


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## The Routledge Handbook Of Philosophy Of Well-Being

Guy Fletcher

### Friendship and well-being

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# 19

## FRIENDSHIP AND WELL-BEING

*Diane Jeske*

I'm out of those chains, those chains that bind you  
That is why I'm here to remind you

What do you get when you fall in love?  
You only get lies and pain and sorrow  
So for at least until tomorrow  
I'll never fall in love again

*(I'll Never Fall in Love Again: music by Burt Bacharach, lyrics  
by Hal David)*

### Introduction

It seems to be so obvious that friends give our lives meaning and value that it almost seems perverse for a philosopher to question the relationship between friendship and well-being. We are far better off with friends than without them, and surely that is the end of the story. Perhaps the philosopher can sensibly analyze just *how* friendship contributes to our well-being, and explore the ways in which various conceptions of well-being accommodate the contributions of friendship. But surely our starting point must be the claim that friendship is a central component of our welfare.

I think, however, that this would be a mistake, a mistake that has been fed by the ways in which, ever since Aristotle, philosophers have approached friendship. Philosophical theorizing on the nature and value of friendship has often lapsed into either idealization or over-intellectualizing (or both). We have a tendency to focus on the best aspects and best examples of friendship and also on the best examples of friends, including the best versions of ourselves as parties to those relationships. Further, in thinking about the role of friendship in the good life, it is natural to compare a life with friends to a life totally devoid of friends. However, such a contrast can obscure the benefits and burdens of *particular* friendships. It can also mislead us in that we may make assumptions about the friendless individual that are the result of prejudice—"Who could possibly be without friends? What must be wrong with such a person?"—thereby making judgments about friendship based on features of the person or of her circumstances that are extrinsic to friendship itself.

The previous two paragraphs are not leading to a defense of a friendless life. Rather, my aim in this paper is to try to distinguish the merely *causal effects* of friendship on the way that our lives

are going from the *necessary* contributions of friendship to our well-being. And, in order to do this, we need to consider friendship in its various forms, from the ideal to the not so ideal, and to consider various types of friends, from the virtuous to the just not very nice, from the witty and charming to the dull and tedious, from the happy-go-lucky to the chronically depressed, from the wealthy and generous to the strapped and/or just plain stingy. Are we necessarily better off for having friends, no matter what our nature, our friends' nature, or the particularities of the friendship?

Clearly, the answer to this question depends on both our conception of friendship and on our conception of well-being. In the section on the best of friends I will discuss the Aristotelian conception of friendship<sup>1</sup> in order to substitute for it, for the remainder of the paper, what I regard as a less idealized and thus more plausible conception of friendship.

In the section on pleasure, desire, and friendship I will discuss the connection between friendship and well-being if we adopt some version of a hedonist or desire-satisfaction theory of well-being. On such conceptions of well-being, it will become clear, whether any particular friendship makes one's life better overall depends upon contingent features of the psychology of the individual and the nature of the particular friendship. But this shouldn't be at all surprising, given that, on such conceptions of well-being, the contribution of just about anything will be contingent on human psychology and empirical circumstances. This, of course, is in contrast to an objective goods theory (in the section on friendship as an objective good), according to which certain states of affairs are necessarily valuable, independently of people's contingent attitudes toward those states of affairs. The question is whether the state of affairs of two persons' being friends should be regarded as such an objective good and also how such a good is to be weighed against other objective goods.

Finally, I will address those who claim that the good of our friends is not metaphysically distinct from our good, i.e., that their good is a part of our good in the same way that the good of my future self is part of my own overall good. Such views are attempting to provide philosophical substance to Aristotle's claim that a friend is another self. But even these views, I argue, fail to support the claim that we are necessarily better off for having friends.

### The best of friends

As I said in the introduction, I am not interested in interpretation of Aristotle's text, but, rather, in what has come to be known as Aristotle's conception of friendship. Whatever Aristotle really means to be saying in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, there is a well-known reading of the text that is influential and useful as a starting point.<sup>2</sup>

Aristotle distinguishes three types of friendship: friendships for pleasure, friendships for advantage or utility, and friendships between virtuous persons, this last being what he calls "complete friendship." Even if Aristotle thinks that the first two are genuine friendships, i.e., that they fall under the same univocal concept of friendship as does the last, it is clear that he thinks that the last, between two persons of virtue, is the best sort of friendship.<sup>3</sup> Friendships for pleasure and for advantage are distinguished via the attitudes that the parties to the relationship have to each other: friends for pleasure enjoy one another's company, whereas friends for advantage derive some other good—business deals, social status, fashion aid—from their relationship with each other. So friendships for pleasure are specific types of friendship for advantage where the end sought is the pleasure derived from the company of the friend. In these sorts of friendship—both that for advantage and that for pleasure—the friend is viewed purely instrumentally<sup>4</sup>: she is viewed as a means to some benefit for the agent herself, and that benefit is the motivation to enter into and to maintain the friendship. If my friend becomes dull and depressing or ceases to

be able to help me to make business connections or to dress fashionably, I then have no motivation to maintain the friendship or to exhibit special concern for my friend.

In friendships between the virtuous, however, the parties to the friendship care about each other for the other's own sake, i.e., they do not view the other purely instrumentally. Given that they love each other for the other's own sake, in order for their love to be justified, each must be virtuous, because virtue is worthy of love—if I am less than virtuous, then my character is not an appropriate object of love. If you have other goals—pleasure, honor, etc.—then you can love me as a means to those ends, but only my virtue makes me lovable for my own sake.<sup>5</sup> Aristotle says that “loving is the virtue of friends. And so friends whose love corresponds to their friends' worth are enduring friends and have an enduring friendship” (1159a35).

In an Aristotelian complete friendship, friends are “other selves” because they mirror each other in virtue. Each party to the relationship can, in admiring and loving the character of the other, thereby contemplate her own character, and can love her friend in the same way that she loves herself, i.e., in response to her virtue. Conversation and time spent together in virtuous activity can support and develop the character of the friends, both in respect of their virtue and in respect of their other capacities (1170a10ff.). These complete friendships will last, because virtue is enduring and virtuous people, in agreeing upon ends, will avoid conflict. They also will not cease to enjoy one another's company, because they will not cease to enjoy the contemplation of the virtue of the other, being virtuous themselves.

What is interesting about Aristotle's account is that he recognizes, at least in some sense, that friendships can vary quite a bit. Also, he makes it the case that for each type of friendship, its endurance is correlated with its contribution to the agent's well-being. Friendships for pleasure and for advantage last as long as the agent continues to derive the relevant advantage from the relationship. Complete friendships last “forever” because the virtue of those involved lasts as long as they live, and “in loving their friend they love what is good for themselves; for when a good person becomes a friend he becomes a good for his friend” (1157b30).

I think that we get closest to the truth about friendship if we start from the idea that friendships vary quite a bit. I think that Aristotle latched on to some important features that friendships often exhibit. Where he went wrong was in thinking that these features are only exhibited by, or only “completely” exhibited by, friendships between virtuous persons. So let's consider these features:

1. Friends must exhibit mutual concern for each other, and this concern must be for the other's own sake. (See Aristotle 1985: 1155b30ff.)

Aristotle claims that only in complete friendships can the agent care about her friend *for the sake of the friend*—in friendships for advantage or pleasure, the friend is cared about as a means to the procurement of some good for the agent. Even if we agree with Aristotle that friends must exhibit special concern for each other that is not purely instrumental, there is no reason to suppose that such concern only occurs in his complete friendships. Two people can be drawn to each other for any number of reasons—they find each other funny, intelligent, sexy, helpful, etc. Our motivations for initiating a friendship with someone may be our own advantage of some sort, but our interactions with that person can lead us to care about her for her own sake, even if she is not virtuous. Whether such concern or love is justified is another matter entirely—my point here is that, as a matter of psychological fact, it certainly seems that two less-than-virtuous people can care about each other for the other's own sake, even if their own advantage was (and perhaps, continues to be) a major motivation for being in the relationship.

2. Friends must have spent time with one another, or have causally interacted in some other relevant way. (See Aristotle 1985: 1156b25.)

Friendship, as Aristotle points out, cannot happen immediately. Whether or not there is a possibility of love at first sight, it is certainly the case that there is no possibility of friendship at first sight. Friendship does involve certain kinds of emotional attitudes—some sort of concern, liking, love, fondness, etc.—but friendship is not merely the having of those attitudes. Friends have a history with one another, a history of interaction, and this interaction must reveal, in some way, their concern for one another. In most cases, we would expect that friends enjoy at least some of their interactions with one another.

3. Friends must, in some sense, have knowledge of each other. (Again, see Aristotle 1985: 1156b25.)

We seem to know our friends in ways that we do not know other people and in ways in which other people do not know our friends. It is, however, difficult to spell out how exactly this is the case. I have argued elsewhere<sup>6</sup> that we can have many false beliefs about our friends, even false beliefs about central elements of their character and values. For example, in the film *The Third Man*, Holly Martins learns that his old buddy Harry Lime has been involved in very nefarious dealings and is essentially amoral. It seems to me correct to suppose that Holly and Harry really were friends, in spite of Holly's ignorance of Harry's character.

We certainly do not want to understand friends as always knowing *more* about each other than those who stand in no friendship to the persons involved. For example, Paul may tell much more about himself to his psychiatrist than he reveals to his best friend Peter. I don't think that anyone would think that this undermines the claim that Paul and Peter are good friends.

So what is the special way in which friends know one another? I think that this will vary from friendship to friendship. Much of what we know about our friends is experiential in nature—what it is like to be cheered up or consoled by my friend, what it is like to laugh at shared jokes, what it was like when we did such and such, etc. We cannot quantify such knowledge. Often, friends will say that they see a “side” of each other that most others don't see, where that “side” amounts to may not be explicable merely by stating facts that have been revealed by the friend—it's a way of acting and of interacting that is unique to *us*.

The features that I have listed—mutual special concern, causal interaction, special knowledge—corral together a range of relationships. I think that it is futile to try to give precise necessary and sufficient conditions for a relationship to be a friendship, but I do think that it is clear that we can reject the idea that the parties to the relationship need to be fully or even partially virtuous. As for the rest, perhaps the three conditions above need to be met to some degree, but in what ways and to what degrees will vary from one friendship to another. I suspect that there is probably indeterminacy with respect to whether some relationships are friendships—this can be seen best if we ask about a past friendship, “when did it end?” I doubt that there will be a clear dividing line at some time such that before that time there was a friendship, but not afterwards.

And friendships do end: even very good friendships can end, due to changes in circumstances. So Aristotle's claim that the best friendships must endure seems false to me—a certain friendship may be extremely important and meaningful while I am in my 20s, but play far less of a role or indeed no role at all in my life when I am in my 40s. There is no reason to suppose that I cannot have special concern for a person for her own sake for some limited period of time.

So let's take this more open-ended and inclusive conception of friendship and consider what role it plays in our well-being.

## **Pleasure, desire, and friendship**

In this section, I am going to consider how friends figure into our well-being according to hedonistic and desire-satisfaction theories of well-being. For each of these two types of theory there are many variations, but I am not going to consider all of them. Rather, I am going to try to remain neutral with respect to questions about the nature of pleasure and desire and, thus, talk about hedonism and desire-satisfaction theories in general terms. Hopefully, what I say will apply (with perhaps slight modification) to various versions of these theories.

Hedonists claim that all and only pleasure has intrinsic value. Whatever it is that causes me to experience pleasure—eating pie, playing with my cat, teaching philosophy—has instrumental value in so far as it is a means to intrinsically valuable pleasure. Importantly, it is an entirely contingent matter for a hedonist as to what has instrumental value, because it is an entirely contingent matter as to what causes a person to experience pleasure. Further, what causes pleasure for me—such as eating pie—might not cause pleasure for Ali, who dislikes pie, and what causes pleasure for me at one time—I used to really enjoy running—might not do so at a later time, after my knees have been destroyed by years of pounding the pavement.

So let's suppose that Ali is my friend. Thus, I have special concern for Ali for his own sake. In so far as I am concerned about him, I will take pleasure in his pleasure, so I have a source of pleasure in my friends. In most cases, I will enjoy—at least some of the time—spending time with Ali. Ali will also have special concern for me for my own sake, so he will most likely, when able, put forth effort to see that I am enjoying myself. Thus, friendship, as we know, is often a source of pleasure, and, thus, can contribute to our well-being.

But now we have to look at the flip side of this coin. Just as I will take pleasure in Ali's pleasure, I will be pained in so far as I am aware that he is suffering. The extent to which I enjoy my time with Ali will depend upon our circumstances: if he is ill, either mentally or physically, then my concern will lead me to help him, but if my help is futile, my time spent with him will be difficult and frustrating. And, if Ali is ill, he may not be in a position to promote my pleasure in any way. So friendship can also often be a source of pain.

Hedonists, then, cannot hold any necessary truths about the effects of friendship on our well-being. Whether any particular friendship brings us, on balance, more pleasure than pain will depend upon the nature of the friend and the nature of the circumstances in which both I and my friend find ourselves. The hedonist cannot assert that friendship is essential to well-being.

The same is true of the desire-satisfaction theorist who claims that all and only the satisfaction of intrinsic desires has intrinsic value, where *S* intrinsically desires *X* if and only if *S* desires *S* as an end (or, for its own sake) and not merely as a means to something other than *X*. Just as it is a purely contingent matter whether, say, eating pie, gives Ali pleasure, so it is a purely contingent matter whether Ali wants to eat pie or to get the pleasure of eating pie.

If Ali is my friend, we have mutual special concern for each other. Thus, each of us will want to promote the other's well-being: if Ali does well, then I will have my desires satisfied, and if I do well, then he will have his desires satisfied. So friends will often have instrumental value in so far as they are people disposed to promote our welfare. Whether they actually do have instrumental value will depend upon our situation—do they have the resources to actually help us as they want to do? Similarly, the well-being of my friends will satisfy my desires but whether those desires are satisfied is a matter of the extent to which I (and others) am able to help them. For example, if my friend is dying of a painful and debilitating disease, then my desires with respect to him will inevitably be frustrated—he cannot do well and I cannot help to promote his well-being.

It is of course true that in many cases I will share interests with my friends and want to spend time with them. But, again, such desires may or may not be satisfied—perhaps my friend is in

the army and has been posted to Afghanistan. In such a case, I may not even have my desire to know that my friend is alive satisfied very often. The bottom line for the desire-satisfaction theorist, as for the hedonist, is that whether any particular friendship makes my life go better is a purely contingent matter dependent upon the circumstances in which my friend and I find ourselves.<sup>7</sup>

Once we abandon the requirement that genuine or true friendship requires virtue in the parties to the friendship, we face further ways in which friendship can actually hinder rather than promote our well-being. As Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett (2000) point out in “Friendship and Moral Danger,” our friends can get themselves into moral and/or legal trouble and leave us with the difficult choice as to whether to help them “bury the bodies” as it were. Whatever we do, we will experience pain and have severely frustrated desires.

So, if we are hedonists or desire-satisfaction theorists, what is the lesson that we should draw about friendship? I think that the lesson is that friendship is a risk, something of a crap-shoot in fact. Given that we cannot have full knowledge of other people, any particular friendship may, on balance, provide us with more pain than pleasure, more frustration than satisfaction. On either theory, it is possible that some individual *S* would have been better off having no friends rather than having the friends that *S* had in the circumstances in which *S* and her friends found themselves. You may think that a friendless life is unlikely to be a very good life—no shared joys and triumphs, no shoulder to cry on, no private inside jokes, no companionship—but it still, under certain circumstances, may be better than a life with friends.

Some people will take this as an argument against hedonism and desire-satisfaction theories. Surely, they will say, a good life *requires* friends—no one can be well off without friends, and friends always make our lives better rather than worse. To make this the case, we would need a theory according to which something internal to friendship has great value—enough to outweigh the disvalue of any pain or frustration caused by friendship. So let’s consider that sort of a theory.

### Friendship as an objective good

In *Principia Ethica* (1993), G.E. Moore claimed that we can divide “all the greatest goods we know into the two classes of aesthetic enjoyments, on the one hand, and the pleasures of human intercourse or of personal affection, on the other” (251). Moore’s own discussion, in the pages that follow this claim, has a decidedly Aristotelian flavor: he seems to attribute intrinsic value to affection that takes as its object “admirable mental qualities” or to the complex of the affection and the admirable qualities which it takes as its object.<sup>8</sup> But because we have set aside the Aristotelian view, let’s consider a modified Moorean view according to which a state of affairs consisting of an attitude of affection and the person who is the object of that affection is intrinsically good.

Using Moore’s isolation test, it seems to me that this is a plausible claim. If I imagine two worlds in which I hold everything constant except that in World *A* Richard is indifferent toward Diane and in World *B* Richard regards Diane with personal affection, it seems as though *B* is clearly the better of the two worlds.<sup>9</sup> Given the role of personal affection and/or concern in friendship, we can see that, if the modified Moorean view is right, then friendship will always add something good to the life of the friends: they will be parts of valuable states of affairs both as the subjects and as the objects of personal affection.

But it would be a strange theory of intrinsic value according to which *only* personal affection had intrinsic value. Further, that which has intrinsic value may be instrumentally bad. If Diane develops a painful illness that is gradually killing her, Richard’s affection for Diane is an important causal factor in Richard’s grief and depression: there is nothing more painful and frustrating than to watch someone about whom we care suffer and not be able to do anything about it.

Richard's grief and depression may interfere with his ability to enjoy his other activities and relationships. So it looks as though Richard's personal affection for Diane (and hers for him) has positive intrinsic value but very negative instrumental value. Thus, his friendship with Diane contributes both to his life going better and to his life going worse.

One might, however, in a Moorean spirit,<sup>10</sup> say that affection is not the only thing that has intrinsic value but that it is a necessary constituent of any whole's having intrinsic value. So a life with lots of pleasure and knowledge, say, but no affection, would have no intrinsic value, a life with affection but no pleasure or knowledge would have intrinsic value, while a life with affection, pleasure, and knowledge would have even more intrinsic value. According to this view, then, friendship would be necessary for a good life if affection always brought friendship along with it. Of course, accepting this view requires accepting some view akin to Moore's view about organic wholes, and also some account of why pleasure, for example, only has intrinsic value if it is experienced by someone who is both the subject and the object of personal affection. We do often speak about how a pleasure shared is always better, but this is clearly not true—think, for example, of gaining solitary sexual pleasure from a fantasy that one wants to make sure that no one else knows about. It seems somewhat implausible and mysterious to me why such a pleasure would only have intrinsic value if the person experiencing it had friends. One could say that the pleasure does have some value, but that the agent's whole life will lack the enormous value that it would have if it contained not only pleasure but also friendship. For our purposes here, what is important is how many controversial claims we would need to adopt in order to render friendship essential to well-being or to any high level of well-being.

Many people want to say that it is always better to have a friend than to not have a friend. What I have argued in the above is that this is—setting aside the organic wholes view just discussed—clearly not true, and that it is difficult to see how it could be. But we have to be careful about what inferences we draw here. Suppose that Ali asks Richard whether, given his, Richard's, grief and depression over Diane's suffering and impending death, Richard wishes that he had never become friends with Diane. Diane will hope that Richard will say, as many good friends would, "Of course not. I just wish that I could do something to alleviate her suffering." Is this a rational response on Richard's part?

What is important is that Richard's reasons have altered from the time before he befriended Diane to the time at which Ali asks his question. His concern for Diane provides him with new reasons, including reasons to avoid, if he, *per impossible*, could alter the past and never become friends with Diane. When we care about someone, what we want is not to not be affected by or to be ignorant of her suffering, but to alleviate her suffering. And if friendship itself generates reasons,<sup>11</sup> then Richard has reason to maintain and act on his special concern for Diane even in situations where the friendship is painful and frustrating. So some of our intuitions about our responses concerning our friends may have to do with our reasons to act rather than with how our friends and friendships are contributing to our own well-being.

### Friends as other selves

Aristotle famously said that friends are other selves. This claim could be read as having non-literal meaning, and that is how most of us would understand it: our friends share our triumphs and defeats, they empathize with us, they share our interests, etc. Others, however, have argued that friends are other selves in a more literal sense.

David Brink (1990) has argued that the well-being of our friends is literally a part of our own well-being in the same way that the well-being of our future selves is a part of our overall



well-being. He arrives at this conclusion by appealing to a psychological reductionist theory of personal identity. The psychological reductionist claims that me-now is identical with some past person-slice or future person-slice if and only if me-now stands in the relation of psychological continuity with that past or future person-slice.<sup>12</sup> For our purposes here, we can understand two person-slices as psychologically continuous with one another if and only if those two slices are connected via a sequence of psychologically connected slices, and two slices are psychologically connected if there are sufficient memory, personality, character, and other psychological causal connections between them.<sup>13</sup>

According to the psychological reductionist, the connections that hold between me-now and me-at-some-other-time are not in kind different from the connections that hold between me-now and my friend-now.<sup>14</sup> What makes my friend-now distinct from me is not the type of connections between us but, rather, the number and strength of such connections. Thus, Brink argues, if we are to regard the welfare of me-at-some-later-time as part of my own overall welfare, we have the same sort of reason to regard the welfare of my friend as part of my own overall welfare. According to Brink, then, we cannot assess how my life is going without considering how my friend's life is going.

If Brink is right, then, of course, whatever reasons I have to promote my own good I also have to promote the good of my friends. According to this view, there are more sources of good available to me than if the good of my friends was not part of my own good, but there are also more sources of bad available to me. So even if my friends' well-being is literally a part of my own, it will be a purely contingent matter as to whether any particular friendship makes my life go better: if my friend leads a charmed life, my life goes better, but if she gets killed in a death camp, that makes my life go worse, even if I never know about her fate.

So Brink's view does not make friendship essential to well-being. Further, there is a serious issue regarding the plausibility of his view. Even if we accept psychological reductionism, we also have to accept that there is a very real difference between one's own pains and the pains of one's friend: I am directly aware of my own pains but not of the pain of my friends. However the psychological reductionist wants to cash that out—perhaps in terms of a pain state and an awareness directed at the pain state being bundled together—it remains the case that me-now contains no such awareness states directed at Ali's pain or pleasure states. Ali may be experiencing excruciating pain right now and I might never even be aware of that fact. This seems to me to be a serious worry about Brink's view.<sup>15</sup>

## Conclusion

Should we be surprised or worried to discover that friendship is not essential to a good life and that any particular friendship could remain a genuine friendship and yet make our lives go worse than if we had never had that friendship? I am inclined to think not. People can matter to us, be important to us, without its being the case that they make our lives go better. Their mattering to us does mean that our well-being is causally tied to their well-being: we will want them to do well and we will experience pleasure when they are doing well. Similarly, we will feel pain when they are faring poorly and we will desire that their suffering cease. Caring about people can bring us joy and make us feel fulfilled, but it can also bring us sorrow and grief, and make us feel empty, abandoned, and impotent. We are not, as a matter of fact, going to stop having friends, so we just need to hope for the best, for their sakes and for our own. As the song says, we may get only pain and sorrow from love and friendship, but we'll be back for more.

## Notes

- 1 Whether what I am calling the Aristotelian conception of friendship is really Aristotle's is a question of exegesis that goes far beyond the scope of this paper. See Note 3 below.
- 2 All quotations from the *Nichomachean Ethics* are from the translation by Terence Irwin (1985).
- 3 Aristotle says that "the friendship of good people in so far as they are good is friendship in the primary way, and to the full extent; and the others are friendships by similarity" (*NE* 1157a30). Much more discussion would be needed here to try to figure out precisely in what sense, according to Aristotle, friendship for pleasures or advantage are friendships.
- 4 This is true at least with respect to the attitudes that distinguish the friendship. One could accept that all persons are such that their good, in and of itself, provides one with a reason to promote that good, independent of how the promotion of their good affects one's own good. The *additional* attitudes that are present due to the friendship involve viewing the friend purely instrumentally. (I have no idea whether Aristotle would regard this as a friendly or as an unwelcome amendment to his theory.)
- 5 The pleasant and useful are lovable, but if my friends are pleasant or useful, then they are lovable as means to the pleasure and utility.
- 6 I discuss this in my "False Friends" (unpublished).
- 7 I have not separately addressed informed desire-satisfaction theories, because it does not seem that the requirement that the agent have sufficient or full information will change my argument here. In fact, if an individual had full information about a potential friend's character and/or future, she might have very good reason to avoid friendship with that person if she can see that such a friendship will bring her, on balance, greater frustration as opposed to satisfaction. Unless full information involved knowledge of the intrinsic value of friendship, my central claims about desire-satisfaction theories hold if we require an informed agent.
- 8 Moore does say that such a whole will have even greater value if it is "combined with an appreciation of the appropriate *corporeal* expression of the mental qualities in question" (252).
- 9 I am here assuming that we accept that there is an objective property of intrinsic goodness. Defending such a claim is well beyond the scope of this paper.
- 10 See Moore's (1993) discussion of organic wholes (79ff.).
- 11 See my *Rationality and Moral Theory: How Intimacy Generates Reasons*.
- 12 I am playing fast and loose with the person-slice language here. First, I am leaving it open as to whether the psychological reductionist holds that the person is a temporally extended entity or that the person exists entirely at any single moment, i.e., I am not committing to an endurance view as opposed to a perdurance view or vice versa. And, of course, me-now, considered as a temporal part, is not literally identical to some me-in-the-future temporal part.
- 13 What counts as sufficient can vary from context to context and may depend on the nature of the connections and their strength. See Parfit (1984), *Reasons and Persons*.
- 14 Of course, memory is a special case, but it also presents difficulties in the intrapersonal case. See Shoemaker (1959), "Personal Identity and Memory."
- 15 If the bundle that is me-now did contain a state of awareness directed at Ali's pain state (why that pain state wouldn't then be part of my bundle, I don't know), then it does seem right that Ali's pain state is bad for me in the same way that my pain state is bad for me. But, at least in my experience, it just doesn't work that way.

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