


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SOUL, MIND, AND BODY

Paul J. M. M. Bakker

Introduction

One of the most salient and far-reaching differences between modern “philosophy of mind” and medieval “philosophical psychology” has to do with the relation between soul and mind. For Descartes and the vast majority of his early modern successors, there is no meaningful distinction between these two notions. “Soul” (*anima*) and “mind” (*mens*) are just two names by which we refer to one and the same “thinking thing” (*res cogitans*). The problem that was created by Descartes, and that has occupied philosophy of mind until today, is how to explain the relationship between this thinking thing, the immaterial and unextended mind, and the body, defined in terms of matter and extension (*res extensa*). In its modern, Cartesian form, the “mind-body problem” was unknown to medieval thinkers. For them, the notion of “soul” had a much broader meaning than that of “mind.” The soul is not merely a thinking thing, but the principle that accounts for the whole range of functions associated with life: nutrition, growth, reproduction, locomotion, sensation, imagination, memory, and thinking. Hence, soul is not specifically human: plants and non-human animals have souls as well, albeit less complex and less powerful ones. From the perspective of medieval philosophical psychology, the primary problem is not how to explain the relationship between mind and body, but rather how to explain the relationship between soul, as the “principle of life” in general, and mind (or intellect), as the “principle of thinking.”¹

The introduction of Aristotle’s book *On the Soul* (*De anima*) to the Latin West, in the mid-thirteenth century, made the question of the relationship between soul and mind a particularly pressing and delicate issue. Aristotle famously defines the soul as the “first actuality,” or the “substantial form,” of a potentially living, organic body (*DA* II.1, 412a27–28). In Aristotle’s metaphysics ofhylomorphism, a “substantial form” is what primarily gives the most basic structure and unity to matter and, by doing so, makes a material substance exist as the specific kind of thing it is. Defining the soul as the “first actuality” or “substantial form” of a potentially living, organic body therefore amounts to saying that the soul is what primarily accounts for the organic structure and unity of a body, and what makes it capable of performing all its characteristic vital functions. From this perspective, it goes without saying that soul and body are inseparable (*DA* I.1, 413a3). But in the same book *On the Soul*, Aristotle describes the mind in terms that sit quite uneasily with his generalhylomorphic account of the soul. On the one hand, he claims that the mind is a “part” of the soul—namely the part by which the soul thinks or, more accurately, the part of the soul by which a human being thinks (*DA* III.4, 429a10). But on the other hand, he suggests that the mind

is “an independent substance implanted within us” (I.4, 408b18–19); that it is not mixed with the body and that it makes no use of bodily organs (III.4, 429a25–26); and that the mind is capable of “separate existence” because thinking does not involve the body (I.1, 403a8–11). Aristotle himself thus confronted his medieval readers with the question of how to conceive the relationship between soul and mind, and their respective relationship with the body.²

Averroist Views: Siger of Brabant and John of Jandun

The first way to answer this question is to claim that soul and mind are indeed two distinct entities that somehow work together to produce acts of thinking. According to this view, the mind is not ontologically speaking a part of the soul and of the hylomorphic metaphysical make-up of an individual human being, but is united to the soul only operationally in the act of thinking. Among the best-known representatives of this—highly controversial—view are Siger of Brabant (d. 1282/84) and John of Jandun (d. 1328), who both took their cue from Aristotle’s influential Arabic commentator Averroes (d. 1198).³

Averroes proposes a challenging reading of Aristotle’s notoriously difficult chapters on the mind (*DA* III.4–5). In these chapters, Aristotle describes thinking, just like perception, in terms of a change: thinking brings about a specific kind of (non-physical) change in the knower. For Aristotle, this entails that the mind must somehow consist of two parts or aspects: one that is receptive of the change and another that actively produces it. The function of the former, generally called the “possible intellect,” is to be made identical with the object known (more accurately, with the object’s *form*), whereas the role of the latter, usually called the “agent intellect,” is to make objects actually known. Knowledge, on this view, consists in a “formal identification” between the possible intellect and the object made known by the agent intellect. Both parts of the mind must have certain properties so as to be able to perform their typical functions. With respect to the possible intellect, Aristotle claims that it must have no determinate nature of its own, besides that of being receptive of the forms of all possible objects, and hence that it can neither be mixed with the body nor operate through a bodily organ. In other words, the possible intellect must be separable from the body. Concerning the agent intellect, Aristotle offers a very sketchy and partly metaphorical description, calling it a light, separable, impassible, and unmixed.

The vast majority of Aristotle’s Greek and Arabic commentators understood the agent intellect to be a single, separately existing celestial substance, not a part of the individual human soul. The originality of Averroes lies in his claim that not only the agent intellect, but also the possible intellect (or the “material intellect” as he confusingly calls it) is totally separate from the body and not mixed with matter in any way. Given that for Averroes (as for most medieval Aristotelians) matter is what accounts for the differentiation of individuals within the same species, the possible intellect’s immateriality inevitably entails its supra-individuality, i.e. the idea that there is only *one* separately existing possible intellect for *all* individual human beings. In the act of thinking, individual knowers are united (“conjoined” in Averroes’s terms) with this unique intellect, thanks to their sense images. In Averroes’s view, sense images, stored in the imaginative faculty of the soul, thus ultimately account for the individuality of thinking as well as for its content (i.e. the fact that I am thinking of, e.g., ducks instead of dogs).⁴

Siger of Brabant was probably the first Latin philosopher to adopt Averroes’s reading of Aristotle’s statements on the agent and possible intellect. In one of his earlier works, his *Questions* on book III of Aristotle’s *On the Soul*, Siger argues that the soul of a human being is somehow “composed” of the sensitive soul, on the one hand, and the intellect, on the other. The sensitive soul is united substantially with the body as its single substantial form. In other words, the sensitive soul, and nothing but the sensitive soul, is what gives matter the typical structure and unity that makes it exist as a human body. The intellect, however, is a unique and eternal, separate substance

made of a receptive part (the possible intellect) and an active part (the agent intellect). This unique intellect is not the body's substantial form, but establishes an operational union with an individual human being. This union comes about when human individuals provide sense images to be used by the intellect in order to perform acts of thinking. Hence for Siger, just as for Averroes, the sense images ultimately account for the operational union between the unique supra-individual intellect and individual human knowers.⁵ In a later work, his treatise *On the Intellective Soul*, Siger abandons the idea that the operational union between individual knowers and the unique intellect is established by means of sense images. In this work, he is willing to call the intellect a "part" and even a "form" of the human body, not in the strict hylomorphic sense of a substantial form, but in the broader sense of an "internally operating agent" (*intrinsecum operans*). The intellect is understood as a separate substance that "informs" individual human knowers by performing cognitive operations in them.⁶

Siger's view of the intellect as a separate agent operating "internally" in human knowers occupies a central place in the writings of John of Jandun, the highly influential "Prince of the Averroists." According to Jandun, the intellect is not the human body's substantial form, i.e. it does not give being to the human body, but a separate substance that performs cognitive operations in a human body. In the act of thinking, the separate intellect establishes a union with the body, more accurately with the "cogitative power," the highest embodied faculty of the sensitive soul. In this broad sense of an internally operating agent, Jandun is willing to say that the intellect is a "form" of the cogitating human being. Just as Siger in his later work, Jandun thus considerably broadens the meaning of the notion of "form." Moreover, he uses the idea of a plurality of forms to account for the relationship between soul, mind, and body. According to Jandun, a human being possesses not one single form, but two "proper forms," i.e. two forms that specifically account for being human: the cogitative faculty of the sensitive soul and the intellect. Both are "forms" in different senses. The former is a substantial form in the strict hylomorphic sense, whereas the latter is a form united with the human body in the way a sailor is united with a ship. By extending the meaning of the notion of "form," and by accepting a plurality of forms in human beings, Siger and Jandun go as far as Averroists can go to include the mind in Aristotle's general hylomorphic definition of the soul as form of the body.⁷

Pluralist Views: Peter John Olivi and William of Ockham

For most medieval Aristotelians, the Averroist view of the mind as a supra-individual separate substance was unacceptable, not only for philosophical reasons, but also because it was officially condemned in 1270 and 1277.⁸ As an alternative, some argued that human beings are not hylomorphic compounds in the strict sense, i.e. substances composed of matter and one single substantial form. Rather, human beings are multi-layered entities composed of matter and a plurality of distinct formal principles. Two well-known defenders of such a pluralist view were Peter John Olivi (d. 1298) and William of Ockham (d. 1347).

In sharp contrast to Siger of Brabant and John of Jandun, Olivi is critical of the application of hylomorphism to the human intellective soul.⁹ More precisely, Olivi endorses Aristotle's view of the soul as the body's substantial form but he considers it unacceptable (both "contrary to reason" and "dangerous to the faith") to hold that the mind, the soul's "intellective and free part," is the substantial form of the body. To account for the distinction between soul and mind, and for their respective relationship with the body, Olivi postulates three essentially different "formal parts" within the human soul: a vegetative, a sensitive, and an intellective part. These formal parts of the soul are related to one another because they are united in the same "spiritual matter."¹⁰ Spiritual matter is what accounts for the constitution of a unified human soul, by holding its three parts together. The soul is therefore not a simple entity, but a composite comprising spiritual matter

and three formal parts. Even though the tripartite soul taken as a whole constitutes the substantial form of the human body, the intellective part of the soul taken as such must be separate from the body in order to perform its typical functions (universal cognition and free volition). In order to explain the link between the mind and the human body, Olivi ascribes a mediating role to the soul's sensitive part. On the one hand, the sensitive part of the soul constitutes the immediate substantial form of the body.¹¹ On the other hand, the sensitive and the intellective parts of the soul are immediately linked together. This twofold relation entails that the sensitive part of the soul mediates between, and ties together, the body (with which it is united in a hylomorphic way) and the intellective soul. In Olivi's own words:

By the very fact that the intellective part [of the soul] and the body are said to be united with and inclined towards the sensitive part [of the soul], they are also held to be inclined towards and united with one another . . . And in this way it is true that their [i.e., the intellective part and the body] union is intimate; nevertheless it is not immediate, since it is with the sensitive part mediating that they are inclined towards each other and are united with each other.¹²

Olivi carefully avoids speaking of a plurality of souls in a human being. In his view, human beings possess only one soul composed of distinct formal constituents ("formal parts") having diverse relationships with the body. A few decades later, William of Ockham would go one important step further by arguing that human beings differ from plants and non-human animals by the fact that they possess two really distinct souls, a sensitive soul and an intellective soul. Both souls have the ontological status of a substantial form.¹³ Ockham's most powerful argument in favor of a real distinction between these two souls draws on the empirical observation that one and the same human being sometimes experiences mutually exclusive desires at the same time, one by sensitive appetite and the other by intellective appetite. The argument runs as follows:

It is impossible that contraries should exist simultaneously in the same subject. But an act of desiring something and an act of spurning that same thing are contraries in the same subject. Therefore, if they exist simultaneously in reality, they do not exist in the same subject. But it is manifest that they exist simultaneously in a human being, since a human being spurns by his intellective appetite the very same thing that he desires by his sentient appetite.¹⁴

Ontologically speaking, the crucial difference between the sensitive soul and the intellective soul is that the former is material and extended along with the extension of the body, whereas the latter is immaterial and indivisible (in Ockham's terms: "present as a whole in the whole body and in every part of it"). The intellective soul consists of two powers: intellect and will. These powers only differ from one another from the point of view of their respective acts. Acts of cognizing are really distinct from acts of willing (I can cognize *P* without willing it), but the principle that causes these acts is really one and the same, namely the intellective soul, which performs both acts on its own without using any bodily organ.

In contrast to the intellective soul, the sensitive soul (which accounts for all vegetative and sensitive functions of a human being) is divisible into parts that operate on different parts of the body. For example, the part of the sensitive soul that operates on the eye is called the "power of vision." Another part of the sensitive soul that commands the ear is called the "power of hearing." According to Ockham, these parts of the soul are homogenous. In other words, the distinction between the power of vision and the power of hearing does not derive from the sensitive soul itself, but finds its origin precisely in the relation between the sensitive soul and the various parts of the body. Nevertheless, Ockham claims that the distinction between the powers of the sensitive soul is real, for the simple reason that one can cease to function while others remain undamaged.

Applying this principle, Ockham even goes so far as to admit that human beings possess two really distinct powers of vision, namely one for each eye. But this real distinction between the parts of the sensitive soul is entirely dependent on the organic structure of the body, not on the sensitive soul as such. Hence, the organic structure of the body determines which acts are caused by a specific part of the sensitive soul.

Ockham's pluralist view ultimately amounts to a rather strong form of dualism between the sensitive soul and the intellective soul (or the mind). The former is made largely dependent on the organic structure of the body, whereas the latter operates independently from the body and its organs. This dualist view makes it difficult to explain how the sensitive soul and the intellective soul interact and how human beings act as unified living organisms.

Unitarian Views: Thomas Aquinas and John Buridan

According to their opponents, pluralists such as Olivi and (a fortiori) Ockham are unable to account for the unity of a human being. Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274), one of the most outspoken thirteenth-century adversaries of pluralist views of soul, mind, and body, argues as follows. A substantial form is the principle on which the existence, structure, and unity of a material substance primarily depend. Hence, if a material substance were composed of a plurality of substantial forms, it would not be a real unity, but rather an aggregate of distinct things. Applying this argument to human beings, he concludes:

Therefore if a human being were to be living through one form [the vegetative soul], an animal through another [the sensory soul], and human through a third [the rational soul], then it would follow that a human being would not be one thing unconditionally (*unum simpliciter*).¹⁵

Aquinas thus commits himself to a strictly unitarian, hylomorphic view according to which human beings are composed of matter and one single substantial form: the intellective soul. In his view, the intellective soul is the first operative principle of all vital functions human beings perform, from the most material and corporeal ones to the most immaterial and spiritual ones. Human beings possess no other substantial forms besides the intellective soul. Hence, the body has no substantial form of its own (a "form of corporeity"), but owes its being, unity, (organic) structure, and functioning entirely to the intellective soul. For Aquinas, and for other unitarians such as John Buridan (died. c. 1361), the question then is how to deal with Aristotle's claims about the mind being separable, immaterial, and unmixed.

In Aquinas's view, the solution to this question lies in postulating a distinction between the soul itself (or the "essence of the soul") and the soul's powers or faculties. Aquinas's main argument in favor of such a distinction is based on the assumption that the soul, according to its essence, is what accounts for the fact that a human being (or any other living organism) is always actually alive, from birth to death. The soul's powers or faculties, however, are not always actualized, at least not all of them. For example, human beings are not continuously engaged in acts of thinking or writing poetry. According to Aquinas, this implies that the soul's essence and the soul's powers are not fully identical. If this is indeed the case, then the question arises what kind of entities powers of the soul are. Aquinas suggests two possible ways of answering this question. In one sense, thinking along the lines of Aristotle's *Categories*, he claims that powers of the soul are "accidents" of the soul belonging to the ontological category of quality. But following Aristotle's discussion of the so-called five predicables in the *Topics*, Aquinas argues that the powers are not accidents, but "proper attributes" (*propria*) of the soul. Aristotle's example of a proper attribute is a human being's ability to learn grammar: this ability is not part of the essence and of the definition of being human, but it is necessarily consequent upon it. Hence, saying that the soul's powers are proper attributes of the

soul implies that they are not included in the soul's essence, yet are inseparable from it.¹⁶ Aquinas describes this intimate relation in terms of an emanation: all powers of the soul naturally emanate ("flow forth") from the soul's essence.

But even though all powers emanate from the soul's essence, they do not all have the same "subject" or substratum. The soul's vegetative and sensitive powers obviously require specific bodily organs to perform their operations. Hence, these powers have the whole human composite, soul and body together, as their substratum. However, the soul's intellectual powers, intellect and will, do not require bodily organs to carry out their operations: it is the soul itself that performs acts of understanding and willing. Hence, these powers have the soul's essence as their substratum, not the composite of soul and body. In Aquinas's view, the soul's ability to perform acts of understanding and willing without using bodily organs is ultimately explained by the general metaphysical principle according to which forms possess an excess of causal power beyond the potential of their substratum. This principle can be observed at all levels of nature, as the following passage makes clear:

It is important to consider, however, that to the extent a form is loftier, to that extent it is more dominant over corporeal matter, less immersed in it, and more surpasses it in its operation or power. For this reason we see that the form of a mixed body has an operation that is not caused by the elemental qualities. And the farther we go in loftiness among forms, the more we find that the power of the form surpasses the elemental matter: the vegetative soul beyond the form of metal, and the sensory soul beyond the vegetative soul. But the human soul is the ultimate in loftiness among forms. Thus its power so surpasses corporeal matter that it has an operation and power that it in no respect shares with corporeal matter. And this power is called the intellect.¹⁷

Aquinas thus deals with Aristotle's claims about the mind being separable, immaterial, and unmixed by describing the mind as the only power of the soul able to act without using bodily organs. In his view, the mind is neither a separate substance (as the Averroists claim) nor a separate formal part of the composite soul (as Olivi argues), let alone a distinct soul in its own right (as Ockham claims), but a distinct power or faculty of the intellectual soul, a human being's single substantial form. The ability of this power to perform acts of understanding and willing without using bodily organs is ultimately explained, on the one hand, in terms of a hierarchy of natural forms and, on the other, by means of the general metaphysical principle according to which forms possess causal powers that surpass the potential of their substratum.

Another rigorous defender of a unitarian view of soul, mind, and body is the fourteenth-century philosopher John Buridan.¹⁸ Buridan argues, just as Aquinas, that human beings have only one substantial form, the intellectual soul. But while for Aquinas the human intellectual soul occupies a position at the top of the hierarchy of natural forms, Buridan goes one important step further by arguing that the human soul transcends the domain of the natural and inheres in the body in a supernatural way. As a consequence, only faith and theology are able to provide knowledge about the soul's essence and essential properties. All natural philosophy can do is study the soul in relation to, and by means of, the body. Moreover, since the intellectual soul is the first operative principle of all vital functions of a human being, Buridan argues that not only the intellectual functions of a human being, but also the vegetative and sensitive functions belong to the realm of the supernatural. Hence in his view, vegetative and sensitive operations in human beings differ fundamentally from similar operations in non-human animals and plants.

Buridan also deviates from Aquinas with respect to the powers of the soul.¹⁹ In Aquinas's view, all powers of the soul naturally emanate from the soul's essence, even though the vegetative and

sensitive powers have the whole human composite as their substratum, while the intellective powers inhere in the soul's essence. Buridan, however, has a more parsimonious view. His account is based upon a distinction between a narrow and a broad understanding of the notion "power of the soul." Taken in a narrow sense, the notion "power of the soul" refers to what Buridan calls the soul's "principal" powers. In this sense, the notion stands precisely for the powers of the soul, leaving aside the bodily dispositions necessary for these powers to act. In a broader sense, the notion "power of the soul" refers to what Buridan labels the soul's "instrumental" powers. In the second sense, the notion "power of the soul" denotes either the powers of the soul together with anything needed for these powers to operate, in particular the organic dispositions of the body, or these bodily dispositions themselves.

The distinction between a narrow and a broad understanding of the notion "power of the soul" allows Buridan to make two apparently contradictory claims. On the one hand, he argues that the principal powers of the soul are really identical with the soul itself. Speaking of "principal" powers, we can only attribute multiple powers to the human soul in the sense that the soul is able to perform a variety of acts. According to this variety of acts, we use different words to describe the soul as vegetative, sensitive, or intellective. But these different words do not imply the real existence of vegetative, sensitive, or intellective powers distinct from one another and/or from the soul itself. On the contrary, it is the soul itself that "principally" performs all its acts, no matter how different they are. However, with respect to the soul's "instrumental" powers, Buridan argues that the powers are really distinct both from one another and from the soul itself. But the contradiction between these two claims is only apparent, because the principal powers are powers of the soul, whereas the instrumental powers are powers of soul and body together or, in other words, powers of the animated body. The latter are called "powers of the soul" only because the soul uses them as instruments. Insofar as these instrumental powers are bodily powers, they are really distinct from one another and from the soul itself. For example, the instrumental power of nutrition is distinct from the instrumental power of vision because the respective bodily (organic) dispositions required for nutrition and vision are really distinct. And precisely the same goes for the intellective power (qua instrumental power of the soul), which differs from the power of vision because the latter needs a specific bodily organ to act (the eye), whereas the former operates without any bodily organ at all.

Hence, on Buridan's account, all principle powers of the human soul are immaterial, indivisible, and immortal, precisely because they are really identical with the intellective soul, the single substantial form of a human being. Only at the level of instrumental powers, it makes sense to differentiate between vegetative and sensitive powers, on the one hand, and intellective powers, on the other. However, instrumental powers are not just powers of the soul, but powers of soul and body together.

Conclusion

Against the background of Aristotle's definition of the soul as the body's substantial form and his puzzling remarks about the mind being separable, immaterial, and unmixed, medieval Aristotelians developed various accounts of the relationship between soul, mind, and body. Given that Aristotle describes the mind as a "part" of the soul (*DA* III.4, 429a10), they all tried, in one way or another, to include the mind in Aristotle's general hylomorphic framework of the soul-body relation. One of the ways to achieve this goal was to elaborate, with different degrees of creativity, on the notion of "form." For example, Siger of Brabant and John of Jandun were both willing to call the mind (or the intellect) a "form" of the body, not in the hylomorphic sense of a substantial form, but in the broader sense of a separate agent operating "internally" in the (body of the) knower. Alternatively, Peter John Olivi described the soul as composed of three

essentially different “formal parts” (the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective) united in the same “spiritual matter.” He argued that the sensitive part of the soul ties together the body (of which it is the substantial form) and the intellective part of the soul (with which it is united in a different, non-hylomorphic way). Finally, Thomas Aquinas, who subscribed to a strict hylomorphic view of a human being as composed of matter and one single substantial form, considered forms to possess an excess of causal power beyond the potential of their substratum. This principle makes it possible for him to understand the mind as part of the intellective soul while allowing it to function without using any bodily organ.

Another striking feature of the medieval discussion about soul, mind, and body is the emergence of different types of dualism within an Aristotelian framework. This tendency can be observed in William of Ockham’s account of the radical distinction between the material and extended sensitive soul, closely linked to the organic structure of the body, and the largely independent, immaterial, and indivisible intellective soul. But the clearest witness to this nascent dualism is John Buridan. In Buridan’s view, human beings possess one single substantial form, the intellective soul, whose essential nature transcends the boundaries of natural philosophy. Only faith and theology are able to provide essential knowledge about the soul and its supernatural inherence in the body. In Buridan’s account of the (instrumental) powers of the soul, the intellective powers are considered to function independently from the body and its organs, just as Thomas Aquinas had argued. However, the vegetative and sensitive powers are so strongly tied to the body and its organic structure that they are no longer considered to be powers of the soul, but powers of soul and body together, or powers of the living body. Buridan thus makes an important step in the direction of a distinction between a material, extended (organic) body and an immaterial, immortal (intellective) soul—a step Descartes would certainly have approved.

Notes

- 1 For this difference between medieval philosophical psychology and modern philosophy of mind, see Pasnau (2007) and King (2007).
- 2 For a more extensive list of “Aristotelian *aporiae*” concerning soul and mind, see Bazán (2005: 594–595).
- 3 Averroes’s view of the intellect was particularly influential at Italian universities (especially in Bologna and Padua) between the fourteenth and the sixteenth centuries. See Kuksewicz (1965) and Hasse (2007).
- 4 For a clear and brief account of Averroes’s views of the intellect, see Black (2010).
- 5 For Siger’s early account of the intellect in his *Quaestiones super tertium De anima* (written c. 1265), see Bazán (2005: 603–613). As Bazán rightly points out, Siger’s view of the possible and agent intellects as “parts” of the unique separate intellect differs from the position of Averroes, who claimed that the agent and possible intellects were two distinct separate substances.
- 6 For Siger’s later account of the intellect in his *De anima intellectiva* (written in the early 1270s), see Bazán (2005: 613–617). Siger’s change of mind concerning the role of the sense images in individualizing thought was to a large extent due to Thomas Aquinas’s criticism. In his *On the Unity of the Intellect*, Aquinas famously argues that we cannot attribute the act of thinking to a specific human being simply because she provides sense images to the unique intellect.
- 7 For Jandun’s view of soul and mind, see Brenet (2003: 72–84, 2009). The analogy between the soul-body relation and the sailor-ship relation finds its origin in Aristotle’s *De Anima* I.2, 413a7–9.
- 8 One of the propositions condemned in 1270 states “that there is numerically one and the same intellect for all humans.” Similar statements were condemned in 1277. On the condemnations of 1270 and 1277 in general, see Wippel (1977).
- 9 For Olivi’s view on soul and mind, see Jansen (1934) and Pasnau (1997).
- 10 The notion of “spiritual matter” is derived from a view known as “universal hylomorphism,” i.e. the idea that all beings with the only exception of God are composed of matter and form. In the case of immaterial beings such as “angels” and the soul, this matter has to be of a spiritual nature. This “universal hylomorphism” finds its origin in the work *The Fountain of Life (Fons vitae)* of the Jewish philosopher Solomon Ibn Gabirol (also known as Avicenna) (d. 1057/8).

- 11 In Olivi's view, the human body itself is a composite entity as well. It is composed of matter and a substantial "form of corporeity." Hence in his view, human beings are composed of matter and two really distinct substantial forms, the form of corporeity and the tripartite soul. The form of corporeity brings about the characteristic physical structure and unity of a human body. The (sensitive part of the) soul accounts for the fact that this physically structured body carries out its characteristic vital functions.
- 12 Peter John Olivi, *Sent.* II, q. 59. For the English translation, see Duba (2012: 178–179).
- 13 Just like Olivi, Ockham argues that the human body has a substantial form of its own, the "form of corporeity." Hence in his view, human beings are composed of matter and three really distinct substantial forms: the form of corporeity, a sensitive soul, and an intellective soul. For Ockham's view of soul, mind, and body, see Perler (2010).
- 14 Ockham, *Quodlibet* II, q. 10. For the English translation, see Ockham (1991: 132–133).
- 15 Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 76, a. 3. For the English translation, see Pasnau (2002: 31).
- 16 Following the *Categories*, everything that exists must be either substance or accident. Given that the soul itself, as a substantial form, belongs to the category of substance, the soul's powers can only be accidents. Aquinas argues more specifically that the powers belong to the "second species of the category of quality," i.e. they are "natural capacities" for doing or undergoing something easily (cf. Aristotle, *Cat.* 9a14–19).
- 17 Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 76, a. 1. For the English translation, see Pasnau (2002: 23). The "form of metal" is a reference to magnets, whose magnetic power is not caused by the qualities of the composing elements.
- 18 For Buridan's view of soul, mind, and body, see Zupko (1997), and De Boer (2013: 219–224, 288–298).
- 19 For Buridan's view of the powers of the soul, and its background, see De Boer (2013: 241–248) and Bakker (2019).

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