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Classical feminist film theory

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PART I

What is [feminist] cinema?

In this section, we interrogate the question of what [feminist] cinema is within a range of political, historical, geographical, and cultural contexts. Patrice Petro’s opening essay situates the history of feminist film studies with respect to the ongoing scholarly contestations over its impact and relevance. She examines the tension between theory and practice, and between activism and academia. Sandra Ponzanesi and Sumita Chakravarty turn to postcolonial and transnational frameworks in order to chart current and emerging directions of the field. Ponzanesi highlights filmmakers such as Shirin Neshat and Gurinder Chadha, and situates postcolonial theoretical interventions as pivotal for rethinking the concept of cultural difference. Chakravarty focuses on the cinema of migration and particularly on US films such as *Gran Torino* and *Frozen River*, which stage a white protagonist’s encounter with (im)migrant Others. Lucy Fischer highlights the work of Mai Zetterling as a way to explore the links between women’s cinema and feminist forms of address. Kathleen Vernon and Sally Chivers illuminate some critical, but frequently overlooked, aspects of feminist film inquiry—sound (Vernon) and age and disability (Chivers). Lingzhen Wang and Anikó Imre examine film and feminism in different socialist contexts that may, on closer inspection, offer important counter-examples to Western-centric understandings of both cinema and gender alike, while Amy Borden returns to the radical aspects of queer cinema and queer theory in order to examine them as a practice that disrupts some of the identity-based tendencies of LGBT+ cinema.

Although not meant as a comprehensive overview of feminist cinema, this group of essays aims to give the reader insight into the breadth of the field of feminist film studies, as well as provide an introduction to the concerns that inform the field’s past, present, and future trajectories.
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In an April 2015 interview, University of Groningen student Daniel O’Neill asked Laura Mulvey about what we might now call “classical” feminist film theory—that is, feminist film theory of the 1970s. Specifically, he asks, what has changed since the publication of “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” in 1975? Mulvey responded by explaining that her now infamous essay was a political intervention and not an academic one. She stated,

One absolutely crucial change is that feminist film theory is now an academic subject to be studied and taught. “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” was a political intervention, primarily influenced by the Women’s Liberation Movement and, in my specific case, a Women’s Liberation study group, in which we read Freud and realised the usefulness of psychoanalytic theory for a feminist project. In addition to this feminist context, the essay could be seen as experimental, within the cultural context of the 1970s avant-garde: its writing, its films, and its ideas.¹

Indeed, as Mandy Merck has recently described it, “Visual Pleasure” was a manifesto, a call to arms, and part of a larger history of feminist polemics and manifestos, stretching from “Mary Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of the Rights of Women to Emma Goldman’s ‘The Tragedy of Women’s Emancipation’ to Shulamith Firestone’s The Dialectic of Sex to Mary Daly’s Gyn/Ecology” (Merck 2007:7).

As Merck points out, “Visual Pleasure” may be (overly) familiar to film and media scholars, but is still less well known within feminist theory more generally. Similarly, Claire Johnston’s early writings, including “Women’s Cinema as Counter-Cinema” (1973) and “Feminist Politics and Film History” (1975) were likewise written in the mode of the polemic and the manifesto and are even less known today than the ubiquitous “Visual Pleasure” essay, which has been expansively reprinted although repeatedly criticized for its lack of scholarly and theoretical rigor (as a direct result of its engagement with psychoanalysis, not to mention its lack of features traditionally found in scholarly essays, such as footnotes).

In this essay, I explore the standing and status of “classical” feminist film theory in the past and today. I reflect on recent writings and scholarship that trace the history of film studies, especially the history of film theory and its “academic turn” in the 1980s and
beyond. Finally, I offer an intervention into the status of feminist film theory within larger accounts of our field.

So to begin. At the 2012 Society for Cinema and Media conference, held in Boston, I attended a workshop entitled “Where is Film Theory Today?” In the course of the discussion, I was surprised to learn that many of the participants believed that film theory “died” in the mid-1990s after a prolonged critique by those who were uneasy about what they saw as its undue influence on the field. David Bordwell, for example, famously coined the phrase “S.L.A.B.” theory to describe film theory in the 1970s and 1980s—that is, the theories of Saussure, Lacan, Althusser, and Barthes, and/or Baudrillard—to capture what he believed was a detrimental orthodoxy in the vast majority of scholarship, perhaps especially feminist film scholarship.

Admittedly, I was not only surprised to learn that film theory had been dead for more than fifteen years—I was also perplexed by the funereal tone surrounding discussions of film theory. To be sure, I had read David Rodowick’s 2007 essay (although not his book, which was not yet published) entitled “An Elegy for Theory.” Here, Rodowick challenges Bordwell’s critique of the field and, more specifically, what he sees as Bordwell’s attempt to establish film studies as a discipline modeled on cognitivist science and historical poetics, along the lines of the ideals of the natural sciences (2007: 91–109). Rodowick’s “elegy,” however, is not exactly a lament for film theory’s or even the cinema’s death (and, tellingly, in the 2007 essay, he has absolutely nothing to say about feminist theory or feminist theorists). Instead, it is more of a reflection on what should constitute a philosophy of the humanities today, and in Rodowick’s view, this entails a return to the work of Stanley Cavell and Gilles Deleuze.

In his book that followed, Elegy for Theory, published in 2014, Rodowick does mention feminist film theory but mostly relegates it in his account to identity politics and cultural studies. His first mention of feminism in relation to theory, moreover, occurs on page 201 in a book of 265 pages; and here, it is included as part of a longer list, including “formalism, myth criticism, Marxist criticism, psychoanalysis, feminism, queer theory, critical race theory, postcolonial theory, new historicism, cultural studies, media studies, and so on” (2014: 201–2). Even Cavell himself, writing in 1990, emphasized the centrality of feminist film theory to film studies when he wrote: “So since it seems to me generally recognized, and incontestable, that feminism theory is, as a body of work, the most influential in the field of film study, its most powerful force” (1990: 239). How is it, then, that some twenty-five years later, feminist theory is nearly absent from Rodowick’s history of film theory and his philosophy of the humanities? What is at stake in this voluntary forgetting of feminist film theory’s centrality to film theory more generally?

To be sure, it is not just Rodowick who has sidelined feminist film theory in his account of the field. Indeed, many criticisms have been leveled against feminist film theory specifically in the writings of feminist film scholars, who denounce feminist film theory, not on epistemological grounds but because of its opacity and abstraction, its propensity towards jargon and cliché, and its aloofness from activism and political engagement. In her 1998 book Chick Flicks, for example, B. Ruby Rich, characterizes academic film feminism in disparaging terms, claiming that in place of the broad coalitions and contradictory communities that so defined feminist work in the 1970s, feminist film theory in the 1980s and beyond devolved into an academically hierarchical, heterosexist, party-line feminist film theory, with its own conferences, journals, and its own “professionalized, parochial, self-absorbed, and deracinated writing” (1998: 6). As she explained: “What sprang up in the seventies and was institutionalized in the eighties has been stagnating in the nineties, its vigor bypassed by
Thus, Rich points out a significant fact: that regardless of a seemingly greater prominence (or cultural recognition) of minority filmmakers and themes, such prominence remains delineated along gender lines.

In view of these remarks, it is important to return to the political and historical context of the 1980s, not because I believe that feminist film theory declined after this date, but because the eighties more broadly figure as a rhetorical turning point in the writings of many critics and theorists who seek to chart historical change. For some theorists, the 1980s were a watershed, especially when considered in relation to technological, cultural, and political change. Indeed, it is now something of commonplace for scholars to locate 1989 as a major historical pivot point, marking the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War, and the acceleration of major technological innovations in communication technologies that have fundamentally altered our relationship to the world. As Siva Vaidhyanathan puts in his book, *The Googlization of Everything: And Why We Should Worry*:

> In 1989, as a young man of twenty-three, I could not have been more optimistic about the prospects for justice and democracy in my country and the rest of the world. … To a naïve young American like me, fascinated by new technology and devoted to the belief that free speech can be deeply and positively transformative, this simple connection between a new technology and stunning historical events was irresistible. Such a techno-optimistic story accorded well with the other views I held at that time: that the Reformation and the Enlightenment were driven, or made necessary, but the emergence of the printing-press in fifteenth-century Europe, and that mass-market pamphlets such as Thomas Paine’s *Common Sense* were essential factors in the birth of the American republic. Of course, this view was far too simple an explanation for the sudden (and in many places, temporary) spread of democracy and free speech. Historians of both politics and technology knew the story was more complex.

*(2011: 122)*
The story is indeed more complex, and when we look to the field of cinema and media studies to trace the recent history of feminist film theory over the last four decades, this techno-optimistic narrative gives way to a different account of a loss of utopian aspirations and transformation. As Mulvey herself has pointed out (in her contribution to a roundtable on feminist film theory, published in 2004 in the feminist journal *Signs*, of which I will have more to say momentarily):

During the 1980s, events on a world scale marked the point at which the traditions of progressive politics could no longer struggle against the changing balance between left and right. The success of neoliberal economics, the collapse of communism, the globalization of capitalism, the export of industry to nonunionized developing economies, the impoverishment of Africa, and an increase in racism both in Europe and other parts of the world definitively changed the political spectrum. During this period, not only was it impossible to maintain the progressive optimism of the 1970s, it was also hard to privilege the problems of women (especially those of developed economies) and the priorities of film feminism while left politics failed in postcolonial and third-world countries.

*(2004: 1288)*

Mulvey does not locate 1989 as the watershed moment that moved us beyond ideologies and into an era of social justice and democracy; instead, for her, the 1980s were the tipping point of a new era, defined by the expansion of neoliberal economics and the expansion of capitalism on a global scale.

Nevertheless, like Vaidhyanathan, Mulvey also takes up the question of technology and historical change, but in her case, by reflecting on the history of cinema and the emergence of digital forms. “The cinema’s one-hundredth birthday in 1995,” she explains,

may have been a temporal marker of purely symbolic importance, but this symbolism coincided with objective, material changes in its conditions of production, distribution, and consumption. The arrival of video and then, more significantly, digital technologies marked a definite end of an era for the way in which celluloid had functioned within the sphere of mass entertainment and within that of radical or avant-garde aesthetics during the greater part of the twentieth century.

*(Mulvey 2004: 1287)*

The relationship between film and feminism came at the very end of that era, Mulvey further explains; moreover, feminist film theory and practice had close links with an even longer tradition of cinephilia. “It was a last wave,” she says,

following the great Third Cinema movements, above all in Latin America, and the European and North American avant-gardes of the 1960s. For these movements, cinema was of central importance as a symptom and symbol of utopian political teleology. Not only could cinema articulate the desire for a better world, its complex way of interpreting and representing could also produce both critique and new ways of seeing. For feminism, this was particularly the case: the cinema doubled as a major means of women’s oppression through image and
as a means of liberation through transformation and reinvention of its forms and
conventions.

Mulvey concludes by emphasizing that new digital capacities nonetheless open up a space
for new reflections on cinema and film feminism. Refracted through new technologies, film
not only provides the raw material for re-forging links across the great divide of the 1980s
but also suggests a metaphor for reflecting on the difficulty of time and history. “From this
perspective,” she writes, “feminist alternative histories, the reconfiguring of storytelling,
and the questioning of given patterns provides an invaluable point of departure” (ibid.).

So what are these alternative histories, these new points of departure? Or, to put it dif-
ferently, how might we begin to trace the spaces and places for feminist film theory today,
especially given recent accounts, including Mulvey’s own, that argue that film feminism
founded in the 1990s, unable to maintain the progressive optimism, enthusiasm, and
political activism that so marked its formation in the 1970s? To be sure, there are many
scholars who continue to engage in feminist scholarship and the process of its histori-
ography, and younger scholars (many of them included in this anthology) have shown a
renewed interest in feminist film theory as well. Established scholars, too, have endeavored
to recall the history of feminist film theory, most notably, for example, E. Ann Kaplan, in
her 2001 anthology Feminism and Film, which brought together major essays on feminist film
theory in an effort to trace that history from the 1970s to the new century. In 2004,
moreover, a special issue of the journal Signs explicitly aimed to address recent approaches
to feminist film theory. Co-edited by Kathleen McHugh and Vivian Sobchack, it was
entitled “Beyond the Gaze: Recent Approaches to Film Feminisms.” According to the
editors, the special issue sought to “provide a forum for the new film and media feminisms
emerging now, more than twenty-five years after the ‘first wave’ of feminist film theory.”
Invited participants were asked to assess the current state of the discipline as well as how the
field of film and media studies has changed over the past decades. The entries in the round
table—ten all together, including personal reflections from Lynn Spigel, Annette Kuhn,
Mary Ann Doane, E. Ann Kaplan, Laleen Jayamanne, Judith Mayne, Linda Williams, Anna
Everett, Laura Mulvey, and myself—represent a broad range of scholars and scholarship;
each participant came of age during a slightly different period in history, and each plays a
different role in relation to feminism, film, television, and media. Hence, I think this is a
useful way to sketch out developments in feminist film theory since the 1970s and beyond.

Importantly, this Signs “roundtable” was not really a “roundtable” in the conventional
sense at all; the respondents were never actually brought together for a discussion, and so the
various reflections are not part of a larger conversation, but rather statements based on
individual experiences, here expressed for the first time. It is nonetheless remarkable that at
least two of the participants shared very similar views, which surprisingly denigrate feminist
film theory as an orthodoxy even though it had otherwise been so important to their earlier
work. Linda Williams’s stance is obvious from the title of her essay, “Why I Did Not Want to
Write This Essay.” As she explains,

When I was asked to contribute to this roundtable, my first impulse was to duck.
Film feminisms are no longer the highest priority of my scholarship. Writing about
a field that had once felt very exciting … was, in the case of this essay ‘assignment,’
beginning to feel like an unwanted duty.

(Williams 2004: 1264)
She continues with the following statement:

Often I have the same experience teaching film theory in graduate seminars. I find I have more enthusiasm for Hugo Münsterberg than for Laura Mulvey ... I now feel weighed down by the burdens of what feels like orthodox feminist position taking. Looking at my writing over the past ten years, I also find a similar reluctance. I have not written a single thing with the word feminist in the title. Pressed by the editors of this volume to say something, I have decided to examine briefly what might be behind this personal backlash.

In an ironic reversal of Tania Modleski's 1991 book, *Feminism Without Women*, which scrutinizes both the triumph of male feminist perspectives as well as feminist disavowals of “woman” in the name of anti-essentialism, we now have not feminism without women but women without feminism, or rather, major feminist film theorists who no longer identify as such. Williams writes: “Feminist film and media scholarship must now compete with a wide number of other theories, other methods, other objects of study, some of which now seem more vital, more pressing.” She concludes her essay abruptly, and rather surprisingly, given what she has said up to this point: “While I understand that political and social realities have led some women to claim to be beyond feminism, for me it will always be the crucial foundation to whatever work I do in film and media” (Williams 2004: 1270). Thus, Williams has moved away from feminism but not entirely beyond it.

I do take Williams at her word that she has indeed never moved beyond feminism, which still informs her recent and important work, especially her work on porn and sexual politics more generally. Indeed, some of the most compelling recent feminist work on film (and media) has been devoted to exploring issues of privacy, policy, sexuality, and technology that had their origins in the 1970s sexual revolution; Williams and Constance Penley have been at the forefront of this work. And yet, Williams' expression of weariness with “orthodox feminist position taking” finds resonance as well in Lynn Spigel’s take on feminist television history in the *Signs* issue, where she provides similar insight into her views of feminist film theory, when she offers a personal account of archiving her collection of feminist texts after moving houses, which necessitated that she weed out her vast library. “To save space,” she writes,

I put my old feminist theory books down in the basement. This, for sure, was a meaningful gesture. It meant I no longer really regarded these books as “primary” texts I need for writing but rather as “storage.” Still, they are not just dusty remnants but rather a kind of quotidian archive, foundational for everything I write.

Like Williams, Spigel argues that feminist film theory remains foundational if no longer directly relevant to her work. For her part, Spigel directly locates the problem with feminist film theory in “psychoanalytic film theory’s universalizing aspects and blind spots, particularly with regard to issues of race and ethnicity” (ibid. 1211). Although she offers no further detail about these blind spots, the critique she poses here has been offered elsewhere. In an introduction to a special issue on “The Spectatrix” in *Camera Obscura* which they edited in 1989, Mary Ann Doane and Janet Bergstrom ask: “How has feminist film criticism,
which was marginal and controversial at the outset, come to be seen so quickly as an orthodoxy, a monolithic enterprise? To which they answer:

To some extent, this is undoubtedly linked to its alliance with psychoanalysis, which has always been confronted by the specter of orthodoxy. But it is also a function of feminist film criticism’s academic entrenchment. Critical and theoretical texts which conveyed a political and intellectual urgency in the 1970s have become part of a canon which graduate students must master for their oral exams or dissertation projects. … There is a feeling among many, whether they were veterans of the sixties or not, that feminist film and media theory has been cut off from its original sense of bold innovation and political purpose. It is time to reexamine our priorities and to remember a sense of shared goals in the light of our history over the past fifteen years, in order to renew the sense of vitality that once kept film studies from the self-perpetuating careerism that inevitably invades any academic (publish-or-perish) discipline.

(1989: 15–16)

Like Mulvey, Doane, and Bergstrom emphasize the need for film feminism to renew its sense of purpose. They also stress the need for feminists to forge bridges between generations and to reclaim their contested history—a call that has been answered by many feminist scholars over the years. Significantly, moreover, they locate a tendency on the part of scholars and critics to dismiss anything produced from a psychoanalytic framework or an ideological analysis which depends on its insights. Indeed, equating feminism with psychoanalysis and both with “orthodoxy” has become a shorthand way for some scholars to reject them both. And yet, even at the height of psychoanalytic feminist film theory, feminist film scholars explicitly recognized the limitations of the psychoanalytic framework. Writing in 1991, for instance, Mary Ann Doane explained:

Much of my own work has been shaped by the conviction that psychoanalysis was a particularly appropriate methodology for deciphering the psychical operations of the cinema and its impact upon the spectator. But this belief always existed in an uneasy tension with the simultaneous conviction that psychoanalysis was most significantly about the limits and instability of such knowledge, about the decenteredness of the investigative position itself as the effect of the unconscious.

(1991: 7)

Doane goes on to say, “When my work is unproblematically labeled ‘psychoanalytic,’ there is, I think, a failure to register the wariness in my relation to psychoanalysis which is legible in the earliest essays” (ibid.).

By way of a conclusion, allow me to offer some final thoughts about the spaces and places for feminist film theory today, particularly in view of the many claims that feminist film theory has died or failed, or that feminist film theory is over, or that the cinema itself is at an end. On the one hand, as I have just described, there are major film scholars who formerly identified as feminist that now disavow that label; on the other hand, there are theorists like Jack Halberstam, whose book Gaga Feminism: Sex, Gender, and the End of Normal (2012) explicitly aims to reinvent feminism for a new generation, showing how Lady Gaga’s sexual politics and performative style opens up new possibilities for sex and gender models in the digital age. Halberstam sees Lady Gaga as an exemplar of a new kind of feminism that
privileges gender and sexual fluidity, and his book has been described as “part handbook, part guidebook, and part sex manual … the first book to take seriously the collapse of heterosexuality and find signposts in the wreckage to a new and different way of doing sex” (ibid. back cover). While I am less certain that heterosexuality has entirely collapsed (although I understand the aspirational nature of the claim), I am interested in the way that Halberstam explains his approach to the topic:

[A]s someone for whom feminism was formative and foundational as a political discourse, I am stunned at how disinterested people are in feminism now. And when I say “people” I mean young people, popular audiences, intellectuals, and so on. I believe that part of the split between the perceived anachronism of feminism and the perceived coolness of queer theory can be traced back to the sex wars of the 1980s and the homogenizing popular representations of feminism as anti-sex, anti-male, white and essentialist. I’m not interested in returning to those debates so much as opening up our definitions of feminism—rewriting its genealogies, reframing its theoretical contributions, recasting its contemporary political frames. (Potter, 5 December 2012)

In line with other scholars, many of whose work is included in this volume, new trajectories of feminist insight into cinema and its future (from climate trauma and eco-feminism, to post-human and animal studies) have a great deal to gain from feminist theory.

If feminist film theory in the seventies was explicitly political and polemical, as Mulvey and others have claimed, it seems fair to say that feminist film scholarship in the beginning of the twenty-first century is academic and archival in objective and aim. But what is gained and what is lost in this shift in focus—beyond the obvious move from a critique of cinema to an affirmation of its heterogeneity? Why has early cinema, for example, emerged in our own time as the site for explicitly feminist work? Feminist historians have argued that early cinema affords insights into our own global media culture and to the role of women in that culture. They have also demonstrated through archival research that women were given far more roles and agency in the early days of cinema in terms of their involvement in production on multiple levels. Thus, while our own time—marked by the end of the Cold War, the electronic media revolution, and the restructuring of global capital—certainly bears comparison with the development of international media economy in the turn of the last century, the status of women in media production today is actually worse than in the early part of the twentieth century, as women remain marginalized in the industry, discriminated against even within the more progressive terrain of the New Queer Cinema.

There are always generational and personal factors that explain how and why scholars deemphasize the theoretical knowledge that was previously foundational for their thinking, and yet such practices nevertheless carry institutional and disciplinary consequences and risks. In addition to passing on historical gaps to new generations of students and scholars alike, the practice of consigning feminist film theory to the dustbin of history or characterizing it as essentially anti-sex, anti-male, or simply not rigorously theoretical (as Rodowick does) ultimately encourages less critical and, ultimately, less historical and nuanced scholarship.

Given the revisions to the history of film theory that are now being written in our field, it is important to emphasize once again that feminist film history gains nothing from disowning its origins, whether in activism, the academy, or in relation to psychoanalysis. As I have written before, women “film pioneers” can be found in not only the archives,
documents, and incomplete prints of early cinema. They exist also in our very midst, in the writings and essays and books of those feminist theorists who, years ago, and still today, engaged in debates about textual analysis, visual pleasure, progressive texts, and ideological formations, all in an effort to insist on the centrality of feminist issues to film theoretical concerns. As Mulvey explained, for many writing in the 1970s, the cinema as a medium seemed uniquely positioned to articulate the desire for a better world. But it was not the cinema alone, but also feminist film theory, which was so positioned, and the desire for a better world still remains, both in film and media and in feminist approaches to them.

**Related topics**

Sandra Ponzanesi, “Postcolonial and transnational approaches to film and feminism”

Kristin Lene Hole, “Fantasy echoes and the future anterior of cinema and gender”

**Notes**


2 Stanley Cavell, Letter, *Critical Inquiry*, vol. 17, no. 1 (Autumn 1990), 239. It is important to note that Cavell’s remarks about feminist film theory (which run to seven pages) were written in response to Tania Modleski’s letter to the *Critical Inquiry* editors, in which she takes issue with the press and with Cavell’s pair of essays, “Ugly Duckling, Funny Butterfly; Bette Davis and Now, *Voyager*,” and “Postscript (1989): To Whom it May Concern,” both of which were published in *Critical Inquiry* in its Winter 1990 issue. Modleski (in a single paragraph) criticizes the journal for publishing these essays, because Cavell fails to cite any previous scholarship on the films he discussed. Modleski writes: “Inasmuch as Cavell, despite this specific charge against feminists, fails to name them (Doane, Jacobs, LaPlace, and others have written powerful critiques of Now, *Voyager* and other Bette Davis films), and inasmuch as *Critical Inquiry* exempts Cavell from the minimal requirements of scholarship, both parties perpetuate the very condition being analyzed: they participate in a system in which women go unrecognized, their voices unheard, their identities ‘unknown.’” It is no small irony that in his companion volume to *Elegy for Theory*, entitled *Philosophy’s Artful Conversation* (Harvard University Press, 2015), Rodowick—in the only extended film analysis he provides in either this or his 2014 book—takes up *Now, Voyager* to demonstrate his Cavellian approach to film analysis. And just like Cavell twenty-five years earlier, Rodowick never mentions any feminist work on the film—not Mary Ann Doane, or Lea Jacobs, or Maria LaPlace, or even more recent work by younger scholars, such as Alison McKee (see Alison McKee, *The Woman’s Film of the 1940s: Gender, Narrative, and History* (Routledge Press, 2014). Instead, he writes: “In the recent past and still current context of theory, the temptation to apply a critical template that reads these films as narratives of the redomestication of women and the management of heteronormative desire is strong. But this would be too easy.” (256).

3 For an extended discussion of this issue, see my chapter, “Film Feminism and Nostalgia for the Seventies,” in *Aftershocks of the New: Feminism and Film History* (Rutgers University Press 2002).

4 The 2012 interview from which this quotation was taken is no longer online. For a related interview, see “B. Ruby Rich Discusses Queer Films on the Festival Circuit,” www.youtube.com/watch?v=5rlqaJ4iZI (accessed August 15, 2016).


7 I have made this argument in *Aftershocks of the New: Feminism and Film History* (2002); see Chapter 9, “Film Feminism and Nostalgia for the Seventies.”
I have written more extensively about this in my own contribution to the special issue of Signs; see, Patrice Petro, “Reflections on Feminist Film Studies, Early and Late,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, special issue on “Film Feminisms,” vol. 20, no. 1 (Autumn 2004), 1272–8.

Bibliography


