


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### Powers

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## 9

## POWERS

*JT Paasch*

The subject of this chapter is causal powers—or, as some philosophers today like to call them, “dispositions.” Powers (or dispositions) are roughly just the capabilities and capacities that things have to behave in certain ways. For instance, I can raise my arm, think through complex issues, make choices, and so on. These are all things I have the power to do, and such powers are what the scholastics call *active powers*, or powers to act.

But there are not just powers for doing things. Most objects can have various things done to them as well. Wine glasses can be shattered, my arm can be raised (by me, or by a pulley system), and so on. The capacities to undergo such things are, in one way or another, capacities to behave in certain ways as well, so they count as powers too. They are what the scholastics call *passive powers*, or powers to be acted upon.

What exactly are powers, be they active or passive? Scholastic philosophers spent a good deal of time discussing the matter. Anyone who has read scholastic texts will recognize a Latin word that crops up quite often, namely *potentia*, the scholastic term for “power.” Other terms are sometimes used too, like *vis*, or *virtus*. Whatever the label, the concept of power plays an important role in many scholastic discussions.

Despite the pervasiveness of the concept, there was no “standard” medieval view about powers. Rather, there were a number of competing theories about the nature of powers, much as there is today in the contemporary philosophical literature.

To illustrate the diversity of theories, I will present what four scholastic authors have to say about a particular question they debated regarding powers. Those authors are Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), Henry of Ghent (1217–1293), John Duns Scotus (1266–1308), and William Ockham (1285–1347). The debate I will focus on centered around this question: are the powers of the human soul the same as, or distinct from, the essence of the soul?

The soul was a *locus* of debate about powers because the scholastics take the soul to be a substantial form that brings along with it a variety of powers. For instance, it provides powers for basic biological functions. It also provides sensory powers, like sight and smell, along with the ability to synthesize sense data into images and store that in memory. Finally, it provides humans with intellect and will. (For the background in Aristotle, see Johansen 2012.)

In what follows, I will explore what each of the aforementioned authors believes about the ontology of powers, in the context of the human soul. As I proceed, I will note how these authors answer three particular ontological questions:

- 1 When we speak of a power of the soul, what do these authors think we are referring to (or as these authors sometimes put it, what are we designating when we speak of a power)?
- 2 What sort of entities are the soul's powers? Are they qualities? Relations? What category do they fall under?
- 3 To use the terminology of Ryle (1949), are the soul's powers single-track or multi-track? A single-track power can bring about only one type of effect, while a multi-track power can bring about more than one type of effect.

As we shall see, Aquinas, Henry, Scotus, and Ockham each provide different answers to these three questions. By focusing on these three questions and these four authors, I do not mean to imply that this is all there is to the story. But I do hope that I can at least illustrate some of the diversity on this topic that is present in the scholastic tradition.

### Thomas Aquinas

I begin with Thomas Aquinas, who holds that the soul's powers are not the same as the soul's essence. For convenience, I will discuss the view that Aquinas presents in *Summa Theologiae* 1.77, although as I will note later, Henry, Scotus, and Ockham rely on Aquinas's similar discussion from *Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima*, q. 12.

For Aquinas, the essence of the soul is that it is the substantial form of a human being. What is the substantial form of a human being? To highlight certain aspects of Aquinas's take on the matter, I want to cast the issue in the following way.

Imagine the production of a living organism as a kind of construction process: in a series of passes, bits of matter are acted upon and transformed into progressively more complex states. At the end of the process, you have the completed organism. For our purposes here, we can think of the substantial form as the full set of actualizations that are needed to bring that organism to completion.

There are two things to note about substantial forms under this description. First, the substantial form is the *goal* of the construction process. So it is not some intermediate state on the way to a further state. On the contrary, it is the final state that the production process is aimed at realizing. As Aquinas puts it:

Insofar as the soul is a [substantial] form, it is not an actualization that is directed to some further actualization. Rather, it is the final goal of the production.

*(ST 1.77.1.resp., Marietti 1948: 370a)*<sup>1</sup>

Second, no part of the substantial form can lie dormant or be inactive, for that would mean the organism is not yet completed. For example, the organism cannot be completed until its heart is actually beating. So every part of the substantial form must be fully activated and “switched on,” so to speak. To quote Aquinas's terse way of putting this:

By its very essence, the soul [i.e., the substantial form] is [entirely] *actus*.

*(Ibid.)*<sup>2</sup>

What about the powers of the soul, e.g. powers for digesting or thinking? Are they part of the substantial form? Aquinas says no. If they were, they would be activated—always “switched on,” so to speak—but they clearly are not. I only sometimes digest, for example. So they cannot be part of the substantial form.

If the essence of the soul [= the substantial form] were the direct source of its activities, then whatever has a soul would always be performing its vital activities . . . But we find that a thing which has a soul is not always performing its vital activities . . . so the essence of the soul is not the same as its powers.

(*Ibid.*)<sup>3</sup>

The argument here hinges on the notion that the substantial form contains only what completes the organism. As Aquinas sees it, if (say) digesting were part of the substantial form, then that would entail that the organism would not be completed until it digests something, and it would cease to be completed any time it is not digesting. Clearly, that is absurd. An organism is completed prior to doing to any actual digesting. Its completion does not depend on the activity of digestion, in the way that its completion *does* depend on (say) a continuously active heartbeat. In fact, an organism need never digest anything at all (though, of course, it would then live a short life).

This point was controversial. For why should the substantial form include only things that are *active*? Why not think that part of what is involved in bringing an organism to completion is endowing it with certain vital powers which may (but need not always) be activated? As we shall see, Henry, Scotus, and Ockham are perfectly happy to say that the powers of the soul are included in the substantial form, despite the fact that they are only sometimes active.

In any case, here we have a partial answer to the first question, namely: when we speak of the soul's powers, what are we referring to? According to Aquinas, we do not refer to the soul's essence (the substantial form). Instead, we are referring to something outside the substantial form.

If powers are distinct from the substantial form, then what sorts of entities are they? As is well known, the scholastics call any form or property of the organism that is outside its substantial form an "accident," so for Aquinas, the soul's powers are accidents. Indeed, according to him, they are particular kinds of accidents, namely qualities:

Since a power of the soul is not its essence, it must be an accident, and this in the second species of quality.

(*ST 1.77.1.ad.5, Marietti 1948: 370b*)<sup>4</sup>

For Aquinas, some of these are qualities of parts of the composite, and some are qualities just of the soul itself. For example, the power to digest is a quality of the digestive system, and the power to see is a quality of the eyes. By contrast, the intellect and will are qualities of the soul itself.<sup>5</sup> But whichever of them we are talking about, we now have an answer to both the first and the second questions: when we speak of powers, what are we referring to, and what kind of entities are they? In the case of the soul, Aquinas says that we are referring to qualities.

These powers may not be part of the substantial form, but nevertheless they are necessarily possessed by every human being. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a completed, healthy human being who would not have the power to digest or think. So even though these powers are qualities, they are not the sorts of qualities that humans may or may not have. On the contrary, they are what the scholastics call *propria*—i.e. naturally occurring qualities of every human being.

A *proprium* does not belong to the essence of a thing, but it is caused by the essential principles of the species, whence it stands midway between the essence [of the soul] and the [non-necessary] accidents [of the organism], as was said. In this way, the powers of the soul can be said to stand midway between the substance and its [non-necessary] accidents, as naturally occurring properties of the soul.

(*ST 1.77.1.ad.5, Marietti 1948: 370b*)<sup>6</sup>

Notice that Aquinas says these qualities are *caused* by the essential principles of the species. An interesting question is: in what sense, exactly? Here, Aquinas is somewhat vague. He is clear that these qualities are not produced in humans by external agents. Rather, they are somehow produced internally by the organism that possesses them.

Insofar as the subject of such an accident actually exists, it produces that accident. I say this about the *proprium* accident, for with respect to an extraneous accident, the subject can only receive it, since such an accident is produced by an external agent.

(ST 1.77.1.6.resp., Marietti 1948: 374a)<sup>7</sup>

But how exactly does the production of these powers happen? At this point, Aquinas simply resorts to a metaphor, and says that the powers *flow* from the soul, as from a source.

Whence it is clear that all powers of the soul, whether their subject is the soul itself or the composite, flow from the soul's essence [= the substantial form] as from a source.

(Ibid., Marietti 1948: 374a–b)<sup>8</sup>

It is tempting to think that what Aquinas means is that these powers are somehow grounded in the soul, through an explanatory but non-efficiently-causal grounding relation. But Aquinas does use causal language here. Note how he says these powers are “caused” or “produced” (see also ST 1.3.4.resp.). This can suggest that the relevant kind of causality is efficient causality. If that were right, then as soon as the soul exists, it would automatically spawn its powers, by directly (efficiently) causing them. But of course, we would then have to ask: where does the soul get the power to do *that*?

Let me turn now to the third question: are the soul's powers single-track or multi-track? According to Aquinas, the soul's powers are different in kind, and they are sorted into kinds by the activities they give rise to:

A power, insofar as it is a power, is directed to an activity. Whence, the account one gives for a power must be taken from the activity to which it is directed, and by consequence, it is necessary that the account one gives for powers gets diversified as the account one gives for activities gets diversified.

(ST 1.77.3.resp., Marietti 1948: 371b)<sup>9</sup>

When Aquinas speaks of activities here, is he speaking of activity *types*, or activity *tokens*? This question is relevant because, as we shall see, Ockham will attack this particular point.

I assume that Aquinas is thinking of types, rather than tokens. Otherwise, he would have to say that there is a distinct power for each particular activity token, and he does not seem to speak this way. So, I will assume that for him, there is in a human one power for thinking (not a separate power for each separate act of thinking), which is different in kind from that human's power for willing.

Given this, it follows that each of the soul's powers must be distinct from all of the others, since they are powers for different types of activity. As Aquinas puts it in the *Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima*:

[That the essence of the soul is not the same as its powers] is clear from the diversity of the soul's activities, which are different in kind, and cannot be reduced to one direct source . . . But since the essence of the soul is a single source, it cannot be the direct source of all of its activities. Rather, it must have many different powers corresponding to its different activities.

(QDA 12.resp., Leonine 24.1: 110.210–220)<sup>10</sup>

Aquinas assumes here that one thing cannot give rise to different kinds of activities, which allows him to conclude that there must be a distinct power for each of the soul's activity types. But this too was controversial. As we shall see, Henry, Scotus, and Ockham see no reason why they should grant this assumption. Nevertheless, this makes it clear that, according to Aquinas, the soul's powers are single-track powers. For as he sees it, each power is a power for a single type of activity.

To summarize Aquinas's view, we can say that, for him, the soul's powers are distinct items that are outside the substantial form. In particular, they are qualities, which necessarily come along with every human soul. Moreover, they are single-track powers, each responsible for a single type of activity. For more on Aquinas's account of the soul's powers, see Pasnau (2002), Cross (2008), King (2008), Wood (2011), and Vucu (2020). For other discussion of Aquinas on souls and powers, see Kainz (1972) and Stump (2003: ch. 6).

### Henry of Ghent

I turn next to Henry of Ghent, who discusses the soul and its powers in *Quodlibet* 3.14. There, he claims that every power cannot be distinct from the essence of the thing it is rooted in, on pain of an infinite regress.

Suppose a power were a distinct quality, attached to a form. What would provide that form with the capacity to have that power attached to it? A further power or capacity? And what about that one? A further power or capacity? This cannot go on forever, so at least some powers must be identified with the forms they are rooted in. As Henry puts it:

If a power were really different from the very essence [of the form it is rooted in], it would be something that attaches to the essence [of that form], which would be receptive to it. But this could only be through a passive power [i.e., a receptive capacity], which is [something that should be identified with] the very essence [of that form], else this would go on forever.  
(*Quod. 3.14, Bad. 1518: 67rR*)<sup>11</sup>

To illustrate this, consider the heat of a flame. Henry points out that surely the essence of heat and its power to heat are not distinct, for otherwise there would be an infinite regress:

Fire heats by its heat (as its power for heating), but here the essence of its heat (a passible quality) is not different from the power itself. On the contrary, the essence of the heat is that very power to heat in the flame. It is not some [further quality] naturally added to it. For otherwise this would go on forever . . . If the power were not really the essence itself, it would be something added to it, and then there would be the same question about it.  
(*Quod. 3.14, Bad. 1518: 66vP*)<sup>12</sup>

The same goes for substantial forms. As Henry sees it, there is no reason to think that the powers which necessarily come along with substantial forms need to be distinct from the essence of those forms.

Whence, even in substantial forms which are actualized and are not apt to exist or act by themselves if separated, there is nothing incompatible about the essence of those things being the very power by which the composite properly functions, with such activity belonging to it *per se* through the nature of its substantial form. For a composite should act not only by reason of its accidental forms, which is how a flame heats, but also by reason of its substantial form, which is how a flame generates [another] flame.

(*Quod. 3.14, Bad. 1518:66vP*)<sup>13</sup>

In direct opposition to Aquinas, Henry identifies a thing's powers with its substantial form, rather than distinct qualities:

In terms of its substance, the power through which something performs its proper and essential operation is the substantial form of that thing. For the substantial form is directed not only to the actualization of giving being to the composite (through which it is in the final state of its production), but also to the actualization of its operations, and this through its essence, rather than some [quality] added to it.

(*Quod. 3.14, Bad. 1518: 66vP*)<sup>14</sup>

This reveals Henry's answer to the first question: when we speak about the powers of the soul, what are we referring to? In contrast to Aquinas, Henry thinks that we are referring directly to the soul's essence, which is to say the substantial form.

It is obvious that Henry is targeting Aquinas here, since his language so directly echoes the concepts that Aquinas discusses. And indeed, in *Quodlibet* 3.14, Henry quotes verbatim from Aquinas's *Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima* q. 12 more than once.<sup>15</sup>

However, is Henry's regress argument a refutation of Aquinas's view? It is hard to see how it could be. Aquinas agrees that a power is just a quality, and not some *further* item beyond that quality. So Aquinas would agree that, say, the power to heat is not some further item beyond the heat quality.

Because of this, Cross (2008) suggests that Henry might have misunderstood Aquinas's view, and perhaps that is right. However, perhaps Henry is arguing that, if we have no reason to think that the power and the quality are extensionally distinct (a point that Aquinas agrees with), then we have no reason to think that the power and the essence of the soul are either.

Either way, Henry is begging the question. For Aquinas would simply counter that, although there is no reason to think that the power and the *quality* are extensionally distinct, he does indeed have a reason to think that the power and the *substantial form* are. As I noted earlier, Aquinas assumes that whatever is in the essence of the soul must be actualized, and that compels him to separate out the soul's powers. What Henry's argument shows is only that Henry rejects that assumption.

What about the second question: what kinds of entities are the soul's powers? According to Henry, powers are relational in nature.

Every power, insofar as it is a power, is rooted in something with respect to something else.  
(*SQO 35.4, Wilson 1994: 37.76–77*)<sup>16</sup>

Why are powers relational? For Henry, it is because we speak about the soul as the *source* of activity, and conversely, we speak about the activity as the *result* of that power. So, we are speaking about a relation:

A source, insofar as it is a source, is not spoken of in terms of substance, but only in terms of a relation, and a relation implies a reference to another, as the result.  
(*SQO 35.4, Wilson 1994: 37.67–69*)<sup>17</sup>

Henry thinks that this relational characteristic of powers is the defining mark of a power. For Henry, the quiddity of a power consists precisely in its connection with the activities for which it is a power:

Regarding the nature of a power (insofar as it is a power), it is something that is spoken of with respect to some activity, so it is not some non-relative thing, but rather just this connection with activity that is rooted in a non-relative thing.  
(*SQO 35.2, Wilson 1994: 15.62–64*)<sup>18</sup>

For Henry, this means that when we speak about powers, although extensionally we are picking out the forms they are rooted in, we are doing so only insofar as they are linked to the activities for which they are powers.

To use one of Henry's examples, I can talk about heat as a quality, or I can talk about heat as a power (insofar as it is used to heat other things).

If [a bit of] heat separated [from a flame] were able to heat [other things] by itself, it would only be a quality in terms of its substance, and it would only be a specific power . . . with respect to an act of heating: it would go into action whenever something heatable came near, and it would cease its action when the heatable thing disappeared.

(*Quod. 3.14, Bad. 1518: 71rF*)<sup>19</sup>

Similarly, although the will is extensionally the same as the substance of the soul, the soul qualifies as a willing-power only insofar as it is related to acts of willing, which it performs naturally whenever good things are presented to it in thought:

The will is a natural power in the soul and is nothing but the substance of the soul, but it comes about only from a natural constraining and relation to the act of willing the good as good (either an unqualified good or an apparent good), which it necessarily has to will naturally when it is presented to it in thought . . . And when something good is not presented to it as an object . . . it cannot will at all.

(*Quod. 3.14, Bad. 1518: 71rF*)<sup>20</sup>

Likewise, although the agent intellect is extensionally the same as the substance of the soul, the soul qualifies as an abstracting-power only insofar as it is related to acts of abstracting intelligible content from mental images:

Similarly, the agent intellect is a natural power in the soul and is only the substance of the soul, but it comes about from a natural constraining and relation to the act of abstracting intelligible species from a phantasm when they are presented to it, so that it cannot fail to abstract them.

(*Quod. 3.14, Bad. 1518: 71rF*)<sup>21</sup>

So it is the relation that the soul has to these different activities that makes the soul a power for those things. The soul's powers are the soul, *insofar as* it is related to those different activities.

In fact, Henry says that we can think of powers in terms of matter and form, where the root of the power plays the role of matter and its relation to the activity plays the role of the form.

The term "power" signifies a property as it is pointing outwards at something, so that in its significate it includes the essence [of the thing], having the character of that property. Hence, the significate is composed, as it were, from two things, namely from the subsistent thing itself, which it signifies quasi-materially, and that property, which it signifies quasi-formally.

(*SQO 35.8, Wilson 1994: 78.66–70*)<sup>22</sup>

Caution is in order here. To describe the soul's substance and its relation to activity as the "matter" and "form" of the power might lead one to think that Henry believes the relation is a distinct item, separate from the soul itself. But for Henry, relations are not distinct items separate from their bases. They are just special modes of existence. A thing *x* is related to another thing *y* when



$x$  looks outward or points at  $y$ , and this “pointing” is just an aspect of the way that  $x$  exists, rather than a distinct entity in its own right.<sup>23</sup>

So in the case at hand. When Henry speaks about the soul insofar as it is related to one of its activities, he is envisioning the soul only insofar as it exists in a state where it points outward at that activity. Henry’s answer to the second question is thus that the soul’s powers are *relations*, but we should understand this in the light of Henry’s ontology of relations. For Henry, the soul’s powers are extensionally just the soul itself, insofar as it is related to (i.e. pointing at) the activities for which it is the source.

What about the third question: are powers single-track or multi-track? Henry is clearly an advocate of multi-track powers. For him, the same soul is the source of multiple activities, and this is due not to the fact that the soul itself is divided up into different powers, but rather because it is related to different activities.

That there is so great a diversity and distinction of powers of the soul is not on account of some real diversity that they have on the side of the soul, but only on account of the diversity of constraints in the substance of the soul that occur through it being related to diverse activities. And because of this it gets the names of diverse powers.

(*Quod. 3.14, Bad. 1518: 68vZ*)<sup>24</sup>

The soul itself is one thing, and the activities are different things, and the soul is the single source for all of those activities.

The soul’s substance is one in terms of reality, but in terms of diverse being and in terms of diverse determinations it is appointed the character of diverse intellectual and sentient powers, since in its root the power is nothing in it but its simple substance. Considered in itself, it is the essence or substance and form of the animated being, but considered in terms of diverse being through diverse determinations and operations for diverse actions and diverse objects, it is said to be diverse powers, which adds nothing beyond its essence except a relation to the acts that are diverse in kind.

(*Quod. 3.14, Bad. 1518: 67rS*)<sup>25</sup>

In sum, Henry sees no reason to identify the soul’s powers as distinct items outside the essence of the soul. On the contrary, the soul is the sole source of its various activities. Hence, we find in Henry quite a different account than we find in Aquinas. For more on Henry and powers, see Cross (2008), Wood (2011), Paasch (2012: chs. 9 and 10), and Vucu (2018).

### John Duns Scotus

I turn now to Duns Scotus. In his *Quaestiones super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis* 9.5, Scotus attacks Henry’s idea that the relation between a power and its effect could somehow be a constitutive component of that power.

It is worth pointing out that Scotus agrees with Henry that these concepts imply relationships. Take the notion of being the source of some effect. This implies a causal relationship between the source and the effect, such that the source in some way brings about the effect.

And so it is clear that the term “source” [*principium*] implies essentially the relationship of causing [*principiationis*].

(*Meta. 9.3–4, n. 19, Andrews 1997: 542.13–14*)<sup>26</sup>

Moreover, the abstract notion of causing can be used to designate different things. You can speak of what is doing the causing (the *quod*), or you can speak of that through which it does the causing (the *quo*). For instance, when a flame heats a pot of water, the flame is the *quod* (it is the thing doing the heating), but its heat is the *quo* (the heat is that through which the flame does the heating).

From the relationship [between source and effect] signified in the abstract, which is called “causing” [*principiatio*], different things are designated. For example, the “that which” [*illud quod*] causes and the “that through which” [*illud quo*] it causes.

(*Meta. 9.3–4, n. 19, Andrews 1997: 542.1–3*)<sup>27</sup>

The same holds for terms related to power.

Entirely similarly, it should be said that *potentialitate*, *potentia*, and *potente* imply the same relationship. The first abstractly, the other two concretely, but in different ways insofar as the relationship is meant to name the direct and indirect basis or subject [i.e., the *quo* and the *quod* of the effect] in different ways.

(*Meta. 9.3–4, n. 20, Andrews 1997: 543.9–13*)<sup>28</sup>

So Scotus agrees that the notion of power implies a causal relationship. If you put a pot of water over a flame, Scotus would point and say, “look, there’s a real causal connection there.”

However, as Scotus sees it, Henry’s view implies that this relation is an essential *constituent* of a power. After all, on Henry’s view, the heat in a flame is a power for heating only insofar as it is heating something. Without that, it is just a quality.

For his part, Scotus assumes that the essential constituents of a power must be naturally prior to any effects the power causes. It is obvious that he assumes this because of the way he words the initial question. He opens *Questiones super Libros Metaphysicorum* 9.5 with these words:

Next it is asked whether a power (be it active or passive), *insofar as it is naturally prior to its effect*, essentially includes some relation.

(*Meta. 9.5, Andrews 1997: 559.4–5, emphasis mine*)<sup>29</sup>

Scotus repeats this point at various places. For instance, he asks again:

If some relation does belong to the nature of an active power *insofar as it is prior to the effect* [then what would that relation be?]

(*Meta. 9.5, n. 9, Andrews 1997: 561.18–19, emphasis mine*)<sup>30</sup>

So Scotus is clearly assuming that the essential constituents of a power must be naturally prior to any effects the power causes. As he puts it more generally:

What is appropriate is that the source [of the effect] has in itself completely everything needed for causing its effect.

(*Meta. 9.5, n. 37, Andrews 1997: 573.4–5*)<sup>31</sup>

What exactly does Scotus mean by natural priority? One thing is naturally posterior to another if the other depends on it for its existence, but not vice versa. As he explains elsewhere:

The prior is said to be that on which something depends, and the posterior that which depends on it.

(*De Primo 1.8, Wolter 1966: 5*)<sup>32</sup>

Scotus appeals to Aristotle here, who famously said that one thing is naturally prior to another if the one can exist without the other and not vice versa. As Scotus explains:

I understand the sense of prior here as Aristotle did in *Metaphysics* 5, where he shows (following Plato) that what is prior in nature and essence can exist without the posterior, but not vice versa. (*Ibid.*)<sup>33</sup>

But we need to be careful. It may be tempting to think that Scotus is simply saying that something is naturally prior to another if it can exist without whatever is naturally posterior to it existing. This would imply that if two things are necessarily simultaneous, the one cannot be naturally prior to the other, since the one would never exist without the other.

But Scotus makes it clear that this is so. Even in cases where one thing  $x$  necessarily causes another thing  $y$ , so that there is no scenario in which  $x$  would ever exist without  $y$ , Scotus still thinks that there is natural priority, since  $y$  depends on  $x$  for its existence but not vice versa. As he explains:

I understand this to mean that, even if the prior thing were to necessarily cause the posterior thing and so could not exist without it, still this is not because it needs the posterior thing for its existence, but rather the other way around. (*Ibid.*)<sup>34</sup>

What sorts of things are related as naturally prior and posterior? Relations are a paradigmatic case. Like many scholastic thinkers (including Aquinas and Henry), Scotus believes that relations supervene on the things they relate, and depend on them for their existence (there cannot be relations without things to relate).<sup>35</sup>

For instance, take two white balloons. Since they are both white, they are similar in color. That relation (of similarity) is based on the non-relative qualities of those balloons (e.g. their respective white colors). The relation is naturally *posterior* to those qualities, since the relation depends on those qualities for its existence. However, the converse is not the case. The colors are naturally *prior* to their similarity, since they do not depend on that relation for their existence.

For Scotus, the relation between a cause and its effect is just the same. A causal relation depends on there being a cause and an effect. If there were no effect, for instance, there would be no causal relation. Of course, the relation is simultaneous with the effect. As soon as the cause produces the effect, there is a causal relation there. But the point is not a point about temporal priority. It is a point about dependence.

This relation [of causing] is simultaneous in nature with being caused . . . and it is posterior in nature to what is affected [or caused], that is, to that on which the relation of being caused is based.

(*Meta. 9.5, n. 10, Andrews 1997: 561.2–4*)<sup>36</sup>

With that, Scotus can state his critique of Henry's view: how can something that is naturally *posterior* to the effect be a constituent of the power that is used to *produce* that effect? Surely, whatever constitutes the power must be naturally *prior* to its effect. Hence, no such relationship could ever be a constituent of the power. As Scotus puts it when speaking of active powers:

This relation that is [supposedly] intrinsic to [as an essential constituent of] the active power must be prior in nature to that which is caused, [which is impossible]. Therefore, no such relationship can be found [as a constituent of an active power].

(*Meta. 9.5, n. 10, Andrews 1997: 561.6–8*)<sup>37</sup>

As Scotus sees it, the idea that any relation between a power and its effect is an essential constituent of a power cannot be correct, because the relation shows up on the metaphysical scene too late, as it were, to do any constituting.

It is perhaps worth noting that, for Scotus, such relations do not *explain* very much either. As Scotus points out elsewhere, if you asked me why two white things are similar, it would not help much if I said, “because they are similar.” But it would help if I said something like, “because they are both white,” for then I would be appealing to the basis for their similarity. And the same goes for powers.

Whence, when we ask why things are similar, we do not ask why they are similar *per se primo modo*, because in that sense they are similar because of their similarity. Rather, we ask why they are similar *secundo modo per se*, i.e., we ask whether they are similar by their whiteness, or some other form. Whence, we ask about the basis of their similarity. Likewise, when it is asked, “what is a power of the soul,” one is not asking for the relation which the power implies. Rather, one is asking for the basis.

(*Lect. 1.7.un., n. 35, Vat. 16: 485.9–21*)<sup>38</sup>

To recall the notorious quip by Molière, why does opium make one sleepy? It does not help much to say “because it can make you sleepy.”<sup>39</sup> But it does help if you point to, say, chemical and physiological factors that are the basis for this effect.

In any case, since the relation cannot be an essential constituent of a power, Scotus concludes that the power must be precisely the non-relative constituent of the agent which the causal relation is rooted in. When speaking of active powers, for instance, he says:

Hence, it is precisely the non-relative thing [e.g., the heat] that is essentially the active power, and not the relation alone . . . Therefore, it is precisely this form [i.e., the heat] that is the active power.

(*Meta. 9.5, n. 8, Andrews 1997: 561.13–14, 16–17*)<sup>40</sup>

For Scotus, when we speak about powers, we are designating or picking out not the relation, but rather the thing on which that relation is based.

Just as we commonly take other concrete terms [for forms] to refer to their subjects (insofar as those subjects possess the forms [referred to by the concrete terms in question]), so also when we speak of a “power,” we do not understand the relation, but rather the subject on which the relation is based.

(*Meta. 9.3–4, n. 20, Andrews 1997: 543.13–16*)<sup>41</sup>

Here, we have Scotus’s answer to the first question: what are we referring to when we speak of the soul’s powers? On Scotus’s view, when we speak of the powers of the soul, we are designating the soul’s essence.

It may seem to follow from this that Scotus is a multi-tracker about powers. For if the essence of the soul itself is the source of all of its activities, then it would be a multi-track power. In the *Reportatio* 2.16, Scotus points out that, if one were so inclined, one could reasonably defend such a view:

I say it could be maintained that the intellect and will are not really distinct things, but rather are entirely the same things and are the same nature. That is, one could maintain that the essence of the soul is entirely uniform as a thing and a nature, and is the source of many operations without there being any real diversity of powers in it.

(*Rep. 2.16, n. 17, Wadding 11: 348a*)<sup>42</sup>

Scotus himself says that he does not opt for this view (though cf. van den Bercken 2015 and Cross 2014: ch. 7). Instead, he claims that the soul's powers are formally distinct components that are somehow identified with (as essential constituents of) the soul's essence:

The powers are not the same formally or quidditatively, not with each other nor with the essence of the soul itself. But neither are they distinct things from the soul. Rather, they are the same by identification [*idem identitate*].

(*Rep. 2.16, n. 18, Wadding 11: 348b*)<sup>43</sup>

What does Scotus mean when he says they are the same by “identification”? This is the terminology he uses to speak of his famous formal distinction. Formally distinct items are items that have distinct definitions or quiddities, but yet are bound or fused together in a single object.<sup>44</sup>

So for Scotus, the powers of the soul are distinct items, but they are tightly bound together, in virtue of them all being contained in the essence of the soul. To use Scotus's terminology, they are “unitively contained” in the soul's essence:

I say that the powers [of the soul] are not other than the soul, but rather are unitively contained in the essence of the soul.

(*Rep. 2.16, n. 18, Wadding 11: 348b*)<sup>45</sup>

With that, we have Scotus's answer to the second question: what kind of entities are the soul's powers? For Scotus, they are formally distinct components of the soul. We also have the answer to the third question. For Scotus, the soul's powers are single-track. For example, the intellect is one formally distinct power, and the will is another formally distinct power, even though the two are bundled together inside the same soul.

To summarize, Scotus holds that the powers of the soul are formally distinct constituents of the soul's essence, and qua powers, they are naturally prior to any of the effects they produce. For more on Scotus and powers, see Normore (1996), King (2001, 2008), Cross (2008), Paasch (2012: ch. 12), Cross (2014: ch. 7), van den Bercken (2015), and Vucu (2018).

### William Ockham

Finally, I turn to Ockham. In the *Quaestiones super Libros Sententiarum* 2.20, Ockham rejects Aquinas's view that powers must be outside the essence of the soul because they are not always exercised.

Recall that, for Aquinas, the soul's powers must not be contained in the soul's essence because they sometimes are and sometimes are not activated after the organism is completed. Ockham rejects this. As he sees it, there is no reason to think that the *powers* are later or secondary actualizations of their possessors, simply because their *activities* are. It is perfectly reasonable to think that unexercised powers are themselves fully present or fully realized in the essence of the soul, as part of its primary actualization:

If you say that thinking is a secondary actualization . . . and therefore it must be different from the primary actualization . . . then I say that thinking is indeed a secondary actualization, because it presupposes some prior actualization in that in which it occurs—say, [there must be] a power, or habit, or at least some other things—whereas the primary actualization is not like this . . . Still, in no way is thinking called a secondary actualization because its existence is more *in fieri* or *in fluxu* than a power or habit, which are primary actualizations, because they do have all of their existence all at once.

(*Quaest. in Sent. 2.20, OTh 5: 431.5–14*)<sup>46</sup>

With regard to Henry's view, Ockham follows Scotus. For Ockham as much as for Scotus, relations cannot be constitutive of powers.

Ockham provides a number of arguments for this claim, but one is worth mentioning. Imagine that you are a free-floating human soul, and you are the only thing that exists. In such a world, you cannot think or will, since there is nothing to think about or will. But surely you would still have the *power* to think and will:

Neither [can this alleged] relation [that supposedly constitutes a power] be a real relation, because there is never a real relation without a really existing relatum, even according to him [viz., Henry]. But the powers of the soul are fully present even if no object exists to direct their activity at. For God could make a thinking soul, without making any objects in the world. In that case, there would still be the fully present powers of the soul, and nevertheless there would be no exercise of them, since there would be no object [to direct their activity at].  
(*Quaest. in Sent. 2.20, OTh 5: 432.8–12*)<sup>47</sup>

But this begs the question against Henry. A supporter of Henry might look at this empty world populated only by your free-floating soul, and ask, what sense can even be given to the idea that you have powers in this world? In such a world, you are just a thing with certain qualities, and no activity.

Regarding his own view, Ockham agrees with the first part of Scotus's view, namely that the powers of the soul should indeed be identified with the soul:

Therefore, I say by holding the first part of the view of John [Duns Scotus] . . . that the powers of the soul, of which we speak in the case at hand, namely intellect and will . . . are really the same with each other and with the essence of the soul.  
(*Quaest. in Sent. 2.20, OTh 5: 435.4–8*)<sup>48</sup>

Of course, Ockham rejects the formal distinction wherever he can (see, for instance, Adams 1976), and he does so here too. Hence, for Ockham, the soul's powers are not even formally distinct.

Speaking of the intellect and will in the second way [i.e., by speaking about what is designated by the term "power"], then in this way the intellect is no more distinguished from the will than it is from intellect, or than God is distinguished from God, or than Socrates from Socrates, because the intellect is distinguished from the will neither in reality nor in concept.  
(*Quaest. in Sent. 2.20, OTh 5: 436.5–8*)<sup>49</sup>

At this point, we have Ockham's answer to the first question: when we speak of the soul's powers, what are we referring to? According to Ockham, we are referring to the soul's essence.

We also have Ockham's answer to the second question, namely: what sorts of entities are the soul's powers? Unlike Scotus, who thinks that they are formally distinct components in the soul, Ockham believes that they are just the soul itself (the substantial form).

For Ockham, there is the soul, which is one thing, and it is the source for multiple sorts of activities. We call the soul the "intellect" or "will" insofar as it produces an act of understanding or willing, respectively, but those are just different denominations.

And speaking in this way, there is one substance of the soul, able to have distinct acts, with respect to each of which it can have different denominations. For as it elicits (or can elicit) an act of understanding it is called the intellect, and as it elicits an act of willing, it is called the will.  
(*Quaest. in Sent. 2.20, OTh 5: 436.8–12*)<sup>50</sup>

So we have Ockham's answer to the third question too: are the soul's powers single-track or multi-track? As Ockham sees it, the soul is a multi-track power.

Moreover, Ockham outright rejects the single-track assumption that there must be as many powers as there are activities. He points out that, if you think there must be as many powers as there are activity *tokens*, then you would have to grant that there is, say, a distinct intellectual power for each particular thought, which is absurd.

I say that on account of the diversity of activities it is not necessary to posit a distinction of powers, so that there are as many powers as there are activities. For otherwise, there would be as many intellectual powers as there are acts of understanding.

*(Quaest. in Sent. 2.20, OTh 5: 429.3–6)*<sup>51</sup>

By contrast, if you think that there must be as many powers as there are activity *types*, Ockham rejects that too, asking: which type is the relevant individuator? Kinds are organized into a hierarchy, so which level is the one where we start counting different powers?

And if you say that one power extends to all activities that belong to the same genus rather than a different genus, then against this: the activities of all powers belong to the [same] genus of quality.

*(Quaest. in Sent. 2.20, OTh 5: 429.7–9)*<sup>52</sup>

To summarize, like Henry and unlike Scotus, Ockham believes that the soul is the sole multi-track source of its various activities. But like Scotus and unlike Henry, Ockham believes that the soul is a power prior to any relations it might have with its activities. For more on Ockham and powers, see Adams (2001), Robert (2002), King (2008), Perler (2010), and Paasch (2012: chs. 13 and 14).

## Conclusion

In the preceding pages, I looked at what four scholastic thinkers say about the powers of the soul. As I went, I attended to three questions. (1) When we speak of the soul's powers, what do we refer to or designate? (2) What sorts of entities are the soul's powers? (3) Are these single-track or multi-track powers? Each of the authors I discussed provides different answers to each of these questions, thereby revealing at least some aspects of their various ontologies of powers.

But this is only a snapshot of the topic, and there is still much to research. Obviously, the aforementioned three questions are not the only questions that deserve attention. For example, one could ask if powers are emergent (on this in Aquinas, see Stump 2012), one could ask about self-motion (on this, see Vucu 2018), one could ask who or what does the acting when powers are exercised (on this, see Cross 2008), and so on.

In addition, there are other headings (besides the soul's powers) under which scholastic authors discuss powers. For example, powers are relevant in discussions of efficient causation, mind and cognition, change, science, angels and celestial mechanics, and various topics in theology like the Eucharist, the Incarnation, and the Trinity.

Moreover, the four thinkers I survey do not exhaust the spectrum of medieval theories about powers. For an analysis of John Buridan's theory of powers, for example, see Löwe (2018) and Wood (2011). For Suarez, see Rozemond (2012) and Shields (2013). And for some reflections on various late medieval and early modern thinkers, see Pasnau (2011: ch. 23).

For further general discussion on the soul and powers in the medieval tradition, see Woods (2011), De Boer (2013), and Perler (2015). For a discussion of the topic before Aquinas, see Künzle

(1956). For primary texts in English, a text called *Later Medieval Theories of Powers of the Soul: A Reader* is currently being edited with translations by Löwe, Friedman, Embry, van den Bercken, and Paasch. Still, there is much research to be done in the area of powers, both in terms of general survey, and in terms of specific scholastic thinkers and specific issues.

## Notes

- 1 “Non enim, in quantum est forma, est actus ordinatus ad ulteriorem actum, sed est ultimus terminus generationis.”
- 2 “Nam anima secundum suam essentiam est actus.”
- 3 “Nam anima secundum suam essentiam est actus. Si ergo ipsa essentia animae esset immediatum operationis principium, semper habens animam actus haberet opera vitae . . . Invenitur autem habens animam non semper esse in actu operum vitae . . . Relinquitur ergo quod essentia animae non est eius potentia.”
- 4 “Cum potentia animae non sit eius essentia, oportet quod sit accidens; et est in secunda specie qualitatis.”
- 5 See ST 1.77.6. Note that, according to Aquinas here, if the human dies and becomes a disembodied soul, they lose the powers associated with the composite during their disembodiment, since there no longer is a digestive system to do any digesting nor eyes to do any seeing. But the intellect and will are retained during disembodiment, since they are qualities of the soul itself (see ST 1.77.8).
- 6 “Proprium enim non est de essentia rei, sed ex principiis essentialibus speciei causatur, unde medium est inter essentiam et accidens sic dictum. Et hoc modo potentiae animae possunt dici mediae inter substantiam et accidens, quasi proprietates animae naturales.”
- 7 “[I]n quantum autem [subiectum formae accidentalis] est in actu, est eius productivum. Et hoc dico de proprio . . . accidente, nam respectu accidentis extranei, subiectum est susceptivum tantum; productivum vero talis accidentis est agens extrinsecum.”
- 8 “Unde manifestum est quod omnes potentiae animae, sive subiectum earum sit anima sola, sive compositum, fluunt ab essentia animae sicut a principio.”
- 9 “[P]otentia, secundum illud quod est potentia, ordinatur ad actum. Unde oportet rationem potentiae accipi ex actu ad quem ordinatur, et per consequens oportet quod ratio potentiae diversificetur, ut diversificatur ratio actus.”
- 10 “[H]oc apparet ex ipsa diversitate actionum anime, que sunt genere diverse, et non possunt reduci in unum principium immediatum . . . Et ita, cum essentia anime sit unum principium, non potest esse immediatum principium omnium suarum actionum, sed oportet quod habeat plures et diversas potentias correspondentes diversitati suarum actionum.”
- 11 “Si enim esset potentia illa alia re ab ipsa essentia, illa accidens esset in illa essentia quae eius esset receptiva, et hoc non nisi per potentiam passivam quae est ipsa essentia, vel esset abire in infinitum.”
- 12 “Cum ignis calefacit calore, ut potentia calefaciendi, ibi non est aliud essentia ipsius caloris, quae est passibilis qualitas, et aliud ipsa potentia: immo ipsa essentia caloris est ipsa potentia calefaciendi in igne: non aliquid additum ei naturaliter, aliter enim esset abire in infinitum . . . Quia si potentia non esset re essentia ipsa, esset re aliquid additum ei. Et de illa re esset quaestio eadem.”
- 13 “Unde etiam in formis substantialibus quae sunt actus tantum, non nati per se existere nec agere separatim, nullum est inconveniens quod ipsa essentia earum est ipsa potentia qua compositum agit suam propriam, et per se actionem debitam ei ratione formae substantialis. Non solum enim ratione formae accidentalis debetur composito quod agat, ut igni quod calefaciat, sed etiam ratione formae substantialis, ut quod ignem . . . generet.”
- 14 “Forma ergo substantialis rei est ipsa potentia secundum suam substantiam qua agit suam propriam operationem essentialem. Non enim forma substantialis tantum ordinatur ad actum dandi esse composito, per hoc quod est terminus generationis, sed etiam ad actum operandi, et hoc per suam essentiam, non per aliquod additum ei.”
- 15 For example, in Quod. 3.14, Bad. 1518: 67rR, Henry writes: “Et magnus error est dicere, quod potentia passiva quae est ad actum substantialem: est in genere substantiae: et quae est ad actum accidentalem, est in genere accidentis: ut qualitatis,” which is verbatim from Aquinas, QDA 12 (see Leonine 24.1: 109.183–191). Also, in Quod. 3.14, Bad. 1518: 67vV–68rV, Henry writes: “[A]rguunt contra nos sic. Sicut se habet esse ad essentiam: ita et operari ad potentiam. Ergo permutate proportione sicut se habet esse ad operari, et essentia ad potentiam. Sed in solo deo esse suum est eius operari, ergo in solo deo essentia est ipsa eius potentia. Non ergo in anima essentia est eius potentiam,” which is also verbatim (Leonine 24.1: 107.108–113). Note that Henry summarizes rather than directly quotes arguments from Aquinas’s *Summa Theologiae*. This suggests that Henry’s primary target in Quod. 3.14 is Aquinas’s QDA 12, rather



than Aquinas's *Summa*. Later scholastic thinkers like Scotus and Ockham also discuss these arguments, and they recite these very same passages that Henry cites. So, it seems to me that they are taking these arguments directly from Henry. For instance, see Ockham, *Quaest. in Sent.*, 2.20 (OTh 5: 426.1–4). In the footnotes, the editors of Ockham's *Opera Theologica* point to Aquinas's *Summa Theologica* 1.77.5.resp. as the source of this quotation, but that seems incorrect. As is clear from Henry's text here, it comes from Aquinas's QDA 12. Ockham is presumably getting this argument from Henry's Quod. 3.14, and Henry is getting it straight out of Aquinas's QDA 12 (or perhaps Ockham is taking this argument from Scotus, who, in turn, got it from Henry).

- 16 “[O]mnis potentia, in quantum potentia, fundatur in aliquo ut respectus ad aliud.”
- 17 “[P]rincipium ut principium non dicitur secundum substantiam, sed solum secundum relationem, et relationem importat ad aliud, ut ad principiatum.” Henry makes this observation more than once. For example, Quod. 3.14, Bad. 1518: 68rY: “Potentia enim non definitur nisi ex relatione ad actum”; and SQO 35.8, Wilson (1994: 78.57): “[P]otentia significat ‘ad aliquid’ [viz. ad actum], et a ratione respectus imponitur.”
- 18 “[D]e ratione potentiae in quantum potentia, est quod dicitur ad actum, ita quod nihil absolutum sit, sed solum respectus fundatus in re super aliquo absoluto.”
- 19 “Sicut caliditas separata si esset calefactiva in se, non esset nisi qualitas per essentiam, et non esset potentia quaedam nisi ex naturali determinatione et respectu ad actum calidi: ita quod iret in actum quandocumque approximaretur calefactibili, et cessaret ab actu absente calefactibili.”
- 20 “[V]oluntas est potentia naturalis in anima, et non est nisi substantia animae: sed ex naturali determinatione et respectu ad actum volendi bonum ut bonum, sive simpliciter sive apparens, quod necesse habet velle naturaliter cum ei praesentetur in cognitione . . . et cum bonum ut obiectum . . . ei non praesentetur, velle secundum actum omnino non potest.”
- 21 “Similiter intellectus agens potentia naturalis est in anima, et non est nisi substantia animae: sed ex naturali determinatione et respectu ad actum abstrahendi species intelligibiles a phantasmate, cum ei praeponuntur, ita quod non potest illas non abstrahere.”
- 22 “Potentia vero significat ut proprietas ad aliquid respiciens, quod in suo significato includit essentiam sub ratione illius proprietatis, ut suum significatum sit quasi compositum ex duobus, scilicet ex ipso subsistenti, quod significat quasi materialiter, et illa proprietate, quam significat quasi formaliter.” In fact, Henry suggests that we can think of any categorical entity that has a connection with something else like this. SQO 32.5, Macken (1991: 81.57–60): “Intentio ergo praedicamenti constituitur ex re naturae subiecta, quae est res praedicamenti, quasi materiale in ipso, et modo quo esse ei convenit . . . quae est ratio praedicamenti circa rem ipsam, quasi formale in ipso.”
- 23 For more on Henry's account of relations and modes of being, see Henninger (1989: 40–58), Descorte (2002), Iribarren (2002), Macken (1981), and Teske (2006).
- 24 “Sic ergo quod tanta est diversitas et distinctio potentialiarum animae, hoc non est propter aliquam diversitatem realem quam habent ipsae ex parte animae, sed propter diversitatem de terminationum substantiae animae solummodo diversos actus respicit, et ex hoc nomina diversarum potentialiarum sortitur.”
- 25 “[I]ta quod eius substantia quae una est secundum rem, secundum diversa esse, et secundum diversas determinationes, sortitur rationes diversarum potentialiarum intellectivarum et sensitivarum, cum in radice nihil sit potentia in eadem nisi eius simplex substantia, quae in se considerata, essentia sive substantia est et forma animati, considerata vero secundum diversa esse per diversas determinationes et operationes ad diversas actiones, et ad diversa obiecta, dicitur potentiae diversae quae non ponunt super essentiam eius nisi solum respectum ad diversos actus specie.”
- 26 “Patet itaque quod principium importat essentialiter relationem principiationis.”
- 27 “Sic ab ista relatione quae dicitur ‘principiatio’ significata in abstracto, diversimode denominatur ‘illud quod’ principiat et ‘illud quod’ principiat.”
- 28 “Consimiliter omnino dicendum est de potentialitate, potentia et potente, quod eandem relationem important. Primum in abstracto, alia duo in concreto, sed diversimode secundum quod illa relatio nata est diversimode denominare fundamentum proximum et remotum sive subiectum.”
- 29 “Quaeritur an potentia active sive passive, in quantum prior est naturaliter principiato, includat essentialiter aliquem respectum.”
- 30 “Item, si aliqua relatio pertinent ad rationem potentiae activae in quantum prior est naturaliter principiato [deinde est relatio?].”
- 31 “[Q]uod approprietur sic quod habeat in se totam perfectionem requisitam ad causationem huius, hoc oportet.”
- 32 “Secundo modo prius dicitur, a quo aliquid dependet, et posterius, quod dependet.”
- 33 “Huius prioris hanc intelligo rationem, quam etiam Aristoteles 5<sup>o</sup> Metaphysicae testimonio Platonis ostendit: Prius secundum naturam et essentiam est quod contingit esse sine posteriori, non e converso.”

- 34 “Quod ita intelligo, quod, licet prius necessario causet posterius et ideo sine ipso esse non possit, hoc tamen non est quia ad esse suum egeat posteriori, sed e converso.”
- 35 See Henninger (1989) and Hansen’s contribution to this volume for more on Scotus’s theory of relations and scholastic theories of relations in general.
- 36 “[N]am illa [relatio] simul natura est cum principiatio . . . et posterior est natura eo quod est principiatum, hoc est, illo in quo fundatur relatio principiati.”
- 37 “Oporteret autem relationem intrinsecam potentiae activae esse priorem natura illo quod est principiatum. Ergo omnino nulla relatio invenitur talis.”
- 38 “Unde, quando quaerimus in quo sunt aliqui similes, non quaerimus in quo sunt similes per se primo modo, quia sic similitudine sunt similes, sed quaerimus in quo sunt similes secundo modo per se, utrum sint similes albedine vel alia forma; unde quaerimus de fundamento similitudinis. Similiter quando quaeritur quid sit potentia animae, non quaeritur de respectu quem potentia importat, sed quaeritur de fundamento.”
- 39 “Mihi a docto doctore. Domandatur causam et rationem quare Opium facit dormire. A quoi respondeo; Quia est in eo Virtus dormitiva, Cujus est natura Sensus assoupire” (Molière 1879: 567).
- 40 “Ergo praecise alterum [viz., absolutum] est essentialiter potentia activa, non relatio tantum . . . Ergo illa [viz., forma absoluta] praecise est potentia activa.”
- 41 “Sicut autem alia concreta communiter accipimus pro subiectis in quantum habent tales formas, ita frequenter quando dicimus ‘potentiam’, non intelligimus de respectu, sed de illo in quo fundatur respectus.”
- 42 “Dico igitur quod intellectus et voluntas non sunt res realiter distinctae, sed potest sustineri, quod sunt omnino idem re et ratione; vel quod essentia animae omnino indistincta re et ratione, est principium plurium operationum.”
- 43 “[N]on sunt potentiae idem formaliter vel quiditative, nec inter se nec etiam cum essentiae animae, nec tamen sunt res aliae, sed idem identitate.”
- 44 For more on the formal distinction, see Grajewski (1944), Gelber (1974), Adams (1976), Cross (2002), and Paasch (2012: 68–74).
- 45 “[D]ico aliter quod potentiae non sunt res alia [quam anima], sed sunt unitive contentae in essentia animae.”
- 46 “Si dicas quod intelligere est actus secundus . . . igitur aliter habet esse quam actus primus . . . Dico quod est actus secundus, quia praesupponit aliquem actum priorem in illo a quo est, puta potentiam et habitum vel saltem alterum; sed actus primus non sic . . . Et nullo modo dicitur actus secundus quia plus habet esse in fieri vel fluxu quam potentia vel habitus, qui sunt actus primi quia habent totum esse suum simul.”
- 47 “Nec est respectus realis, quia nunquam est respectus realis sine termino realiter existente, secundum eum etiam [viz., secundum Henricum]. Sed potentiae animae possunt esse perfectae et nullum obiectum [esse], quia Deus potest facere animam intellectivam non faciendo aliquod obiectum in mundo. Et tunc erunt potentiae animae perfectae, et tamen nullus terminus in actu, quia nullum obiectum.”
- 48 “Ideo dico, tenendo primam partem opinionis Ioannis . . . quod potentiae animae, de quibus loquimur in proposito, scilicet intellectus et voluntas . . . sunt idem realiter inter se et cum essentiae animae.”
- 49 “Sed loquendo de intellectu et voluntate secundo modo [in modo accipitur pro illo quod denominator ab illo nomine potentia], sic intellectus non plus distinguitur a voluntate quam ab intellectu vel quam Deus a Deo vel Sortes a Sorte, quia nec distinguitur a voluntate nec re nec ratione.”
- 50 “Sed sic est una substantia animae potens habere distinctos actus, respectu quorum potest habere diversas denominationes. Quia ut elicit vel elicere potest actum intelligendi dicitur intellectus; ut actum volendi voluntas.”
- 51 “[D]ico quod propter diversitatem actuum non oportet ponere distinctionem in potentiis, et tot potentias quot actus. Aliter enim esset tot potentiae intellectivae quot actus intelligendi.”
- 52 “Et si dicas quod una potentia se extendit ad omnes actus eiusdem generis et non diversi generis, contra: actus omnium potentiarum sunt in genere qualitatatis.”

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