This article was downloaded by: *10.3.97.143*
On: 02 Apr 2023
Access details: *subscription number*
Publisher: *Routledge*
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK



The Routledge Companion to Medieval Philosophy

Richard Cross, JT Paasch

Will

Publication details
https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315709604-25
Cyrille Michon
Published online on: 13 Jan 2021

How to cite :- Cyrille Michon. 13 Jan 2021, *Will from:* The Routledge Companion to Medieval Philosophy Routledge
Accessed on: 02 Apr 2023
https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315709604-25

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT

Full terms and conditions of use: https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms

This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

20
WILL

Cyrille Michon

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 12:06 02 Apr 2023; For: 9781315709604, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315709604-25

What is the concept of will and when did it appear? Dihle (1982) assigned it to Augustine and his biblical roots; other scholars have defended an earlier origin: with the Stoics (Voelke 1973) or with Aristotle (Irwin 1992), or a later one: with Maximus the Confessor (Gauthier 1954). Recently, Sorabji (2003) has confirmed Dihle's diagnostic, while Charles Kahn (1988) took the ecumenical view of a progressive constitution through all those steps. One might also deny that there is one concept of will and trace back our different notions to different origins (Bourke 1964). But, whatever one thinks of the unity and the origins of the concept or concepts of will, it seems undeniable that in medieval Latin thought, the word *voluntas* is commonly used as a very broad concept to mean an act and/or a faculty of the rational soul (or of the soul of rational creatures), appropriately attributed to pure spirits and to God. In the Middle Ages, two meta-processes are at play, not necessarily with the same force and path: one of *unification* and one of *promotion*. The Augustinian tradition dominates first and then merges with the Aristotelian conception of action, leading to Aquinas's synthesis. We will see reasons for attributing a major influence to the elaboration of the concept of will on an Augustinian basis in the eleventh and twelfth centuries (the section "The Augustinian Tradition"), and then reasons for acknowledging Aquinas's effort to synthesize the most relevant elements concerning human action (the section "The Aristotelian Synthesis of Thomas Aquinas"). But it can also be argued that a major shift occurred with the clash between most theologians and Aristotelianism at the end of the thirteenth century. The will and its freedom at that time were promoted against and above reason in a very conscious process. If one adopts as a concept of will that of a power free and active by itself, capable to adjudicate between different options and different desires by its own act (volition), then there is a case for the thesis that such a concept was fully elaborated by the voluntarist thinkers, mostly Franciscans, of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries (the section "The Clash").

The Augustinian Tradition

The vocabulary of the will was unified by Augustine, who also gave the will a preeminent position in the moral life (analysis of sin and merit), in the doctrine of grace (received as a light in the intellect and as a pleasure and inclination in the will), and in his description of human psychology (a trinity in the soul analogous to the divine Trinity: the mind/memory is analogous to the Father, reason/intelligence is analogous to the Son, and the will/love is analogous to the Holy Spirit). Relying on concepts mostly coming from Stoicism, Augustine had to conceptualize Christian doctrine and dogmas, and mostly Paul's teaching on grace and will. But some confusion

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 12:06 02 Apr 2023; For: 9781315709604, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315709604-25

remained, since it is not clear whether Augustine takes the will to be a faculty (see Rist 2014 for the thesis that he does not), and since he does not distinguish between inclinations and acts (what will later be called *volitio*). "*Voluntas*" marked neither a strict distinction between sensual desires and rational ones having as objects only what a rational power could apprehend, like happiness, nor what only such a power could present as desirable (virtue, God's vision). Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109), mainly building on Augustine's work, introduces those distinctions. He sets apart the will as instrument (the faculty), its dispositions or affections and its uses or acts (*De libertate arbitrii* 3, 7; *De conceptu virginali* 4; *De Concordia* 3.11—all references to Anselm's works can be found in translation, in Anselm 1998). Anselm famously considered that the human will has two fundamental inclinations: one for what is pleasant and agreeable (the *affectio commodi*), mainly coming from sensual desires, and one for righteousness or justice (the *affectio iustitiae*), due to reason in human beings (*De Casu diaboli* 4 and 13; *De Concordia* 3.11–13). The will is affected by both and may have to decide when they enter in conflict. This opposition of the two basic affections is the root of moral responsibility, for there is sin when the *commodum* is preferred to the *iustum*, merit and virtuous act in the other case (if the affection for justice is lost, as in hell, the will is no longer free, *De Concordia* 3.13). Lucifer's sin is paradigmatic of the prevalence of one affection over the other without any explanation other than a pure act of will (*"non nisi quia voluit"*: *De casu diaboli* 27; *De Concordia* 3.14).

The act of choice is then the cornerstone of the moral life, and Anselm follows Augustine in calling *liberum arbitrium* the power of choice (and deforms Augustine, according to Rist 2014, in taking *liberum arbitrium* for a faculty of the soul). Though Peter Abelard (1079–1142) does not consider as much the topic of freedom, and still uses the term *voluntas* to mean desires and inclinations of any kind, he is famous for having restricted all moral values to consent and intention of the will (*Ethics* 1995: 4, 14, c. 3). The term "consent" underlines the power to choose between options; the term "intention" refers to the content of every choice (King 1995; Marenbon 1997: ch. 11). They are like the two components of a single interior act that gives way to one over other desires or motives. On Abelard's view, consent/intention is the only intrinsic bearer of moral value. The overt, exterior action is morally indifferent, as are also the previous desire and the pleasure aroused by the deed (*Ethics* 1995: 13; *Dialogue* 1995: 99). Abelard's doctrine was very influential on twelfth- and thirteenth-century thinkers, despite the fact that it was never quoted because Abelard had been condemned for different positions in theology (for example, his remark that "the whole quality of deeds should be taken according to the root of intention (*radix intentionis*)" (as quoted by Marenbon 1997: 252) is a proposition condemned at the Council of Sens). Even if he will disagree about the complete neutrality of the exterior deed, or about the involuntariness of certain choices, Aquinas will follow Abelard in giving consent and intention a central role in moral evaluation. In the fourteenth century, William Ockham will vindicate Abelard's doctrine of the moral neutrality of the action that follows from a mental volition. Only the volition has an intrinsic moral value; virtues and vices are habits bearing directly on the acts of the will, and only indirectly on the acts that they command and cause.

For his part, Anselm refused to define freedom as the power to choose between good and evil. Such a power to sin cannot apply to God nor to the beatified angels and souls. Following Augustine, he saw in the powerlessness to sin (*non posse peccare*) a greater freedom than in the power to sin (*posse peccare*), itself above our present state of misery which is a powerlessness to avoid sinning (*non posse non peccare*). And he opted for a very particular definition of freedom as the power to keep the righteousness of the will for its own sake, because such a definition applies also to God ("*Libertas arbitrii est potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem*," in *De libertate arbitrii*, c. 3–4; cf. *De veritate* 12; *De conceptu virginali* c. 3). Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153) is more traditional and influential in making a threefold distinction between the freedom from misery allowed only by glory, the freedom from sin, allowed with the help of grace, and the freedom from necessity, which does not exclude the power to sin, but which cannot be lost, being innate

(*ingenita libertas*) and given to humans by nature. This lowest kind of freedom is sufficient for *liberum arbitrium* and necessary for the two other kinds (*De gratia et libero arbitrio* 3.6–4.9; translation in Bernard 1989). For Bernard, there is no will without freedom, no freedom without will: *Ubi voluntas, ibi libertas* (ibid.: 2.2).

Bernard might be the first thinker to consider explicitly the question that will concern theologians of the late thirteenth century: the relation between will and reason. Reason is given for instruction but not in a way that would determine the will and suppress freedom: consent, which is the root of justice and injustice, is free in virtue of the will, but bears with it a judgment of reason in the agent (ibid.: 2.4). Reason is the servant of will (*pedissequa voluntatis*, ibid.: 2.3), a counselor who might be needed to present options, and justify a preference, but whose judgment does not necessitate the act of the will. The will, identified with free will, is the real master in the human person (though good will makes us the property of God, bad will of the devil; ibid.: 6.16). Bernard even says that freedom is the proper locus of God's image in man, or rather the first degree of freedom is the image, the two others constitute the resemblance (ibid.: 9.28), contrary to a tradition that passes through Augustine and says that reason—maybe in a sense that includes rational willing—is God's image. But Bernard's is an extreme position, and when Peter Lombard (1100–1160) writes his *Sentences* in the 1150s, he also echoes thinkers who see in the working of *liberum arbitrium* and choice a collaboration between reason and will.

Peter Lombard's work is the main synthesis of medieval thought at the time, and it remained the source and basis for the teaching of theology for centuries. On the topic of the will, he welcomes quite a lot of contributions and distinctions. Most come from Augustine, through Anselm or Hugh of Saint Victor (1096–1141) in his effort to describe God's will (will of good pleasure vs will of sign, antecedent vs consequent will, distinction of four wills in Christ). The central notion is that of *liberum arbitrium* and the question raised and debated by Peter (in the *Sentences* II.25) is whether it is a third faculty in addition to reason and will, and presumably superior to them, or the will only in its disposition to choose between options, or a common disposition to both reason and will. All these positions had been or will be defended throughout the Middle Ages. The Lombard seems to rally with the last one. He gives credit to the explanation that relates the *arbitrium* to reason and its freedom (*liberum*) to the will. The two major authorities in the discussion are Boethius's definition, considered philosophical, of the *liberum arbitrium* as a judgment bearing on the will (*iudicium de voluntate*), and a definition attributed to Augustine (but only found in Lombard's text *Sent*. II.24.3), and that will be considered theological, saying that *liberum arbitrium* is a faculty of both reason and will (*facultas rationis et voluntatis*).

In fact, authors on all sides seem to admit that the will cannot will, nor the *liberum arbitrium* choose, without some guidance by reason (on all this, see Lottin 1957). It belongs to the rational faculty to discern between good and bad, and so to tell which option is the good one. And they all seem to admit also that the will can consent to or dissent from reason's suggestion. But there are two ways of looking at the same scene where one actor tells the other which way to go and the other decides whether to follow the advice. It is quite easy to split the different authors into two groups. There are those who consider, with the Hellenistic tradition, that reason is the leading faculty. To this view belongs William of Auxerre, who explicitly assimilates the *liberum arbitrium* with reason and says that reason is the best part (*optimum*) in the soul, the most imperative (*imperantissimum*), and that it can be called king (*rex*) and leader (*dux*) of the others.

The other interpretation insists that reason's advice is given by a servant (Bernard's *pedissequa*) to his master or his mistress: the will ultimately decides and commands the other parts of the soul. This is the view of, or at least the language used by, the *Summa Sententiae*, Gilbert of Poitiers, William of Auvergne, Alexander of Hales, and even in a way by Albert the Great (c. 1200–1280), who insists in his *Summa de homine* (2004) that the *liberum arbitrium* is the real head over reason and will. A special mention must be made of Philip the Chancellor (1165–1236) who in the 1220s

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 12:06 02 Apr 2023; For: 9781315709604, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315709604-25

defends the view that reason and will should not be considered as two *really* distinct faculties (as other powers in the soul can be).

Bonaventure (1217–1274) gives an idea of the state of the art in the middle of the thirteenth century, one century after Peter Lombard. In his commentary on the *Sentences* (volumes I–IV in Bonaventure 1882–1902), in the chapter about *liberum arbitrium* (bk. II, d. 25), Bonaventure counts himself with those who do not make the *liberum arbitrium* a third faculty in addition to reason and will. After attributing *liberum arbitrium* to rational beings only, since the *arbitrium* is the judgment of an intellect on what is just and unjust, which presupposes the power of reflection and so immateriality (q. 1), he goes on to say that its distinction from reason and will is only *secundum rationem*: it is a *facultas* of both according to Peter Lombard, but that means a facility not a faculty (q. 2), or a *habitus* (q. 5). Reason and will concur as the father and the mother do who constitute a unique power to manage the family, or as the hand and the eye do to write (q. 3). This implies that the act of choice involves both reason and will. But there is a distinction in that reason is the proper place for the beginning of free choice, and will is the proper place of its ending. Does the will always follow reason? No, if one thinks of the first judgment, the *dictamen* of reason, which says what ought to be done. Yes, if one means the definitive judgment about what to do (all things considered), but in that case this act cannot be said to belong to reason alone: "the will attracts this other act to itself." Bonaventure certainly holds that the will is active and can go against the judgment of reason alone. But he does not go as far as Bernard in taking the will for the proper image of God in us. He rather says that "image and resemblance" must be understood as referring to cognitive and volitive powers (*Sent*. II.16.2.3). And he does not separate the two aspects in his account of glory and beatific state: vision, love, and joy must be referred to reason and to the concupiscible and irascible appetites (*Sent*. IV.49.1.1.5).

The Aristotelian Synthesis of Thomas Aquinas

Bonaventure was the contemporary of Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) who lectured on the *Sentences* a few years later. Even though they both had the same Aristotelian background, Aquinas, following his master Albert the Great, did much more to combine the traditional psychology inspired by Augustine and his medieval followers with the one coming from Aristotle and his Arab commentators. In the end, the synthesis revealed the potential tensions between the Greek conception that emphasized the rationality of human beings, and the Christian one centered on love, freedom, and will.

In a way that became common in the thirteenth century, Aquinas defines the will as the rational or intellectual appetite (*appetitus rationalis*, *appetitus intellectivus*). This is an Aristotelian concept transmitted by the translation of John Damascene's *De fide orthodoxa* (*Burgundionis versio* 1955, 36.8–15). Aquinas gives it a precise meaning. The will is the motive power of the intellectual part of the soul (*Summa theologiae* [ST] 1963, 1.80). It is thus a faculty on its own. It issues desires that do not belong to the sensible part of the soul, and it can adjudicate between opposite desires, since it belongs to its dominant part (the intellective one). Aquinas certainly goes farther than Aristotle in admitting a distinction between the volitions as elicited acts (*actus eliciti*) and the acts of the other faculties of the soul and of the body, that are commanded by the will (*actus imperati*) (ST 1–2.8, 17). Using this distinction, he says that the will has a *despotic* power over the body, and only a *political* one over the other faculties (ST 1–2.9.2 ad 3). Finally, Aquinas justifies the use of the term *voluntarium* (meaning "coming from the will"—*a voluntate*) to translate Aristotle's *hekousion*. Aristotle meant every act that is morally imputable to the agent, excluding those performed under constraint or by ignorance. Some voluntary actions may proceed from passion from a sensual desire, and so not directly from an act of will. But, Aquinas explains, they are voluntary if (and because) they remain under the control of the will. If the agent could have avoided those acts, by an explicit act of will, they are responsible for them and those acts are voluntary (ST 1–2.6.3).

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 12:06 02 Apr 2023; For: 9781315709604, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315709604-25

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 12:06 02 Apr 2023; For: 9781315709604, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315709604-25

Concerning the will's proper acts, Aquinas follows John Damascene's analysis of human action in different steps or stages (ST 1–2.8–16). This analysis had some success in the time of Abelard, who finally put the whole emphasis on *consent*. I mentioned that Aquinas followed this idea, giving to choice (*electio*) the important weight in moral life. But important as it is, choice is only one of the steps leading to fully accomplished action. And Aquinas distributes those steps between reason and will, both before and after the act of choice. Beginning with the intellectual consideration of some good, the first act of the will is the simple willing (*voluntas*, *velle*), which is the rational tendency toward the apparent good (ibid.: q. 8). The intellect judges that this good is an end attainable through some means, and the will *intends* to achieve it through them (*intentio*, q. 12). The intellect then deliberates and compares the different means, if there are any, and the will *consents* to them (*consensus*, q. 15). The intellect judges that one course of action (a means) is better, and the will *chooses* it (q. 13). After choice, it belongs to the intellect to *command* the action (*imperium*, q. 17), and to the will to execute the command by *using* (*usus*, q. 16) the different relevant faculties (mental and/or corporeal). Once the action is completed, the will is still at play when it *rejoices* in the good obtained (*frui*, *gaudium*, q. 11). Most of the considered steps are present in Aristotle's study of human action in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and so, too, is the distinction between voluntary and involuntary. But they are not attached to a single faculty. Nonetheless in commenting upon the Philosopher's text, Aquinas does not hesitate in attributing to him the concept of will, and according to modern scholars, he might be right in doing so, showing that in the end Aristotle had a concept of, but no name for, the will (Kenny 1979, 1993; Irwin 1992; Hoffmann, Müller, and Perkams 2013 for more on Aquinas and Aristotle on the will).

The proper object of the will is the good. The will cannot tend toward something that is (or seems) not good (ST 1–2.8.1). Concerning particular or concrete goods, there is some necessity of willing only with reference to the supreme good, happiness, and what is considered as a necessary means toward it (ST 1–2.1.6). When confronted clearly with such a good, as in beatific vision, the will necessarily wills or loves it (ST 1.82.2; 1–2.13.6). The will considered as intending the good in general or the supreme good in particular is a natural (though rational) tendency. Though such natural willing is necessary, in that case Aquinas allows for Augustine's talk of a will that is free (*libera voluntas* as opposed to *liberum iudicium*), since there is no form of constraint, and the will's act is wholly dependent on the will (*Quaestiones disputatae de veritate* [QDV] 1970–1976, 24.1 ad 20). This also applies to the wills of angels and to God's will, for example, in the love of Himself which is both necessary and free. But this necessary and natural willing is not free in the sense of the ability to do or choose otherwise. This is the proper meaning of *liberum arbitrium*, which is nothing else than the power of the will in its proper act of choice between different goods. *Liberum arbitrium* can apply only to finite (created and limited) goods, concerning which one can deliberate. The will is then considered as a rational power, having access to the opposites (*via ad opposita*), the way Aristotle defined "rational powers." (When considering Christ's wills, Aquinas also uses the traditional label of the *voluntas ut ratio*, will as reason, in opposition to the first, will as nature, *voluntas ut natura*; see *In Sent*. 1929–1947, 3.17.1.3; ST 3.18.) Choice bears only on means, since one deliberates on how to reach a given end by considering the appropriate means. But any end can be considered as a means toward a further end, except the ultimate end in itself. So it seems that for the most part, human actions are not only voluntary (i.e. caused by the will or under its control), but contingent and under the control of the will understood as *liberum arbitrium*. It is a necessary condition of the whole moral life (ST 1.83.1). God and beatified angels and souls *have liberum arbitrium*, but only between equal goods, they cannot choose evil and do not have this kind of freedom between good and evil which is proper to rational creatures without beatific vision.

Aquinas is quite traditional in defining *liberum arbitrium* not as a third faculty, but as emerging from both reason and will, though it can properly be said to be the will's power (ST 1.83.4). Concerning the act of choice, he says that the will is its subject, while reason is the formal or

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 12:06 02 Apr 2023; For: 9781315709604, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315709604-25

the final cause, since it is the object (i.e. the good apprehended by the intellect) which moves the will as its end. This has given rise to a major dispute both in Aquinas's time and among contemporary commentators (see below). At the same time, Aquinas insists on the freedom of choice as incompatible with necessitation, and he concedes Aristotle's description (*DA* III.30) of the appetite as a passive power, or a *moved mover* (*movens motum*). This has to be understood at least in two ways. First, the initial movement of the will comes from the sensitive appetite, or even from God, the first mover of everything and creator of the will. Second, in any act of will, including choice, a principle of essential motivation (MacDonald 1998) is at play: the will follows the judgment of reason. That willing an object presupposes some awareness of it, and even of its goodness, is not controversial. But the principle of essential motivation seems to imply that reason determines the will, so that, contrary to Bernard's doctrine, it cannot go against reason. Some texts favor this form of strong intellectualism (Hause 1998), while others seem to admit that the will is never necessitated by the judgment of reason (Hoffmann and Michon 2017). Aquinas recognizes that the will moves the intellect (in directing its attention), and that the intellect moves the will (in presenting the object). Distinguishing freedom of specification (to choose and do this rather than that) and freedom of exercise (to act rather than not), Aquinas sometimes says that specification belongs to the intellect, and exercise to the will (*De Malo* 1982, q. 6). One way out is to underline Aquinas's saying that the root of freedom is in reason ("*totius libertatis radix est in ratione constituta*," QDV 24.2). Able to reflect on itself, to consider the end as an end, and the relation of means to ends, reason can always consider different aspects of the proposed action so that which one will be chosen is not predetermined. Another way out would be to deny the real distinction between the act of will and that of practical reason in choice. Aquinas insists in the *Summa theologiae* that both faculties contribute to the whole act as matter and form (ST 1–2.13.1).

Whatever the correct interpretation of Aquinas (see Stump 2003: ch. 9), an intellectualist accent is undisputable. It goes with his repeated affirmation that the intellect is the simplest and so the best part of the human soul. It is true that in some places this is said not with reference to the relation between intellect and will, but rather with the presupposition that will belongs to the intellective part of the soul. See, for example, Aquinas's conception of the image of God in man: its proper locus is the soul rather than the body (which is only a vestige of God), and the intellect rather than the sensitive part of the soul. Augustine's trinity of the soul (*mens*, *notitia*, *amor*) is an image of the divine Trinity and it includes love or will as corresponding to the Holy Spirit. But, to the question whether the will is more eminent than the intellect (ST 1.82.3), he answers with caution: simply speaking (*simpliciter*), considering the faculties in themselves, the intellect is superior because its proper object (the very property of goodness—*ratio bonitatis*) is more abstract and absolute than the proper object of the will (the good and desirable being, *bonum appetibile*), but in a certain respect (*secundum quid*), the object of the will may be sometimes higher than the object of the intellect, which is the thing thought, as being in the mind. It happens when the object of the will, outside of the human mind, is higher than the intellect and its forms, e.g. when God is loved. Concerning beatitude, Aquinas holds that the union of the soul with God is (or will be) through intellectual knowledge, and is properly called contemplation or vision. This seems to make the intellective power and act more important than will and love. But Aquinas also affirms that this union ends up with the joy resulting from such union (Augustine's *gaudium de veritate*, in *Confessions* book X) which is a proper act of the will (ST 1–2.3.4).

Aquinas's intellectualism is then quite moderate and welcomes most of the traditional affirmations before him. But he also opens the door to a more radical form of defense of his positions and to more radical rejections of them. The following years show that he provoked a crisis rather than a peaceful agreement.

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 12:06 02 Apr 2023; For: 9781315709604, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315709604-25

The Clash

The controversy that occurred in the last third of the thirteenth century around the question of the will, its nature, its value, and its freedom, is one aspect of a larger controversy, prompted by the so-called "Latin Averroism." This movement, better described as "radical Aristotelianism," grew up among the arts masters, the philosophers who taught Aristotle with the Arab commentators, mainly Averroes. All along during that century, some Aristotelian theses had been condemned as incompatible with Christian faith: the doctrines of the eternity of the world, of the unicity of human intellect, of the possibility of mundane beatitude among philosophers. The novelty was that those theses now seemed (to the critics) to be sustained by some masters at the University (Siger of Brabant, Boethius of Dacia) and to be receiving surprising support from some theologians—above all from Aquinas, in his effort to harmonize the Philosopher with the Bible. Even though the arts masters did not defend the "heretical" views of Aristotle or Averroes, they argued that those views were what natural reason unaided by faith led to. It also appeared (to some) that Aristotle's psychology of the will and analysis of action might go against the Christian doctrine of human freedom and of the superiority of charity over the other virtues. According to Siger of Brabant, it is the only reason that could break the deterministic chain coming from the stars, because it could consider different goods to be pursued (*Quaestiones super librum de causis* 1972, q. 25). Reason allows a power of veto, and is certainly the only real master in the human soul, and the will necessarily follows the determination of the intellect ("*Existente apprehensione . . . necesse est hominem appetere*," *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* 1981: 330, V.8).

Radical Aristotelianism came under harsh criticism from the Franciscan masters in the late 1260s. Bonaventure had reacted with vigor, in a series of sermons from 1267 to 1268 called *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*, but with more concern for the topics of creation and the human soul than for the conception of the will and freedom. His successor at the University of Paris, Walter of Bruges (c. 1227–1307), filled the gap. He was followed by a secular master, in the early 1270s, Henry of Ghent (1217–1293), who argued against Aquinas and the Averroists, in favor of the superiority of the will over the intellect, its freedom being irreducible to the mere following of reason, and its ability to determine itself. Henry was a member of the group of theologians who constructed the list of 219 propositions condemned in 1277 by the bishop Stephen Tempier, head of the University of Paris. About twenty of them bore on the topic of the will and its freedom, and the "Augustinian" tradition was vindicated against any contamination by Aristotle's intellectualism, which was seen as a form of determinism (in Hissette 1977: art. 150–169). Among them, one can quote art. 163: "The will necessarily follows what is firmly believed by reason; and it cannot refrain from what reason dictates. This necessitation is not coercion, but it is the nature of the will." This conception of the submission of the will to reason seemed to go hand in hand with the idea that sin was only an error (art. 167), or could only come from the inferior powers of the soul, from passion (art. 169). A parallel attack, led by William of La Mare's treatise *Correctorium fratris Thomae* (1927), was directed explicitly against Aquinas's teaching. At the far extreme, a marginal but very influential Franciscan, Peter Olivi (1248–1298), argued forcefully against Aristotle and the use of his philosophy, which he considered to amount to introducing heresy, or worse, paganism into Christian teaching, specifically on the question of the will and its freedom. Olivi went farther than Henry in saying that the will is fully active, by itself. To this vast wave of voluntarism led by the majority of traditional theologians, some (mostly Dominicans) did respond. But the most eloquent one at the faculty of theology of Paris was a secular priest, Godfrey of Fontaines (1250–1309), who opposed many of Henry of Ghent's teachings, and even questioned the condemnations of 1277. Godfrey adopted a line inspired by Aquinas, but which was more radically intellectualist. Others responded to William of La Mare on the interpretation of Aquinas's texts (these defenses of Aquinas are now called the literature of *Correctoria*).

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 12:06 02 Apr 2023; For: 9781315709604, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315709604-25

Most of the arguments *pro* and *contra* adduced in this huge controversy are taken up by Gonsalvus of Spain (1250–1313) in his *Quaestiones Disputatae* (1935) on the intellect, the will, and beatific vision at the end of the century. Gonsalvus became the General Minister of the Franciscan order at the beginning of the fourteenth century as he was teaching at the University of Paris where his classes (and a dispute with Meister Eckhart) might have been attended by John Duns Scotus who largely adopted Gonsalvus's views on the will. His disputed questions offer a good overview at the eve of fourteenth century of the controversy during the thirty preceding years. Officially bearing on the nature of the (intellectual) act of praising God (*actus laudandi Deum*), they raise some of the traditional worries about the will at that time: is the will superior in dignity to the intellect, does the will determine, specify, or actualize itself, can the will go against reason's judgment, or is the will free in itself? As Bonnie Kent has remarked (1995), the interest has shifted from the nature of *liberum arbitrium* (before 1270) to that of the freedom of the will, understood as its independence from reason. Gonsalvus often distinguishes three positions: that of Godfrey, which we might call fully intellectualist, that of Aquinas which is moderately so, and that of Henry, which illustrates voluntarism. The traditional Bonaventurian position is not really represented, nor are the two extremes: Siger on the intellectualist side, Olivi on the voluntarist one. In fact, one can find identical arguments in Siger and Godfrey, or in Henry and Olivi. It might be good, nonetheless, to keep separate those who say that both reason and will are efficient causes of choice (Bonaventure), those who think reason is only a necessary or *sine qua non* condition (Henry and most voluntarists after him), and the extreme Olivi who says that the will is fully active and in no need of a complementary cause. Finally, the arguments used on both sides do not make much difference to the moderate and the extreme position.

On the intellectualist side, one should stress the psychological and phenomenological facts that one chooses what one judges to be the best of different options, and that the will is not always active, but sometimes at rest (one does not will anything). If one adds the metaphysical principle that the will, like everything else that is movable, must be moved by some mover, and would always be active if it were self-moving—which contradicts the facts—then one reaches the conclusion that the will must be moved by something else (the intellect, the judgment, the object, etc.). The principle of essential motivation summarizes the intellectualist thesis and argumentation. On the voluntarist side, the phenomenology goes the other way and underlines the possibility of choosing against one's best option: the feeling of remorse, and the sin of the angel or of the first man (who are supposed to be fully aware of the badness of their choice) are presented as empirical proofs that one can will against one's judgment. The will is called the first mover in the soul (*primum movens in regno animae*), and even at times the first *unmoved* mover, a phrase reserved for God, and the main idea is there when one thinks of the will as an active power, able to actualize itself by itself. Most of all, there is the ethical and theological demand concerning the will's freedom, as a condition for moral responsibility and true merit and demerit, which would be undermined if the will had to follow the intellect's judgment. Presumably, the reason behind this verdict is that such judgments are not under the control of the judging mind, but the result of education, culture, and circumstance (belief is a passive rather than an active state).

When John Duns Scotus (1265–1308) began to teach and write on the topic of the will, he first adopted the Bonaventurian idea of concurrent causes (*causa concurrens*) as a middle path between Godfrey's intellectualism (the object is the efficient cause) and Henry's voluntarism (the will is the efficient cause), recognizing the force of Godfrey's arguments. Still, in his *Questions on the Metaphysics* (1997–1998), Scotus famously declared that the intellect is a natural and not a rational power as defined by Aristotle, since it can only act according to its nature. Only the will is a rational power having access to opposites (IX, q. 15). So, even if intellect and will are both partial causes of a choice, the will is the only free cause. Only the will introduces contingency in the world: God's will is the source of all contingency (*Ord.* 1.39, in Scotus 1964), but human

will is a secondary source of it (*Quod.* 18, in Scotus 1975). This shows an important asymmetry between the roles of the two faculties. Scotus refers to Anselm's doctrine of the two affections or inclinations of the will (see above), for happiness (*affectio commodi*) and for justice (*affectio iustitiae*), in order to explain its capacity to rise above a natural inclination (*Ord.* 2.6.2, nn. 49–51, in Scotus 1950), and even to choose against one's own supreme good (happiness). One can then understand, though it comes as some surprise, that when Scotus came to Paris, he joined with Henry in calling the intellect only a necessary (*sine qua non*) cause of choice, giving to the will the principal role (Dumont 2001).

One may then see Scotus as a major step, building on the work of his predecessors (Henry, maybe Olivi, Gonsalvus) and opening the path to the even more radical voluntarism of William Ockham (1284–1347). According to Ockham, the will has no natural inclination at all, but is defined as the power that can incline itself toward this or that, in the same circumstances (*Quod.* 1.16, in OT 9: 89). It sets itself its end (*Ord.* 1 prol. 10 in OT 1: 291), and even the desire for happiness is not necessary (*Ord.* 1.1.6 in OT 1: 503–507). Otherwise, Ockham's psychology of the will is quite similar to that of Scotus, where the will can go against reason's last practical judgment (*Ord.* 1 prol. 10 in OT 1: 286–287; *Quod.* 1.16 in OT 9: 88). Ockham's influence is greater concerning the structure of morality (Adams 1999). He argues that only the interior act of will has a moral value, being the only act that is directly under the control of the agent (*Ord.* 1 prol. 10, in OT 1: 292). The moral value of the exterior act just depends on that of the interior act that causes it, and it is extrinsic, the act being intrinsically morally indifferent (neutral). Ockham proves this by showing that the very same exterior act can change its value with the change of the interior act of the agent: his most famous example is that of a suicidal person who jumps in the void, and repents during the fall. The same exterior act (the fall) is first morally bad, and then indifferent, since it is not caused by the actual interior act (the remorse, and the now inefficacious will not to kill oneself), but only by the jump, which was caused by the previous interior act (*Quod.* 1.20 in OT 9; *Sent.* 3.11 in OT 6; see Scotus, *Quod.* 18, n.3 in Scotus 1975). Only an interior act can be necessarily (and intrinsically) good, and there has to be such acts; otherwise, there would be no contingently (and derivatively) morally good acts: a derivatively good act depends on a further act that is good (*Quod.* 3.14 in OT 9). Either it is intrinsically good, or it is not, and so on, ad infinitum. Ockham here presupposes that such a regress is vicious (which seems to be obvious), and that there are morally good and bad actions (which also seems obvious or certain on the basis of faith). In fact, among interior acts, only the act of loving God above all and for God's own sake is intrinsically good, the other ones being good only derivatively (*Quod.* 1.20 and 3.14 in OT 9).

To this evolution concerning the moral value of individual acts, one should add an evolution concerning the objective basis of morality in divine commands and so in divine will. Scotus admitted that only the first table of the Ten Commandments belonged to natural law, such that even God could not command otherwise. According to Ockham, all the commandments, even the first precept of the love of God, are such that God could have commanded otherwise (though in the case of the first commandment, it is such that had God commanded otherwise, no one could have obeyed). In addition to psychological and ethical voluntarism, one may then speak of a theological voluntarism that completes the importance conferred to the will by those medieval thinkers.

References

Abelard, Peter (1995) *Ethical Writings: Ethics and Dialogue between a Philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian*, trans. P. V. Spade. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company.

Adams, Marilyn (1999) "Ockham on Will, Nature and Morality." In *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*, ed. P.V. Spade. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 245–272.

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 12:06 02 Apr 2023; For: 9781315709604, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315709604-25

Albert the Great (2004) *Über den Menschen (De homine)*, ed. and trans. H. Anzulewicz and J. R. Söder. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag.
Anselm of Canterbury (1998) *Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works*, ed. B. Davies and G. Evans. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Aquinas, Thomas (1929–1947) *In Scriptum super libros sententiarum*, 4 vols, ed. P. Mandonnet and M. Moos. Paris: Lethielleux.
——— (1963) *Summa Theologiae*. Turin: Marietti.
——— (1970–1976) *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, vols. 22.1–3 of *Opera Omnia*. Rome: Leonine Commission.
——— (1982) *Quaestiones disputatae de malo*, vol. 23 of *Opera Omnia*. Rome: Leonine Commission.
Bernard of Clairvaux (1989) *On Grace and Free Choice*. Collegeville, MN: Cistercian Publications.
Bonaventure (1882–1902) *Opera Omnia*, vols. I–IX, ed. the Fathers of the Collegii S. Bonaventura. Florence: Quaracchi.
Bourke, V. (1964) *Will in Western Thought: An Historico-Critical Survey*. New York: Sheed and Ward.
Damascus, John (1955) *De fide orthodoxa. Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, ed. E. Buytaert. St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute.
Dihle, A. (1982) *The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Dumont, S. (2001) "Did Scotus Change His Mind on the Will?" In *After the Condemnation of 1277: Philosophy and Theology at the University of Paris in the Last Quarter of the Thirteenth Century*, ed. J. Aertsen, K. Emery, Jr., and A. Speer. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 719–s794.
Duns Scotus, John (1950) *Opera Omnia*, vol. 2. Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis.
——— (1964) *Opera Omnia*, vol. 6. Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis.
——— (1975) *God and Creatures: The Quodlibetal Questions*, ed. and trans. F. Alluntis and A. Wolter. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
——— (1997–1998) *Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle by John Duns Scotus*, trans. G. Etzkorn and A. Wolter. St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute.
Gauthier, R.-A. (1954) "Saint Maxime le Confesseur et la psychologie de l'acte humain." *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 21: 51–100.
Gonsalvus of Spain (1935) *Quaestiones Disputatae et de Quodlibeta*, ed. L. Amorós. Florence: Ad Claras Aquas.
Hause, J. (1998) "Voluntariness and Causality: Some Problems in Aquinas' Theory of Moral Responsibility." *Vivarium* 36: 55–66.
Hissette, R. (1977) *Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277*. Louvain: Peeters Publishers.
Hoffman, T., J. Müller, and M. Perkams, eds. (2013) *Aquinas and the Nichomachean Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hoffman, T. and C. Michon (2017) "Aquinas on Free Will and Intellectual Determinism." *Philosopher's Imprint* 17: 1–36.
Irwin, T. (1992) "Who Discovered the Will?" In *Ethics (Philosophical Perspectives: 6)*, ed. J. Tomberlin. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, pp. 453–473.
Kahn, C. (1988) "Discovering the Will." In *The Question of "Eclecticism": Studies in Later Greek Philosophy*, ed. J. M. Dillon and A. A. Long. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 234–259.
Kenny, A. (1979) *Aristotle's Theory of the Will*. London: Duckworth.
——— (1993) *Aquinas on Mind*. London: Routledge, Kegan, and Paul.
Kent, B. (1995) *Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century*. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press.
King, P. (1995) "Abelard's Intentionalist Ethics." *The Modern Schoolman* 72: 213–232.
Lottin, O. (1957) "Libre arbitre et liberté depuis saint Anselme jusqu'à la fin du XIIIe siècle." In *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, 2nd ed. Gembloux: J. Duculot, pp. 11–389.
Marenbon, J. (1997) *The Philosophy of Peter Abelard*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
MacDonald, S. (1998) "Aquinas's Libertarian Account of Free Choice." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 52: 309–328.
Ockham, William (1967–1989) *Opera Philosophica et Theologica* [OT], vols. 1–9. St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute.
——— (1991) *Quodlibetal Questions*, 2 vols, trans. A. Freddoso and F. Kelley. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Rist, J. (2014) *Augustine Deformed: Love, Sin and Freedom in the Western Moral Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Siger of Brabant (1972) *Les Quaestiones super librum de causis de Siger de Brabant*, ed. A. Marlasca. Louvain: Publications universitaires.

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 12:06 02 Apr 2023; For: 9781315709604, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315709604-25

——— (1981) *Quaestiones in metaphysicam. Édition revue de la reportation de Munich. Texte inédit de la reportation de Vienne*, ed. W. Dunphy. Louvain-la-Neuve: Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie.

Sorabji, R. (2003) "The Concept of the will from Plato to Maximus the Confessor." In *The Will and Human Action: From Antiquity to the Present Day*, ed. T. Pink and M. W. F. Stone. London: Routledge, pp. 6–28.

Stump, E. (2003) *Aquinas*. London: Routledge.

Voelke, A.-J. (1973) *L'idée de volonté dans le stoïcisme*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

William of La Mare (1927) *Correctorium fratris Thomae*. In *Les Premières Polémiques Thomistes: Le Correctorium Corruptorii "Quare,"* ed. P. Glorieux. Kain: Le Saulchoir.

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 12:06 02 Apr 2023; For: 9781315709604, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315709604-25