


This article was downloaded by: 10.3.97.143

On: 02 Dec 2023

Access details: *subscription number*

Publisher: *Routledge*

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK



## **Routledge Handbook of Democratization in Africa**

Gabrielle Lynch, Peter VonDoepp

### **Voting behavior**

Publication details

<https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315112978-14>

James D. Long

**Published online on: 22 Jul 2019**

**How to cite :-** James D. Long. 22 Jul 2019, *Voting behavior from:* Routledge Handbook of Democratization in Africa Routledge

Accessed on: 02 Dec 2023

<https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315112978-14>

**PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT**

Full terms and conditions of use: <https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms>

This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

# 13

## VOTING BEHAVIOR

*James D. Long*

Over the past thirty years, elections have become the core institutional mechanism that African voters use to select their leaders. While in some contexts members of the *ancien régime* proved capable of exerting power to remain in office after transitional elections, in others, electoral contests resulted in the downfall of entrenched political elites. As the pace of elections has grown, new and shifting political coalitions have proven increasingly competitive. These trends towards democratic deepening receive popular approval from African citizens, who participate in elections at consistently high rates.

At the same time, elections have also ignited deep social divisions, generating a “winner-take-all” mentality among some politicians and voters. In these cases, electoral competition can spark conflict between political actors, who often deploy divisive campaign messages, attempts to rig the process, intimidation, and violence to win office (Adejumobi 2000). If voters either explicitly or tacitly support these methods, elections in Africa may not deliver the promises of democratic consolidation, but could instead cause reversion or breakdown. Therefore, central to understanding variation in democratic outcomes in Africa lie the factors that shape Africans’ electoral participation and voting decisions.

What motivates voting behavior in Africa? An important scholarship has tackled this question since the continent’s “third wave” transition (Nwosu 2012), focusing on the drivers of voter mobilization (turnout) and ballot selection (vote choice). Despite the conjecture that elections ought to produce good governance and political accountability, many observers take a skeptical view of the extent to which African voting behavior reflects attempts by citizens to discipline politicians (Collier 2007). Reflecting common narratives in the popular media (Chege 2010), many studies highlight the primacy of social identity as a motivating force in political behavior (Berman, Eyoh, and Kymlicka 2005). According to this perspective, given the salience of ethnic identity in Africa during election periods, candidates rely on ethnic appeals to garner support and voters coordinate to elect co-ethnic leaders to further narrow group interests. Elections generate little more than a “tyranny of numbers,” when vote outcomes mirror demographic patterns and reinforce ethnic divisions (Githuku 2013).

However, election results do not always reflect ethnic headcounts or bloc-voting in Africa because politicians cannot always rely solely on co-ethnic support to win office (Elischer 2013). At the presidential level, many voters do not have the choice of a co-ethnic, and for local races, voters often choose between co-ethnics. Voters also frequently express considerations of

government performance and policy adoption in their electoral decisions, and individuals are potentially influenced by a candidate's regional, religious, class, generational, and gender identity. Ethnicity may also indirectly shape substantive concerns, like evaluations of candidates and their promises, if voters view them through an ethnic lens. Therefore, beyond ethnicity's direct influence on vote choices, scholars examine additional factors to explain voting patterns, including judgments of political parties and candidates.

This chapter reviews the multidisciplinary literature on African voting behavior on the existence, motivations, and salience of ethnic, performance, and policy factors to explain electoral choices. It first outlines each approach's theoretical logic and empirical implications, and then reviews data sources and methods employed to test hypotheses. The chapter concludes with a discussion of important open questions that arise from prior work and the agenda they set for future research.

### How do voters decide?

Political economy approaches to democracy advance elections as a critical mechanism for citizens to obtain political accountability from leaders (Barro 1973). Over time, elections should produce better outcomes from leaders as they improve their behavior anticipating the competition for reelection (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999). This logic generated enthusiasm for the reform potential provided by Africa's transition to electoral democracy in the 1980s and 1990s (Olukoshi 1998).

Less clear are the specific considerations that play a role in shaping voters' decisions, including whom to reward and punish, how, and why. Citizens confront numerous challenges assessing the quality of candidates since, *ex ante*, individuals do not know how a politician or party will fair if elected. To overcome informational deficiencies and improve their likelihood of choosing candidates representing their interests, voters employ informational "cues," or heuristics, to make a best guess (Downs 1957). Cues "enable voters to call on beliefs about people and government from which they can generate or recall scenarios, or 'scripts'" (Popkin 1994, 16). An example of such cognitive shortcuts that are often salient to voters includes party labels: knowing a candidate's party membership helps voters recollect the party's past performance to form assessments about the credibility of their promises and likely actions.

Many countries transitioning to democracy, including some in Africa, often lack stable parties and party systems to demonstrate records that are reliable predictors of future performance. New electoral competitors, without records on which to compete, often cannot credibly make promises compared to incumbents. Voters may not have the means (such as media access) to obtain robust information about democratic institutions and actors (Nyamnjoh 2005). Indeed, scholars first noted the difficulty of applying partisan cues to vote choice under Africa's one-party regimes. In Kenya, Barkan (1976) demonstrates how, when all parliamentary candidates ran on a Kenya African National Union (KANU) ticket, voters employed non-partisan informational sources to help them decide, including a candidate's ability to act as an effective linkage between the central government and local level. A similar dynamic is evident in other countries, for example, in the emphasis placed on individual merit, such as Uganda's "no-party" democracy (1986–2005) (Kasfir 1998). Moreover, candidate or party identities carried over from non-democratic regimes may affect voters' judgments about a party's commitment to democracy now that they contest in competitive elections. African voters often lack the reliable shortcuts to overcome information problems available to voters in more consolidated democracies. What heuristics, then, do African voters use to inform their electoral decisions?

## Ethnicity

A prevailing view in the scholarship on African democracy asserts that dynamics emanating from social identity shape the nature of political competition and election outcomes. African countries demonstrate impressive levels of ethnic diversity. A well-known “pathology” of African states is that from the colonial period, most country’s borders were drawn irrespective of ethnic boundaries, dividing diverse cultures between states and amalgamating groups (with little in common) within states. After independence, states failed to manage this diversity (Mutua 2008); many colonial powers had elevated selected ethnicities at the expense of others, and groups represented by post-independence leaders were likely to receive preferential access to government resources. Institutions, even after democratic transition, have tended to reinforce ethnic divisions and biases in the political, economic, and social order in African states (Osaghae 2004). Given the saliency of social identity, voters are therefore likely to rely primarily on information shortcuts or heuristics related to a candidate’s ethnicity or a party’s ethnic reputation when deciding whether and for whom to vote.

### *Preferences and transaction costs*

Two features inherent to social identity underscore *how* ethnic identity provides a compelling source of political mobilization in Africa. First, ethnic groups often hold internally consistent group interests and consequently preferences over a range of policies or beliefs about how the government should distribute resources; but across groups, preferences are likely to diverge. For example, an ethno-linguistic group may wish to enact a policy making their language a state’s official language for education and commerce. While members of a group may support co-ethnic leaders advancing such a policy, members of other groups have incentives to oppose it since it requires learning a new language and can degrade their group’s standing. Ethnic groups may also hold divergent interests regarding the distribution of government resources to certain areas or regions, given the geographic concentration of groups (Bates 1974). Histories of marginalization may lead some groups to prefer more radically redistributive policies or decentralization (Lynch 2016). As ethnic groups’ preferences align internally and diverge externally, ethnicity creates mobilizing incentives to yield political winners that ensure the group’s well-being.

Second, shared social identity helps to reduce the transaction costs of communication and organization among co-ethnics. Given similarities of language and culture, and denser social networks, coordination for joint action, like voting, is easier within groups than between them (Miguel and Gugerty 2005). Co-ethnics are better at disseminating information and leveraging norms of reciprocity to monitor and sanction in-group members compared to non-co-ethnics (Habyarimana et al. 2009). Ethnic groups can therefore leverage aspects of shared culture to mobilize turnout and coordinate vote choice.

### *Ethnic cues*

A variety of motivations explain *why* information conveyed in cues related to ethnic identity and reputation attracts voters to politicians. First, individuals may receive positive psychosocial gratification arising from solidarity and affective ties of group membership (Horowitz 1985). Ethnic bonds can produce feelings of affinity toward members of one’s social group, expressed when voters organize members to turn out and support co-ethnic candidates. Positive feelings of ethnic membership may specifically strengthen during electoral periods in Africa (Eifert,

Miguel, and Posner 2010), when ethnicity is salient and voters can assert their identity through coordinated political action.

South Africa provides an example of the importance of linking feelings of social solidarity with electoral behavior (Anyangwe 2012). Because the white apartheid regime constrained the ability of blacks to participate based on their race, in the first transitional elections in 1994 many black South Africans experienced enormous pride by turning out to vote for Nelson Mandela and the ANC (Friedman 2004). Psychosocial emotions that South Africans associate with elections can have lasting effects on behavior as well; de Kadt (2017) finds that blacks voting in 1994 were more likely to attribute positive feelings with participation and therefore were more likely to turn out in future elections, compared to white voters, who associate 1994 with negative emotions. Black support for the ANC has held steady since 1994 as party leaders continue to mobilize turnout with messages cuing supporters to perform their racial and party “duty” (Erllich, Jung, and Long 2018).

Second, a related set of motivations involves voters’ negative evaluations of non-co-ethnics in the form of fear of, and prejudice towards, ethnic strangers. Language of “negative” ethnicity or “tribalism” (wa Wamwere 2008) is often invoked as a means to mobilize a candidate’s base (Nyamnjoh 2005). To stoke fear and anxiety, these appeals may recall past sectarian violence or suggest harmful reprisals if “outsiders” win office. Politicians may also project prejudicial labels about the socioeconomic status of other groups: dominant ethnicities may stigmatize marginalized people and their desired redistributive preferences or willingness to work (Bates 1974), and marginalized groups may use their perceived or experienced isolation to mobilize political action to improve their standing (Smith 2007). Candidates’ reinforcement of negative attitudes towards out-groups can motivate beliefs about the likelihood of positive or negative shifts in the physical safety and socioeconomic position of their supporters depending on who gains or retains power after elections (Murunga and Nasong’o 2007). Voters may select co-ethnics to secure their status and interests.

Negative ethnic stereotyping shapes political competition routinely in Africa and may go so far as to spark violence. In Rwanda, the numerically small and politically dominant Tutsi enjoyed preferential treatment under Belgian colonial rule, but lost that prominence to the majority Hutus once the country gained independence (Vuningoma 2009). Hutu political elite subsequently pursued decades of anti-Tutsi violence and government purges to degrade Tutsi status, culminating into civil war and genocide after a failed attempt at democratic power-sharing between the Hutu government and Tutsi insurgents. Paul Kagame, a former Tutsi rebel leader turned president of Rwanda, has routinely employed narratives of past ethnic violence to consolidate his political authority and curtail democratic competition. Violence during election periods persistently stokes fears of ethno-sectarian conflict in Kenya (Kagwanja 2003; Long et al. 2013), Ethiopia (Smith 2009), Zimbabwe (Moyo 2005), and Nigeria (Haliru 2012). Real or anticipated violence may depress turnout if voters are fearful (Collier and Vicente 2014) or, conversely, attract support towards co-ethnics who promise to protect group standing (Kimenyi and Gutierrez-Romero 2008; Mueller 2008).

A third motivation driving ethnic voting derives from the instrumental desire of groups to coordinate the selection of winning candidates who are likely to deliver patronage to co-ethnics. A core feature of the relationship between state and society in Africa involves the clientelist linkages between citizens and politicians. Favoritism towards politicians’ ethnic homelands may persist through the democratic era (Franck and Rainer 2012). If voters seeking resources believe their share of state-produced goods directly relates to whether their politicians are co-ethnics, they are likely to mobilize collective support for the same ethnic group or coalition based on material interests. Ethnicity is a salient line of distributive logic because it provides a source of information that helps both voters and politicians build expectations about each other’s

behavior; promises from co-ethnics are likely deemed more credible than those from non-co-ethnics (Chandra 2004). Voters therefore rely on ethnic information cues about politicians and coalitions to form beliefs about their behavior. Similarly, politicians appeal to the ethnicity of voters to help identify their potential bases of electoral support, motivating turnout with vote-buying and obtaining votes with promises of resources.

Numerous studies document the persistence of ethnic patronage as a strategy to win elections in Africa. In Zambia, Posner (2005) characterizes the ability of politicians to gain electoral support and the concomitant desire of voters to receive goods as a problem of coordination that ethnicity solves. Lacking other sources of information, ethnic shortcuts help both voters and politicians identify electoral coalitions most likely to advance their interests. In Benin, Wantchekon (2003) shows how shared identity and solidarity with ethnic and regional candidates reinforces voters' responsiveness to politicians' clientelist appeals. Ethnic distribution of resources reflects the oft-used idiom of "eating" in African politics, where groups compete to gain power to consume state largesse (Branch, Cheeseman, and Gardner 2010). Mueller (2008) applies this logic to Kenya to argue that where voters perceive biased distribution, marginalized groups will seek to redirect resources away from groups they believe have reaped disproportionate benefits, while those historically associated with power may express concern for redistribution of resources away from their communities if their leader loses.

### ***Testing and measuring ethnic voting***

If shared identity provides mechanisms and incentives for ethnic groups to coordinate members to turn out and vote, how do scholars test and measure ethnic voting in Africa? Two general sets of empirical implications reveal whether ethnicity motivates voting and, if so, why. First, voters are likely to coordinate with their co-ethnics and select co-ethnic candidates; candidates in turn will receive electoral support roughly equivalent to their group's share of the population. Where voters do not have a direct co-ethnic competing, or politicians have incentives to build multiethnic coalitions to gain winning seat shares, members within groups are likely to coordinate and vote together, allying with other groups and perhaps following endorsements from co-ethnics. In either case, voters employ ethnic heuristics such that demographics produce census-style elections where ethnic patterns accord with vote results. Second, if ethnicity drives choice, voters' behavior likely arises from specific motivations as reflected in ethnic heuristics, such as expressions of solidarity or expectations of ethnic patronage. Individuals' decisions are not, then, epiphenomenal to the actual ethnic content of the information shortcuts, but rather reflect specific ethnically inspired motivations.

Scholars test hypotheses from these observable implications in Africa in a variety of ways. Matching local census results with election results or responses on a survey reveals the degree of co-ethnic choices and in-group coordination (Ishiyama 2012). Survey data helps to measure the relative salience of ethnic motivations expressed by African voters: Ferree (2011) finds that racial voting patterns in South Africa are more likely driven by perceptions of party's racial credentials than to expressions of racial solidarity; and in Kenya, Long (2012) shows that fear of non-co-ethnics drives voters' responsiveness to ethnic cues more so than expectations of patronage.

### **Performance and policy**

Despite the importance of social identity in Africa, there are reasons to suspect that ethnicity is not the only, or even the most important, consideration for voters. While groups sometimes have distinct policy preferences, most ethnicities still have a majority of members who are poor;

class lines do not often overlay group membership or the party system. Shared identity may reduce transaction costs of coordination, but countervailing political realities frequently generate incentives for leaders to negotiate policy across ethnic lines (Gibson and Hoffman 2013; Kasara 2007; Osei and Malang 2018). African countries also demonstrate wide variation in the success of parties to build and maintain multiethnic support: politicians must often gain support from non-co-ethnics to win seats if co-ethnic support is not enough, and elites sometimes fail to coordinate their members to vote as a group (Ferree, Gibson, and Long 2014). Issues of performance or policy can become intertwined with ethnicity if voters assess candidates' records and promises from an ethnic lens.

A growing literature therefore argues that Africans employ information beyond ethnicity, including evaluations of candidates based on what they have done and promise to do. The multicountry, multiyear Afrobarometer public opinion surveys demonstrate that respondents express extensive and well-informed opinions of government (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005). Africans across sampled countries consistently communicate knowledge of and beliefs regarding democracy, the performance of elected leaders at the local and national level, preferences over various economic and social policies, ratings of government corruption, and the quality of public services. Recognizing the importance of performance and policy to inform voting behavior, scholars advance two critical parameters of appraisal that motivate electoral choices: retrospective and prospective evaluations.

### ***Retrospective evaluations***

Retrospective voters will use assessments of candidates' past and current behavior as a core component of choice, including how the performance of the government accrues to incumbent candidates contesting for reelection. Retrospective evaluations may consist of numerous elements, including government's success at economic improvements, generating growth, reducing unemployment, and controlling prices. Perceptions of economic conditions can matter directly to individuals' well-being or to their assessment of the country generally. These views may not be fixed and can evolve during campaigns as voters receive increasing exposure to political messaging. Unlike in consolidated democracies, economic voting in Africa does not easily map onto the party system as reflective in consistent left-right ideological coherence over policy. Rather, considerations over economic performance more likely adhere directly to the sitting government. If voters evaluate economic conditions positively, they will be more likely to turn out and support incumbents; if they hold negative perceptions, they will be more likely to avoid participating or support challengers to register disapproval of the status quo.

Evidence points to a relationship between economic conditions and electoral outcomes in Africa, including explaining incumbent losses in transitional elections in Benin in 1989 (Allen 1992) and Zambia in 1991 (Chikulo 1996). Further, Posner and Simon (2002) find that declining economic conditions correlate with both lower voter turnout and a loss of incumbent party support in Zambia; a similar pattern is demonstrated in Ethiopia, where negative economic conditions across districts presage opposition support (Arriola 2003). In Ghana, citizens' government approval ratings track with evaluations of the national economy (Youde 2005), and in Kenya, disastrous economic policies throughout the 1980s and 1990s produced dissatisfaction with then-President Daniel arap Moi (Ajulu 1992), who only managed to obtain pluralities of the vote in 1992 and 1997.

As the incidence of multiparty elections grows, research increasingly examines the specific relationship between individuals' retrospective evaluations of incumbent economic performance and vote choice. In Ghana, Hoffman and Long (2013) demonstrate that perceptions about

the two main parties (the New Patriotic Party and the National Democratic Congress) and the government's economic management predict variation in vote choice; Lindberg and Morrison (2008) further find that Ghanaian voters are more likely to form decisions based on evaluations of performance compared to ethnicity or clientelism. Similarly, Ferree and Horowitz (2010) show that ethno-regional identities have become less influential in determining party support over time in Malawi compared to presidential performance and policy adoption.

Beyond judgments about the economy, another relevant aspect of retrospective performance includes the provision of public services. National governments in Africa are usually tasked with healthcare, education, security, and job-creation programs; locally, legislators and councilors are responsible for services such as water provision, school bursaries, and market upkeep. The amount and quality of public goods provides a salient and reliable measure of performance for African voters because services are seen as important aspects of politicians' work and are highly visible, easy to verify, and consequential to welfare.

Research establishes an association between public service quality and political outcomes in Africa. Stasavage (2005) shows that the introduction of competitive elections in Uganda spurred the creation of universal primary education; a similar dynamic obtained in Kenya, where voters credited Mwai Kibaki for delivering free schooling (Harding and Stasavage 2013), and Burundi, where the government's abolition of school fees in 2005 increased support for the incumbent (Travagianti 2017). The provision of roads also tracks with electoral support in Ghana (Harding 2015) and Kenya (Burgess et al. 2015).

Another retrospective performance metric involves whether African politicians have "kept their promises" since the last election. For example, a dynamic of many contests involves the importance of incumbents having tackled corruption (Kpundeh 2004)—negative associations of graft with incumbent parties has dogged the electoral might of the dominant *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM) in Tanzania (Babeyi 2011) and *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO) in Mozambique (Phiri and Macheve 2014). Promises to fight corruption also galvanize opposition mobilization and campaign messaging. While Kenyan voters perceived improvements of Kibaki's government relative to his predecessor Moi (Bratton and Kimenyi 2008), Kibaki's failure to successfully address corruption after taking office in 2002 generated support for his competitor, Raila Odinga, in the 2007 race (Kanyinga, Okello, and Akech 2010).

### *Prospective evaluations*

A second dimension closely related to retrospective performance includes voters' prospective evaluations, such as the information voters rely on to project how a politician will behave in the future, typically assessed from candidates' pronouncements on salient campaign issues. Candidates may promise specific policy implementation if elected, encouraging citizens to align choices with parties that represent their interests. Challengers specifically have incentives to draw distinct policy promises from incumbents since they do not have performance records to run on.

Traditionally, the literature on African voting typically moderates the importance of campaign issues towards voters' considerations, following the prevailing belief that elections are devoid of substantive policy debates or differences in platforms (Bleck and van de Walle 2013). However, differences in economic policies or reform agendas has informed party positions. For example, Kim (2018) finds that parties in Ghana obtain support by proposing economic platforms that appeal to distinct agricultural sub-sectors. In Kenya's 2007 presidential race, Kibaki and Odinga differed over constitutional revision and plans for devolved government (Kanyinga and Long 2012).



Campaigns in Africa also play an important role in helping voters to learn about candidates' backgrounds and inform assessments of their "type" (Horowitz and Long 2016). Perceptions of politicians' quality may include attributes related to their gender, age, experience, trustworthiness, and charisma. These traits can provide shortcuts to form judgments about competence, and likely future performance and policy action. Joyce Banda's presidency generated hope among many Malawians that she would pursue pro-women's policies given her gender and work as a women's advocate (Mbilizi 2013). In Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, viewed by many voters as a skilled technocrat and anti-corruption crusader, won a closely fought election in 2005 against her male opponent and former professional soccer player, George Weah, who had no previous political experience (Adams 2008). Exhausted from the devastating effects of civil war, many Liberian voters expressed a desire for competent leadership promised by Sirleaf.<sup>1</sup>

Prospective messages reflecting campaign narratives of "continuity versus change" increasingly texture African elections. Incumbents often portray themselves as competent and experienced by appealing to the importance of "continuing the (good) work" (Wanyama 2010); conversely, challengers promise new ideas, younger candidates, and charismatic leadership to supplant the old guard. Political rivals have routinely criticized entrenched leaders perceived as lacking vision or in need of reform, such as Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe (Muzondidya 2013) and Uganda's Yoweri Museveni (Mwenda 2007).

### ***Testing and measuring performance voting***

Given the logic and motivations driving voters to support candidates and parties that they perceive to have governed well (or are likely to in the future), how is performance voting measured in Africa? First, voters are likely to use their evaluations of government performance when deciding whether to turn out and support candidates and parties with which they assign positive performance. For incumbents, this produces correlations between government ratings and support for the ruling party. When voters rate the government positively, they are more likely to support incumbent candidates; when they perceive government failures, voters are more likely to back opponents. Second, voters are likely to support candidates that promise to advance policies that they prefer or have qualities that help individuals assess type and future behavior. Campaign promises and other characteristics should prove especially important for challengers, who do not otherwise have performance records and must distinguish themselves from incumbents to attract support.

Performance can reflect subjective perceptions that vary over individuals and over time, as well as objective indicators of government output. Research employs survey-based indicators of African respondents' views of the economy, service provision, and judgments about candidate quality to correlate with incumbent or opposition party support (Hoffman and Long 2013; Gibson and Long 2009; Long and Gibson 2015). Alignment of voters' policy preferences interrogated on surveys with candidates' positions expressed in campaigns also explains variation in vote choice (Ferree, Gibson, and Long 2014). Beyond perceptions, scholars attribute measures of performance to vote outcomes using objective economic indicators (Arriola 2003) or service delivery outputs (Harding 2015).

### **Data and methodology**

Scholars have leveraged a variety of quantitative, experimental, and qualitative data sources and methods to pursue a rich empirical research agenda exploring voting behavior in Africa.

### **Quantitative analyses**

Employing tools from comparative political behavior, researchers frequently employ quantitative data and statistical analyses to investigate the relationship between variables reflective of ethnic, performance, and policy motivations on election outcomes. This approach includes administrative data sources, such as the ethnic census and voting results, as well as public opinion surveys that relate individual-level variables with a person's reported voting behavior. Such tests also allow researchers to control for potential confounding factors in statistical models. The Afrobarometer surveys have measured Africans' opinions on a variety of political, economic, and social matters over the past twenty years, generating invaluable data and an unprecedented look inside the political attitudes and behavior of respondents across the continent. The survey, nationally representative and conducted at households, provides important variables on evaluations of government, alongside measures of ethnic identity. A complementary quantitative survey method—exit polls—more specifically focuses on turnout and vote choice to examine the motivations that drive citizens' participation. Exit polls are sampled from polling stations and registered voters, providing more accurate samples of the voting population that turns out than do public opinion surveys that include non-voters. Exit polls have been conducted in Kenya (Gibson and Long 2009; Ferree, Gibson, and Long 2014), Ghana (Hoffman and Long 2013; Ferree and Long 2016), Uganda, and South Africa.<sup>2</sup> The rapid expansion of cell phones, smartphones, and social media allow researchers to exploit ICT to conduct surveys and measure aspects of political participation at lower costs and in real-time in contrast to traditional household surveys (Erlich et al. 2018; Ferree et al. 2017).

### **Experimental analyses**

A growing research agenda leverages experimental methodology to identify and disentangle motivations for Africans' political choices, including treatments embedded in surveys or performed in labs or the field. Experiments involve a researcher randomizing a treatment variable, typically an aspect of information related to ethnicity, performance, or policy, on a subject to measure how their response or behavior changes, such as expressed support for a hypothetical or real candidate. In Uganda, Carlson (2015) and Conroy-Krutz (2013) employ survey experiments to test the effects of information regarding various candidate qualities on citizens' support. Using a nationwide survey experiment in Kenya, Long (2012) demonstrates that performance cues are more salient than ethnic cues in predicting voting behavior. Researchers also test alternative mechanisms to explain outcomes like co-ethnic collective action or ethnic preferences, as explored in lab settings by Habyarimana et al. (2009) in Uganda and Berge et al. (2015) in Kenya. Field experiments have tested the effects of information provision regarding candidates' qualities and performance on political behavior and outcomes in Mali (Gottlieb 2016) and Uganda (Humphreys and Weinstein 2012).

### **Qualitative analyses**

Scholars use a variety of qualitative data and ethnographic methods, including focus groups with the public about aspects of their political behavior, elite interviews with candidates, or archival work on the cultural and institutional aspects of group identity and democratic participation. Qualitative methods help to more narrowly define and interrogate important concepts, and explore mechanisms and causal process tracing, specifically at a local level and within ethnic communities. Schaffer's (1998) study of democracy in Senegal employs key informant

interviews, ethnographies, and archival work to examine how cultural understandings of democracy map onto people's perceptions about the meaning and form of political participation. Lynch's (2011) ethnographic study of the Kalenjin ethnic group relies on informant testimony and archives to chart why and how the group has succeeded at creating and managing electoral influence in Kenya.

## Conclusion

This chapter concludes by discussing open questions and frontiers for future research on African voting behavior. First, the roles of ethnicity and performance or policy are not always mutually exclusive but may overlap and interact. Ideas of how leaders have or will behave can be closely intertwined with ethnicity or viewed through ethnic lenses. If ethnicity confounds retrospective or prospective evaluations, performance and policy may only matter as a thin veneer atop ethnic foundations. Empirically, in certain contexts like South Africa, co-ethnicity appears consistently to color perceptions of performance (Mattes and Piombo 2001). However, elsewhere ethnicity either appears to not (Hoffman and Long 2013), or only weakly and under very specific conditions, affect performance perceptions (Ferree, Gibson, and Long 2014; Long and Gibson 2015). Further statistical, experimental, and qualitative analyses will help to disentangle ethnic, performance, and policy metrics and to measure their independent and interactive effects.

A second topic for research innovation addresses the potential for ambiguity in ethnic and performance cues, or "mixed signals" that may scramble voters' easy reliance on information shortcuts. Ethnic heuristics assume that voters correctly perceive a consistent and objective ethnic signal sent by candidates or parties, but competitors may not always relay obvious ethnic cues. Some parties have recruited candidates not typically associated with their ethnic labels to appeal more broadly. Moreover, as shown in Benin, politicians may gain support from more than one set of co-ethnics when leaders can claim membership to multiple groups given mixed heritage (Adida 2015), or relations through marriage (Adida et al. 2016). Voters may therefore have to navigate a multitude of possibly reinforcing, conflicting, or inconsistent ethnic cues. Additionally, voters may perceive mixed performance signals since individuals possibly evaluate government along variegated dimensions, not all of which are likely to be uniformly positive or negative. If voters receive information that a politician's record is ambiguous, African voters may resort to other heuristics, like candidate ethnicity, to help them decide (Ferree, Gibson, and Long 2017).

Third, institutions and electoral rules play a critical role shaping the salience of ethnic and performance factors on voting behavior (Burgess et al. 2015; Posner 2005). Yet scholars typically do not leverage the impact of institutional variation on vote choice. Ethnic factors may differ across units of analysis comparing how politicians try to construct winning coalitions at the national level and whether this creates tension with or reinforcement of ethnic alliances for local races. The trade-offs inherent in politicians' ability to coordinate voters may at least partially explain why groups who do not yield direct co-ethnic candidates often have a harder time coordinating elites and voters within their groups, a frequent phenomenon observed in Kenya (Ferree, Gibson, and Long 2014).

Finally, Africa's road to democratization has gained pace since transitional elections that occurred almost thirty years ago. But few scholars have examined the conditions under which ethnic, performance, and policy considerations may change over time in response to the evolution of institutional incentives and previous election outcomes. In some countries, like Kenya, the inability of certain ethnic groups to gain (or alternate) executive power relative to groups that have already held it may further solidify ethnic boundaries. In other contexts, like Ghana

and Senegal, parties and party systems appear to have become less volatile even as elections are nonetheless competitive and result in turnover. In these instances, while social identity no doubt still matters to political life, the importance of shared ethnicity for voters may grow less relevant over time. Given rich and increasingly available data, numerous diverse scholars will no doubt continue to tackle the important question of what shapes voters' electoral behavior and the prospects this provides for democratic consolidation in Africa.

### Notes

- 1 Subsequently, Weah won the 2017 election against Sirleaf's vice-presidential successor by campaigning against her government's alleged corruption.
- 2 Exit polls can also obtain measures of electoral integrity, both by allowing voters to report irregularities and also by matching survey responses with electoral returns (Long et al. 2013; Ferree and Long 2016; Kanyinga, Long, and Ndi 2010).

### References

- Adams, Melinda. 2008. "Liberia's Election of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and Women's Executive Leadership in Africa." *Politics & Gender* 4, no. 3: 475–84.
- Adejumobi, Said. 2000. "Elections in Africa: A Fading Shadow of Democracy?" *International Political Science Review* 21, no. 1: 59–73.
- Adida, Claire. 2015. "Do African Voters Favor Coethnics? Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Benin." *Journal of Experimental Political Science* 2, no. 1: 1–11.
- Adida, Claire L., Nathan Combes, Adeline Lo, and Alex Verink. 2016. "The Spousal Bump: Do Cross-ethnic Marriages Increase Political Support in Multiethnic Democracies?" *Comparative Political Studies* 49, no. 5: 635–61.
- Ajulu, Rok. 1992. "Kenya: The Road to Democracy." *Review of African Political Economy* 19, no. 53: 79–87.
- Allen, Chris. 1992. "Restructuring an Authoritarian State: 'Democratic Renewal' in Benin." *Review of African Political Economy* 19, no. 54: 42–58.
- Anyangwe, Carlson. 2012. "Race and Ethnicity: Voters' Party Preference in South African Elections." *International Journal of African Renaissance Studies* 7, no. 2: 38–58.
- Arriola, Leonardo. 2003. "Ethnicity, Economic Conditions, and Opposition Support: Evidence from Ethiopia." *Northeast African Studies* 10, no. 1: 115–44.
- Babeiya, Edwin. 2011. "Electoral Corruption and the Politics of Elections Financing in Tanzania." *Journal of Politics and Law* 4, no. 2: 91–103.
- Barkan, Joel D. 1976. "Comment: Further Reassessment of 'Conventional Wisdom': Political Knowledge and Voting Behavior in Rural Kenya." *American Political Science Review* 70, no. 2: 452–5.
- Barro, Robert. 1973. "The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model." *Public Choice* 14, no. 1: 19–42.
- Bates, Robert. 1974. "Ethnic Competition and Modernization in Contemporary Africa." *Comparative Political Studies* 6, no. 4: 457–85.
- Berge, Lars Ivar Oppedal, Bjorvatn, Kjetil, Galle, Simon, Miguel, Edward, Posner, Daniel N., Tungodden, Bertil and Zhang, Kelly. 2015. "How Strong are Ethnic Preferences?" National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 21715, November.
- Berman, Bruce, Dickson Eyoh, and Will Kymlicka, eds. 2005. *Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa*. Oxford: James Curry.
- Bleck, Jaimie, and Nicolas van de Walle. 2013. "Valence Issues in African Elections: Navigating Uncertainty and the Weight of the Past." *Comparative Political Studies* 46, no. 11: 1394–421.
- Branch, Dan, Nic Cheeseman, and Leigh Gardner, eds. 2010. *Our Turn to Eat: Politics in Kenya Since 1950*. Berlin: Lit Verlag.
- Bratton, Michael, and Mwangi S. Kimenyi. 2008. "Voting in Kenya: Putting Ethnicity in Context." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 2, no. 2: 272–89.
- Bratton, Michael, Robert Mattes, and Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi. 2005. *Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Burgess, Robin, Remi Jedwab, Edward Miguel, Ameet Morjaria, and Gerard Padró i Miquel. 2015. "The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya." *American Economic Review* 105, no. 6: 1817–51.

- Carlson, Elizabeth. 2015. "Ethnic Voting and Accountability in Africa: A Choice Experiment in Uganda." *World Politics* 67, no. 2: 353–85.
- Chandra, Kanchan. 2004. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Chege, Michael. 2010. "Ethnic Pluralism and National Governance in Africa: A Survey." In *Ethnic Diversity in East Africa*, edited by Kimani Njogu, Kabiri Ngeta, and Mary Wanjau, 3–17, Nairobi: Twaweza.
- Chikulo, Bornwell C. 1996. "Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in the Third Republic, 1991–1994." In *Democracy in Zambia: Challenges for the Third Republic*, edited by Owen Sichone, and Bornwell C. Chikulo, 25–51. Harare: SAPES Books.
- Collier, Paul. 2007. *The Bottom Billion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Collier, Paul, and Pedro C. Vicente. 2014. "Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria." *The Economic Journal* 124, no. 574: F327–55.
- Conroy-Krutz, Jeffrey. 2013. "Information and Ethnic Politics in Africa." *British Journal of Political Science* 43, no. 2: 345–73.
- de Kadt, Daniel. 2017. "Voting Then, Voting Now: The Long Term Consequences of Participation in South Africa's First Democratic Election." *Journal of Politics* 79, no. 2: 670–87.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Eifert, Benn, Edward Miguel, and Daniel N. Posner. 2010. "Political Competition and Ethnic Identification in Africa." *American Journal of Political Science* 54, no. 2: 494–510.
- Elischer, Sebastian. 2013. *Ethnicity and Party Formation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Erlich, Aaron, Danielle F. Jung, and James D. Long. 2018. "Covering the Campaign: Election Events in Emerging Democracies." SocArXiv Working Paper, June 2018.
- Erlich, Aaron, Danielle F. Jung, James D. Long, and Craig McIntosh. 2018. "The Double-Edged Sword of Mobilizing Citizens via Mobile Phone in Developing Countries." *Development Engineering* 3: 34–46.
- Ferree, Karen E. 2011. *Framing the Race: The Political Origins of Racial-Census Elections*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ferree, Karen E., Clark Gibson, Danielle Jung, James D. Long, and Craig McIntosh. 2017. "How Technology Shapes the Crowd: Participation in the 2014 South African Election." Center for Effective Global Action Working Paper 067, June. <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5pd6k715>.
- Ferree, Karen E., Clark C. Gibson, and James D. Long. 2014. "Voting Behavior and Electoral Irregularities in Kenya's 2013 Election." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 8, no. 1: 153–72.
- . 2017. "Half Empty or Half Full? African Voting in Conditions of Performance Ambiguity." Paper presented at Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August–September.
- Ferree, Karen E., and Jeremy Horowitz. 2010. "Ties That Bind? The Rise and Decline of Ethno-Regional Partisanship in Malawi, 1994–2009." *Democratization* 17, no. 3: 534–63.
- Ferree, Karen E., and James D. Long. 2016. "Gifts, Threats, and Perceptions of Ballot Secrecy in African Elections." *African Affairs* 115, no. 461: 621–45.
- Franck, Raphael, and Ilia Rainer. 2012. "Does the Leader's Ethnicity Matter? Ethnic Favoritism, Education, and Health in Sub-Saharan Africa." *American Political Science Review* 106, no. 2: 294–325.
- Friedman, Steven. 2004. "South Africa: Building Democracy After Apartheid." In *Democratic Reform in Africa: The Quality of Progress*, edited by Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, 235–62, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Gibson, Clark C., and Barak Hoffman. 2013. "Coalitions not Conflicts: Ethnicity, Political Institutions, and Expenditure in Africa." *Comparative Politics* 45, no. 3: 273–90.
- Gibson, Clark C., and James D. Long. 2009. "The Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Kenya, December 2007." *Electoral Studies* 28, no. 3: 497–502.
- Githuku, Nicholas. 2013. "Votes that Bind: Ethnic Politics and the Tyranny of Numbers." Columbia University, Institute of African Studies. [www.ias.columbia.edu/blog/votes-bind-ethnic-politics-and-tyranny-numbers](http://www.ias.columbia.edu/blog/votes-bind-ethnic-politics-and-tyranny-numbers).
- Gottlieb, Jessica. 2016. "Greater Expectations? A Field Experiment to Improve Accountability in Mali." *American Journal of Political Science* 60, no. 1: 143–57.
- Habyarimana, James, Marcatan Humphreys, Daniel Posner, and Jeremy Weinstein. 2009. *The Co-Ethnic Advantage*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Haliru, T. 2012. "Ethnicity and Political Violence in Nigeria: Challenges of Democratic Governance." *Journal of Research in Peace, Gender and Development* 2, no. 4: 89–94.
- Harding, Robin. 2015. "Attribution and Accountability: Voting for Roads in Ghana." *World Politics* 67, no. 4: 656–89.

- Harding, Robin, and David Stasavage. 2013. "What Democracy Does (and Doesn't Do) for Basic Services: School Fees, School Inputs, and African Elections." *The Journal of Politics* 76, no. 1: 229–45.
- Hoffman, Barak, and James D. Long. 2013. "Party Attributes, Performance, and Voting in Africa." *Comparative Politics* 45, no. 2: 127–46.
- Horowitz, Donald. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Horowitz, Jeremy, and James D. Long. 2016. "Strategic Voting, Information, and Ethnicity in Emerging Democracies: Evidence from Kenya." *Electoral Studies* 44: 351–61.
- Humphreys, Macartan, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2012. "Policing Politicians: Citizen Empowerment and Political Accountability in Uganda – Preliminary Analysis." International Growth Centre Working Paper S-5021-UGA-1, March.
- Ishiyama, John. 2012. "Explaining Ethnic Bloc Voting in Africa." *Democratization* 19, no. 4: 761–88.
- Kagwanja, Peter. 2003. "Facing Mount Kenya or Facing Mecca? The Mungiki, Ethnic Violence and the Politics of the Moi Succession in Kenya." *African Affairs* 102, no. 406: 25–49.
- Kanyinga, Karuti, and James D. Long. 2012. "The Political Economy of Reforms in Kenya: The Post-2007 Election Violence and a New Constitution." *African Studies Review* 55, no. 1: 31–51.
- Kanyinga, Karuti, James D. Long and David Ndii. 2010. "Was It Rigged? A Forensic Analysis of Vote Returns in Kenya's 2007 Election." In *Tensions and Reversals in Democratic Transitions: The Kenya 2007 General Elections*, edited by Karuti Kanyinga and Duncan Okello, 373–411. Nairobi: Society for International Development.
- Kanyinga, Karuti, Duncan Okello, and Akoko Akech. 2010. "Contradictions of Transition to Democracy in Fragmented Societies: The Kenya 2007 Elections in Perspective." In *Tensions and Reversals in Democratic Transitions: A Study of the 2007 Kenyan General Elections*, edited by Karuti Kanyinga and Duncan Okello, 1–28. Nairobi: Society for International Development.
- Kasara, Kimuli. 2007. "Tax Me if You Can: Ethnic Geography, Democracy, and the Taxation of Agriculture in Africa." *American Political Science Review* 101, no. 1: 159–72.
- Kasfir, Nelson. 1998. "'No-Party Democracy' in Uganda." *Journal of Democracy* 9, no. 2: 49–63.
- Kim, Eun Kyung. 2018. "Sector-based Vote Choice: A New Approach to Explaining Core and Swing Voters in Africa." *International Area Studies Review* 21, no. 1: 28–50.
- Kimenyi, Mwangi S., and Roxana Gutierrez-Romero. 2008. "Identity, Grievances, and Economic Determinants of Voting in the 2007 Kenyan Elections." Working Paper 2008–38, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, January. [www.gov.uk/dfid-research-outputs/identity-grievances-and-economic-determinants-of-voting-in-the-2007-kenyan-elections](http://www.gov.uk/dfid-research-outputs/identity-grievances-and-economic-determinants-of-voting-in-the-2007-kenyan-elections).
- Kpundeh, Sahr J. 2004. "Corruption and Corruption Control." In *Democratic Reform in Africa: The Quality of Progress*, edited by Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, 121–40. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Lindberg, Staffan I., and Minion K.C. Morrison. 2008. "Are African Voters Really Ethnic or Clientelistic? Survey Evidence from Ghana." *Political Science Quarterly* 123, no. 1: 95–122.
- Long, James D. 2012. "Voting, Fraud, and Violence: Political Accountability in African Elections." PhD Dissertation, University of California, San Diego. <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2bs339cm>.
- Long, James D., and Clark C. Gibson. 2015. "Evaluating the Roles of Ethnicity and Performance in African Elections: Evidence from an Exit Poll in Kenya." *Political Research Quarterly* 68, no. 4: 830–42.
- Long, James D., Karuti Kanyinga, Karen E. Ferree, and Clark Gibson. 2013. "Kenya's 2013 Elections: Choosing Peace Over Democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 24, no. 3: 140–55.
- Lynch, Gabrielle. 2011. *I Say to You: Ethnic Politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- . 2016. "Majimboism and Kenya's Moral Economy of Ethnic Territoriality." In *The Moral Economies of Ethnic and Nationalist Claims*, edited by Bruce Berman, Andre Laliberté, and Stephen J. Larin, 49–69. Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Manin, Bernard, Adam Przeworski, and Susan C. Stokes. 1999. "Elections and Representation." In *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, edited by Adam Przeworski, Bernard Manin, and Susan C. Stokes, 29–54. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mattes, Robert, and Jessica Piombo. 2001. "Opposition Parties and the Voters in South Africa's General Election of 1999." *Democratization* 8, no. 3: 101–28.
- Mbilizi, Margaret Asalele. 2013. "When a Woman Becomes President: Implications for Gender Policy and Planning in Malawi." *Journal of International Women's Studies* 14, no. 3: 148–62.
- Miguel, Edward, and Mary Kay Gugerty. 2005. "Ethnic Diversity, Social Sanctions, and Public Goods in Kenya." *Journal of Public Economics* 89, no. 11: 2325–68.

- Moyo, Sam. 2005. "Land and Natural Resource Redistribution in Zimbabwe: Access, Equity and Conflict." *African and Asian Studies* 4, no. 1/2: 187–224.
- Mueller, Susanne. 2008. "The Political Economy of Kenya's Crisis." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 2, no. 2: 185–210.
- Murunga, Godwin R., and Shadrack W. Nasong'o, eds. 2007. *Kenya: The Struggle for Democracy*. London: Zed Books.
- Mutua, Makau. 2008. *Kenya's Quest for Democracy: Taming Leviathan*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Muzondidya, James. 2013. "The Opposition Dilemma in Zimbabwe: A Critical Review of the Politics of the Move." In *The Hard Road to Reform: The Politics of Zimbabwe's Global Political Agreement*, edited by Brian Raftopoulos, 39–70. Harare: Weaver Press; Port Shepstone: Solidarity Peace Trust.
- Mwenda, Andrew. 2007. "Personalizing Power in Uganda." *Journal of Democracy* 18, no. 3: 23–37.
- Nwosu, Bernard U. 2012. "Tracks of the Third Wave: Democracy Theory, Democratisation and the Dilemma of Political Succession in Africa." *Review of African Political Economy* 39, no. 131: 11–25.
- Nyamnjoh, Francis B. 2005. *Africa's Media: Democracy and the Politics of Belonging*. London: Zed Books.
- Olukoshi, Adebayo O., ed. 1998. *The Politics of Opposition in Contemporary Africa*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
- Osaghae, Eghosa E. 2004. "Political Transitions and Ethnic Conflict in Africa." *Journal of Third World Studies* 21, no. 1: 221–40.
- Osei, Anja, and Thomas Malang. 2018. "Party, Ethnicity, or Region? Determinants of Informal Political Exchange in the Parliament of Ghana." *Party Politics* 24, no. 4: 410–20.
- Phiri, Madalitso Zililo, and Antonio Macheve Jr. 2014. "Mozambique's Peace Decades Since the end of the Conflict: Inclusive or Managed Democracy?" *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 14, no. 1: 37–62.
- Popkin, Samuel L. 1994. *The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Posner, Daniel N. 2005. *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Posner, Daniel N., and David J. Simon. 2002. "Economic Conditions and Incumbent Support in Africa's New Democracies: Evidence from Zambia." *Comparative Political Studies* 35, no. 3: 313–36.
- Schaffer, Frederick C. 1998. *Democracy in Translation: Understanding Politics in an Unfamiliar Culture*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Smith, Lahra. 2007. "Voting for an Ethnic Identity: Procedural and Institutional Responses to Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 45, no. 4: 565–94.
- . 2009. "Explaining Violence after Recent Elections in Ethiopia and Kenya." *Democratization* 16, no. 5: 867–97.
- Stasavage, David. 2005. "The Role of Democracy in Uganda's Move to Universal Primary Education." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 43, no. 1: 53–73.
- Travagianti, Manuela. 2017. "How Abolishing School Fees Increased Support for the Incumbent in Burundi." *African Affairs* 116, no. 462: 101–24.
- Vuningoma, James. 2009. "Ethnic Diversity Background and Issues: The Case of Rwanda." In *Ethnic Diversity in Eastern Africa: Opportunities and Challenges*, edited by Kimani Njogu, Kabiri Ngeta, and Mary Wanjau, 161–82. Nairobi: Twaweza Communications.
- Wantchekon, Leonard. 2003. "Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin." *World Politics* 55, no. 3: 399–422.
- Wanyama, Frederick O. 2010. "Voting Without Institutionalized Political Parties: Primaries, Manifestos, and the 2007 General Elections in Kenya." In *Tensions and Reversals in Democratic Transitions: the Kenya 2007 General Elections*, edited by Karuti Kanyinga and Duncan Okello, 61–100. Nairobi: Institute for Development Studies.
- wa Wamwere, Koigi. 2008. *Towards Genocide in Kenya: The Curse of Negative Ethnicity*. Nairobi: MvuleAfrica Publishers.
- Youde, Jeremy. 2005. "Economics and Government Popularity in Ghana." *Electoral Studies* 24, no. 1: 1–16.