judgement and so on. The translation of reasons into action is not fundamentally an epistemic matter. One can fail to act on reasons without this being an epistemic failure of any kind. Scherkoske's account also fails to fully accommodate the importance of aspects of life that are not matters of conviction. We often form attachments and commitments that are not based on reason's adjudication of what is worthwhile, but that reflect the particularities and happenstances of our lives. Integrity is relevant to the disposition of such things.

Another approach to integrity puts the moral aspect of the virtue at the centre of things. Recall that, etymologically, the term "integrity" has two aspects: a formal aspect (wholeness, soundness, intactness) and a moral aspect (innocence, blamelessness, purity). Contemporary philosophical conceptions of integrity do not translate the historical conception unaltered, but if there is a role for the moral aspect of integrity in contemporary conceptions, what role might that be? Mark Halfon offers one suggestion. He describes integrity in terms of a person's dedication to the pursuit of a moral life and their intellectual responsibility in seeking to understand the demands of such a life. He writes that persons of integrity:

embrace a moral point of view that urges them to be conceptually clear, logically consistent, apprised of relevant empirical evidence, and careful about acknowledging as well as weighing relevant moral considerations. Persons of integrity impose these restrictions on themselves since they are concerned, not simply with taking any moral position, but with pursuing a commitment to do what is best.

(Halfon 1989: 37)

Alongside this epistemic virtue, integrity is a matter of strength of will and moral courage. To live a life of moral purpose is both to struggle to understand the requirements of morality and to struggle to live up to them. Again, Halfon's vision of integrity is a very plausible version of part of the story.

Each of the accounts of integrity mentioned so far – self-integration, maintenance of identity, standing for something, living a convincing life, living a life of moral purpose – capture part of the concept of integrity as it functions in contemporary discourse. None of them capture the whole concept, however. So what do they have in common that might form a basis for a satisfactory generalization? It seems that what they each have in common is an attempt to capture what it is to successfully take one's life seriously. Self-integration and wholeheartedness are important from this perspective because ambivalence threatens the sense in which one could say that one's life has a shape, is about something rather than being a series of unordered experiences and desires. The demand is excessive, as we have seen, when it can only be achieved by under-valuing or arbitrarily alienating the experience of value. This is because an open, unconniving and unprejudiced experience of

value is an important part of what it is to succeed in taking one's life seriously. Identifying integrity with the virtues constitutive of what it is to successfully take one's life seriously explains both the significance of self-integration and also the significance of accepting particular forms of ambivalence and all the emotions of self-assessment that attend such ambivalence.

Maintenance of identity is clearly related to the business of successfully taking one's life seriously – to have a core set of commitments that constitute the thing that gives one's life purpose and structure, and to remain true to these commitments in the face of difficulties and temptations is obviously a part of what it is to succeed in taking one's life seriously. It is not all of it, of course, because the individual and social conditions in which one decides upon and revises identity-conferring commitments are also ingredients in a life taken seriously. Standing for something emphasizes the social aspect of this process. Living a convincing life emphasizes its epistemic aspects. Living a life of moral purpose emphasizes the moral aspects of what it is to succeed in taking one's life seriously.

Integrity, therefore, is a kind of master virtue. It coordinates all those character traits that are constitutive of what it is to succeed in taking one's life fully seriously. We explicitly frame this as a success condition. It is easy enough to appear to oneself to be taking one's life seriously; this might involve no more than a set of secondary attitudes to oneself and one's affairs. A person who is angered and frustrated whenever a plan, no matter how trivial or valueless or misconceived, comes to nothing may seem to be taking themselves very seriously – too seriously perhaps – but the success we are seeking to describe has little to do with these kinds of affect responses. It is an accomplishment at the same time that it is a struggle. It is the accomplishment of genuinely struggling with the business of living, rather than merely appearing to take it all seriously. So what are the virtues constitutive of this kind of success?

The best way of approaching this is not to list conventional virtues (strength of will, courage, moral sensitivity and so on) but to set out the conditions that defeat or diminish a person's integrity. In *Integrity and the Fragile Self*, we defend a view of integrity that has a broadly Aristotelian shape (Cox *et al.* 2003). According to us, integrity stands as a mean to various excesses. On the one side there are character traits and ways of behaving and thinking that tend to maintain the status quo even where acting with integrity demands a change. These are things like arrogance, dogmatism, fanaticism, monomania, preciousness, sanctimoniousness and rigidity. These are all traits that can defeat integrity in so far as they undermine the attempt to fully and honestly experience and appraise sources of value and how they may change. Thus, refusing to acknowledge that circumstances in a marriage, or one's passionate desire to write a novel, have dramatically changed (for whatever reasons) may indicate a lack of integrity – a giving in to cowardice for example, and a refusal to acknowledge new or overriding commitments.

On the other side, a different set of characteristics undermine integrity. These make it difficult to discern stable features in one's life, and in one's relations to others, that are necessary if one is to act with integrity. This category includes capriciousness, wantonness, triviality, disintegration, weakness of will, self-deception, self-ignorance, mendacity, hypocrisy and indifference. Although the second of these lists dominates contemporary reflection on the nature of integrity, the first also represents an ever-present threat to integrity. The person of integrity lives in a fragile balance between every one of these all-too-human traits (*ibid.*: 41).

Central to the idea of integrity as the virtue of successfully taking one's life seriously would be the idea that a pursuit of integrity involves somehow taking account of one's changing values, convictions, commitments, desires, knowledge, beliefs and so on over time. Integrity would thus require a robustly successful kind of self-examination. A crucial feature of integrity, therefore, is emotions of self-assessment: regret, remorse, guilt, shame. These are central to the kind of self-monitoring that would be part of what it means to have the virtue of integrity, understood as the virtue of successfully approaching one's life seriously. Far from being either unnecessary or undesirable, such emotions may be essential to integrity.

A conception of integrity as a virtue – either developed along the lines described above or along different lines – is compatible with the existence of constraints on the content of the norms the person of integrity is committed to. Profound moral failure may be an independent defeater of integrity, just as hypocrisy, fanaticism and the like are defeaters of integrity. One might judge as internal to such a conception of the virtue the idea that integrity is incompatible with major failures of moral imagination or moral courage, or with the maintenance of wholly unreasonable moral principles or opinions. On such a view, a Nazi could not, all things considered, be regarded as a person of integrity. The Nazi may be a self-deceiver and a liar (which is highly probable), but even if he is not, his principles and his actions are not rationally defensible under any coherent moral view. And this latter fact may by itself justify the judgement that the Nazi lacks the virtue of integrity, because although he may have understood himself to have lived seriously – to have lived seriously above all else – his failures of moral imagination constitute a failure of seriousness after all. In this way the sense of blamelessness central to integrity is incorporated to an extent in our account. A person of integrity may not be fully blameless, but they will be immune from wholesale moral condemnation.

NOTES

1. We discuss the main accounts of integrity developed in the philosophical literature in this chapter, but for a more detailed discussion of them, see Cox *et al.* (2013).
2. This version of Raz's case for incommensurable values is taken from Nien-hê Hsieh (2012).
3. The phenomenon described here entails a kind of self-effacement of virtue theory. See Keller (2007b), Martinez (2011), Pettigrove (2011), Cox (2012).
4. We take this phrase from the title of Scherkoske's book *Integrity and the Virtues of Reason: Leading a Convincing Life* (2013).