This article was downloaded by: *10.3.98.93*
On: 19 Oct 2018
Access details: *subscription number*
Publisher: *Routledge*
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK



The Routledge History of Terrorism

Randall D. Law

Militant Organizations in Western Europe in the 1970S and 1980S

Publication details
https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315719061.ch20
Hanno Balz
Published online on: 02 Apr 2015

How to cite :- Hanno Balz. 02 Apr 2015, *Militant Organizations in Western Europe in the 1970S and 1980S from:* The Routledge History of Terrorism Routledge
Accessed on: 19 Oct 2018
https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315719061.ch20

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT

Full terms and conditions of use: https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms

This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Downloaded By: 10.3.98.93 At: 04:47 19 Oct 2018; For: 9781315719061, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315719061.ch20

20

MILITANT ORGANIZATIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE IN THE 1970s AND 1980s

Hanno Balz

When looking at the postwar societies of Western Europe, we can observe a tantalizing contrast between, on the one hand, a tendency towards liberalization and, on the other, a series of domestic crises and the antagonisms and tensions of the Cold War condition. While it appears to be common sense that the student revolt of the late 1960s had a lasting liberalizing effect on most societies, its offshoots, the armed groups of the 1970s and 1980s, are regarded as their perverted epigones – the black sheep of the radical family. The threat of "terrorism" caused a considerable perception of crisis, mainly in West Germany and Italy, where in the late 1970s the threatened state became a "state of emergency," and the mass media repeatedly created moral panics.[1]

In this chapter I will first examine the origins of this outbreak of left-wing political violence in West Germany and Italy and the connections between the armed groups of the 1970s and the protest movement of the 1960s, which eventually became a serious threat to internal security. Furthermore, I will explore how armed groups like the Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion or RAF) in West Germany and the Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse or BR) in Italy operated transnationally and what caused their decline in the 1980s.

In the second part of this chapter I will focus on right-wing (neo-Nazi and neo-fascist) armed groups in Italy and West Germany. Surprisingly, this facet of political violence in the 1970s and 1980s has been repeatedly neglected and plays a minor role in public memory compared to the attacks from the Left, although the bombings of right-wing groups caused a higher death toll. However, in the last twenty years there have been many investigations into the involvement of the security and military apparatus concerning right-wing bombings, which have shed new light on this form of domestic terrorism in Western Europe.

Talking about revolution: the revolt of the 1960s

At the 1967 convention of the West German Socialist German Student League (Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund or SDS), one of the topics was the discussion of Che Guevara's "*foco* theory" of guerrilla intervention and direct action. Members of SDS were not the only ones who hoped that the guerrilla concept would win support for the New Left, as may be seen if we take a closer look at the post-1968 movements in Western Europe.[2] After revolutions failed to break out following the tumultuous events of 1968 in most Western

Downloaded By: 10.3.98.93 At: 04:47 19 Oct 2018; For: 9781315719061, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315719061.ch20

European countries, activists longed to take the revolt to a "higher level," as was the dictum of the times. From here on, the movements, predominantly supported by students, underwent major splits and ventured in different directions. A major fraction saw political salvation in a neo-orthodox turn to Maoist or Leninist party organization. In London, the well-known intellectual and student-activist Tariq Ali called for a "Revolutionary Socialist Party," while in France the Proletarian Left (Gauche prolétarienne) was founded in late 1968. The next year saw the emergence of Unceasing Struggle (Lotta Continua) and Worker's Power (Potere Operaio) during Italy's "hot autumn." While these neo-orthodox militant groups were focusing on workers' struggles in the factories and beyond, the offspring of the anti-authoritarian Left proved to be rather short-lived in most Western European countries besides West Germany and Italy. Groups such as the Angry Brigade in Great Britain and the Red Youth in the Netherlands acted on a considerably smaller scale than the aforementioned groups, choosing symbolic actions without causing any casualties.

In West Germany, the split between proletarian and anti-authoritarian groups was more profound than elsewhere. While the emerging "Communist Groups" (K-Gruppen) focused on party organizations and discipline, the anti-authoritarian movement and its later offspring, the so-called Sponti Groups (believers in the "spontaneity of the masses"), pursued organization by militant action.[3]

Although the omnipresent Che Guevara was executed in 1967, the late 1960s saw a sudden emergence of militant revolutionary struggles all over the world. In Northern Ireland, the all-but-civil-war known as "The Troubles" gave rise to the Provisional IRA; the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked their first airplane; and Basque's ETA militants engaged in their first shootout. Large parts of the world seemed to be going up in flames – the success of anti-colonial liberation movements changed global power relations and it seemed that even the US could be defeated, as was about to happen in Vietnam. For self-declared Western revolutionaries, the Cuban Revolution, as well as the Maoist takeover in China, appeared to serve as blueprints for a revolution beyond the orthodoxies of the Leninist model. Were not Fidel Castro and his 82 comrades who entered Cuba in 1956 to overthrow the Batista dictatorship historic proof that you did not need a proletarian mass organization for starting an armed rebellion? The anti-authoritarian New Left rejected the Leninist idea of building up a proletarian party that would eventually form the avant-garde for a future revolution. In opposition to the new Maoist splinter parties of the 1970s, which would turn back to the orthodox model of mass organization, the anti-authoritarian political current served as the background for the manifold groups that waged an armed struggle from the late 1960s on.

Germany: from the West German student movement to "building up the Red Army"

In Berlin, the first militant attacks started in 1969 after the members of the counter-culture militant group Tupamaros West-Berlin were the first to visit a Fatah camp in Jordan to get military training. The following year, the group carried out arson attacks against police and US facilities in Berlin. It gained notoriety when it took responsibility for an attempted bombing of the Jewish Community Center in West Berlin on November 9, 1969, to protest Israeli policies against the Palestinians. Although the bomb didn't go off, it set off a debate on anti-Semitism in the German radical Left. In 1972 the group merged with the newly founded June 2nd Movement.[4]

Downloaded By: 10.3.98.93 At: 04:47 19 Oct 2018; For: 9781315719061, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315719061.ch20

Yet the organization with the most militant approach and the biggest impact on West German society emerged in May 1970 and shortly after began calling itself the Red Army Faction. In the early years (1970–5) of this tightly organized urban guerrilla group, it was mainly called the Baader-Meinhof Group or Gang. The choice of label followed the speaker's political attitudes. On the one hand were those who sought to delegitimize the RAF by emphasizing its merely criminal character. On the other hand, the name Red Army Faction was meant to conjure up emotional images of Germany's archenemy during World War II. Herein lies the legacy of the West German student movement's confrontation with the German past.

Featuring no more than two dozen members in the early 1970s, the RAF's members were mostly young Germans with academic backgrounds. A distinguishing characteristic of the first RAF generation, compared to their successors after 1972, was the fact that the individuals who went underground in 1970 were already prominent figures. Ulrike Meinhof was editor of the left-wing magazine *konkret* and a radio personality. Similarly famous was Horst Mahler, who as a lawyer defended SDS spokesman Rudi Dutschke in court. Finally, Andreas Baader and Gudrun Ensslin gained substantial media attention in 1968 when they were sentenced for arson in the bombing of a Frankfurt shopping center. Thus a paradoxical situation emerged: the people in the early urban guerrilla movement were prominent personalities, yet their political program was hardly known at all. Being a VIP "terrorist" influenced to some extent public perception and caused a stronger focus on the personal stories of the RAF members in the media.[5]

The strategy of the RAF, as well as that of the Red Brigades, was to unveil the "open fascism" of contemporary politics by provoking the state monopoly on the use of force through specific guerrilla attacks. The RAF's "propaganda of the deed," a concept that goes back to nineteenth-century anarchist Paul Brousse and was later manifested by the Tupamaros of Uruguay, was to serve as a call to arms for the radical Left after the revolt of '68 had diversified and radicalized itself.[6] RAF's propaganda was that of an avant-garde that sought to escalate a growing conflict by what they thought were military means. The RAF believed that the only answer to the provocation would be massive repression by the state which would cause it to drop its "democratic mask." A revolutionary situation would then follow. By conjuring up the repression – which the Left already experienced and would have to suffer much more of – this strategy embodied a constitutive, cynical "ends justify the means" rationality that was common within RAF and BR ideology. Assuming that the revolutionary process was not emancipation from present living conditions but passage through a "new fascism," the RAF detached itself from the New Left. This could also be called "armed propaganda" by the RAF to raise public awareness about issues that were neglected before (like the fact that US bombings in Vietnam were coordinated at the US Army headquarters in Heidelberg).

During the first two years of its existence, the group predominantly tried to organize a clandestine infrastructure and to raise money and arms by robbing banks and weapon stores. This was also the formative propaganda phase. The RAF issued four lengthy theoretical communiqués in 1971 and 1972 that were mostly written by Meinhof.[7] Her ideology could be called Marxist–Leninist with a Maoist, even anarchist, influence, reflecting the radical eclectic political belief system of the New Left since the late 1960s. Meinhof's "revolutionary subject" (which, ironically had to be led by an armed avant-garde) was not the prototypical proletariat, but rather the radical students and the fringe groups of West German society.[8]

Downloaded By: 10.3.98.93 At: 04:47 19 Oct 2018; For: 9781315719061, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315719061.ch20

Eventually, the RAF would orient itself more towards the anti-imperialist struggle in the "third world."

In the year after the RAF's emergence, it seems there was considerable backing for the urban guerrilla movement in West German society, at least with the rebellious youth: polls revealed in 1971 that twenty-five percent of West Germans under the age of thirty held "certain sympathies" for the RAF and one out of twenty said they would even help to shelter its members.[9] This stirred up serious concern among the political elite and especially within the Federal Criminal Police Office, which from then on focused not only on increased prosecution but on its own propaganda, which one federal attorney called the "aggressive informing of the public."[10]

While three police officers had been killed in shootouts with RAF members in 1971 and 1972, sympathies for the RAF didn't dwindle until its lethal May Offensive in 1972 when, seeing itself at war with the US Army, the RAF bombed the US Army Headquarters in Frankfurt and Heidelberg, killing four GIs and injuring eighteen. People were also injured after bombings of the Augsburg police headquarters and the Hamburg branch of the Springer Publishing Company – the latter expressing the RAF's preoccupation with the media, especially with Springer's tabloid *Bild*.

Shortly after, the first generation cadres – among them Meinhof, Baader, Ensslin, Meins, and Raspe – were arrested, and the RAF appeared to be history for the next three years. Nevertheless, the imprisoned members gained considerable media attention when they conducted several hunger strikes until 1977; in fact, Meins died in November 1974. Meanwhile, a second generation of the RAF was emerging, organized by one of the former attorneys of RAF members, Siegfried Haag, who was eventually captured in 1976.

It wasn't until April 1975 that the next generation would spring into action, when RAF members seized the German embassy in Stockholm and demanded the release of twenty-six German militants. Two diplomats were shot during the takeover, and accidental explosions killed two RAF members before the police could storm the building. After this incident, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt decided that in the future the federal government would never give in to "terrorist blackmail."[11]

Between 1975 and 1978, the RAF solely focused on freeing their imprisoned mentors and therefore set aside their armed propaganda. Nonetheless, the prison conditions of the RAF members – especially Meinhof's incarceration in an isolation cell during her first year in prison – became a highly contentious issue in West German discourse. The highly controversial trial did not start until 1975 and was held on the grounds of the Stammheim prison in a newly erected courtroom, often called the "bunker" in the media. "Stammheim" became a synonym for courtroom confrontation, the dubious ad hoc tightening of laws, hunger strikes, the secret service's eavesdropping on advocates, and prison cell suicides, like that of Meinhof on May 8, 1976, which a majority of the radical Left believed was a state murder for the years to follow.

Shortly before the end of the "trial of the century," as it was dubbed by the press, RAF "commandos" – called thusly by both the RAF and the media – killed the federal attorney general Siegfried Buback and his escort in plain view. This was the first assassination of a leading "representative of the system," as the RAF denounced him in West Germany. During the following '77 Offensive, as it was called by the RAF's second generation, the federal government was pressured to release RAF prisoners once again. The first attempt to kidnap a representative of the German economic elite failed when, in July 1977, the chairman of Dresdner Bank, Jürgen Ponto, was killed when he resisted his kidnapping.

Downloaded By: 10.3.98.93 At: 04:47 19 Oct 2018; For: 9781315719061, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315719061.ch20

Just a few weeks later on September 4, the RAF succeeded when members kidnapped Hanns-Martin Schleyer and killed his escort of three bodyguards and a driver. Schleyer was the most influential, yet controversial, economic leader in West Germany at that time. He was a former manager for Mercedes-Benz and in 1977 was head of the two most important German employers' associations, which made him the "boss of the bosses."[12] For the Left, he was a prominent enemy, for Schleyer used to be a middle-rank SS officer and was known for his tough stance against striking workers.[13]

The six weeks that followed are still considered the Federal Republic's moment of greatest existential danger. The federal government and especially Chancellor Helmut Schmidt were adamant in not giving in to the kidnappers' demands to release the Stammheim prisoners. During these weeks, an extra-legislative administration led by the former Wehrmacht officer Schmidt handled all affairs. This crisis squad immediately established a news ban and even discussed the reintroduction of the death penalty.[14] Palestinian commandos further escalated the crisis when they hijacked a Lufthansa plane with German tourists on October 13 in support of the RAF's demands. When four days later all hostages were freed by West Germany's new counter-terrorism unit GSG-9, it became clear that the RAF's '77 Offensive was a train wreck. The next morning, October 17, Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe were found dead in their high-security cells.[15] Schleyer's dead body was discovered a day later.

While what came to be known as the German Autumn is the most referenced phase of the RAF's attack on the state, it must be seen as a culmination of what happened in the years before. In the 1970s, the conflict between the RAF and the West German state proved to be a paradigm for the growing political polarization of communications in German society.

Italy: "Carry the attack to the heart of the state!"

Like those that emerged in West Germany, the clandestine groups that sprung up in 1969–70 in Italy were also ideologically and personally connected to the revolt of 1968. But radical activism in Italy followed the neo-Marxist trend of Workerism (Operaismo). After the events of Italy's "hot autumn" and with the addition of more and more public support after 1969, groups like Worker's Power and Unceasing Struggle saw the political struggle taking place in the factories in Milan and Turin rather than at the universities. Eventually an increasing militancy accompanied "operaist" and later "autonomous" activism. The year 1969 saw a wave of strikes and unrest in northern Italian factories. This industrial militancy was fed by the precarious conditions that millions of marginalized migrant workers from the impoverished Italian South encountered in the production plants in Milan and Turin. To the radical "operaistii," the Communist Party of Italy and the opportunistic trade unions were turning their backs on unorganized workers. Added to this, a growing number of university graduates who found it increasingly difficult to find employment saw themselves as a new "proletarian intelligentsia."[16]

Historic legacies also played an equally important role in the self-conception of militant Italian groups. Like the RAF, they shared the assumption that the state would become openly fascist again and even believed in the possibility of a right-wing coup d'état, but they also linked themselves to the history of anti-fascist partisans during World War II.[17]

Among all European states, Italy had the largest number of revolutionary armed factions, which also enjoyed more mass support than, for example, in Germany. Nearly 500 left-wing groups – most of them rather obscure – claimed responsibility for militant attacks involving nearly 3,000 participants between 1969 and 1980.[18] With 426 members overall, the Red

Downloaded By: 10.3.98.93 At: 04:47 19 Oct 2018; For: 9781315719061, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315719061.ch20

Brigades was the largest armed group in Italy by far, and it developed a strictly hierarchical organization from 1974 on, when most of its members began to live clandestinely. Thereafter, a Strategic Command and an Executive Committee were the organization's highest political authorities, while five regional "columns" operated in Milan, Turin, Genoa, Rome, and the Veneto. The "columns" were supported by "irregulars" who managed logistics and who had not gone underground.[19] While the different cells might not know of each other, they were given orders by a central command at the top level.

When the Red Brigades were founded in October 1970, they were still taking part in militant movements in factories, especially those of Fiat, Sit-Siemens, and Pirelli in Milan and Turin. Thus, the formation of the Red Brigades was announced as "the first moments of the Proletariat's self-organization in order to fight the bosses and their henchmen."[20] Founding members Renato Curcio, Margherita Cagol, and Alberto Franceschini had been active in the short-lived Metropolitan Political Collective (Collettivo Politico Metropolitano) and now discussed strategies of armed struggle with other militants.[21]

The radicalization of the movements that existed in Italy in the early 1970s was, to a certain extent, the result of attacks by fascist groups from the late 1960s onwards – groups that, in turn, saw themselves as a reaction to the student unrest and strike waves of 1968/69. When sixteen people were killed and eighty-seven injured in the Piazza Fontana bombing in Milan in December 1969 (which is described below), it was the radical Left that was blamed first. But to the activists on the Left, it was clear that this was carried out by neo-fascists from the Italian Social Movement (Moviemento Sociale Italiana or MSI). Even more, these atrocities were observed to be part of a greater "strategy of tension" aimed at preparing the ground for an authoritarian coup d'état in Italy with support from the Italian police force, secret service, and army.[22] For that reason, the BR repeatedly targeted members of the MSI and shot two of them in 1974.

At first, the Red Brigades were active in the factories and saw their actions as strategic interventions on behalf of militant workers. BR militants burned managers' cars and sabotaged factory equipment.[23] Still, the *brigatisti* tried to keep their links with the radical workers in the factories, which in the ensuing years proved to be more difficult. In 1972, BR shifted its tactics: the attacks grew more and more personal and began to include temporary kidnappings of managers and later their notorious kneecappings of managers and state-officials, thus furthering the goal of "armed propaganda" as well as a crude notion of political revenge.

Caselli and della Porta have identified four distinct periods in the history of the Red Brigades. As with the RAF, we can speak of the group's succeeding generations: "(1) the period of 'armed propaganda' (1970–4); (2) the 'attack on the heart of the state' (1974–6); (3) the 'strategy of destruction' (1977–8); and (4) the military confrontation with the state for survival of the organization (1979–82)."[24] In 1974 and 1975, BR's leading members were captured: Curcio and Franceschini were arrested, while Cagol was shot by police in a gunfight. By then, the Red Brigades engaged in high-profile kidnappings (e.g., Assistant State Attorney Mario Sossi) and demanded the release of militant prisoners. In 1974, BR's tactics radicalized when most moderate and some radical leftist social movements underwent a partial institutionalization and underwent the *riflusso*, or withdrawal from the radical Left.[25] Since Italy experienced economic crises after 1973, a 1975 manifesto from BR stated that its new goal was to "carry the attack to the heart of the state! Transform the crisis of the regime into the armed struggle for communism."[26] Given this, the "SIM" (the "Imperialist State of the Multinationals," as the BR called the combined Italian system of governmental, business,

Downloaded By: 10.3.98.93 At: 04:47 19 Oct 2018; For: 9781315719061, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315719061.ch20

and military institutions) became a primary target of the group that by now was being led by the hardliner Mario Moretti.[27]

After the trial against the captured *brigatisti* started in May 1976 in Turin, a BR "commando" team committed the group's first assassination of a high-ranking member of the judiciary when they shot Genoese Attorney General Francesco Coco and his bodyguards a month later. By this point, it proved to be more and more difficult to find judges and prosecutors for terrorism trials since militant groups issued threats against anyone who would participate in them.[28]

After 1977, when Italy experienced widespread street violence during the inner city protests carried out by the autonomous Movement of '77, which was made up of counterculture youths who had turned away from the factories to broader societal issues, the Red Brigades benefited from an inflow of radicalized youth who wanted to leave street battles behind and take up arms.[29] Also at this time, Front Line (Prima Linea), the second largest armed organization of the Italian Left, emerged from Unceasing Struggle (Lotta Continua), which had dissolved earlier. This group was responsible for more than twenty assassinations – mainly of those who were associated with the executive authority and the penal system.[30]

The year 1978 proved to be the peak of the "anni di piombo" (the Years of Lead), the term later applied to the escalation of the violent confrontation between the Italian state and militant groups on both the left and the right. By that year, the second generation of BR deployed their "strategy of destruction" primarily against the ruling Christian Democratic Party (DC) – twelve of their politicians were injured in attacks. This strategy of intimidating political personnel was exemplified in the slogan "strike one to educate a hundred," which was written on the sign that the Red Brigades' first kidnapping victim had to wear around his neck. The phrase comes from Mao Zedong's guerrilla strategy, according to which the aim is not to defeat the enemy directly but to win over public opinion – but it also bluntly encapsulates the general communicative nature of the "terrorist" act.[31] BR hoped to follow such strikes by quickly escalating toward an even greater "direct confrontation" based on a plan to physically eliminate those politicians at the state's nerve center.[32]

This is why the Red Brigades came to blame one man for the groundbreaking rapprochement – known as the "historic compromise" – between the conservative Christian Democrats and the Italian Communist Party (PCI), which had recently turned towards eurocommunism. That man was the former prime minister Aldo Moro, the leader of the Christian Democrats. Large segments of the radical Left saw the Communist Party as corrupted by the Christian Democrats when the PCI agreed to tolerate Giulio Andreotti's minority cabinet in 1978. Devoted from the start to bringing the PCI "back into revolutionary line," the Red Brigades decided to maximize the confrontation by kidnapping Moro on March 16, 1978, during which five of his bodyguards were killed. After his kidnapping, Moro was held for fifty-five days in what the BR in their communiqués called a "people's prison." The Red Brigades became an important political factor, and the ensuing crisis can be compared to the events of the German Autumn half a year earlier with a de facto state of emergency and widespread public expressions of insecurity. BR demanded the release of thirteen political prisoners and gained considerable media attention, issuing nine communiqués during the kidnapping, while public and political life in Italy seemed to be paralyzed.[33] However, Prime Minister Andreotti, like Helmut Schmidt before him, adamantly refused to give in to the kidnappers' demands. Decades later, after the Italian judiciary investigated the Moro affair, it became clear that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had obviously influenced the Italian government's decision-making. For the CIA, Moro's

Downloaded By: 10.3.98.93 At: 04:47 19 Oct 2018; For: 9781315719061, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315719061.ch20

efforts to include the PCI in the political process posed a threat at a time when the United States feared the growing influence of euro-communism.[34] In the end, Moro was submitted to a "political process" and then "executed," with his body abandoned in the trunk of a car in Rome, where it was found on May 9, 1978.

Like the Red Army Faction, the Red Brigades experienced a lasting defeat after the killing of Moro, which produced strong controversy among the Italian Left and within the organization itself, although BR cells engaged in more deadly attacks than ever before between 1978 and 1981. Nevertheless, many observers have understood this expansion as a sign of desperation and with it a first step of the Red Brigades' decline.[35] Furthermore, Italian law enforcement reacted strongly after the Moro kidnapping, and the so-called government of national unity issued several anti-terrorist emergency laws. Still, BR continued its lethal attacks. In fact, the highest concentration of militant attacks occurred in Italy during the period between 1977 and 1980.[36] But, at the same time, the armed groups lost their support within the radical Left and especially with workers, who, for example, were alienated by the BR's killing of a trade unionist who reported a BR activist.[37] The ebbing support in the factories and from the Left led to major internal divisions from 1979 onwards. One of the main accusations was that after the Moro kidnapping, the Red Brigades featured a form of "militarismo" that was detached from political struggle outside of the armed groups.[38] New factions emerged, like the Communist Combatant Party (BR-PCC). In the meantime, the state went on the offensive: the new laws of December 1979 and especially the "legge Cossiga" (the laws introduced by Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga) of February 1980 were a general blow to civil liberties and broadened the powers of the police, but they also granted benefits to repentant BR members who would collaborate (the *pentiti*). More than 130 *pentiti* collaborated with the police in the early 1980s, and their information, such as that provided by Petrizio Peci, weakened BR even more than did the internal rifts.[39] The Red Brigades' attacks grew more personal, as when they shot Peci's brother as retaliation for his collaboration. Yet, the decline continued. By the end of 1983, there were some 3,000 militants in Italian jails, some of whom were organized by the old BR avant-garde.[40] The Red Brigades ceased to exist as a unified organization around 1981, but its core successor, the BR-PCC, continued to stage high-profile attacks throughout the decade, until its leaders formally declared the armed struggle finished in 1988. From 1970 to 1988, the Red Brigades were responsible for some seventy-five assassinations, 115 attempted assassinations, and seventeen political kidnappings – unlike other armed organizations in Western Europe, bombings were not part of its tactics.[41]

The "European front" in the 1980s

In the late 1970s, militant groups emerged that weren't directly linked to the movement of 1968. Two groups founded in 1975, Spain's GRAPO (First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Groups) and the Greek 17N (Revolutionary Organization 17 November), understood their attacks as anti-fascist interventions during the transitional periods following the collapse of authoritarian governments in each country. In West Germany, the RZ (Revolutionary Cells) emerged from the autonomous wing of the German radical Left in the mid-1970s. While these cells did not go underground and refrained from using lethal violence (although they did carry out kneecappings), an international arm of the RZ gained notoriety when its members joined the international terrorist group led by Carlos the Jackal and participated in the 1975 raid on the Vienna OPEC conference. In 1976, they took part

Downloaded By: 10.3.98.93 At: 04:47 19 Oct 2018; For: 9781315719061, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315719061.ch20

in the hijacking of an Air France plane with Israeli passengers that was then redirected to Entebbe. This action provoked angry reactions from the German Left and led to some efforts to tone down expressions of anti-Zionism even as armed groups and others continued to denounce Zionism as an ideology.

The French group Action Directe (AD) emerged in 1979, followed somewhat later by the Belgian Communist Fighting Cells (CCC), both of which cooperated to a certain extent with the re-emerging RAF in the early 1980s. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Western European armed groups generally developed a more transnational strategy with the focus shifting to attacking NATO infrastructure in Western Europe. The RAF, after its major defeat in 1977, regrouped in the Middle East and was joined by the remaining members of the June 2nd Movement. Ten RAF members of the second generation quit the armed struggle and found refuge in East Germany, where they lived a normal life under new identities provided by that country's government.[42] The remaining RAF members nevertheless started a new campaign in 1979 by attempting to assassinate NATO's commander-in-chief, General Alexander Haig, in Belgium. Shortly after, they released a communiqué containing the first hint of a significant change in perception, one that would subsequently turn into a strategic shift, based on what the RAF believed to be a fundamental change in the international balance of power in the post-Vietnam era. "With the victories of the liberation struggles in Southeast Asia and Africa," the communiqué stated, "the front line has moved closer to the centre, it has fallen back to the metropole itself and is making the tactical and strategic retreat of U.S. imperialism – the so-called shift of the strategic core to Western Europe – inevitable."[43]

As we can see with the call to arms beyond national borders, RAF's second (and then third) generation sought combined efforts to attack NATO structures. In fact, the RAF and the Red Brigades probably began to cooperate as early as 1977.[44] Although BR leadership disapproved of the RAF's lack of building a "proletarian fighting party," cooperation intensified in the early 1980s.

During the 1970s the Red Brigades, unlike the RAF, only attacked Italian targets. Even in their "war against imperialism," they hadn't attacked NATO or American targets. This changed when BR kidnapped NATO Deputy Chief of Staff James Dozier in Verona in December 1981. Dozier, one of the highest ranking US officers in Italy, was rescued some weeks later.[45]

Meanwhile, the RAF had to regroup after most of the second generation was arrested by 1982. Even today there is a considerable lack of established knowledge about RAF's third generation and its hard core of an estimated fifteen members. However, after the RAF carried out another assassination attempt against a high-ranking NATO officer – the commander of NATO's Central Army Group, General Frederick Kroesen – in September 1981, its new anti-NATO agenda became more obvious. The RAF published its new political platform, the so-called May Paper, in May 1982. In this, its first theoretical paper in ten years, the RAF called for a single "front" uniting the "urban guerrilla" and the growing militant Left (the "resistance"), which came from the influential West German "Autonomen" movement. More than that, this new "front," as the RAF declared, should demonstrate the combined effort of different anti-imperialist armed groups in Western Europe. By 1982, these groups oriented themselves towards the non-working-class New Social Movements which had gained momentum since the late 1970s. In fact, the massive anti-nuclear and anti-war movements in Western Europe seemed to offer new possibilities for armed intervention. Since all of the armed groups lost significance and lost the support of left-wing

Downloaded By: 10.3.98.93 At: 04:47 19 Oct 2018; For: 9781315719061, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315719061.ch20

activists from the late 1970s onwards, critical observers saw the RAF, BR-PCC, and others' new orientation as an attempt to ingratiate themselves.

Although it is doubtful that there were established links between most of the armed groups in Western Europe in the 1980s, we can observe certain cross-references in different groups' communiqués and actions. For example, Action Directe and the RAF claimed joint responsibility for the 1985 bombing of the US Rhein-Main Airbase in Frankfurt. Furthermore, Action Directe and the RAF targeted representatives of the "military-industrial complex," such as, for example, the French general René Audran, and Ernst Zimmermann, chairman of the German armaments firm MTU, both in 1985.[46]

As it turned out, transnational cooperation between the armed groups proved to be rather problematic. Although Action Directe seemed to look up to the RAF (or perhaps just the RAF's legacy), the more or less open claim of RAF to a leadership position stirred major objections from others, including the BR-PCC.[47]

The latter half of the 1980s saw the dissolution of the Western European "front": Action Directe was broken by arrests in 1987, and the BR-PCC in 1988. The RAF held on to its notion of anti-imperialism but, in its final years in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it turned towards domestic issues. This became manifest when RAF militants assassinated Deutsche Bank chairman Alfred Herrhausen in 1989 and in 1991 shot Detlev Carsten Rohwedder, who was responsible for the privatization of the former German Democratic Republic's (GDR) state economy. The latter proved to be the last deadly assault by the RAF; eventually its members dissolved the organization in 1998.

The major global cataclysm of the collapsing communist world affected the final days of armed struggle in Western Europe. While that ended with a whimper, the anti-terrorist apparatus remained in existence, with its massive limitations on civil liberties, expanded police and intelligence administrations, and a history of dubious counter-terrorism.

"Strategy of tension": attacks from the Right

Regarding counter-terrorism, there is still an ongoing debate about the involvement of various Western European states in right-wing terrorist attacks. In Italy at least, several parliamentary commissions of inquiry have found proof of the high-level governmental involvement in nearly 200 lethal attacks between 1969 and the early 1980s.[48] The blueprint for this came from Greece's authoritarian coup in 1967, which was supported by the CIA and influenced the radical Right in Western Europe. And in the late 1960s and early 1970s, radical right-wing parties enjoyed some electoral success in Italy and Germany.[49] The neo-fascist MSI became Italy's fourth largest party in the 1960s. Its offshoot, New Order (Ordine Nuovo or ON) – later the Black Order (Ordine Nero) – engaged in militant bombings and assassinations starting in the late 1960s.[50]

In Italy, right-wing terrorists were responsible for the highest death toll of all militant attacks during the Years of Lead, although in most instances these acts cannot be attributed to a specific organization. The major difference between attacks from the militant Left and the Right, besides the fundamental political antipode, was the latter's strategy of causing massive insecurity through indiscriminate attacks on the population as well as the total lack of a political agenda published in communiqués. While left-wing organizations always claimed responsibility for their attacks and tried to elaborately explain their motives, there was nothing but unsettling silence after the radical Right attacked. Another, even more striking difference was the neo-fascists' ability to mysteriously escape after each bombing.

Downloaded By: 10.3.98.93 At: 04:47 19 Oct 2018; For: 9781315719061, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315719061.ch20

Unlike the members of the Red Brigades, neo-fascists were never caught red-handed and it was not until the mid-1980s that trials against the militant Right began to shed some light on these incidents. Slowly, it became obvious that the Italian security apparatus, especially the military secret service, had spread its wings of protection over New Order and others. In 1984, Vincenzo Vinciguerra, a member of the neo-fascist National Vanguard, testified in court that the Italian state heavily supported right-wing terrorism. In 1990, he told the British *Guardian* newspaper: "Avanguardia Nazionale, like Ordine Nuovo, were being mobilised into the battle as part of an anti-communist strategy originating not with organisations deviant from the institutions of power, but from within the state itself, and specifically from within the ambit of the state's relations within the Atlantic Alliance."[51]

The first bomb to shatter Italian society and to set an example for the Italian militant Right was set off in a bank in Piazza Fontana in Milan in December of 1969. Sixteen people, mostly customers, were left dead, and eighty-seven were injured. For some time, the extreme Left was blamed for the bombing, as was presumably the goal of the bombers. Investigations were frustrated by segments of the police and the military secret service. This major "false flag" attack was part of a "strategy of tension" (as the British *Observer* newspaper first labeled it in 1970) that garnered considerable support from influential right-wing elements in Italian politics, the secret service, judiciary, and the military.[52] Since the growth of the communist Left after 1968 and the fragmenting of the Christian Democratic Party, there were two elements to this strategy. First, attacks were to be carried out which would lead the Left to be blamed for a new wave of violence that affected everyone. This would mean the marginalization of the Left in general and calls for a "strong state." Second, it was hoped these attacks would eventually prepare the ground for a possible coup d'état (as happened earlier in Greece) via the declaration of a "state of emergency." In fact, elements of the military nearly seized power in Italy in December 1970 in what was known as the Borghese Putsch, which was named after the influential leader of the neo-fascist movement, Junio Valero Borghese. This right-wing takeover was called off at the last moment, and the already mobilized neo-fascists from the National Vanguard and military units returned home.[53] In any case, the Right soon turned away from its goal of carrying out a coup. This helps explain the emergence in the 1970s of a new generation of militant neo-fascists, like those in the Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari or NAR) and Third Position. Presenting themselves as a "spontaneous movement" without a central command or a program, they were not linked to traditional Italian fascism and lacked a coherent strategy.[54]

The early 1970s saw a rise in right-wing attacks, including the bombing of trains (the Rome–Messina train in 1970 and the "Italicus" train in 1974) which left eighteen people dead. Additionally, there were numerous attacks on the Left, most notably a hand grenade attack on an anti-fascist rally in Brescia that killed eight in May 1974.[55] Attacks by neo-fascist organizations against members of the police and the judicial system were often blamed by officials on the Red Brigades and other organizations from the Left. Extensive manipulation of the investigations by police and secret service helped to uphold these accusations and were part of the "strategy of tension."[56]

The attacks from the Right seemed to ebb by the mid-1970s, but in the early 1980s, there was a return of even deadlier attacks, predominantly committed by NAR, which was founded in 1980 and had close ties to the Italian mafia. On August 2, 1980, the group carried out the most devastating act of domestic terrorism in postwar Western Europe when it

Downloaded By: 10.3.98.93 At: 04:47 19 Oct 2018; For: 9781315719061, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315719061.ch20

detonated a bomb in the railway station of Bologna during the peak of the holiday season, killing eighty-five people and injuring about 200. Unlike the 1969 Piazza Fontana bombing, this time everyone accused the neo-fascists of being responsible. What followed was a crackdown on right-wing organizations, so that after the mid-1980s right-wing attacks ceased.

In the following years, numerous official investigations revealed that the "strategy of tension" was supported by the Italian SISMI intelligence service, members of the Italian judiciary, the CIA, and NATO.[57] In the early 1990s, Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti publicly recognized the existence of Operation Gladio, NATO's top secret, paramilitary "stay behind" organization, the purpose of which was to wage guerrilla warfare in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. Investigations after the end of the Cold War revealed the existence of such organizations in most NATO member states and that some of them did not "stay behind" but lived a life of their own. Soon, more facts, as well as more conspiracy theories, about Gladio's involvement with the attacks from the radical Right came to light. Later, Colonel Oswald LeWinter, a CIA liaison officer for Europe, revealed that there existed a secret NATO policy which consisted of tolerating anti-communist extreme-Right activities.[58] Still, the precise role played by Gladio has not yet been uncovered, even though the controversial publications of Daniele Ganser shed light on the dimension of state-sponsored terrorism.[59] There is evidence that the Italian mafia was heavily involved in the "strategy of tension." It has even been argued that the Red Brigades were infiltrated by secret service informants and that the Italian state was somehow involved in the Aldo Moro kidnapping.[60] Since much of the debate on these issues belongs to the realm of conspiracy theories, further speculation is not warranted. But many questions regarding the state's involvement in Italian armed groups remain, and there certainly is more to discover in the future. There is, however, broad agreement on the fact that the Italian state apparatus, the CIA, and NATO played a considerable role in the "strategy of tension." Beyond that, newer publications even take a closer look at the Soviet KGB's involvement.[61] Anna Bull summarized the "strategy of tension" by defining it as "destabilizing in order to stabilize the political system."[62]

In the case of West Germany, there is no such evidence of a "strategy of tension." Nevertheless, West Germany experienced its own attacks by the militant Right in the late 1970s and early 1980s. These were carried out by militant neo-Nazi groups such as the German Action Groups (Deutsche Aktionsgruppen), the Hoffmann Militia Group (Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann), and the People's Socialist Movement of Germany/Labor Party (VSBD/PdA). As with neo-fascists in Italy, German neo-Nazis were increasingly active in the public sphere. Many Germans dismissed them as obsessed with paramilitary training and Nazi uniforms and firearms, referring to them as "kooks" and "nutcases" and stuck in the past.[63] But by the late 1970s, they emerged as a growing threat, with the number of neo-Nazi incidents tripling to 1,533 from 1977 to 1980.[64] The first neo-Nazi assassination attempt to attract major attention occurred in April 1968 when the unskilled worker Josef Bachmann, who had contacts in the neo-Nazi world, shot and severely injured the speaker of the West German student movement, Rudi Dutschke.[65] In the early 1970s, there were attacks on communist party structures and Jewish facilities, although these did not cause any casualties. Some small neo-Nazi militant cells planned bombings and assassination in the 1970s, but in all cases the police were able to break them up before they were launched. This was because the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutz) and other West German intelligence offices had recruited informers who were quite involved in neo-Nazi groups. In the wake of the deadly attacks in 1980, some Germans grew concerned that the authorities

Downloaded By: 10.3.98.93 At: 04:47 19 Oct 2018; For: 9781315719061, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315719061.ch20

were better informed about what was going on with the militant Right than they dared to admit. This is still a highly controversial issue today.[66]

During the second half of the 1970s, some fringe groups also engaged in militant attacks from the Right. The Ludwig Group, which consisted of only two members, committed arson attacks and assassinations that left fifteen dead between 1977 and 1984. They were mostly active in northern Italy, where they targeted homosexuals, minorities, and sex clubs. Quite unusually for the militant Right, they left behind leaflets with Nazi symbols and crude slogans.[67] During these years, police investigators discovered more and more militant neo-Nazi cells that apparently modeled themselves after organizations from the Left like the RAF or the Revolutionary Cells.

The most notorious neo-Nazi group was the Hoffmann Militia Group (WSH, from its German name), founded in 1973 by the neo-Nazi Karl-Heinz Hoffmann as a paramilitary organization. It had some 400 members over the seven years of its existence. In a manifesto explaining his neo-Nazi agenda, Hoffmann called for the establishment of an authoritarian state, "a dictatorship with the right man at the helm."[68]

After engaging in paramilitary training, members of the group later stockpiled weapons and attacked members of the radical Left. In the second half of the 1970s, WSH members carried out several attacks, although it is unclear whether these actions were part of the group's overall strategy or the deeds of "lone wolves," an explanation that was given for nearly all neo-Nazi attacks. Although the WSH was outlawed by the Federal Minister of the Interior in January 1980, that year saw the climax of deadly attacks by the group's former members.

There is still much debate over whether the most deadly militant attack in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Oktoberfest bombing of September 26, 1980, in Munich, was the work of a "lone wolf." This attack killed thirteen people and injured 211. As in many Italian cases, militants from the Left were initially blamed. Finally evidence was uncovered that the bomber was twenty-one-year-old Gundolf Köhler, who died in the explosion and who had links to WSH.[69] The bombing happened just a few days before West German general elections, and it has been argued that it created an atmosphere of instability that was meant to help the right-leaning Christian Democrat candidate Franz-Josef Strauß win the election – which he did not.[70]

It is still unclear whether Köhler was the lone perpetrator. For instance, another WSH member claimed to be involved in the attack shortly before he committed suicide after a shootout in 1982.[71] Daniele Ganser even links the Oktoberfest bomb to remnants of the German branch of Operation Gladio, suggesting that the explosives were drawn from one of its many secret arms caches found a year later.[72] The West German authorities were reluctant to follow up these leads and preferred to close the file soon after. Recently, researchers have also found links between the German and the Italian militant Right. Since Italy's NAR carried out a very similar attack on the Bologna rail station just weeks earlier, some have speculated that there was a coordinated strategy between the two groups.[73] German neo-Nazis also received assistance from their neo-fascist counterparts in France and Belgium.[74] Astonishingly, WSH even received support from East Germany's secret police, the Stasi, as part of the GDR's propaganda efforts to discredit West Germany's government.[75]

The Oktoberfest attack was not the last by WSH members. In December 1980, a former WSH member shot dead the Jewish publisher Schlomo Lewin and his partner, Frida Poeschke. Hoffmann was himself accused of the assassination and fled to Lebanon

Downloaded By: 10.3.98.93 At: 04:47 19 Oct 2018; For: 9781315719061, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315719061.ch20

with fourteen of his followers to train with the PLO's Fatah faction. He was arrested after his 1981 return to Germany and in 1986 was sentenced to nine years imprisonment for illegal possession of firearms and explosives as well as aggravated assault, although the judge found him not guilty in the case of the Lewin murder. WSH's responsibility for the attack has also still not been verified.[76]

The early 1980s were the most deadly period of neo-Nazi attacks in West Germany. In addition to attacks carried out by the WSH, other groups attacked foreigners (two Vietnamese refugees died in an arson attack by members of the German Action Groups in 1980) and US Army personnel (carried out by the Hepp-Kexel Group) and were engaged in bank robberies and deadly shootouts with police (VSBD/PdA).[77]

Conclusions

The militant neo-Nazi attacks of the 1970s and 1980s did not leave a big footprint in the nation's public memory (this is somewhat less the case in Italy). How can this be explained? First, right-wing bombings were carried out like covert secret service operations – no one was meant to know who was behind the assaults. In most cases there was no coherent program or strategy – except for the spreading of fear and uncertainty – visible behind the attacks. It is worth noting that the public was less fearful of being a potential victim of right-wing bombs despite the fact that right-wing extremists chose arbitrary targets more often than did their left-wing counterparts. For example, more than fifty percent of West Germans interviewed in a 1977 survey stated that attacks like those by the RAF (this was even before the hijacking of the Lufthansa plane) could "hit any of us. I'm personally afraid of that."[78]

This suggests that it was predominantly the media and the political elite who were responsible for these very different perceptions. Left-wing militants indeed struck at the "heart of the state," challenging those in power, while right-wing groups targeted those, at least in the German case, who were already the subject of discrimination in society (refugees, Jews, homosexuals). Most of all, the period examined here is subject to the dichotomies of the Cold War. It was the Left that was blamed as a "fifth column" of Moscow, while, on the contrary, the radical Right was not understood to have a greater power behind it pulling the strings.[79] It was implicit from the start – and later became obvious – that everyone who was drawn into the terrorist spectacle in the 1970s and 1980s – the militants, the state apparatus, the media – were actors on a greater stage. It became self-evident that militant organizations were a threat to the Cold War balance of power in Europe, even as they were being used to maintain that very balance. The dictum that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" never appeared to be more applicable as with the covert support of terrorism by intelligence and security agencies on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

When the Cold War eventually ended in 1991, social-revolutionary terrorism ultimately ebbed. A communist utopia seemed further away than ever, and the global Left found itself in disintegration. Furthermore, the Cold War condition in which militant organizations worldwide found sponsors or safe havens from the "other side" was over, and the remaining armed groups struggled with this lack of support and soon ceased to exist. One obstacle that makes it difficult to write a complete history of the conflicts between armed groups and the state in Europe – one that could, in particular, shed more light on the most dubious forms of state involvement in the terrorism spectacle – is the fact that while states like the GDR are no longer around, most of the state apparatuses that left a legacy of counter-terrorism are

Downloaded By: 10.3.98.93 At: 04:47 19 Oct 2018; For: 9781315719061, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315719061.ch20

still in existence. Therefore, the task remains for future historians to ask the necessary discomforting questions.

Notes

1 H. Balz, "Throwing Bombs in the Consciousness of the Masses: The Red Army Faction and Ist Mediality," in *Media and Revolt: Strategies and Performances from the 1960s to the Present*, ed. K. Fahlenbrach et al. (New York: Berghahn, 2014), 270.
2 B. Davis, *Changing the World, Changing Oneself: Political Protest and Collective Identities in West Germany and the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s* (New York: Berghahn, 2012), 161.
3 M. Klimke, "West Germany," in *1968 in Europe: A History of Protest and Activism, 1956–1977*, ed. M. Klimke and J. Scharloth (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 101.
4 See A. Reimann, *Dieter Kunzelmann: Avantgardist, Protestler, Radikaler* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009), 237–54. The group named itself after the date the student Benno Ohnesorg was shot by a police officer at a demonstration against the Shah of Iran in Berlin in 1967.
5 See H. Balz, *Von Terroristen, Sympathisanten und dem starken Staat* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2008), 52.
6 For more on the origins of the term "propaganda of the deed," see Chapter 8 by Richard Bach Jensen on European and world anarcho-terrorism in this volume. For more on the Tupamaros of Uruguay and the origins of the "urban guerrilla" movement, see Chapter 19 by Jennifer S. Holmes in this volume on terrorism in Latin America.
7 "The Urban Guerilla Concept" (1971), "On the Armed Struggle in Western Europe" (1971), "Serve the People: Urban Guerilla and Class Struggle" (1972), and "The Action of 'Black September' in Munich" (1972). See J. Smith and A. Moncourt, *The Red Army Faction: A Documentary History*, vol. 1, *Projectiles for the People* (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2009).
8 Meinhof – as well as Ensslin, Baader, and Raspe – had been involved in working with fringe groups, especially asylum runaways. See S. Aust, *Baader-Meinhof: The Inside Story of the R.A.F.* (London: Bodley Head, 2008), 46.
9 "Politische Überzeugung," *Der Spiegel*, July 26, 1971, 16.
10 Balz, *Von Terroristen*, 125.
11 Smith and Moncourt, *Red Army Faction*, 331–2.
12 "Der Boss der Bosse," *Stern*, 1974, no. 51, 76–86.
13 J. Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 197.
14 "Exotische Lösung," *Der Spiegel*, February 11, 1980, 27.
15 This remained a controversial issue for at least two decades and was the subject of many conspiracy theories, concerning whether these were suicides or murders carried out by the state. For details – for which room does not exist here – see K. Hanshew, *Terror and Democracy in West Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 231. Also see H. Lehmann, *Die Todesnacht in Stammheim. Eine Untersuchung: Indizienprozess gegen die staatsoffizielle Darstellung und das Todesermittlungsverfahren* (Köln: Pahl-Rugenstein, 2012).
16 R. C. Meades, Jr., *Red Brigades: The Story of Italian Terrorism* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), 20.
17 P. Cooke, *The Legacy of the Italian Resistance* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 119.
18 D. Hauser, "Terrorism," in Klimke and Scharloth, *1968 in Europe,* 272–3.
19 A. Orsini, *Anatomy of the Red Brigades: The Religious Mind-set of Modern Terrorists* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 56.
20 M. Burleigh, *Blood & Rage: A Cultural History of Terrorism* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009), 198.
21 G. C. Caselli and D. della Porta, "The History of the Red Brigades," in *The Red Brigades & Left-wing Terrorism in Italy*, ed. R. Catanzaro (London: Pinter, 1991), 72.
22 J. E. Engene, *Terrorism in Western Europe: Explaining the Trends since 1950* (Cheltenham: Edgar Elgar, 2004), 136–7; and D. Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe* (Milton Park, UK: Frank Cass, 2005), 76–83. See also: A. C. Bull, *Italian Neo-Fascism: The Strategy of Tension and the Politics of Non-Reconciliation* (New York: Berghahn, 2007); and F. Ferraresi, *Threats to Democracy: The Radical Right in Italy after the War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
23 Burleigh, *Blood & Rage*, 199.

Downloaded By: 10.3.98.93 At: 04:47 19 Oct 2018; For: 9781315719061, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315719061.ch20

24 Caselli and della Porta, “History of the Red Brigades,” 71.
25 D. della Porta, *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 30.
26 Meades, *Red Brigades*, 52.
27 Caselli and della Porta, “History of the Red Brigades,” 79–89.
28 Burleigh, *Blood & Rage*, 203.
29 One example of the widespread support for the Red Brigades among the radical Left was the demonstration of 5,000 youths in favor of the assassination of the neo-fascist party member Enrico Pedenovi in 1976. See Richard Drake, *The Aldo Moro Murder Case* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 172. A newspaper reported that BR could rely on more than 10,000 supporters in Italy. See “Italien: Terror nach deutscher Art,” *Der Spiegel*, March 27, 1978, 120.
30 See C. Novaro, “Social Networks and Terrorism: The Case of Prima Linea,” in Catanzaro, *The Red Brigades*, 144–73.
31 A. P. Schmid and J. de Graaf, *Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and Western News Media* (London: Sage, 1982), 20.
32 Caselli and della Porta, “History of the Red Brigades,” 91.
33 Burleigh, *Blood & Rage*, 209–12.
34 M. Moore, “US Envoy Admits Role in Aldo Moro Killing,” *The Telegraph* (London), March 11, 2008 (accessed March 5, 2014); and R. Igel, “Linksterrorismus ferngesteuert? Die Kooperation von RAF, Roten Brigaden, CIA und KGB,” *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* 52, no. 10 (2007): 1222.
35 M.Wieviorka, *The Making of Terrorism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, [1993] 2004), 90.
36 Engene, *Terrorism*, 135.
37 Burleigh, *Blood & Rage*, 212.
38 Caselli and della Porta, “History of the Red Brigades,” 97.
39 Meades, *Red Brigades*, 216.
40 A. Jamieson, “Identity and Morality in the Italian Red Brigades,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 2, no. 4 (1990): 510.
41 Y. Alexander and D. A. Pluchinsky, *Europe’s Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organizations* (London: Frank Cass, 1992), 194.
42 The GDR also presumably provided support to active RAF cadres. To what extent they offered military training to RAF members is still debated today. See J. Smith and A. Moncourt, *The Red Army Faction: A Documentary History* (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2013), 2:183–4.
43 Smith and Moncourt, *Red Army Faction*, 2:116–18.
44 E. Karmon, *The Red Brigades: Cooperation with the Palestinian Terrorist Organization (1970–1990),* (Israel: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), 2001).
45 Meades, *Red Brigades*, 206.
46 Alexander and Pluchinsky, *Europe’s Red Terrorists*, 57, 136.
47 A. Straßner, “Perzipierter Weltbürgerkrieg: Rote Armee Fraktion in Deutschland,” in *Sozialrevolutionärer Terrorismus: Theorie, Ideologie, Fallbeispiele, Zukunftsszenarien*, ed. A. Straßner (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2008), 232. When the RAF issued a communiqué under the name of “Commando Patrick O’Hara,” the Irish National Liberation Army denounced this as a misappropriation.
48 See for example: Ganser, *NATO’s Secret Armies*; Bull, *Italian Neofascism*; and Ferraresi, *Threats to Democracy*.
49 H.-G. Jaschke, “Right-wing Extremism and Populism in Contemporary Germany and Western Europe,” in *Right-Wing Radicalism Today: Perspectives from Europe and the US*, ed. S. von Mering and T. W. McCarty (Milton Park, UK: Routledge, 2013), 24.
50 See R. Chiarini, “The ‘Movimento Sociale Italiano’: A Historical Profile,” in *Neofascism in Europe*, ed. L. Cheles, R. Ferguson, and M. Vaughan, 19–42 (London: Longman, 1991).
51 E. Vulliamy, “Secret Agents, Freemasons, Fascists . . . and a Top-level Campaign of Political ‘Destabilisation,’” *The Guardian*, December 5, 1990, 12.
52 Bull, *Italian Neofascism*, 30–5; and Ferraresi, *Threats to Democracy*, 90–115. There is a wide range of literature on the Piazza Fontana bombing that links this attack to the Italian Secret Service and the Army. For example, see L. Lanza, *Bombe e Segreti. Piazza Fontana: Una Strage Senza Colpevoli* (Milano: Eleuthera, 2005).

Downloaded By: 10.3.98.93 At: 04:47 19 Oct 2018; For: 9781315719061, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315719061.ch20

53 Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*, 76–7.
54 Chiarini, "Movimento," 37; and D. della Porta, *Clandestine Political Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 160.
55 Engene, *Terrorism*, 137.
56 Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*, 4.
57 P. Willan, "Terrorists 'Helped by CIA' to Stop Rise of Left in Italy," *The Guardian*, March 25, 2001 (accessed March 5, 2014); and, in particular, R. Igel, *Terrorjahre: Die dunkle Seite der CIA in Italien* (München: Herbig, 1997).
58 Bull, *Italian Neofascism*, 59. Bull uses an incorrect spelling of LeWinter's name in her text.
59 Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*.
60 G. Fasanella, C. Sestieri, and G. Pellegrino, *Segreto di stato: La Verità da Gladio al Caso Moro* (Turin: Einaudi, 2000); Igel, *Terrorjahre*, 162–202; and Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*, 80.
61 R. Igel, "Linksterrorismus ferngesteuert?"
62 Bull, *Italian Neofascism*, 76. For a more critical stance on the existence and significance of the Gladio network and its "false-flag" operations, see Chapter 25 by Geraint Hughes on international terrorism in this volume.
63 B. Hoffman, "Right-wing Terrorism in Europe," in *European Terrorism*, ed. E. Moxon-Browne (New York: Macmillan, 1994), 96.
64 Ibid.
65 A. Röpke and A. Speit, *Blut und Ehre: Geschichte und Gegenwart rechter Gewalt in Deutschland* (Berlin: C.H. Links, 2013), 46.
66 It proved, for instance, to be a major political scandal when the German Federal Constitutional Court decided that the planned governmental ban of the National Democratic Party (NPD) was to be called off due to the fact that Verfassungsschutz informants were active even in the highest ranks of the party.
67 Röpke and Speit, *Blut und Ehre*, 54.
68 L. McGowan, *The Radical Right in Germany: 1870 to Present* (Harlow, UK: Pearson Education, 2002), 182–3.
69 Ibid., 183.
70 Röpke and Speit, *Blut und Ehre*, 68.
71 Ibid., 69.
72 Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*, 206–9. See also T. von Heymann, *Die Oktoberfest-Bombe: München, 26. September 1980* (Berlin: Nora, 2008); and U. Chaussy, *Oktoberfest: Das Attentat. Wie die Verdrängung des Rechtsterrors begann* (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2014).
73 P. Fahrenholz, "Zweifel an der Einzeltäterthese," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, January 16, 2014. Doubts about the German investigative agencies were aggravated when it recently became public that all court exhibits from the attack were thrown away in 1997.
74 Hoffman, "Right-wing Terrorism," 101.
75 M. A. Lee, "Strange Ties: The Stasi and the Neo-Fascists," *Los Angeles Times*, September 10, 2000.
76 McGowan, *The Radical Right*, 183.
77 Ibid., 182–4.
78 Balz, *Von Terroristen*, 11.
79 P. Lehr, "Still Blind in the Right Eye? A Comparison of German Responses to Political Violence from the Extreme Left and the Extreme Right," in *Extreme Right-Wing Political Violence and Terrorism*, ed. M. Taylor, P. M. Currie, and D. Holbrook (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 207.

Further reading

Alexander, Yonah, and Dennis A. Pluchinsky. *Europe's Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organizations*. London: Frank Cass, 1992.

Bull, Anna Cento. *Italian Neofascism: The Strategy of Tension and the Politics of Nonreconciliation*. New York: Berghahn, 2007.

Engene, Jan Oskar. *Terrorism in Western Europe: Explaining the Trends since 1950*. Cheltenham: Edgar Elgar, 2004.

Ganser, Daniele. *NATO's Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe*. Milton Park, UK: Frank Cass, 2005.
McGowan, Lee. *The Radical Right in Germany: 1870 to Present*. Harlow, UK: Pearson Education, 2002.
Meades, Robert C., Jr. *Red Brigades: The Story of Italian Terrorism*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990.
della Porta, Donatella. *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Smith, J., and André Moncourt. *The Red Army Faction: A Documentary History*. 2 vols. Oakland: PM Press, 2009 and 2013.

Downloaded By: 10.3.98.93 At: 04:47 19 Oct 2018; For: 9781315719061, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315719061.ch20