


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## **The Routledge History of Terrorism**

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### **State Terrorism in early Twentieth-Century Europe**

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## Part III

# TERRORISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

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## STATE TERRORISM IN EARLY TWENTIETH-CENTURY EUROPE

*Paul M. Hagenloh*

Assessing the nature of state terrorism in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century is difficult. The terms “terror” and “terrorism” were in wide use in this period but had varied meanings, not all of which correspond to the way we think about the term today. Even if we accept current definitions that focus on violence committed by (or supported by) governments and directed at non-combatants with clear political goals, often related to national security, we are still left with fundamental questions of definition and scope. Early twentieth-century states, especially dictatorships, mobilized a stunning variety of forms of violence against their populations – structural, paramilitary, legal, extra-legal, often genocidal. Which aspects of this violence qualify as “state terrorism”? Does terrorism occur by definition only in times of peace, or can it occur on the battlefield? Can one state practice “terrorism” vis-à-vis another or only vis-à-vis non-combatant populations (its own or another’s)? Does spontaneous ethnic, religious, or class-based violence count as state terrorism if supported, initially or eventually, by a state? What, if anything, is gained by thinking in terms of “state terrorism” in regards to regimes that operate almost exclusively through violence, intimidation, and fear, or that take genocide as a primary policy goal? One might argue that all violence committed by a genocidal dictatorship should be construed as terroristic, but doing so provides little analytic help in understanding the nature and causes either of state terrorism or of modern state violence in general.

I argue in this chapter for a relatively narrow understanding of state terrorism, one that focuses on overt, immediate, public violence that is intended not only to instill fear and intimidate but also to reshape the basic social makeup of the society at which it is aimed. I argue as well that European state terrorism in the early twentieth century can only be understood in the context of the momentous changes in the nature of European states themselves in this period, especially the changing nature of state administration during war. The brutal wars of the early twentieth century – civil wars, World War I, anti-colonial struggles, World War II, and resistance in Eastern Europe after both world wars – brought many of the tactics that we today call “terrorism” into the mainstream of modern military practice, while at the same time war and revolution brought these terroristic military tactics into the mainstream of modern European statecraft. In short, war made terrorism one of the constituent tools of modern European dictatorships: it is simply impossible to imagine the Stalinist or Nazi dictatorships without the massive application of terroristic violence to civilian populations that took place in colonial struggles and global conflicts alike in the early twentieth century. In sum, war changed “terrorism” from a limited tactic, one that had the most resonance in revolutionary situations, to an almost ubiquitous aspect of modern European conflict and state violence, for states

as well as sub-state actors. By the twentieth century, terrorism was politics by other means; and it was war that made it so.

As many recent works on European history have shown, the connections between modern European statecraft, violence, and war are evident in virtually every corner of the continent, in democracies as well as dictatorships. Yet it was in dictatorships that the potential for violence inherent in modern European statecraft was unleashed with most fury: dictatorships were least restricted by concerns of public responsibility and political culture, especially in peacetime, and interwar European dictatorships were particularly dedicated to using state violence, including state terrorism, to effect massive social and economic transformations in the territories that they controlled. This chapter, then, will focus on the German, Italian, and Soviet cases: these are among the strongest states in interwar Europe as well as the least democratic. In these three cases, we find widespread application of a particular kind of state violence that fits current definitions of state terrorism quite well: these regimes carried out widespread, sometimes random acts of violence against civilian, non-combatant populations, in both wartime and peacetime, for explicitly political ends. These examples show that state violence that emerged and was perfected in wartime in numerous contexts (military, anti-insurgent, colonial) could be transferred to peacetime state activity; and they show how far tactics that were developed during times of war could be taken, under the right conditions, against civilian populations in peacetime.<sup>1</sup>

### **State terror before the Great War**

Without repeating what has been said in previous chapters, we begin by noting that state terror, including the kind we identify as the “modern” variant, certainly took place well before the twentieth century. The French Revolution is perhaps the paradigmatic case of modern state terrorism, one that fits our own contemporary definitions quite closely: revolutionary Jacobins, as described by Mike Rapport in Chapter 5 in this volume, made explicit use of the apparatus of the state to carry out widespread, unpredictable violence against not only internal political enemies, understood as “counter-revolutionary conspirators,” but also against representatives of social classes thought to be inimical by nature to the interests of the new regime. Revolutionary terror was an ad hoc response to the existential threats posed by internal rebellion and by invading European powers, but it was also an extra-legal method of forcing a complete transformation of the existing social and political order, carried out by representatives of a greatly expanded French revolutionary state (and often assisted by popular violence, including that carried out by the infamous *sans-culottes*). The fact that Jacobins viewed “terror” as a constructive avenue of political and social change is often noted when linking them to later violent revolutionaries (fascists, Bolsheviks, National Socialists), but the mere positive connection between terroristic violence and political change is not particularly unusual for any era of human history. More important is the fact that Jacobins used terror as an instrument with which to operate directly on the French body politic: the revolutionary state used terroristic violence (including but not limited to the guillotine) to forge a new political consensus, to effect direct social transformation (e.g., reshaping demographic realities, forced change of cultural and political norms, vicious attacks on religious belief), and to create a new mode of modern civic participation and French republican citizenship.<sup>2</sup>

Yet the French Revolution was, perhaps surprisingly, something of an anomaly in the use of terrorism by states in Europe for most of the nineteenth century, at least domestically. Various revolutionary movements and figures on the far left, it is true, viewed the French experience with state terror as a model to be emulated, but few had any opportunity to put such plans into place – with the notable exception of the Paris Commune, which revived many of the traditions of the Jacobins. More ominously, numerous instances of military conflict, revolutionary uprisings, and insurgency in the nineteenth century also produced state actions that we might deem “terrorism,” beginning with French atrocities against Spanish civilians during Napoleonic campaigns and continuing through independence movements on the Italian peninsula through the numerous nationalist uprisings in the crumbling Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires late in the century. Yet for most of the long nineteenth century, European states shied away from actions that bore too close a resemblance to the state terror of the French revolutionaries, not only domestically but also in times of war, as during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1, when Otto von Bismarck urged his military commanders to burn entire French villages to the ground in order to terrorize the population into submission – a suggestion rejected by the chief of the Prussian General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke.<sup>3</sup>

This situation began to change for numerous reasons in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including the emergence of a new mass politics that brought “the public” to the center of political action; the growing propensity of European states to embark on progressive, Enlightenment-inspired schemas for social change (and the growing technical expertise of such states to carry them out); and the increasingly tense political atmosphere created by struggles for national liberation, from the Balkans to Ireland. But none of these factors was more important in expanding the repertoire of modern states to include terroristic violence against their own populations than the colonial experience. Extreme violence was nearly universal in the European (and North American) colonial experience, with counter-insurgency campaigns in particular often entailing widespread, instrumental use of terror against non-combatant populations. This trend was strengthened by the emergence of a group of state functionaries schooled, quite literally, in the application of violence against non-combatants and by a growing sense of historical mission among European elites that made any tactics possible in the pursuit of the “civilizing mission” or “military necessity.”<sup>4</sup>

Yet there is little sense in searching for the roots of future state terrorism, or lack thereof, in the more or less barbaric nature of colonial violence in one case or another. Nearly all European powers participated in state terrorism in the colonies in a way that could be seen as a precursor to more terrible events to come, and many of the most brutal examples of colonial repression were carried out by nations that had a democratic future – indiscriminate burning of Boer settlements by the British in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, for example, or the murderous campaigns of Indian removal carried out by the military and administrative representatives of the United States as it expanded across the North American continent (for the latter, see Chapter 6 by Matthew Jennings in this volume). The proper analytic question, rather, is: how did this colonial violence metastasize into state terrorism during and after World War I in each individual case, and how did these colonial experiences become permanent parts of domestic statecraft in dictatorial countries but not (or much less so) in democratic countries? The answer lies in the concrete experiences of each of these countries during the era of world war (and ongoing civil war) stretching from 1914 to at least the mid-1920s; and it is to these experiences that we now turn.

## Nazi Germany

We begin with Germany, because the National Socialist regime has for decades been the paradigmatic case of a modern European dictatorship that ruled by terroristic violence. The Nazi system (along with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR], discussed below) was key to Hannah Arendt's immensely influential concept of totalitarianism, which posits that totalitarian dictatorships ruled precisely through ruthless, unpredictable terror. In Arendt's model, these regimes terrorized their populations with a broad array of both public and private violence – show trials, mass executions, vast secret police networks, forced denunciations – in order to produce fear and create social atomization, reducing all people to ciphers that could be manipulated with ease as these revolutionary totalitarian states re-defined completely the basic social, political, and economic structures of the nations they controlled.<sup>5</sup> Arendt's model was for decades so influential that it constrained academic research on interwar dictatorships, as most commenters simply assumed that “terror” was a, perhaps *the*, foundational element of both the Nazi and Stalinist regimes. Arendt's influence has hardly disappeared, but the last several decades of research on interwar Europe have greatly complicated our understanding of how authoritarian European regimes actually functioned, as well as raised the question of the extent to which all modern states employ various modes of violence and coercion in order to define, categorize, and dominate populations under their control.<sup>6</sup>

The widespread understanding of Nazi Germany as a “terror state” is understandable, particularly in light of the regime's self-presentation and the inarguable importance of street-level terrorism and paramilitary violence in the National Socialist rise to power. Key to this narrative are the infamous *Freikorps*, or volunteer paramilitary units of young men, often too young to have served directly in World War I, which were created in the wake of Imperial Germany's defeat in 1918.<sup>7</sup> The *Freikorps* served initially to protect Germany's interests in the East vis-à-vis Soviet Russia, in addition to preventing further left-wing revolution within Germany. Although any military rationale for this paramilitary force vanished quickly in the 1920s with the solidification of international borders and the creation of a stable, democratic Weimar system, their brand of paramilitary street-fighting, imbued with a hatred of “the East” (disorderly, Jewish, Bolshevik), became a foundational part of right-wing political culture during the fragile Weimar years. The infamous “Brownshirts” (Sturmabteilung, or SA) of the National Socialist Party took up the mantle of the *Freikorps* in the 1920s, and paramilitary violence became a widespread part of the Weimar political landscape – on the left as well as the right, as the SA clashed in brutal street battles with opponents from the center and left, most notably the paramilitary Red Front-Fighters Alliance (Roter Frontkämpfer-Bund, or RFB) associated with the German Communist Party (KPD).<sup>8</sup> As the Weimar system faltered under the weight of the Great Depression, street-level terrorism and paramilitary action carried out by the Brownshirts helped usher the Nazi regime into power. Ultimately, the centrality of right-wing popular violence in the overthrow of the Republic ensured that the *Freikorps*' ethos of existential struggle, leader worship, and transformative violence would be a major part of the new political system that emerged in Germany in the mid-1930s. In this analysis, state terror *was* popular terror in Nazi Germany, with the regime not merely co-opting the violent politics of the street but consciously institutionalizing it as a central part of an anti-liberal fascist state.

Yet National Socialist state terrorism was something far more radical, destructive, and transformational than mere Brownshirt thuggery. Most research now suggests that the kind

of “popular terror” represented by the SA was limited internally by the structure of the National Socialist state and that it played far less a role in the daily life of German citizens within the Reich after 1933 than previously assumed.<sup>9</sup> As in the case of the French Revolution, the National Socialist state and popular violence initially coexisted in a symbiotic relationship, with the state relying on the SA for support but with the SA exerting a substantial influence on the nature of state violence carried out by the regime. But, unlike the French case, the National Socialist state rather quickly dispensed with popular violence as an instrument of rule, a process both symbolically and literally summed up in the purge of the SA leadership in 1934 and the subsequent subordination of the SA to the more professionalized SS (Schutzstaffel). “Popular terror,” though important, was only one part of a more complex nexus of anti-democratic populism, scientific racism, eliminationist anti-Semitism, and militarized colonialism, all of which were embodied in and carried out by an exceedingly powerful, modern, National Socialist (i.e., German) state apparatus.

Most new research also suggests that state repression was far less widespread within German society than previously assumed and that the regime ruled on the basis of a substantial amount of popular support for its policies – along with, it must be stressed, a tremendous amount of terroristic violence directed at “externalized” populations both within Germany and especially outside its borders during war. The regime enjoyed popular, sometimes enthusiastic, support for its exclusionary policies, from the infamous pogroms in 1938 known as Kristallnacht (Night of the Broken Glass) through the chaotic and increasingly pointless resistance to the Allied assumption of control over central Europe in 1945. Ultimately, Nazi Germany was a majoritarian dictatorship: a political system in which a group of elites ruled by violence and terror but to the advantage of most of the population, most of whom accorded the regime passive, if not active, support.<sup>10</sup>

National Socialist violence was carried out primarily in the context of a strong German state, both military and civilian; and it is in this context that we can most profitably discuss the concept of “state terrorism” and differentiate between “state terror” and other forms of violence widely employed by the regime, both within and outside its own borders. As the National Socialist regime moved from internal consolidation in the mid-1930s to external conquest later in the decade, the ethos of violence and terrorism inherent in the Nazi political movement was subsumed into a broader political structure that unleashed these destructive terroristic impulses primarily on “externalized” populations in the context of total war. This was true even of Jews, who found themselves progressively excluded from the polity but even so did not face annihilation until they were transported outside the boundaries of the Reich and subsumed fully into the category of “other” in the East. Once war with Poland began in 1939, the occupied lands were freed of any sort of legal or conceptual restrictions on the exercise of state power. The strong German tradition of a Rechtsstaat, a “state of law” based on a written constitution that constrains even the most powerful institutions (e.g., the police, the military), remained in place inside Germany, no matter how battered or abused; but it vanished completely in Eastern Europe, where virtually every part of the military and administrative machinery of the German occupation viewed untrammelled terror as a means of conquest, a strategy for maintaining order, and a tool for the total refashioning of social and political structures in conquered areas. As has been well documented, even the highly conservative Wehrmacht leadership accepted (if in the case of some high-ranking officers only begrudgingly) that conquest in the East would entail mass terrorism and murder of civilian populations by all parts of the National Socialist state apparatus, its own soldiers included.



The sources of this ethos of violence are many. Readers should consult Chapter 24 by Roger Griffin on terrorism and modernity in this volume for a discussion of one crucially important set of such sources: the potent mix of political ideology, instrumental rationality, and modern bureaucracy summed up in the metaphor of the “gardening state.” Yet this amorphous set of assumptions about the nature of modern governments was only one such influence, and the German colonial experience in prior decades had a more direct, and generally underestimated, effect on National Socialist administration in the East. Like most other European powers, German colonial officials made wide use of terroristic violence in the late nineteenth century to control colonial populations and especially to quell local insurgencies. Such violence was an accepted part of colonial practice, enshrined in military doctrine of the time and virtually codified in Charles Callwell’s 1896 handbook, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*.<sup>11</sup> German troops combated irregular forces with a wide array of terroristic methods that generally remained off-limits in conflicts between European powers: mass hostage taking, ruining natural and agricultural resources on which local populations depend, and punitive campaigns against particular villages as punishment for specific anti-colonial actions. German colonial violence in South West Africa, against the Herero and Maji-Maji revolts between 1904 and 1907, was shocking then as now: General Lothar von Trotha’s troops veered far outside any accepted traditions of military conflict, shooting male Herero insurgents out of hand and driving women, children, and the infirm out of villages to die of starvation. When forced to moderate his tactics under pressure from Berlin, von Trotha turned to branding all Herero men who surrendered and conscripting them into forced labor. Such tactics, termed *schrecklichkeit* (frightfulness), were little different, according to one scholar of counter-insurgency, from the Nazi tactics of *abschreckung* (“terror tactics”) of over three decades later.<sup>12</sup>

The German army employed very little of this kind of overt terrorism during World War I, in part because occupations in the East were carried out under the framework of German administrative law, even in an area that had already been culturally redefined as “external” to the Reich and full of populations understood as ethnically (and civilizationally) “other.” War in the East after 1939, however, entailed no such restrictions. Without recounting the entire history of Nazi occupation and the Holocaust, we note that civilian and military officials (Wehrmacht, Waffen-SS, Einsatzgruppen) all engaged in what they saw as counter-insurgency efforts, in which a rhetoric of national security (protecting the Reich from opposition from “hostile” yet “weak” populations) merged with an ideologically conditioned drive to cleanse the East of populations seen as “subhuman” (Poles, Roma, and Jews, among others). Terror was chief among the strategies employed from the beginning of the occupation, made possible by the effective suspension of even military (not to speak of civil) law in zones behind the advancing front lines: Einsatzgruppen and Wehrmacht troops confiscated property, conducted summary arrests, deported both individuals and entire communities, and organized mass executions of populations deemed threatening (Polish elites, left-wing activists, and Jews first and foremost). The Security Police in most areas then attempted to resettle these “cleansed” spaces with “Germanic” populations, with the explicit goal of creating secure military spaces and promoting strong state administration, as well as creating the kind of homogenous social order characteristic of the National Socialist dream of modern “Aryan” society.

Civilian and military officials alike understood such actions as explicit (and proper) “terrorism” in that they were intended to repress representatives of “undesirable” populations (Polish intellectuals, for example) in order to terrorize the remainder into submission. Yet the

relationship between “terrorism” and the broader National Socialist project (including mass violence of various sorts, genocide, forced resettlement, labor camps, etc.) is complicated and underscores some of the dangers of relying on accepted definitions of terrorism when discussing European state violence in the twentieth century. Many of the actions of the Nazi state in the East correspond closely to widely accepted definitions of terrorism that focus on a triangular relationship between perpetrator, victim, and intended audience: Nazi officials often intended to communicate a threat to target populations via the repression of “message generators,” in Alex Schmid’s terminology, in order to instill fear or break resistance.<sup>13</sup> Yet the “threat” being communicated was often the regime’s intent to eliminate a particular group of people altogether, and the initial targeting of “message generators” often served as only the first step in a more comprehensive program of resettlement, internment, and annihilation. Hence the difference between “state terrorism” and “genocide” in the Nazi case is arguably one of scale and state capacity rather than intent or essence. The events of Kristallnacht, for example, were not (yet) intended to eliminate the Jewish population entirely in the target areas, whereas the actions of battalions of reserve soldiers charged with ransacking and murdering Jewish populations behind advancing front lines certainly were; the former was carried out by a still relatively weak state apparatus and involved a considerable amount of spontaneous popular participation, the latter by a highly structured, militarized bureaucracy that nonetheless relied on the consent of the perpetrators to this specific action, if not the overall project of genocide. And yet these actions themselves were so similar in nature that it seems analytically untenable to call the first “terrorism” and refuse to give the same label to the latter merely because its effect was so much greater.<sup>14</sup>

This is a difficult problem to address, and we will return to it below in our discussion of Stalin’s USSR. For now we suggest that it is unhelpful to bracket off “totalitarian” violence from other modes of modern European state violence, as does Griffin, on the assumption that the ultimate goals of these states (i.e., total social and political transformation, with mass violence up to and including genocide as viable tools to effect that transformation) make their concrete methods of violence (including terrorism) somehow unique among techniques of violence carried out by modern states. Nor is it wise to rely on a definition of terrorism, including state terrorism, that rules out mass state actions, including genocide, only because the targets are really the targets and not “message generators.” A robust definition of state terrorism in the twentieth century must take into account the reality that the European state (gardening, surveillance, bio-political, military, etc.) became powerful enough, for the first time, to bridge this gap, and to bring to fruition the dream of the French revolutionaries, which was to operate directly on the body politic with methods that included, but are not limited to, the application of massive amounts of violence, much terroristic, in the effort to create a homogenous, unambiguous, uniform social, political, and ethno/national space.<sup>15</sup> In doing so, modern states, including dictatorships, create their own “ideologies” of power: acts of state terrorism carried out against broad categories of people are inevitably a process of definition and dehumanization, as well as a “tactic” in support of a broader goal. A definition of terrorism that focuses on “doctrine” and “tactic” is, in short, insufficient in attempting to come to grips with the immense potential for violence inherent in the modern state.

### **Stalin’s USSR**

If the past two decades of research have complicated the idea that Nazi rule was based on terror, they have only strengthened this claim in the case of the other major “totalitarian”

regime of the twentieth century, the Soviet Union. The USSR served for several decades after the beginning of the Cold War as the analytic twin of Nazi Germany: Stalin's dictatorship was, in this account, based entirely on the fear engendered by various overlapping forms of repression, including the Gulag system of labor camps, public show trials, surveillance carried out by the secret police (the infamous NKVD), and the ever-present threat of denunciation by a colleague, friend, or family member that marked the beginning of a hellish descent into any or all of the above. The analytic connection between Soviet communism and state terrorism was so strong, in fact, that the single best-known repressive event of Stalin's rule, the wave of arrests and executions that left nearly a million people dead in the space of eighteen short months in 1937 and 1938, became known in academic and popular texts alike as "The Great Terror," a phrase that both invoked comparisons to revolutionary France and designated "terror" as the central function of the Soviet state.

The first wave of research completed after the collapse of the USSR in 1991 did little to soften this characterization, and most accounts now argue that state terrorism was central to the Bolshevik project from the very beginning. One hardly needs to pore over the writings of the early Bolshevik leaders to find evidence that they viewed terrorism as a perfectly legitimate means of effecting revolutionary change. The fledgling Bolshevik regime swiftly carried out mass repressions of potential rivals from other socialist camps – first summary arrests and executions of anarchists in Moscow in early 1918, then arrests of mainstream opposition leaders, mostly Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, and then violent repression of working-class dissent in the summer, all leading to a much broader wave of repressions known as the "Red Terror" over the second half of 1918. The Red Terror, which likely claimed some 10,000 to 15,000 lives, was explicitly punitive, and it was intended to send a strong message to potential opponents as much as to repress individuals seen as active threats, but the tactics had more to do with contemporary political realities than with French-revolutionary precedent: hostage taking and subsequent executions from among the families of leading oppositionists or old-regime figures, arrests and executions among unruly peasant populations that were described as "prophylactic" measures, and the initial creation and population of the labor-camp system – the Gulag – that would come to virtually define the Soviet experience. A strong connection between military action, administration, and state terror was also established immediately – and irrevocably – in the post-revolutionary period. Not only did the new Red Army take part in massive campaigns against peasants resisting the Bolsheviks' grain procurement campaigns between 1918 and 1921, but the rapidly expanding secret police, the Cheka (later the NKVD), created its own military force, known as the Internal Troops for Defense of the Republic, that numbered by 1919 at least 200,000. These Troops carried out direct martial repressions of rebellions major and minor throughout the entire Soviet period, using all means at their disposal, including artillery and even poison gas, during the most dire moments of post-revolutionary conflict.<sup>16</sup>

The regime continued with overtly terroristic repression of entire social categories over the following years. Such actions included the well-known repressions of the unfortunate remnants of the Russian Empire's upper classes, culminating symbolically if not numerically in 1922 and 1923 with the forced expulsion of hundreds of the most talented Russian intellectuals and their families, many of whom would go on to make incalculable contributions to world and Russian culture from their exile abroad. Yet military and police administrations also targeted broad swaths of the population deemed threatening to the new regime, such as Orthodox priests, rebellious peasants on the unstable periphery, and entire socio-ethnic groups like the Don Cossacks. The latter were identified as inherently anti-Soviet based on

their corporate (if not quite ethnic) identity and targeted with a process termed “de-Cossackization” – mass arrests, execution of political elites, destruction of homelands, and forced migration of populations to all reaches of the former Russian Empire. That the de-Cossackization campaign was abruptly halted after only several months, as the political situation shifted in the region, did not prevent more than 10,000 Cossacks from being executed by military representatives of the new Bolshevik state.<sup>17</sup>

As in the German case, many of these more explicitly terroristic strategies have their roots in colonial violence; in contrast to the Wehrmacht, however, the tsarist military made widespread use of exactly these kinds of tactics just before and during World War I. The tsarist military was already in the mid-nineteenth century engaged in massive ethnic cleansing in the Caucasus, expelling more than half a million Chechens and Circassians and resettling their villages with Cossacks; and Kazakh and Kirgiz uprisings in 1915 were met with deliberate acts of genocide by imperial troops and settlers that killed or displaced several hundred thousand people.<sup>18</sup> It was a small step, then, to a massive expansion of these tactics on the western borderlands during World War I, where nearly a million imperial subjects were categorized as “internal enemies” by the military authorities – Germans, Balts, Jews, and Turkish Muslims – and subjected to a wide range of repressions: deportations, property confiscations, internment in concentration camps, and pogroms against both Jews and Germans that often occurred with the only thinly veiled support of local military and civilian authorities alike.<sup>19</sup>

Such tactics continued almost uninterrupted across the revolutionary divide of 1917. A surprising number of tsarist military officials, deemed “bourgeois specialists” but highly valued by the new regime for their professional skills, successfully navigated from one side of that divide to the other, serving in the Red Army in the 1920s and 1930s and forming a direct link between tsarist and Soviet military terror.<sup>20</sup> To be sure, the massive amount of ethnic cleansing, state-supported pogroms, and explicitly punitive operations perpetrated by all sides – Red, White, Green – during the highly confused situation of the Russian Civil War (1918–ca. 1921) make it difficult to discern which instances of “terrorism” in this era deserve to accrue to the tally of the “state.” To take just one example, the city of Kiev in the aftermath of the 1917 revolutions experienced at least a dozen major and minor military coups and changes of power – first the overthrow of the Ukrainian Central Rada by the pro-German Pavel Skoropadsky, then a coup carried out by the Ukrainian nationalist Semyon Petliura, then the Red Army, then White forces under General Denikin, then the Red Army again, the Polish military, and the Red Army a final time. Each change of power was accompanied by waves of arrests, retribution, public executions, resettlement, and pogroms, all of which left the city and the entire area devastated. In Ukraine, as across the wide swaths of lawless territory in which the new regime battled its foes both internal and external, these brutal occupation tactics, usually rooted in a very loose application of military law, became a standard part of both military occupations and civilian administration, for Red as well as White forces.<sup>21</sup>

Taken together, the entire history of Russian and early Soviet state violence ensured that state terrorism – explicit, targeted violence intended to punish, to instill fear, and to reshape the social structure of the country – was engrained in basic Soviet administrative practices by the mid-1920s and that terror would be among the most important strategies of control that the Stalinist state would turn to as it attempted to force the USSR into its version of “socialism” in the 1930s.<sup>22</sup> Parallel trends set the stage for Stalinist repression as well, including a creeping re-emergence of ethno-nationalism in Soviet political culture, along

with the emergence of highly utopian and modernized visions of cultural progress among the new Soviet political elite that correspond closely to Zygmunt Bauman's concept of the "gardening state" in Western Europe.<sup>23</sup> Yet in the early Soviet case, it was most emphatically war – world war, military occupation, military tactics, civil war, and the complex responses of populations who were subject to all of the above – that cast the die for the massive upheavals that would follow under Stalin.<sup>24</sup>

After a brief period of retrenchment and relative calm in the mid-1920s, the Soviet regime reverted to overtly violent tactics in support of Stalin's first policy initiatives during the First Five-Year Plan (1928–32): collectivization of agriculture, forced industrialization, and the expulsion from the Soviet state of remnants of the "bourgeoisie" and their replacement by a new cadre of "proletarian" elites. The Stalinist regime made use of virtually every violent state technique available to it in pursuing these goals, including show trials of technical specialists and foreign industrialists in the late 1920s, state-sanctioned purges of places of employment and other local institutions, the rapid expansion of the labor camp system (the Gulag) and the surveillance activities of the secret police, state-exacerbated (perhaps induced) famine, and mass arrest, resettlement, and execution of large numbers of peasants who resisted or could be expected to resist collectivization of agriculture.

Yet not all of these myriad acts of state violence should be construed as state terrorism. Many are better understood as systemic or structural violence, enmeshed in the basic nature of the Stalinist state/society interface and pervading the entire social fabric of the country by the mid-1930s. For example, the successive waves of deadly purges of the Soviet Communist Party in the 1920s and 1930s, which resulted in the expulsions of thousands of party members and culminated in the infamous show trials of the late 1930s (e.g., Bukharin et al.), were the product of highly complex social and bureaucratic trends that included but extended far beyond the actions of the Soviet state: generational conflicts within Soviet officialdom, shop-floor politics that pitted the working classes against the social-climbing elites who became their new bosses, as well as the direct intervention of the secret police (the NKVD).<sup>25</sup> It makes little analytical sense to refer to such violence as "state terrorism," given our definition of the term above, unless we simply assume that all violence perpetuated by a "totalitarian" state should be construed as "terrorism" – a position that might be consistent with Arendt's analysis but provides little understanding either of state terrorism as a modern phenomenon or of the nature of the Stalinist system.

Some Stalinist state violence, however, was indeed terroristic. Much of the post-1991 research on the Stalin era, in fact, shows that the most repressive and destructive actions of the regime are entirely consistent with the definition of state terrorism outlined above, that is, actions carried out directly by an increasingly powerful Soviet state apparatus that used violent techniques, up to and including mass executions, to target specific populations, instill fear, and in some cases eliminate target categories of people entirely. Collectivization of agriculture in the late 1920s and early 1930s, for example, was accompanied by "dekulakization" – a coordinated attack on "counter-revolutionary" peasant populations, with local officials of the Communist Party and secret police in charge of devising lists of three categories of "kulaks" (moderately well-off peasants) in the countryside and subjecting them to incarceration in labor camps, deportation to distant regions of the Soviet Union, or dispossession and resettlement within their home regions, respectively.<sup>26</sup> Not surprisingly, such actions provoked violent resistance from peasant populations across the USSR, some reaching thousands of peasants in size; and the state responded in kind, with mass arrests, tens of thousands of summary executions, and unprecedented deportation operations – with

arrested families shunted via overcrowded railway cars through a makeshift system of barracks, transit camps, and labor colonies to final destinations on the inhospitable eastern and northern peripheries of the empire – that totaled some 1.8 million people by the end of 1931, with as many as 300,000 perishing along the way.<sup>27</sup>

By the mid-1930s, the Stalinist regime was fully engaged in numerous such campaigns, which targeted specific categories of individuals deemed threatening or undesirable: petty criminals, vagrants, homeless children, and, with increasing intensity as the decade wore on, numerous ethno-national categories that were seen as a national security threat. The latter included Germans, Japanese, Poles, and others seen as potential “fifth columnists” in the event of an increasingly likely war in the West or East. Such campaigns were generally carried out by the state apparatus and entailed relatively little popular participation or support. Not only the notorious NKVD but the NKVD’s Internal Troops, mentioned above, the federal Border Guard administrations, as well as Red Army divisions responsible for security in border regions all played a major role in such repressions, so much so that some accounts of the era now speak of a “militarized” dictatorship under Stalin.<sup>28</sup>

These trends culminated in a wave of mass repressions carried out by the Stalinist state in 1937–8, referred to internally as “mass operations of repression of kulak, criminal, and other anti-Soviet elements.” These operations, in which over 700,000 individuals were shot and roughly a million more incarcerated, arose directly from the regime’s national security concerns, as looming conflict with Germany and Japan goaded the regime into punitive actions against broad categories of potential fifth columnists. Germans, Latvians, Finns, Estonians, and shortly thereafter Japanese, Koreans, Poles, and a raft of other ethnicities seen as unreliable in time of war were targeted, alongside populations of dispossessed peasants, social marginals, and those with any connection to the remnants of the former elite classes. State officials were provided with quotas by region for arrests and executions, and they selected targets based on previous convictions, ethno-national status as ascribed in identification documents, or in many cases random sweeps of public areas that were designed to fill quotas as quickly as possible. Unlike Germany, the Stalinist regime made little distinction of place while targeting suspect populations: a Korean in Kiev was as likely a target as one in the Far East. These operations, which are best understood as a combination of ethnic cleansing and social prophylaxis, were highly organized, directed from Moscow, and carried out almost exclusively by the Stalinist state – as clear an example of state terrorism on a mass scale as we find in the early twentieth century.<sup>29</sup>

Although most of the people who lost their lives in 1937–8 fell victim precisely to these “mass operations,” it bears repeating that they represent only one of the numerous types of violence, state and otherwise, that took place under the Stalinist regime in the 1930s. Arendt was correct in arguing that violence, intimidation, and fear pervaded Stalinist political culture, even if her analysis focused primary on highly visible, obviously irrational aspects of Stalinist violence, especially denunciations, show trials, and confessions – the “whirlwind” of terror that enveloped loyal party members like Nikolai Bukharin and that served as the basis for our understanding of the Stalinist system for decades after World War II.<sup>30</sup>

It should be no surprise that these tactics carried over into Soviet actions during World War II, usually without even a veneer of social prophylaxis. As Red Army and NKVD officials swept into Poland, then the Baltics, they unleashed explicit programs of terror – arrest, execution, deportation – against elites, suspect nationalities, and families of the repressed. The German advance into the USSR likewise resulted in fresh campaigns against

suspect nationalities: Volga Germans, Crimean Tatars, Chechens, and a dozen others were deported to Central Asia. The surprisingly small amount of resistance was met with barbaric violence: in one case, in the Caucasus, an entire village population – some 700 people – was locked into a barn and burned alive.<sup>31</sup> Similar campaigns were carried out as the war came to an end, often in the same areas that suffered at its beginning: Ukrainians, Germans, Estonians, and numerous others fell victim to a system for which terror (arrest, deportation, execution) had become a completely unremarkable aspect of basic Soviet governance.

Ultimately, then, the account that has dominated the field since the collapse of the USSR is the one that we previously applied to the National Socialist case: terror was widespread within the Soviet body politic, and it was applied with abandon outside it, both supporting a dictatorial system based primarily on violence and fear. I have focused here on the less-known aspects of Soviet repression because much of the standard story – denunciations, the show trials, the Gulag – is known to most readers already, if only in outline. In the Stalinist case, the close connection between military operations and state terrorism is impossible to miss: Stalinism was a highly militarized system in which the Communist Party, the domestic security services, and the Red Army ruled much of the country via systemic (and systematic) terror. Perhaps paradoxically, although much of the state violence carried out by the Stalinist regime was indeed publicly demonstrative, this is emphatically not true of several of the most destructive actions of the era: the “mass operations” of 1937 and 1938, for example, were carried out secretly and had little value as a “threat-based communication process,” in Schmid’s terminology. Yet such actions were explicitly intended to reshape the basic demographic, ethno-national, and cultural structures of Soviet society, and they were certainly part of a broad campaign of political state violence that served to “destabilize, coerce, and compel” – key aspects of any consensus definition of terrorism. As in the National Socialist case, however, the most salient analytic criteria in understanding state terrorism under Stalin all related to the immense power of the Soviet state – from the power to collect and analyze demographic information, to the power to arrest, deport, resettle, and execute millions of people in time of peace as in war.

### **Fascist Italy**

Finally, the case of Fascist Italy provides a highly useful counterpoint to the above discussion of totalitarian dictatorships. Despite the explicit importance of terror and violence to the self-conception of Mussolini’s regime, the Fascist state mobilized far less overt violence against its own citizens than either Nazi Germany or the USSR – though, it must be stressed, Fascist Italy was anything but benign, as the dictatorship was shot through with violence at all levels. At the same time, the connection between military violence and terrorism is quite clear in the Italian case: colonialism and war shaped the nature of the Fascist state, and in turn Fascist state practices shaped exceptionally brutal colonial actions in the 1930s. Fascist Italy did employ state terrorism against its populations, and it was, at its core, a political system based on terror in the service of complete social transformation; hence it can be understood as a “totalitarian” system. Yet the regime was far less destructive than either Nazi Germany or Stalin’s USSR, or indeed than Franco’s nationalists during the Spanish Civil War; the Italian case thus underscores both the usefulness of the concept of “state terrorism” in modern Europe and the limits of any analysis that conflates terrorism, terror, and totalitarianism.

Italian fascism was, in some sense, the model for contemporary dictatorships in Greece, Spain, and Romania, as well as Nazi Germany. Mussolini's rise to power was made possible by explicitly terroristic street violence aimed at overthrowing the existing political system, and the new regime understood violence – purifying, anti-liberal, spiritual violence – as the bedrock of the new political order. As in the German case, however, the initial popular impetus towards spontaneous street violence that animated Mussolini's *squadristi* was quickly subsumed under a broader Fascist state; but unlike the Nazi case, the primary goals of Fascist state violence remained internal, and violent practices were generally not “externalized” onto populations that were deemed an existential threat and hence slated for annihilation. Fascist violence was a means of national regeneration, a spiritual imperative in the process of refashioning the Italian *uomo fascista* (fascist man), while externalized violence, while necessary, was merely legitimate, an unavoidable part of the Italian people's struggle for existence.<sup>32</sup> Nonetheless, both forms of violence, taken together, were integral to the Fascist project of creating a new, anti-liberal, supra-national political identity, and they were integral to the basic political structure of the regime.

Perhaps surprisingly, the first several decades of research on Mussolini's Italy in the mid-twentieth century de-emphasized the role of this kind of violence in the Fascist system of power, arguing that Italian fascism was relatively ineffectual, even benign, and that it became radicalized only under the influence of Nazi Germany.<sup>33</sup> Recent work has reversed this trend completely, arguing that Fascist Italy was indeed based on widespread application of terroristic violence, both structurally and in terms of concrete state action. Even though the Fascist state after 1926 curbed much of the spontaneous street violence associated with the *squadristi*, it began to build a state system based on much the same thing. Italian police, often with the assistance of Fascist party operatives or militiamen, routinely beat, harassed, and publicly humiliated Italian citizens, both for perceived political unreliability and for civil infractions as routine as public drunkenness or theft. At the same time, the increasingly powerful and stable Fascist state employed many of the same strategies to control its population and repress dissent that characterized other interwar dictatorships: surveillance, denunciation gathering, extra-legal arrests and imprisonment for both political opponents and non-political offenders.<sup>34</sup>

This combination of systemic terror, on the one hand, and the comparatively modest application of concrete acts of state terrorism to the population – “ordinary violence” in the words of one recent commentator – on the other, may have been less destructive than comparable state practices in Nazi Germany and the USSR, but it was intended nonetheless to effect a utopian social transformation within Italy, one that saw violence as the key to the moral and physical regeneration of the Italian nation.<sup>35</sup> Such an account therefore squarely places Fascist Italy among the nations that deserve to be called “totalitarian”; and yet Italian fascism did not entail anywhere near the same level of internal repression as did the Soviet or Nazi dictatorships. Best estimates suggest that several tens of thousands of Italians were arrested and deported to “confinement colonies” in the south. Fascist violence, though totalitarian, was far from “totalizing” in the more common sense of the word: the Fascist system left large parts of the existing Italian social structure in place, including the Catholic Church, traditional nationalist and local identities, and the family, in sharp contrast to the USSR.<sup>36</sup> Italian fascism also lacked an explicit drive to externalize its brand of political terror, and it did not take extermination of suspect populations as a specific goal. Mussolini embarked on a broad set of anti-Jewish policies in the mid-1930s, for example, that culminated between 1940 and 1943 in a campaign to intern Jews in camps, but it was only



with the Nazi occupation between 1943 and 1945 that these Jews, many of foreign origin, were targeted for annihilation.<sup>37</sup> Ultimately, Mussolini's state apparatus explicitly claimed the right to mete out punishment to any and all citizens with impunity, subjecting the population to sporadic public exercises of punitive and often random violence as a method of instilling widespread fear of punishment; it therefore applied clearly terroristic practices in support of a totalitarian ideology but with drastically less capacity and effect, at least domestically, than its contemporary regimes in Germany and the USSR.

Yet Fascist practices in Italian colonies in the 1930s show just how entrenched state terrorism had become in the Italian political system and just how far the regime was prepared to take violent methods of rule in a context completely outside the boundaries of Italian political culture (again, as with the German case, battered but still present in Italy itself). Long-standing tensions in Italy's Libyan colonies prompted Mussolini to launch pacification campaigns as early as 1923, which spiraled by the end of the decade into genocidal military actions intended to stamp out local Sanusi bands for good. The Italians used not only overwhelming force but also spoiled resources, slaughtering cattle and poisoning water supplies, in order to cause misery and starvation; they also carried out public hangings of rebel leaders in order to demoralize the opposition. Italian actions in Ethiopia in 1935 and 1936 were even worse: Italian troops bombed hospitals, razed entire villages to the ground, and publically executed rebels and civilians alike before taking Addis Ababa in 1936.<sup>38</sup> In the Italian colonial context, fascistic notions of purifying violence came full circle: as one commentator notes, colonial conflict, rather than the domestic political sphere, was "fascism's first true mass mobilization," an "experimental field of violence" in which the regime terrorized non-combatant populations with all the instruments available to a modern state, from aerial bombings and chemical weapons, all filtered through the spirit of "masculine freedom and transgression" that animated the *squadristi* from the beginning.<sup>39</sup>

Comparatively little research exists to connect these experiences to the battlefields of World War II, but that which does suggests that Italian troops in occupied territories (e.g., Greece and Yugoslavia) often replicated the kind of street violence that emerged two decades before – arson, public beatings, and ritualized shamings involving the forced ingestion of castor oil – and combined them with the violent techniques of the modern military state, including internments, deportations, and executions.<sup>40</sup> The Italian colonies, by the mid-1930s, were a de-civilized space in which the terroristic governance strategies that were a constituent part of the Fascist system could be put into place by eager statesmen, trained in the atmosphere of the *squadri* but now operating with the full force of the Italian state at their disposal.

The Italian case shows, perhaps even more clearly than the Nazi or Soviet cases, that "state terrorism" is a useful analytical construct in understanding the violence in the modern era, as long as it is kept separate from the admittedly overlapping categories of systemic violence and totalitarianism. Fascist Italy was totalitarian in its ideology and goals, if not implementation; it employed numerous violent techniques in order to control the populations under its control, all situated in a state structure that used violence to instill fear and maintain control; and it carried out concrete acts of terroristic violence against both domestic and external populations, usually in a way that supported the overall structure of the regime. The most destructive examples of Fascist state terrorism, furthermore, were carried out in explicitly military contexts, often colonial, while a militarized, masculinized culture of action and power had a reciprocal and equally important effect on the Italian state itself. Fascist Italy may have been less destructive, in terms of sheer number of victims, than the USSR or

Nazi Germany, but the widespread application of terroristic violence was nonetheless a basic and fundamental part of the dictatorial system that kept the regime in place.

### Conclusion

The European state system changed drastically in the first half of the twentieth century. Several concrete goals of European statesmen that were highly obvious as far back as the French Revolution came to fruition in these years: a drive to understand and control demographic trends, strict controls on migration and international borders, increasing government intervention into national and global economic systems, and a whole range of policies, based in the Enlightenment-era dream of social perfectibility and modern social homogeneity that made populations easy to “read” and act upon. At the same time, the capacities of the modern European state grew tremendously: European states gained the ability to count populations, to survey them with a vast array of legal and extra-legal institutions (from the census bureau to the secret police), and to act on them with an equally broad array of economic, medico-social, and judicial agencies. Given that much of this growth in institutions was fueled by war (colonial war, world war, civil war), it is hardly surprising that many of these powerful state institutions of the early twentieth century, especially those functioning in dictatorships, had at their disposal a broad array of techniques of violence that were as at home within the national boundaries of a given state as on the battlefield, from the secret and bureaucratic (perustration of correspondence) to the public and highly personal (public beatings, summary arrests, public executions).

Not all of these instances of state violence deserve to be termed “state terrorism,” but those that do share certain qualities. They are carried out by hypertrophied institutions, often military or militarized, and often with the explicit intention of protecting the polity from existential threats, real or imagined. They take as a primary goal the fundamental reshaping of the social structure of the nation – to be clear, a goal that was widespread in European statecraft in the early twentieth century, and not only in “violent” political systems. This goal took on fundamental importance in the dictatorships that we term “totalitarian,” but this fact should not blind us to the reality that all modern states seek to transform the populations under their control. Finally, state terrorism entails the application of often deadly force to civilian populations in what is seen as an effective and legitimate means of achieving these ends.

It should be clear from the above discussion that the idea of “modern state terrorism” is meaningless without the existence of a powerful, interventionist, modern state: states have carried out more or less violent actions against non-combatants from the beginning of human history, but it is the particular combination of goals and means that emerged in the twentieth century that gives the category analytical purchase. As one analyst notes, barbarism in the twentieth century cannot be understood as an unfortunate (and temporary) reversion to an older sort of human cruelty; rather, the “finest creations of the century” – technological, intellectual, and institutional – were themselves “sown with the seeds of authoritarianism and cruelty” and were “employed to terrorise.”<sup>41</sup>

Policy makers and analysts alike would do well, then, to look not merely to ideology, nor strictly to the effects of dictatorship, when searching for the root causes of state terrorism in the contemporary era. State violence is ubiquitous in the modern era, and it tends not to remain compartmentalized in one field of action or another. Terroristic policies that are justified – correctly or not – as legitimate in certain contexts rarely remain limited to those

contexts, at least not without the vigorous public discussion and contestation that occurs in modern liberal democracies. The experience of the twentieth century shows that nearly all strong states have the capacity to engage in terroristic actions, and that those that resist are the states that maintain the strongest sense of civic political culture (not necessarily liberal–democratic) in *all* contexts: military, colonial, as well as domestic.

### Notes

- 1 The definition proposed by the European Union in 2002 seems most useful here: terrorism is violence directed at non-combatants “with the aim of intimidating people and seriously altering or destroying the political, economic or social structures of a country (murder, bodily injuries, hostage taking, extortion, fabrication of weapons, committing attacks, threatening to commit any of the above, etc.)” See Brett Bowden, “Terror(s) throughout the Ages,” in *Terror: From Tyrannicide to Terrorism*, ed. Brett Bowden and Michael T. Davis (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 2008), 4–5.
- 2 In addition to Chapter 5 by Rapport in this volume, see Hugh Gough, “The Terror in the French Revolution,” in *Terror: From Tyrannicide to Terrorism*, 77–91.
- 3 Ian F. W. Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1750* (London: Routledge, 2001) 24–31.
- 4 On the topic of counter-insurgency and terrorism, see Douglas Porch, *Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). The most important account to date of the connection between colonial violence and world war is found in Isabel V. Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).
- 5 Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951). For a perceptive discussion of the Soviet and National Socialist cases, see Peter Holquist, “State Violence as Technique: The Logic of Violence in Soviet Totalitarianism,” in *Landscaping the Human Garden: Twentieth-Century Population Politics in a Comparative Framework*, ed. Amir Weiner, 19–45 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).
- 6 On the latter point, in addition to Foucault’s immensely influential work, see especially Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); and James Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999). For discussion of Bauman, see Chapter 24 by Roger Griffin in this volume, but note that none of these commentators, including Bauman, exclude liberal democratic societies from their analysis of the perils of modernity.
- 7 The classic study of the *Freikorps* in English remains Robert G. L. Waite, *Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in Post War Germany, 1918–1923* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952).
- 8 For street violence on the left, see Eve Rosenhaft, *Beating the Fascists?: The German Communists and Political Violence, 1929–1933* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
- 9 For a recent and comprehensive discussion of paramilitary violence in interwar Europe, see Robert Gerwarth and John Horne, “Vectors of Violence: Paramilitarism in Europe after the Great War, 1917–1923,” *Journal of Modern History* 83, no. 3 (2011): 489–512. Gerwarth and Horne conclude that paramilitarism, while having a substantial influence on the overall political culture of the era, had relatively little direct role in the politics of those continental states that featured strong civic institutions, including Germany and Austria.
- 10 The single most important commentator in English remains Robert Gellately. See his *The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy 1933–1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); and *Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
- 11 Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies*, 32–4.
- 12 Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies*, 42–3.
- 13 Alex P. Schmid, ed., *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 86–7.
- 14 The classic study is now Christopher R. Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (New York: Harper Collins, 1992).

- 15 In this context, see Gordon H. Chang's fascinating account of Japanese internees in the United States during World War II, who were subjected to an all-encompassing program of "social engineering" intended to instill in them an "American" civic identity. This project was supported not only by military internment officials but by a wide array of educators, researchers, and political leaders on the left as well as right. Gordon H. Chang, "Social Darwinism versus Social Engineering: The 'Education' of Japanese Americans during World War II," in *Landscaping the Human Garden: Twentieth-Century Population Politics in a Comparative Framework*, 189–204.
- 16 For a definitive catalog of Soviet-era repressions, and despite the often contentious tone of the rest of the volume, see Nicolas Werth, "A State against Its People: Violence, Repression, and Terror in the Soviet Union," in *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression*, ed. Stéphane Courtois et al., 33–268 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); here 71–80.
- 17 On repressions of intellectuals after 1917, see Stuart Finkel, *On the Ideological Front: The Russian Intelligentsia and the Making of the Soviet Public Sphere* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007). On the repression of the Don Cossacks, see Peter Holquist, *Making War, Forging Revolution: Russia's Continuum of Crisis, 1914–1921* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).
- 18 Jörg Baberowski and Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, "The Quest for Order and the Pursuit of Terror," in *Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared*, ed. Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 202–3.
- 19 Eric Lohr, *Nationalizing the Russian Empire: The Campaign against Enemy Aliens during World War I* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).
- 20 The standard account of the early years of the Red Army remains Mark von Hagen, *Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship: The Red Army and the Soviet Socialist State, 1917–1930* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).
- 21 The literature on the Russian Civil War is vast, but readers interested in the complex mechanisms of state violence in this period should begin with two exceptional works not of history but fiction: Mikhail Bulgakov, *White Guard*, trans. Marian Schwartz (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008); and Isaac Babel, *Red Cavalry*, trans. Peter Constantine (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002).
- 22 For more on state terrorism in the Russian Empire, as well as the more familiar story of Russian revolutionary terrorism, see Chapter 7 by Martin A. Miller in this volume.
- 23 Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the USSR, 1923–1939* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001); and David L. Hoffmann, *Cultivating the Masses: Modern State Practices and Soviet Socialism, 1914–1939* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011).
- 24 For a wide-ranging exploration of the effects of war on the emerging Soviet system that, despite its publication in the 1980s, continues to reflect the basic contours of the field, see Diane P. Koenker, William G. Rosenberg, and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., *Party, State, and Society in the Russian Civil War: Explorations in Social History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989).
- 25 See, for example, Wendy Z. Goldman, *Terror and Democracy in the Age of Stalin: The Social Dynamics of Repression* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); and *Inventing the Enemy: Denunciation and Terror in Stalin's Russia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
- 26 Lynne Viola, *The Unknown Gulag: The Lost World of Stalin's Special Settlement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
- 27 Werth, *The Black Book of Communism*, 146–58; mortality estimate on 155.
- 28 David R. Shearer, *Policing Stalin's Socialism: Repression and Social Order in the Soviet Union, 1924–1953* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009).
- 29 For a guide to the most recent work on Stalinist repression, see James Harris, ed., *The Anatomy of Terror: Political Violence under Stalin* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
- 30 Few accounts have done more to shape the popular understanding of the "Great Terror" than Arthur Koestler's semi-fictional account of Nikolai Bukharin's downfall in *Darkness at Noon* (London: J. Cape, 1940). The metaphor of the "whirlwind" comes from the equally influential memoir by Eugenia Ginzburg, *Journey into the Whirlwind* (New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1967).
- 31 Baberowski and Doering-Manteuffel, "The Quest for Order," 223.
- 32 Aristotles A. Kallis, "Fascism, Violence and Terror," in *Terror: From Tyrannicide to Terrorism*, 192–4.
- 33 Chief among these accounts are the many works of Renzo De Felice, including his four-volume, eight-book biography of Mussolini, unfinished at his time of death: *Mussolini il fascista* (Turin: Einaudi, 1966–8); *Mussolini il duce* (Turin: Einaudi, 1974–81); and *Mussolini Palleato*,

- 1940–45 (Turin: Einaudi, 1990–7). For a comprehensive guide in English to these controversies, see R. J. B. Bosworth, *The Italian Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of Mussolini and Fascism* (New York: Hodder, 1998).
- 34 For a guide to recent literature on the Fascist Italian state, see Patrick Bernhard, “Renarrating Italian Fascism: New Directions in the Historiography of a European Dictatorship,” *Contemporary European History* 23, no. 1 (2014): 151–63.
- 35 Michael Ebner, *Ordinary Violence in Mussolini’s Italy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), esp. 5–11.
- 36 Bernhard, “Renarrating Italian Fascism,” 153–60.
- 37 Kallis, “Fascism, Violence and Terror,” 199.
- 38 Kallis, “Fascism, Violence and Terror,” 199–200.
- 39 Ruth Ben-Ghiat, “Response to Matteo Millan: Mapping Squadrist Violence,” *Contemporary European History* 22, no. 4 (2013): 582, citing Aram Mattioli, *Experimentierfeld der Gewalt: Der Abessinienkrieg und seine internationale Bedeutung 1935–1941* (Zurich: Orell Füssli, 2005).
- 40 Ben-Ghiat, “Response to Matteo Millan,” 583.
- 41 Joanna Bourke, “Barbarisation vs. Civilisation in Time of War,” in *The Barbarization of Warfare*, ed. George Kassimeris (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 35.

### Further reading

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