


This article was downloaded by: 10.3.97.143

On: 20 Mar 2023

Access details: *subscription number*

Publisher: *Routledge*

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK



The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Agency

Christopher Erhard, Tobias Keiling

Life is an adventure

Publication details

<https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315104249-20>

Tobias Keiling

Published online on: 30 Oct 2020

How to cite :- Tobias Keiling. 30 Oct 2020, *Life is an adventure from: The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Agency* Routledge

Accessed on: 20 Mar 2023

<https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315104249-20>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT

Full terms and conditions of use: <https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms>

This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

18

LIFE IS AN ADVENTURE

László Tengelyi's phenomenology of action

Tobias Keiling

László Tengelyi was a Hungarian philosopher who was educated and initially taught at Eötvös-Loránd-University in Budapest before becoming chair of philosophy at Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Germany, in 2001. Tengelyi published extensively in Hungarian, German, French, and English. From a focus on Critical philosophy and Phenomenology in his dissertation and early writings, his interests broadened to themes in ancient and medieval philosophy. In 2011, Tengelyi intervened in political debate in his home country, calling attention to state-led media campaigns against fellow philosophers such as Ágnes Heller. Shortly after completing his major *World and Infinity: On the problem of a Phenomenological Metaphysics* (*Welt und Unendlichkeit. Zum Problem phänomenologischer Metaphysik*, Tengelyi 2014), Tengelyi died unexpectedly at the age of 60.

World and Infinity is the longest and most ambitious of Tengelyi's works, tracing problems in phenomenology back to authors such as Aristotle, Plotinus, Duns Scotus, and Suárez and engaging with Post-Kantian German Philosophy. His perhaps best-known book is an exhaustive exposition of currents in contemporary French phenomenology, written in German with the translator Hans-Dieter Gondek (Gondek and Tengelyi 2011). "Action and Selfhood," Tengelyi's contribution to the *Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology* (2012a), also published in earlier German and French versions (2007a, 2009a), offers a concise presentation of his views in the philosophy of action. Although the central objective of *World and Infinity*, published a few years later, is to give a new, genuinely phenomenological account of the metaphysics of infinity, the book also includes a discussion of the metaphysics of agency that advances over the earlier account by providing a more elaborate discussion of human freedom. I will concentrate on these two texts, leaving aside numerous other writings, in particular Tengelyi's much earlier book-length treatment of "life-history" (Tengelyi 1998, 2004).

It is defining Tengelyi's approach that rather than focusing the moment an action is initiated, a phenomenological account of action should take into view a much larger share of the agent's experience. His approach also stands out for its attempt to relate two problems, namely the metaphysical puzzle regarding the compatibility between human freedom and causal determinacy and the question of personal and, specifically, narrative identity. In Tengelyi's view, a phenomenological account of agency reveals these problems as closely connected: "the agent's experience of his or her action . . . supplies the missing link between

acting and recounting” (Tengelyi 2012a: 273). To make good on this claim, Tengelyi proposes to begin with a specific aspect of agency, namely the fact that actions have unintended consequences. As the consequences of an action unfold, however, the agent’s involvement shifts from intentional activity to a more passive stance:

in the perspective of its emplotment in a story to be told, action considered in its totality will prove to be a mixture of activity and passivity. . . . Our actions are not only that which we perform but also that which *happens to us*.

(Tengelyi 2012a: 265)

Both with regard to the meaning of one’s actions and with regard to the constitution of the (narrative) self, Tengelyi’s central intuition is that the defining elements in the constitution of the meaning of action and self are experienced more as something that *happens to* the agent rather than something the agent deliberately intends and actively pursues. It is for this reason that the problem of unintended consequences is central to Tengelyi’s view. This allows for a straightforward exposition: I will begin by introducing his example case for agency and its implications for first-person involvement in agency in the first section. I will refer to this example throughout the next sections, presenting the increasingly complex discussions of unintended consequences in different contexts: Tengelyi’s critique of Davidson’s semantic theory (Section ‘From action to its agent. Tengelyi on Davidson’), the role of freedom and determinacy in action (Sections ‘Freedom and necessity: the meaning of unintended consequences’ and ‘Grounding grounds: on different ways to be free’), and the constitution of narrative identity (Section ‘My practice, my story, and I: narrative identity’). I end with a critical remark and indicate how his understanding of action should be further developed (Section ‘Conclusion: a case for truth’). Specifically, I will argue that Tengelyi’s account of human freedom calls for a priority of a normative account of the constitution of meaning over a narrative one. I develop such an account by drawing from Heidegger’s treatment of authenticity and truth, hoping to contribute to what Römer (2017: 129) calls a development of a phenomenological account of agency “in the direction of . . . a practical metaphysics.”

What is it like to be an agent? The case of Oedipus

Tengelyi’s choice of example is characteristic for his approach. Unlike authors who orient their discussion to simple cases like intentional movement, Tengelyi chooses a particularly complex example: the story of Oedipus. Although fictional, Tengelyi takes it as genuine expression of the first-person experience of action, revealing the basic traits of human agency. Tengelyi provides no explicit justification why it is permissible to turn to an example from drama, but he gives context to this idea at the beginning of his contribution to the *Contemporary Phenomenology* handbook by citing a passage from Aristotle’s *Poetics* (1450a3): “ ‘the expression of action is a fable’ or even ‘a plot’ [*estín . . . tes . . . praxeos o mythos he mimesis*]” (Tengelyi 2012a: 266). This quote not only establishes the conceptual link between action and narration that Tengelyi will explore in detail. It also implies that a fictional narrative, by virtue of having a plot, may just as well provide insight about the nature of action as a factual account.

For phenomenology as study of the structures inherent in meaning (Crowell 2001, 2013: 9–30; Zahavi 2017: 18), the problem of unintended consequences comes into view through its implications for understanding what is defining the meaning or sense (*sense* in French,

Sinn or *Bedeutung* in German) of an action. This is how Tengelyi approaches the case of Oedipus. It reveals the “highly significant fact that the meaning or sense of an action does not remain unaffected by its unintended consequences, which therefore . . . must be acknowledged as subsequently revealed shreds of meaning that belong to the original deed” (Tengelyi 2012a: 266). The possibility of a dramatic change in the experienced meaning of an action is the most conspicuous feature of the example:

At the notorious crossroads, Oedipus intends to merely kill an arrogant stranger, yet in retrospect, his deed is revealed as the killing of his father. Now, this description of this action also belongs to the meaning or sense of what really happened at that crossroads. . . . An action can thus detach itself from the intention of the agent. Nonetheless, it remains a deed of its originator [*Urheber*]. Can it be ascribed to him as an intentional action at all, its unintentional consequences are also ascribed to him. . . . Through his act of revenge, Oedipus ipso facto becomes a patricide. Here, the agent experiences his action in suffering its unwanted consequences.

(Tengelyi 2014: 368–369)

As an example of how agency is experienced, Tengelyi’s example highlights this dramatic reversal from an experience of active involvement in a deed considered by the agent to be just to an experience of passively suffering the consequences of the very same action, now perceived as morally reprehensible. To capture the different moments of first-person involvement in action, Tengelyi typically refers not to an intention (*intention*, *Absicht*) to act but to the broader notion of the “experience” (*expérience*, *Erfahrung*, Tengelyi 2012a: 271 and *passim*, Tengelyi 2007a, 2009a) of action. This is more informative than it might seem: emphasizing a moment of Husserl’s analysis, Tengelyi sees experience as defined by a form of coherence or agreement (*Übereinstimmung*). Only in contrast to this “basis of agreement” can diverging moments be recognized and expectations can be disappointed (Husserl 1970: 212). Following Hegel and Gadamer, Tengelyi takes the notion of experience to imply both negativity and conflict (*Widerstreit*, Tengelyi 2007b: 322). The story of Oedipus is a case in point. After setting up the discussion, I will return to the implication of this notion of experience in the concluding section.

Another implication of this example is the specific nature of the limitation to knowing what one does. This limitation is to be distinguished from the question whether or to what degree actions involve conscious deliberation or propositional thought. In terms of the debate between Hubert Dreyfus and John McDowell (Schear 2003), whether his actions were ‘mindless’ or ‘minded’ is not at issue in the case of Oedipus: although Oedipus realizes he has been ‘blind’ at the time at which they were initiated, his actions have been the ‘minded’ result of deliberation and conscious choice. The example rather draws attention to another way in which the knowledge of one’s doing is restricted: at the moment an action is initiated, its meaning is to a large extent indeterminate and will remain “unstable, unsettled, and subject to alteration” (Tengelyi 2012a: 271) as it evolves. This evolvment, Tengelyi stresses, has nothing to do with first-person awareness or “with any progress of knowledge; it results solely from the unfolding of the—often unintended—consequences of the original action” (Tengelyi 2012a: 271). Offering the alternative of ‘mindless’ or ‘minded’ involvement therefore does not identify this defining feature of action.

As Tengelyi emphasizes, the “temporal gap” (Tengelyi 2012a: 270) separating consequences from the original action may be considerable. Nonetheless, it is “undoubtedly” true that “even the consequences of an action that emerge considerably later than the original

action enter into the sense or meaning of this action” (Tengelyi 2012a: 270). To bring out the historical scope of the process in which the meaning of action is constituted, Tengelyi (2012a: 270–271) gives an example from the history of philosophy: the consequences of Fichte’s appropriation of Kant’s Critical philosophy in his early writings cannot be gauged by looking at the work of these two authors alone. The accumulated effects of this action can only be measured with a view to German Idealism and its impact as a whole. The same structural feature thus defines the historical development of Post-Kantian philosophy and the story of Oedipus. Both cases reveal the essential incompleteness of any action’s meaning.

Although this feature is much easier to recognize from the third-person perspective of a historian of philosophy or the author of a drama, the specific indeterminacy and incompleteness in the constitution of an action’s meaning is also defining first-person involvement in it. An agent’s experience of her deeds takes shapes within structures of intelligibility that are incongruent with and typically larger than the scope of the agent’s intentions and the consequences she expects. As Tengelyi aims to show, these structures are essentially narrative: the subject is not merely involved in her actions as an initiator of her intentional actions but also as the person living through the experience of her deeds. This makes her a subject of the experience of action and a possible *narrator*. The account of the self underlying this view will be discussed in Section ‘My practice, my story, and I: narrative identity.’ With regard to the meaning of individual actions, it follows from this idea that the link between different descriptions of actions is genuinely narrative: “it is the articulated relation between different descriptions of one and the same action that provides this action with a specifically narrative intelligibility” (Tengelyi 2012a: 273).

Consider our example. Both ‘I killed a stranger on the roadside’ and ‘I killed my father’ are possible articulations of Oedipus’ first-person experience as laid out in the fictional account. As Oedipus never intended what the latter proposition describes, it provides an example of the notion that narrative intelligibility does not stop short of unintended consequences. As Tengelyi writes, narration is also capable of making actions “intelligible as events that have happened to us rather than as initiatives we have taken” (Tengelyi 2012a: 265–266). That consequences “supervene on . . . the initiatives that are taken intentionally” (Tengelyi 2012a: 266), however, does not mean that actions are properly described as events without any reference to intentions. As Tengelyi writes, it cannot

be solely from the point of view of an external spectator that the relation between an action and its unintended consequences is established . . . it is only from the agent’s point of view that the relation between the original action and its unintended consequences becomes properly perceptible. For, unlike natural causality, this relation does not simply connect different events in the world; rather, it links the entire chain of events with the agent as well. It is, indeed, the experience gained—or to be gained—by the agent of the consequences of his or her action that establishes this relation.

(Tengelyi 2012a: 271)

Note that Tengelyi here makes a claim regarding both the *methodological* and the *metaphysical* role of the agent: the “link” between the agent and her actions is not merely “properly perceived” but also “established” by the agent through the way in which she “relates first-personally to the consequences of his or her action”; it is an “experiential relation . . . established by the agent from within” (Tengelyi 2012a: 271). If this is so, the metaphysical task of a theory of action is to make sense of this privilege of the agent building on a phenomenology of what it is like to act “from within.” But it is unclear what in the experience

of agency corresponds to that metaphysical authority: intention is a necessary but not sufficient element, and so is the subject's role as a possible narrator of her actions. The first cannot make sense of unintended consequences, while the role of a narrator does not necessarily draw from the first-person perspective. What then defines the subject's involvement as *an agent*?

In "Action and Selfhood," Tengelyi gives an implicit answer to that question when indicating that establishing a metaphysical relation between an agent and her actions is an exercise of freedom. Because the paper focuses on narrativity, Tengelyi here merely indicates that it follows from this notion that human freedom must not be identified with "noumenal freedom": if it were true that, as Tengelyi quotes Kant from the second *Critique*, action "does not recognize any temporal difference" (Tengelyi 2012a: 271), it would be impossible to make sense of the temporally extended constitution and evolution of the meaning of action. As we will see in Section 'Freedom and necessity: the meaning of unintended consequences,' Tengelyi elaborates this argument in *World and Infinity*, where he gives a positive account of freedom as "*temporally determined capacity*" (Tengelyi 2014: 384). A good way to understand what motivates this move is to consider Tengelyi's critique of Davidson.

From action to its agent. Tengelyi on Davidson

Tengelyi sees a "phenomenology of experience in the life-world" as necessary supplement to "a Davidsonian ontology of impersonal events" (Tengelyi 2012a: 272). Although it helps to account for unintended consequences, Tengelyi argues that Davidson's analysis misconstrues the ontological implications of the phenomenology of agency. The aim of this section is to show what drives this argument.

For Davidson, unlike many canonical and recent phenomenological authors, the problem of unintended consequences is an important problem. Tengelyi takes over Davidson's semantic framing of this problem, namely as a problem of how to properly *describe* action. In this framework, an action is properly grasped as such in a true description in intentional language. Tengelyi rephrases Davidson when defining agency in this vein: "the agent is the originator of all actions that can be ascribed to him under at least one description in which what he does is understood to be intentional" (Davidson 2001: 46; Tengelyi 2012a: 269). In this way, Tengelyi aims to integrate into a phenomenological account an idea first formulated by Anscombe (2000: 37–47), which Davidson calls "the conclusion on which our considerations all converge": there can be "a welter of related descriptions [corresponding] to a single descriptum" (Davidson 2001: 53). Tengelyi emphasizes this point: Davidson's "formula indicates that each new description of an action is a *re-description of the original action*" (Tengelyi 2012a: 270).

Davidson's definition allows dealing with unintended consequences in the way Tengelyi already anticipated: when an action is experienced not as one's intentional doing but as an event the agent suffers, this change in the sense or meaning of the action amounts to a subsequent addition or modification of its true descriptions. What is unclear, however, is whether a semantic theory can express what Tengelyi called the "*experiential relation*" (Tengelyi 2012a: 271) between an agent and her actions and its metaphysical import. Since Tengelyi holds that it is possible to recast intentions within a semantic framework, a promising approach to integrate first-person involvement into Davidson's theory may be to include narratability as well. If "the plot of a story to be told about an action results necessarily from a connection between two or more different descriptions of it" (Tengelyi 2012a: 273), it should be possible to recast narrative connections in this way.

To see how successful this strategy might be, consider the following: ‘Oedipus kills his father *although* he does not intend to kill his father.’ Combining the two propositions in such a way provides a kind of miniature narrative. It reveals that there is not merely semantic continuity (words means the same in both propositions) and alethic continuity between these descriptions (they are both true) but also a genuinely *narrative* one. This continuity is brought out by the *although*, functioning as a kind of narrative connector. Nonetheless, connecting propositions in this way is insufficient to grasp what Tengelyi had identified as defining features in the constitution of the meaning of action. Borrowing a term from Ernst Tugendhat, Tengelyi emphasizes that every narration must be based not only on a connection between descriptions of action but on an “experiential way” (*Erfahrungsweg*, Tugendhat 1979: 25) connecting the agent’s experiences of actions. “It is the agent’s experience of her action that supplies the missing link in the connection between acting and recounting” (Tengelyi 2012a: 272). This idea restricts how descriptions of an action can be thought of as being linked in a narration.

Thus in our example: even if it is true to say ‘Oedipus kills his father *although* he does not intend to kill his father,’ according to the story, there has never been a first-person correlate of that proposition in Oedipus’ experience. Giving voice to *his* experience requires the past tense: ‘I *killed* my father although I *did not intend* to kill my father.’ A more elaborate narrative would bring out the temporal extension of the different experiences: ‘I *had* intended to kill a stranger, *then* I learned. . . , *now* I know. . . etc.’ Only because these tensed, first-personal statements have in the time passed turned out to be true can the story of Oedipus be told by way of connecting third-personal propositions. But doing so reveals not only temporal extension but also indeterminacy and incompleteness as defining the process in which the meaning of an action is established, and these are the constitutive elements in the agent’s experience of action: “every agent takes at least the *risk* of experiencing something unforeseeable and unexpected turns that result from his or her action” (Tengelyi 2012a: 274). Tengelyi’s charge against Davidson’s theory is that it requires that the meaning of action be stable and determinate, which is not the way Oedipus experiences his actions.

As Tengelyi remarks, Davidson “remains a follower of Quine” in that he “relegates the decision regarding the existence of beings to the logical semantics of our linguistic expressions” (Tengelyi 2012a: 268). Although first-personal involvement can be mirrored to some extent within the semantic framework, it cannot reach the ontologically defining element in the agent’s first-personal involvement, the experience Tengelyi refers to as “risking” unintended consequences. Tengelyi (2012a: 271–272) refers to Ricœur (1992: 73–87) as voicing a similar criticism, when he accuses Anscombe and Davidson of addressing the ‘what’ and the ‘why’ of action, but not the ‘who.’ Tengelyi reiterates this point here but identifies not narrative intelligibility as such, but the specific incompleteness and indeterminacy of action as feature defining the ‘who’ of the action. Despite Tengelyi’s initial reliance on Davidson’s treatment of unintended consequences, that it is incapable of expressing the defining feature in the experience of action motivates him to “draw some consequences that remain alien to the Davidsonian ontology of action” (Tengelyi 2012a: 271).

These consequences concern the explanatorily basic and metaphysically defining level in the constitution of the meaning of action. Tengelyi concurs with the assessment that the problem of unintended consequences threatens a clear metaphysical distinction between intentional actions and events. “Intentional actions as such” (Tengelyi 2012a: 270) form no coherent set. But, Tengelyi argues, Davidson is moving too quickly from the observation that the “actions justly ascribed to a particular agent” *do* form “a determinate class of events

among other events in the world” (Tengelyi 2012a: 270) to the claim that agency can be given an “expression [that] is itself purely extensional” (Davidson 2001: 46). That defining action is possible only relative to a specific agent is a claim that “is less innocent than it may initially appear” (Tengelyi 2012a: 270). Assimilating actions to a “class of events” (Davidson 2001: 46) in the world fails to heed the difference between the consequences of actions and the consequences of events, as they emerge both within first-person experience and in semantics. This difference comes out most clearly with regard to how the meaning of an action continues to matter to the agent over time in a way other events do not.

To understand the point Tengelyi wants to make, consider the contrast between the eruption of a volcano and man-made climate change. Because the first is a natural event, its causal effects, Tengelyi writes, “do not enter into the meaning or sense of the original event . . . The eruption of a volcano remains what it is, regardless of the more or less devastating effects brought about by it” (Tengelyi 2012a: 270). The effects of climate change, by contrast, are unintended consequence of human actions. It is a defining trait in their meaning that they are the results of having taken the risk of an unforeseeable outcome and of unexpected turns. You can regret having contributed to climate change, but you cannot regret the eruption of a volcano. Although both cases can be described as events having causally determined effects, in the latter case, this description does not link the causal effects to the agent having, perhaps unknowingly, run the risk of unintended consequences. What defines actions in contrast to natural events is that, should unintended consequences occur, they

enter into the meaning or the sense of the original action . . . The difference between the two cases clearly shows that we are far from interpreting the consequences of actions in the same way as the causal effects of natural events.

(Tengelyi 2012a: 270)

Although Davidson (2001: 54), too, observed that the criterion for taking an event to be an action is “whether we can attribute its effects to a person,” he failed to recognize that this rules out defining the metaphysical role of the agent in causal terms alone. As Tengelyi stresses, he aims for a “holistic view of action . . . according to which a single description never exhausts the content of a deed” (Tengelyi 2012a: 273). This holds true not only for descriptions in intentional language (as Davidson argues as well) but also for descriptions in causal terms. Although Tengelyi does not put it this way, he apparently rejects the claim that “the primary reason for an action is its cause” (Davidson 2001: 4). I will return to this point in Sections ‘Freedom and necessity: the meaning of unintended consequences’ and ‘Conclusion: a case for truth’.

In Tengelyi’s view, Davidson’s theory is therefore incomplete not because it may not be extended to mirror aspects of first-personal involvement such as intention or narrativity but because it cannot give an account of temporal extension, indeterminacy, and incompleteness, which are the defining features of the meaning of action. Given Tengelyi’s brief remarks on human freedom in “Action and Selfhood,” this disagreement is not merely methodological and not merely concerns the role of first-personal accounts. If Davidson’s theory cannot make sense of what it means to risk unintended consequences, it cannot connect to a metaphysical account of human freedom that builds on this phenomenology of agency. In the development of Tengelyi’s own theory, an account of freedom is what the treatment of action in *World and Infinity* adds to the earlier work on narrativity. Given the emphasis on freedom involving an “*experiential* relation,” as discussed in Section ‘What is it like to be an agent? The

case of Oedipus,' one might expect Tengelyi to draw from first-personal accounts as, for instance, Kriegel (2015: 205–244) does. Tengelyi remains closer to his earlier work, however, continuing the discussion of Oedipus, focusing the problem of unintended consequences, and tying in numerous authors from the history of philosophy.

Freedom and necessity: the meaning of unintended consequences

To describe the metaphysical implications of unintended consequences, Tengelyi begins with a comment Aristotle makes in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (114b23, 1114b32–1115a1). Regarding dispositions (*hexeis*), Aristotle holds that the individual is only “co-originating” (*synaitios*) her dispositions. Only the initiative to act, the “beginning” (*arche*) of the action is in our control. Tengelyi follows Ricoeur (1992: 133) in extending this notion to actions in general: humans are not in full control of their deeds but only their “co-originator” (*Miturheber*, Tengelyi 2014: 370). With regard to the problem of unintended consequences, this allows Tengelyi to distinguish degrees of causal involvement: “although the freedom of action is the cause [*Ursache*] of the intentional action, it is only the partial cause [*Mitursache*] of the entire action, once the unintended consequences have entered into it” (Tengelyi 2014: 372). As the action unfolds, the agent’s spontaneity becomes less and less relevant and other determining factors contribute more and more to its meaning. This has an important negative consequence for any account of freedom: “The reason why the notion of a noumenal freedom, in the Kantian sense of the word, has to be rejected is precisely its inability to account for this complicity with reality” (Tengelyi 2012a: 282). In the chapter on action in *World and Infinity*, Tengelyi aims to spell out an alternative view.

The larger metaphysical system Tengelyi develops starts from a number of basic experiential givens with far-reaching ramifications. Taking up a Husserlian notion, Tengelyi calls these “primordial facts” (Husserl 1973: 385; *Urtatsachen*, Tengelyi 2014: 14, 180–227), counting the ego, the world, intersubjectivity, and history among them. Not susceptible to proof or further analysis, these basic or primordial facts have been revealed in the history of philosophy. But this is not where their authority derives from. Rather, a phenomenological treatment of classical metaphysical problems reveals them as being indispensable for making sense of our experience. Although contingent in origin, all experience implies their “factual necessity” (*faktische Notwendigkeit*, Tengelyi 2014: 189; Husserl 2014: 83). Rather than designating them categories of judgment or Heideggerian existentials, Tengelyi coins the new expression “experientials” (*Experientialien*, Tengelyi 2014: 197) to describe the status of primordial facts as phenomenological categories.

In Kantian terms, experientials, despite being “categories of experience” (Tengelyi 2014: 198) are akin to principles of reflective rather than determinative judgment (Römer 2020). Tengelyi emphasizes that in contrast to Kant’s critical system, the “open transcendentalism” first developed by Husserl does no longer assume the “coherence of experience . . . as a necessary consequence of self-consciousness” (Tengelyi 2014: 359). Rather, “all search for rules, order, and unity within the ‘rhapsody of perceptions’ ” is found in a transcendental reflection of experience and thus “delegated to the competence of reflective judgment” (Tengelyi 2014: 359). Although Tengelyi presents this notion of freedom as primordial fact as transformation of Kant’s compatibilist position, recasting it within this system of a phenomenological metaphysics leads to a number of shifts from this position.

Most importantly, Tengelyi denies a separation of a nexus of free determination initiated through the spontaneity of the subject on the one hand and the causal, mechanical order of

the world on the other. Rather than as somehow emerging on two parallel planes at once, experience shows that action is to be defined as the ongoing intersection of spontaneity with the causal order. The reasoning in *World and Infinity* here elaborates the argument from the earlier essay on action: while the idea of a parallelism of two separate domains of freedom and nature reduces freedom to a “merely intelligible, noumenal idea” (Tengelyi 2014: 372), that there are unintended consequences to an action shows that only assuming the constant interaction between the causal order of nature and human spontaneity can yield a plausible notion of human action. Therefore, any “parallelism” of freedom and necessity is to be rejected:

The moment we initiate an action, there is *not yet* a parallel: only once the action has already been initiated is the causal mechanism of the world influenced in such a way as to cause the consequences of the action that come to change sense and meaning of the original action. Once these mechanisms have been set in motion, however, there can *no longer* be a parallel: now, events are already taking place that have not been intended in the original initiative to act. The initiative to act and the causal mechanisms of the world are constantly *meshing*; they never run parallel to each other.

(Tengelyi 2014: 372)

Tengelyi further shifts away from the Kantian picture by introducing the idea that there are other forms of determinacy (*Determination, Bestimmung*) than causal determination. Specifically, Tengelyi draws from the work of the Marburg neo-Kantian Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1950). Hartmann defines freedom of action as the superposition of different “types of determination” (*Determinationstypen*), that of causal determination (“causal nexus,” *Kausalnexus*) and that of volitional determination in the teleological historical process (“teleological nexus,” *Finalnexus*) in particular. As Hartmann says, “freedom is only possible where, in one world, at least two types of determination are superimposed one upon the other” (Hartmann 1932: 64). The teleological nexus is needed for freedom of choice not to remain merely negative (Hartmann 1932: 48).

As Tengelyi emphasizes, Hartmann here follows Hegel’s notion of a “*cunning* of reason” (Hartmann 1960: 474; Hegel 2010: 663), “the idea that freedom begins where reason makes natural causality serve its purposes by using a natural object as a means to achieve its own end” (Tengelyi 2014: 373). Although Hartmann conceives the causal nexus as a “totality,” this totality is underdetermined, “never absolutely closed; it does not prevent the addition of new determining elements—if there be such” (Hartmann 1932: 55). Intentional action and the teleological development of its meaning come to fill the gaps in the causal order without thereby disrupting causal efficiency: “the process is never broken by such additions, it is only diverted” (Hartmann 1932: 55). In Tengelyi’s system, this idea of causality as an underdetermined totality anticipates the phenomenological account of infinity developed in later chapters of his book (Tengelyi 2014: 435–556).

Tengelyi substantially modifies Hartmann’s account, however, by rejecting the claim that there is a hierarchy between the different forms of determination (Tengelyi 2012b). Although affirming the idea of a “redirectability of causal chains” (Tengelyi 2014: 375), Tengelyi denies that the aggregate of free choices, which forms the teleological nexus, supervenes on the only partial determination of action in the causal nexus. Experience shows that causal and volitional determination can and do in fact come to conflict. Again, the fate of Oedipus is a case in point: because killing his father was not what Oedipus intended, it is not the result of informed choice; rather than its meaning being exhausted by its being

located in the teleological nexus, at least one description defines it as primarily causally determined event. As Tengelyi writes, “the phenomenon of unintended consequences shows that natural causality can always come to resist the teleological power of control and disposal. Natural causality often interferes with our free initiatives” (Tengelyi 2014: 375). This interference explains the phenomenology of agency identified in the introductory section as defining the case of Oedipus: the break with the specific intelligibility provided by the final nexus leads to Oedipus’ experience of a radical reversal of the meaning of his deeds. In Tengelyi’s understanding, Oedipus here falls back on the intelligibility provided by the causal nexus.

This discussion of the case of Oedipus is notably different from that of both Hegel and Schelling. Where Hegel finds in Sophocles’ tragedy an eventual “reconciliation of the powers animating action” (Hegel 1975: 1215) and Schelling an “equilibrium between . . . freedom and necessity” (Schelling 1989: 255), Tengelyi sees a resurgence of natural causality and an unresolvable conflict between different forms of determination. In the earlier paper on narrativity, Tengelyi comments on and explicitly rejects Schelling’s interpretation of *Oedipus Rex*. It is central for this reading that, when Oedipus decides to punish himself after suffering the unintended consequences of his deeds, the teleological order is restored and eventually prevails. As that happens, Tengelyi summarizes, “freedom recuperates the unintended consequences of its actions from necessity (or fate) by assuming responsibility for them” (Tengelyi 2012a: 281). Tengelyi acknowledges that Schelling’s reading presents “a serious attempt to resolve the fundamental dilemma of the freedom of action” (Tengelyi 2012a: 281). Yet when Schelling describes Oedipus’ deeds paradoxically as “unavoidable transgression” (Schelling 1989: 254), he restates rather than dissolves the conflict between fate or necessity on the one hand and the realm of freedom on the other. Rather than as its confirmation *sub specie aeternitatis*, Tengelyi interprets the case of Oedipus as undermining the idea of a supervenience of the teleological order. The idea of an “equilibrium between freedom and necessity” must, for a “finite being” at least, remain of “speculative character” (Tengelyi 2012a: 281). It is no trait of the phenomenology of agency.

These remarks highlight Tengelyi’s divergence from the compatibilist position: if a “conflict” between freedom and causality can always emerge, teleological processes do not simply fill the gaps of indeterminacy left in the causal nexus. Although constantly “meshing,” the different types of determination remain “heterogeneous” (Tengelyi 2014: 375). Rather than as threatening the subject’s freedom or as revealing an antinomy, however, Tengelyi takes this conflict as a confirmation of the metaphysical outlook phenomenology advocates:

The possibility of such conflicts speaks most clearly for the claim that the teleology of action can be understood as an experiential category that—similar to other experientials—expresses a tendency of coherence [*Einstimmigkeitstendenz*]. The fact of a conflict between the two types of determination does not contradict this view but rather lays its ground. For where there is but a tendency towards coherence, naturally there is conflict as well.

(Tengelyi 2014: 375)

The negative point to take away from the example of Oedipus, therefore, is that a phenomenological account of merely factual necessities must not make the assumption that there is a single form of homogenous coherence that will eventually come to fully determine the meaning of an action. Again drawing from Husserl, Tengelyi labels the strongest form of determination to be identified in experience an *Einstimmigkeitstendenz* (Tengelyi

2014: 194–200, 303–365, 375), a precarious *tendency* toward coherence or harmony. Even the notion of a “world” does not designate a determinate totality with necessary ontological structures. In a phenomenological understanding, “world” merely “gathers in the form of a single concept the *tendency-character of all tendencies towards coherence* [*Tendenzcharakter aller Einstimmigkeitstendenzen*]” (Tengelyi 2014: 547).

Modifying the metaphysical picture underlying the account of human freedom has the important implication that, pace Schelling, Hegel, and Hartmann, the coherence generated by intentions does not eventually assume the form of a teleological order that fully determines the meaning of actions over the course of history. Rather than being a hierarchy of different forms of determinacy, the problem of unintended consequences reveals that freedom must be understood as in both continuity with and contrast to several heterogeneous forms of determinacy. The aim of the next section is to show how Tengelyi develops what may be labeled a plural-compatibilist position by drawing from Heidegger’s philosophy.

Grounding grounds: on different ways to be free

Recall from the above discussion that, even on a historical scale, the meaning of action remains indeterminate. While the earlier “Action and Selfhood” merely discussed this indeterminacy with respect to an already initiated action, its evolution and possible narration, the view laid out in *World and Infinity* (2014: 375–392) brings this indeterminacy into view as a potential for future action: central to Tengelyi’s discussion of freedom is our “capacity to initiate an action [*Selbstanfängerkönnen*]” (Tengelyi 2014: 384). Importantly, a full account of this capacity requires that indeterminacy not be regarded as the mere “redirectability” of causal chains. As Tengelyi now highlights, several forms of relative indeterminacy can be identified in the experience of agency. In particular, indeterminacy is also found with regard to the moral evaluation of action.

To bring out that there is an indeterminacy relative to moral choice, Tengelyi again turns to a number of authors. He finds the strongest expression of this idea in Schelling’s account of human freedom as the possibility of choosing between good and evil, which Tengelyi takes to reveal a “*strong indeterminism*” (Tengelyi 2014: 200) in the moral determination of acts. Similar in Hartmann: although the teleological order eventually supervenes on moral indeterminacy, Tengelyi concurs with Hartmann’s idea that moral choice is marked by a genuine “indeterminism of values” (Hartmann 1932: 225). In contrast to these views, however, moral determination for Tengelyi has the specific form of an immediate demand or appeal (*Anspruch*). As Tengelyi writes, it belongs to the “mode of determination specific to appeals of ought [*Determinationsweise verschiedener Sollensansprüche*] to leave different options open, or rather: to open them up at all” (Tengelyi 2014: 381). Importantly, however, Tengelyi does not assume a quasi-Platonic domain of value, as Hartmann does, but moves, somewhat quickly, from a Neo-Kantian value ethics to an ethics of responsivity in the wake of Levinas. Tengelyi describes the situation in which the agent is confronted with moral choice as that, in the words of Bernhard Waldenfels (2016: 356), of a “conflict of simultaneous appeals,” where the content of these appeals is not further determined. Here’s Tengelyi’s own account:

The leeway of action is indeed a space of open alternatives. But the possibilities for action offered within this space are not equivalent. They urge the agent, appeal to him and demand to be realized. They each lay claim to determine his will. Thus, they enter into conflict.

(Tengelyi 2014: 381)

Although I cannot discuss the plausibility of this moral phenomenology here, it is clear that the moral form of determination Tengelyi eventually opts for is markedly different from that of causality already in that its main form is not that of laws but of situational appeals to action. With regard to the metaphysical underpinnings of this moral phenomenology, this implies that the indeterminacy manifesting itself varies according to the form of determinacy with which it contrasts. This leads to the decisive implication that the agent is confronted with *both* kinds of relative determination and their corresponding forms of indeterminacy *at once*. She finds herself not only partially determined by the “relative strengths [Kräfteverhältnis]” (Tengelyi 2014: 380) of different causal forces but also within the “field of appeals [Anspruchsfeld]” (Tengelyi 2014: 383) defined by the different moral implications of her options for action.

Having identified these different forms of determinacy and corresponding indeterminacy, Tengelyi returns to the story of Oedipus. Once we see human freedom as temporally extended and abiding capacity to initiate action and heed the heterogeneity of different forms of determinacy, a more complex account becomes possible. Rather than seeing it as embodying a single tragic conflict between freedom and necessity, as did the authors discussed in the last section, Tengelyi’s account aims to make the story intelligible as a series of decisions with which Oedipus reacts to the evolvement of his original deed. In this way, a more fine-grained account becomes possible:

although we cannot always remain masters of our entire deed, we can, within certain limits, remain capable of reacting to the experience of unintended consequences. We are free to change and correct our initial plan for action or to even alter it as a whole. This idea, that we can still interact with a particular event of action [*Handlungsgeschehen*], even if we cannot control it, essentially belongs to our idea of being able to initiate an action [*Selbstanfangenkönnen*]. When referring to this idea, we actually always mean an *always again renewable* capacity.

(Tengelyi 2014: 384)

As Tengelyi highlights, thus drawing out the consequences of the temporal situatedness of human freedom “looks more harmless than it actually is” (Tengelyi 2014: 384). For in order to react to the experience of unintended consequences, we must be able to recognize, distinguish, and make use of the different forms of determinacy and their corresponding forms of indeterminacy. Being able to first intentionally cause, then suffer from, and then react to unintended consequences means to have the capacity to not only initiate, but also “deviate from the line of determinacy within the teleology of action that we are following at that moment,” choosing to “follow another route” (Tengelyi 2014: 384). If the case of Oedipus involves both the nexus of natural causality and the teleological nexus as two heterogeneous forms of determinations, as discussed in the last section, reacting to unintended consequences cannot be explained in reference to a teleological account of action alone. It also means to

have the capacity to isolate a merely causally determined line of determination and find in it indications for how to transform the teleology of action we are currently following. These capacities point to a deeper meaning of freedom. Only a living being that can not only initiate an action but can also take distance from the teleology of action and react to natural causality as it interferes with this teleology is acquainted with something like natural causality and the teleology of action at all.

(Tengelyi 2014: 384–385)

This is the most complex description of the case of Oedipus that Tengelyi gives. It again raises the standard for what a phenomenological account of human freedom must cover: it must not only make sense of the experience of both active and passive involvement in action. It must also show what it means to recognize, distinguish, and make use of the different ways in which the space of possible action is partly determinate, partly indeterminate. A fine-grained account of the temporal and motivational sequence of choices involved in dealing with unintended consequences reveals that free choice requires being able to recognize different forms of determinacy in order to then choose, within the domain of the pertinent indeterminacies, what to do now. The agent does more than function as a cogwheel, as it were, in the meshing of different forms of determinacy.

Tengelyi sees having identified this “deeper meaning of freedom” as “turning point” (Tengelyi 2014: 384) of his entire theory. In particular, Tengelyi draws the conclusion that freedom should be identified neither with spontaneity (with respect to the causal order) nor with moral choice (in responding to the conflicting moral appeals). Rather, an account of freedom must reach deeper than these views by describing the very “openness” (*Offenheit*) for interacting with the different forms of determination at all. Shifting from Hartmann’s notion of “determinations” (*Bestimmungen*) to Heidegger’s talk of “reasons” or “grounds” (*Gründe*), Tengelyi calls this freedom an “openness for relations of grounding in the world as such [*Gründungszusammenhänge in der Welt überhaupt!*]” (Tengelyi 2014: 385). In the concluding passages of his treatment of action, Tengelyi presents Heidegger’s account of freedom from “The Essence of Ground” and the 1928 Leibniz-lecture. Tengelyi fully endorses this view. I conclude this section by outlining three major aspects before returning to the question of narrative identity.

One aspect of Heidegger’s view on freedom is that the concept of a reason or ground is based on a prior interpretation of the situation in which an agent finds herself. Importantly, this interpretation is itself an exercise of freedom in the deeper sense. As Tengelyi puts this point, summarizing Heidegger in his own idiom, “a justification . . . is only possibly within a certain world projection [*Weltenwurf*] and in reference to an each-time different being-in-the-world as factual being-captivated by entities [*Eingenommenheit im Seienden*]” (Tengelyi 2014: 386). Heidegger calls this basic exposure and the subject’s response to it “transcendence” (*Transzendenz*), emphasizing that this is what he means by freedom (Heidegger 1984: 185). Because freedom qua transcendence is what allows a subject to first of all establish an interpretation of what it means to give a reason, Heidegger in a recurring phrase calls it the “ground of ground” (*Grund des Grundes*) (Heidegger 1984: 214, 1998: 134). This phrase aims to bring out that the idea of freedom as transcendence is deeper because it is explanatorily more basic than notions of freedom such as that of spontaneity relative to causal determination. As Heidegger stresses, to understand causal determination to then use its relative indeterminacy to initiate an action depends on a prior use of freedom qua transcendence: “Only because freedom consists in transcendence can freedom make itself known as a distinctive kind of causality in existing Dasein” (Heidegger 1998: 217).

This may seem odd, as it seems to imply that causal determination is itself a form of freedom. Heidegger indeed claims that freedom qua transcendence is necessary for causality to “make itself known” (*sich bekunden*) in experience. But what this means is simply that to recognize the causal order as defining a trait in our experience requires the minimal commitment of taking this experience as truly revealing a feature of reality. This commitment is already an exercise of freedom in the deeper sense of transcendence. Heidegger is thus advocating here what can be labeled a normative understanding of phenomenology, where each form of phenomenal presence, including in the recognition of causality (including

in perception, Doyon and Breyer 2015), involves a response to some normative claim. Although Tengelyi does not refer to these authors, in relying on the account of freedom as transcendence, he situates his discussion of action within readings of Heidegger developed by Haugeland (2013), Crowell (2013), Golob (2014), and others that focus on normativity in this sense. I shall have more to say on what follows from this for Tengelyi's view in the concluding section.

A second implication of Heidegger's account of freedom is that there are different notions of "reason" or "ground" irreducible to a single, coherent notion. This point has already been encountered in the last section with regard to the discussion of the different forms of determinacy when Tengelyi denied a hierarchy among them, referring to Oedipus' as a case in point. As Tengelyi emphasizes now, that reason-giving is not univocal has already been recognized in Aristotle's account of the four causes or Schopenhauer's treatise on the fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason, to both of which Heidegger refers. Tengelyi highlights that Heidegger was always "careful to keep in view a manifold of different relations of grounding" (Tengelyi 2014: 385). This pluralism of forms of grounding runs parallel to Heidegger's discussion of ontology. Although Heidegger never clearly endorses ontological pluralism (Keiling 2018) and an according grounding-pluralism relative to different understandings of the world (*Weltentwürfe*), Tengelyi seems to do so (Keiling 2020).

A third important element in Heidegger's account of freedom qua transcendence is its reference to the manifestation of entities. As Tengelyi stresses, to transcend for Heidegger does not mean to access "some kind of 'beyond' or 'backworld' [*Hinterwelt*]" (Tengelyi 2014: 386). Rather, "that towards which the subject transcends is what we call world" (Heidegger 1984: 166). Specifically, freedom qua transcendence engages with individual entities and their respective forms of manifestation. It takes the form, Heidegger says, of "*letting oneself be bound* [*Sichbindenlassen*]" in such a way that one becomes beholden to the "measure: beings as they are [*das Seiende, wie es ist*]" (Heidegger 1995: 342). Haugeland (2013: 201) aptly calls this the free subject's "beholdenness to entities." Despite the plurality of different forms of grounding, the specific situation and the entities encountered there emerge as the each-time relevant normative correlate. As Tengelyi highlights in reference to another quote from Heidegger's lectures, "being open to beings" (Heidegger 1995: 342) and an "*openness for relations of grounding in the world as such*" (Tengelyi 2014: 385) are co-constitutive.

Note that this view concurs with an element in Tengelyi's critique of Davidson. While Davidson aimed to show "how to construct a primary reason" (Davidson 2001: 4) for an action and that this reason is its cause, Tengelyi's reference to Heidegger's account of what it means to be a reason or ground implies that, although an action may have a primary reason, it is not identical to its cause. Where Davidson aimed to show that any rationalization of action depends on its rationalization in causal terms, Heidegger and Tengelyi hold that all rationalization of action depends on the exercise of freedom qua transcendence, of which a rationalization in causal terms is only one form. Unlike views "inspired by the later Wittgenstein" (Davidson 2001: 10), which Davidson criticizes, this position does not imply that reasons cannot be causes; they are. It only implies that the question "how reasons explain actions" (Davidson 2001: 10) admits to different answers, depending on prior assumptions about how to understand the action; pointing to a cause as its reason is only one possible rationalization of the action. But even if neither their description in intentional nor that in causal terms exhausts the meaning of what actions are, Tengelyi, like Davidson, holds that actions are entities (Tengelyi 2012a: 269). Given the third aspect of Heidegger's view, this raises the question how the relation of these entities to the subject that is free in the sense of transcendence is to be understood. What could it mean to be "open" or "beholden" to

actions? In the setup of Tengelyi's theory, this question directly leads to describing the role of narrative intelligibility in making sense of these entities. I will sketch Tengelyi's discussion of narrative identity before returning to the truth of actions in the concluding section.

My practice, my story, and I: narrative identity

Recall that Tengelyi's paper on narrative identity predates the account in *World and Infinity* and Tengelyi's discussion and endorsement of Heidegger's notion of freedom as transcendence. While there is continuity between the two texts in Tengelyi's treatment of the problem of unintended consequences, I will argue that it is not clear that the earlier treatment of narrativity can be seamlessly integrated with his later discussion of freedom. This section aims to spell out Tengelyi's view before discussing it in the next section.

Recall from Section 'From action to its agent. Tengelyi on Davidson' that Tengelyi took Davidson's theory to be incapable of accounting for the first-person character of the experience of action. Rather than referring to a semantic theory alone, Tengelyi argued that it must build on a metaphysics and a phenomenology of agency defined by the actual course of first-person experience, its "*experiential way* through the life-world" (Tengelyi 2012a: 274). This idea was central to Tengelyi's charge that Davidson's theory was incomplete:

if we take seriously the task of deciding, to put it in Davidson's terms, 'what makes a bit of biography an action', we shall have to pass over from a Davidsonian ontology of impersonal events to a phenomenology of experience in the life-world.

(Tengelyi 2012a: 272)

Although Tengelyi does not put it that way, I take this to mean that the relations between the descriptions a semantic theory recognizes should be seen as dependent on or founded in the meaning encountered in the first-personal experience of action and of taking the risk of unintended consequences in particular. How is such dependence to be understood? Tengelyi's answer to that question is given not in a more elaborate account of how we narrate action such as the one I sketched in Section 'From action to its agent. Tengelyi on Davidson.' Somewhat indirectly, Tengelyi conceives the link between first-personal and third-personal elements in the meaning of an action by means of an account of the self.

Central to that account is the idea that "the constitution of selfhood is . . . a multi-layered process" (Tengelyi 2012a: 280). Tengelyi identifies three such layers building on one another: passive self-constitution, reflective self-awareness, and narrative identity. Tengelyi adopts this model to counter a certain tendency he finds in the theory of narrative identity, the "danger of reducing life and selfhood to fictional constructions . . . to *construct* a meaningful life-history and, so to speak, *invent* an appropriate selfhood" (Tengelyi 2012a: 275). Although Tengelyi recognizes that authors such as Ricoeur (1991: 32) take the constitution of narrative identity to be a *discovery* rather than a *construction*, he finds lacking a more detailed account of how such discovery of a pre-narrative self occurs:

The idea of a narrative identity clearly implies that our selfhood is somehow given before it comes to be specified and determined by narratives. . . . However, it is by no means clear how a *narrative* view of the self could account for the constitution of a *pre*-narrative self-identity. There is no exaggeration in saying that this is a fundamental difficulty with which the proponents of the theory of narrative identity find themselves confronted.

(Tengelyi 2012a: 276)

The three-layered model of the self Tengelyi presents aims to provide a solution to this difficulty. The idea is straightforward: that the narrative identity of the self is *discovered* simply means that it is founded on the explanatorily more basic layer of self-awareness, which is founded in turn in the layer of passive self-constitution, as Husserl describes it in the *Analyses of Passive Synthesis* (Husserl 1966: 203). What connects the passive self with the layer of reflective self-awareness is *memory* or *recollection*, while *narration* or *articulation* connects the self consciously aware of its past with its narrative identity: “the layer of reflective self-awareness is articulated by the stories about one’s life” (Tengelyi 2012a: 280).

Tengelyi takes this model to limit the “validity” (Tengelyi 2012a: 279) of theories of narrative identity, providing a safeguard against the danger of their “constructivist interpretation” (Tengelyi 2012a: 276). In the case of recollection, even “an active search for the self” does not construct or invent the self but discovers it, and “what is discovered” is precisely “a passively constituted self” (Tengelyi 2012a: 278). As Tengelyi stresses

in opposition to fantasy, recollection supposes the existence of the object; it is, consequently, a positional act, and as such it necessarily remains in touch with reality. There is no conscious past—and therefore no life-history—without this adherence to reality. However, the relationship with reality that is characteristic of recollection is by no means constituted by story-telling; on the contrary, it precedes narration . . . the adherence to reality that marks the remembrance of one’s own conscious past is constituted in the passive sphere.

(Tengelyi 2012a: 279)

The “adherence to reality” relevant for recollecting facts thus carries over into the higher layer of the narrative self: “telling stories about one’s own life,” Tengelyi writes, “can only contribute to the constitution of one’s own self, if it preserves the adherence of recollection to reality” (Tengelyi 2012a: 279).

At first, this account seems to have lost sight of the central idea that narration and action are essentially intertwined: one can *recollect* one’s past perceptions just as well as one’s past deeds, both belong to the experience of the passively constituted self. If narration is only *inter alia* founded in recollection, it is unclear how Tengelyi can make good on the claim that structures of narrative intelligibility play a privileged role in the constitution of the meaning of action. So what does it mean when Tengelyi takes actions to be essentially *narratable*? To answer that question Tengelyi returns to the phenomenon of unintended consequences and the case of Oedipus, contrasting an understanding provided by an action as part of a *practice* with that provided by the notion of *narrativity*. Both can articulate the “relation between the different descriptions of one and the same action,” but only one of them “provides this action with a specifically narrative intelligibility” (Tengelyi 2012a: 273). What sets both kinds apart is the way in which they relate different descriptions of actions.

Tengelyi’s example of a practice is what is involved in the job of a philosophy professor. Here, different descriptions make the same action intelligible as part of what it means to be a professor of philosophy: the professor

(i) presents a university lecture on the rise of Greek metaphysics, (ii) he sets forth his views on the relationship between Plato and Aristotle, (iii) he gives a course on the history of philosophy, (iv) he prepares his students for an examination, and (v) he insists on the standards of his profession.

(Tengelyi 2012a: 273)

These different descriptions make the action only intelligible as part of a practice because “the activity in question is intentional in all of the five descriptions”: “the internal coherence of a practice . . . assures the intentionality of action” (Tengelyi 2012a: 273). Because they grow out of the agent’s intentions, Tengelyi argues, practices constitute a structure of intelligibility that is “at least in principle . . . transparent” (Tengelyi 2012a: 273). For this reason, doing something as part of a practice typically does not “give rise to any surprise” and does not “deserve the attention of the story-teller” (Tengelyi 2012a: 273): “the network of practices, with which our life-world is permeated, protects us against the radical turns that our actions are apt to take” (Tengelyi 2012a: 274).

This is different in the case of genuinely narrative intelligibility, which typically includes “the relation between an action and its unintended consequences” (Tengelyi 2012a: 273). It is precisely the feature revealed in the above discussion as defining cases like that of Oedipus, “the fact that every agent takes at least the *risk* of experiencing some unforeseeable and unexpected turns that result from his or her action” (Tengelyi 2012a: 274), that cannot be made intelligible by the intentional and principally transparent structure of practices but requires genuinely narrative intelligibility. Only the more encompassing structure of narrative intelligibility allows the self to see her deeds as part of her personal identity and life-history. A practice not only “rests on a systematic, and to some extent, impersonal articulation of certain intentions to act” (Tengelyi 2012a: 273), the “network of practices” defining the life-world even effects a certain “depersonalization” (Tengelyi 2012a: 274). As long as an action is considered merely as taking part in a practice, it does not contribute to the constitution of a personal self on the level of her *narrative* identity. This idea is certainly controversial, and I will discuss it in the concluding section. But it does tie in with several strands in the above discussion.

One possible consequence, which Tengelyi does not draw explicitly, is that one should distinguish a broader sense of action, which includes all intentional involvement of a practice (all rule-following), from action in a more restricted sense. Action in this genuine sense happens outside the safeguards of an established practice, it requires acceptance of the risk of unintended consequences, and this is what makes it narratable. Arendt, for instance, whom Tengelyi credits with first pointing out “that action gives rise to a story to be recounted, that it is, moreover, in search of a narrative” (Tengelyi 2012a: 272), makes a similar distinction between a doing that, like production (*poiesis*), is merely an anonymous partaking in a practice, and a genuine sense of action (*Handlung, praxis*), in which the agent is involved in such a way that she can emerge as a member of a community of agents (Arendt 1958, 136–247; Tengelyi 2004, 42–52; Loidolt 2018).

Another implication, which Tengelyi does recognize, is that only narrative intelligibility can be understood as adequate articulation of the first-personal experience of the agent. This confirms a point discussed in Section ‘From action to its agent. Tengelyi on Davidson’: with regard to the self’s involvement in action, the best a semantic approach can do is identify the register specific for talking about certain practices and describe what it means for any agent to take part in these practices. But it cannot get a grasp of the first-personal experience of the indeterminacy typical for the constitution of the meaning of action and the indexed specificity of what it is like for me to act in this ways. The metaphysical possibility of unintended consequences then not only confirms the epistemological priority of first-personal knowledge; it is also a necessary requirement for the constitution of a genuinely *narrative* self. This is how Tengelyi puts the point: because actions can have unintended consequences, the “process of depersonalization” typical for practices

is necessarily bound to come to an end. For even when he or she is entangled in a network of different practices, an agent necessarily remains the originator of his or

her actions. And this fact connects the different actions in his or her life, even if they do not belong to the same practice. Such transversal relations preserve the traces of an *experiential* way through the life-world, which is characteristic of personal history. Such an experiential way can, however, never be entirely immune to the unintended consequences of actions. That is why action, as we may put it by converting the Davidsonian phrase, *remains always a bit of biography*.

(Tengelyi 2012a: 274)

The consequence Tengelyi draws from this is that “the narrative view of selfhood” must be refined “in order to account for the possibility of radical turns in life-history” (Tengelyi 2012a: 280). Given Tengelyi’s account of agency as presented above, it is clear that action “implies that *we become the accomplices of a reality that ultimately cannot be fully mastered*” (Tengelyi 2012a: 281). Therefore, the upshot of a narrative account of personal identity is the reverse of what the constructivist reading anticipated. It reveals that narration is bound up with the subject’s continuous “complicity” with reality. At the end of the narrativity paper, Tengelyi summarizes this point in reference to Ricoeur (1992: 308) by defining the subject in its double role as agent and narrator as a “decentered self.” For Tengelyi, this notion gathers the two original and “most important contributions” that a “narrative interpretation of action makes . . . to the characterization of the freedom of action and the selfhood of the agent”: first, that our actions must be always understood “in their intertwinement with the causal mechanisms of the world”; and second, that the agent is “not only the originator of certain initiatives, but also . . . the decentered co-originator of the unintended consequences that supervene on these initiatives” (Tengelyi 2012a: 282). The account of the narrative self as decentered thus takes up central ideas from the phenomenology of action and the metaphysics of freedom it calls for. Only these elements taken together give a full picture of action in Tengelyi’s system.

Conclusion: a case for truth

Tengelyi’s account of human freedom in *World and Infinity*, outlined in Sections ‘Freedom and necessity: the meaning of unintended consequences’ and ‘Grounding grounds: on different ways to be free,’ addresses a lacuna in the discussion of narrative identity in the earlier paper “Action and Selfhood.” Both accounts have the same central theme, the constitution of the meaning of action and the phenomenological traits and metaphysical implications of unintended consequences. But it is not obvious how both accounts can be integrated. In the following, I will try to show that this difficulty is due to some features of Tengelyi’s view of narrative identity presented in the last section. To get to a more coherent picture, a stronger emphasis on the way in which human freedom engages normativity is needed, which I aim to bring out by highlighting the role of truth and the ideal of authenticity in the constitution of the meaning of action. A discussion of truth can function as the missing link between the different elements of or stages in the development of Tengelyi’s view.

There are two elements in Tengelyi’s account of narrative identity I find unsatisfactory. First, recall that Tengelyi relied on the view that the constitution of selfhood is multi-layered. This view provided Tengelyi with an answer to how a narrative identity can be understood as discovery: it discovers, through articulation and recollection, two deeper layers of the self, i.e. reflective self-awareness and passive self-constitution. The problem with this layered account Tengelyi takes over from Husserl is that it does not get a grasp of a feature of subjectivity that is presupposed by the layer-account: its normative relation to truth. Thus the notion of foundation (*Fundierung*) to which Tengelyi refers, is one of the two elements,

alongside with fulfillment (*Erfüllung*), defining Husserl's account of truth as *Evidenz* (Husserl 1970: 226–268; Crowell 2013: 37–41). To conceive one layer of the constitution of the self as *founded* on another presupposes this notion of truth. Further, to conceive the difference between construction and discovery as a contrast defining success in the constitution of a narrative identity, which Tengelyi clearly does, presupposes a prior commitment of the self to understand herself in light of the truths encountered in the process of constituting her life-history. Telling this story involves a standard of truth and a commitment to behold oneself to that standard.

A commitment to constituting, retrospectively, her narrative self as a true self, is also defining the two acts through which the narrative self bases itself in the deeper layers of the self: in the case of articulation, that the narration of one's past experiences is to be founded on acts of conscious recollection rather than fantasy involves a normative contrast to which articulation is beholden. Similarly in the case of recollection: if the narrative self is to be constituted in the narration of one's deeds, then the subject must recollect its past actions rather than its perceptions or other past experiences. Again, an analysis of the semantic structure inherent in the intentional content of an act required for narration to succeed defines a standard for success and failure for this act (Crowell 2013: 156).

For narration to be based on recollection and narration therefore involves the recognition of different instances of truth: recollecting other experiences than actions fails to constitute the narrative self as the agent she in fact is; basing one's personal history on fantasies may be an instance of either a mistake or a self-deception, but clearly also fails to be true. Already on the two layers the narrative is founded upon, the subject is thus constituted in view of a form of truth as evidence. The idea that a narrative self is discovered rather than construed constitutes a normative standard necessary to conceive the narrative self as one layer in the layer structure of the self.

Reference to truth in this sense is not foreign to Tengelyi's treatment of human freedom. Although Tengelyi discusses truth with regard to neither narrative identity nor agency, he emphasizes its importance in the presentation of "Heidegger's metontological foundation of metaphysics" (Tengelyi 2014: 228–264) in an earlier chapter of *World and Infinity*. Here, Tengelyi takes it to be defining Heidegger's account of freedom as transcendence that it discovers entities in normative terms, referring to a passage from *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*. In this passage, Heidegger (1995: 339) describes "being free [*Freisein*]" as the "pre-logical being open for beings as such and holding oneself towards the binding character of things," thereby opening the "*leeway* [*Spielraum*] . . . of truth and falsity." In his discussion, Tengelyi emphasizes that this alethic function of freedom allows one to recognize an "epistemic dynamic [*epistemische Dynamik*]" (Tengelyi 2014: 258) that is not dependent on a specific form of rationalization and its respective *Weltentwurf*. Despite the variance in different forms of rationalization, which Tengelyi recognizes as a central element in Heidegger's account, this dynamic can be seen as the genuine alethic correlate of human freedom. Tengelyi associates this dynamic with Heidegger's account of the world (Tengelyi 2014: 257–259) as well as with Heidegger's notion of an active manifestation or "essence of truth" (Heidegger 1998: 136–154; Tengelyi 2014: 391). Given Tengelyi's reliance on Heidegger's metontological account, it is thus in continuity with his own explicitly formulated views to situate his account of the narrative self within the account of truth implied by the account of freedom he endorses. It is simply addressing an incompleteness in Tengelyi's discussion to say that in recollection and articulation, the constitution of the narrative self is beholden to different moments of an epistemic dynamic. But to recognize the subject's constitutive beholdenness to different manifestations of truth also calls for a more explicit treatment of how such beholdenness contributes to the constitution of the self.

This leads to the second problem I see in Tengelyi's account of narrative identity, which regards the idea that practices are necessarily anonymous and depersonalizing. It is a consequence of that view that an action, if it is part of a practice, contributes nothing or very little to the self's narrative identity. Although I won't argue for this here, this likely overestimates the importance of unintended consequences for the ordinary ('non-Oedipus') self. More importantly, Tengelyi seems to misconstrue the way in which adhering to a practice involves the recognition of normativity. Recall from the last section that the only clearly normative element in his account of what is involved in being a university professor is that "he insists on the standards of his profession" (Tengelyi 2012a: 273), which I take to mean that he is evaluating the actions of *others*. But there is a deeper normative element regarding the first-person: to genuinely uphold the standards of my profession, I must not only be *following* the rules pertaining to a specific practice; I must be *committed* to them, take them as binding *for myself*. Using, curiously, the same example, Crowell (2013: 249) refers to this as the attempt at "trying to be" a philosophy professor. This "trying," however, refers to the norms inherent in what it means to be a true (good) professor, and these can contribute to how I understand myself. Adopting a term from Korsgaard (1996: 101), Crowell highlights that recognizing the standards of certain practices as binding *yourself* provides you with a "a description under which you value yourself," a "practical identity."

At first sight, this contrasts with Tengelyi's insistence that practices do not contribute to the identity of the self, and even if they did, committing to such typical practical identities would not contribute to the specifically *narrative* identity of the self. There is, however, a way in which practical identities may well contribute to my narrative self. To see how both practical and narrative identities can be related, however, it is again necessary to turn to a discussion of different instances of truth. Without embracing a narrative account of the self, Heidegger's account of the authentic self offers a model for how to understand both the continuity and the contrast between these two layers or aspects of the self. Importantly, this discussion of authenticity helps not only to better understand how practical identities can tie in with a life-history (in more mundane cases), but it can also be extended to account for unintended consequences and thus to cover Tengelyi's example (the extreme of Oedipus). In both kinds of cases, the account of a free, true (authentic) self can help to bridge rather than oppose the forms of rationalization provided by practices with that provided by narrativity. I present the central element of that account before connecting it to the discussion of metontological freedom, which Tengelyi clearly endorses.

Heidegger opens his discussion of authenticity with the idea that there must be an "attestation" (*Bezeugung*, 2006: 267, 2010: 257) of the possibility of an authentic existence. He finds such attestation in the possibility of what he calls "*Nachholen einer Wahl*" (2006: 268), which I submit might best be translated as the "*retrieving of a choice*." Such retrieval constitutes the link between the self constituted in every practices, what Heidegger calls the they-self (*Man-selbst*), and the authentic self: "the they-self is modified in an existenziell manner so that it becomes the authentic Being-one's-self" (1962: 313, 2006: 268, 2010: 258). This idea has room for Tengelyi's observation that practices may well be anonymous and depersonalizing: simply adhering to the rules of a practice obscures that there is a choice involved in adhering to the practice. In Heidegger's account, however, the meaning first constituted by the 'depersonalized' 'they-self' is also a prerequisite for the self; the self becomes authentic by (first-personally) *committing* to the normative standards in which it is already engaged, which may, but need not, involve deliberation and a conscious decision. Inauthentic (third-personal) adherence to the practice, by contrast, never involves true choice, which motivates both Macquarrie-Robinson and Stambaugh to translate "*Nachholen einer Wahl*"

as “making up for not choosing” (1962: 313, 2010: 258). But this translation is somewhat misleading: Heidegger stresses that the self has already been involved in choosing, and it is this choice (and its consequences) that an authentic self discovers as having been a possibility of her *dasein* rather than a requisite imposed on the self by others. What the authentic self must “make up” for is its having, in the guise of the they-self, already made some (albeit inauthentic) decision. This is why Heidegger stresses that the retrieval of choice is essentially a reiteration and glosses it as “choosing to make *this* choice [*Wählen dieser Wahl*]” (1962: 313, 2010: 258, emphasis modified). It is decisive for normativity readings of *Being and Time* such as Crowell’s that the retrieval of choices involves what Heidegger calls “[taking] over being a ground in existing [*existierend das Grundsein übernehmen*]” (2006: 284, 2010: 273), i.e. recognizing grounds/reasons with which *dasein* founds herself already confronted (‘thrown into,’ in Heidegger’s idiom) as not merely third-personal forms of rationalization but as *dasein*’s genuine possibilities. Within the framework of *Being and Time*, Heidegger locates the free subject in the authentic experience of the contrast between a free self and the they as “basic concept of unfreedom” (Figal 2005: 115). Crowell (2013: 189) puts it succinctly: “Freedom is not essentially the ability to choose between possibilities, but the difference between the third-person and the first-person as such.”

While there is no explicit treatment of authenticity in Heidegger’s later discussion of freedom as “ground” for different forms of rationalization presented in Section ‘Grounding grounds: on different ways to be free,’ the discussion of authenticity might provide a bridge from Tengelyi’s endorsement of that view to a modified account of the constitution of the narrative self. Thus the contrast between discovering and constructing the self’s narrative identity can be seen as being part of the self’s commitment to being authentic, namely as the agent trying, retrospectively, to be true to the meaning of her past deeds, including those actions that form part of a practice.

This idea can be spelled out in two steps. First, authentically retrieving one’s action as a they-self effects a modification of the meaning from third-personal to first-personal terms that, even if the descriptions of the actions do not involve unintended consequences, may provide ample material for a story. Thus even if its description in third-personal terms may be unaltered, how a self experiences her action retrospectively may very well yield itself to narration. In particular, a first-personal account may involve an attestation of authenticity worthy of narration: ‘*first* I did it because everyone else did it, *now* I do it for my own reasons.’ In this case, authenticity quite precisely marks the transition from a ‘depersonalizing’ involvement in practices to one that, because it is authentic, can also be a formative element in the self’s life-history. The phenomenology of agency thus yields a good reason why a philosophical account of self-constitution should not exclude narratives of the ordinary, a point Cavell has argued in numerous contexts (Mulhall 1994). Authentic involvement in a practice also involves risking unintended consequences, satisfying Tengelyi’s explicit standard for what is worthy of story-telling.

Second, and more importantly, the idea of retrieving one’s choices may be reformulated to apply to cases where unintended consequences do occur and may lead, such as in Tengelyi’s example, to a complete reversal of the first-personal experience of the action. Recall from Section ‘Grounding grounds: on different ways to be free’ that Tengelyi’s most complex analysis of the case highlighted Oedipus’ attempts to regain control of his initial actions, the (causally determined) emergence of unintended consequences motivating his (teleologically determined) decision to initiate further action in the attempt to compensate for the deviation the development of the meaning of his actions has taken from his initial intention. Although Heidegger’s discussion in *Being and Time* is geared toward the inauthentic,

third-personal meaning generated by the they of every-day practice, his discussion of authenticity may be extended to what Oedipus is trying to do: he is trying to retrieve his initial choice. Recognizing that, despite its meaning now mainly determined by factors outside his intention, his deeds are *his*, Oedipus attempts to again use his freedom and modify the ultimate outcome of the process in which the meaning of his initial action is constituted. As Tengelyi highlighted, with regard to the metaphysics of agency, this shows that the freedom to initiate action is an always renewable capacity. Importantly, in contrast to views such as Schelling's, which Tengelyi explicitly rejected, authentically retrieving one's actions does not involve reinstating a fully transparent and autonomous subject. It only leads to assuming that the self is trying to be authentic with regard to the indeterminate process in which the meaning of her deeds is constituted.

The idea of authenticity adds to Tengelyi's view an account of how the renewable exercise of this freedom remains beholden to the unfolding of the actions' (true) meaning, providing a coherent picture of what motivates the sequence of choices and defines the emerging narrative structure. As Wrathall (2015: 193) highlights, it is a defining feature of Heidegger's approach

that he gives methodological priority to authenticity over autonomy. That is, Heidegger argues that one cannot understand what the self is, let alone figure out the right way for the self to ground action, until one has grasped authenticity as an ideal of human existence.

Although there is no explicit reference to authenticity in Heidegger's writing from the 1930s, if authenticity is associated with freedom, the metontological account of human freedom, too, requires a modification of the ideal of authenticity to include the aspects discussed in Section 'Grounding grounds: on different ways to be free': that the rationalization of action is an inherently pluralistic capacity yet remains beholden to the truth of particular entities.

In an earlier discussion of the notion of experience, Tengelyi makes a similar claim regarding the nature of experience as such. Even if the disappointment of expectations and the possibility of conflict are defining feature of experience, this does not negate the directedness of experiences toward entities. Reiterating a point raised in Heidegger's (2002: 86–156) critique of Hegel's notion of experience in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Tengelyi writes:

If the crossing-out of an expectation results from a conflict in experience that, as Husserl wrote, presupposes 'a certain basis of agreement', then it is misleading to speak [with Hegel, T.K.] of changing the object of experience. Rather, one has to insist that it is one and the same object that is suddenly seen in a new light or takes on a new form.
(2007b: 15–16)

Given this also holds true in the experience of action, it means that the notion of an "open essence [*offenes Wesen*]" of things, which Tengelyi (2014: 429) takes over from Husserl (1989: 313), should be extended to actions. Despite its incompleteness with regard to first-person involvement, the semantic framework then correctly identifies the process of describing and redescribing the same action as central element in how its "open essence" evolves.

Tengelyi's central idea that it is the *experience* of action and the self's *experiential way* that link action and narration can then be specified in the following way: what the self discovers in the recollection and the articulation forming part of narrating itself is the passively constituted self *in its interaction with the open essence of entities*. *Aiming to be authentic*, the self

is committed to discovering the truth about entities, and this includes the dynamic constitution of the meaning of its actions. That it tries to adhere to all different instantiations of truth qua evidence defines both the prospective and the retrospective action of the self: she attempts to redirect her deeds and influence how the meaning of her actions develops further by making use, *prospectively*, of her renewable capacity to initiate further action. *Retrospectively*, she attempts to give an account of her true self, committing to discovering her past through recollection and articulation.

According to the modification of Tengelyi's view I propose, what links both the prospective and the retrospective is the self's attempt to authentically relate to her past actions, or in Heidegger's language: to *retrieve* her past *choices*. Importantly, this not only requires switching between a retrospective and prospective perspective. It also requires making use of different forms of rationalizing the changing meaning of actions. Narrating one's agential self is then not merely *another* form of rationalizing action besides its rationalization in causal, teleological, etc. terms. Understood as outcome of the self's capacity to 'ground grounds,' a narrative rapport to one's past actions requires making use of different forms of rationalizing it in causal, teleological. . . terms. In all of this, however, the authentic attempt to narrate one's life-history remains beholden to the evolving meaning of individual actions. Being free in the sense of transcending into the world, the changing truths about an individual action constitute the genuine albeit not uniform measure of the self's attempt at giving a true account of her past deeds, even if these truths include recognizing unintended consequence of the most extreme kind. Referring to the risk of experiencing unintended consequences, Tengelyi in an earlier discussion of freedom in passing calls this risk the "character of adventure" (*Abenteuercharakter*, 2009b: 251) that accompanies every intentional action. As Tengelyi argues, a precise sense can be given to the idea that the life of an agent can be called an adventure. But what is an adventure if not a quest for truth?¹

Related topics

See Chapters 8 (on Heidegger) and 15 (on Ricœur).

Note

- 1 For very helpful comment and encouragement, I am indebted to Inga Römer and Steven Crowell.

References

- Anscombe, E. (2000) *Intention*, second edition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Arendt, H. (1958) *The Human Condition*, second edition, Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- Crowell, S. (2001) *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning: Paths towards Transcendental Phenomenology*, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- Crowell, S. (2013) *Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger*, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Davidson, D. (2001) *Essays on Actions and Events*, second edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Doyon, M. and Breyer, T. (eds.) (2015) *Normativity in Perception*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Figal, G. (2005) "Being-with, Dasein-with, and the They as the Basic Concept of Unfreedom," in R. Polt (ed.), *Heidegger's Being and Time. Critical Essays*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 105–116.
- Golob, S. (2014) *Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom, and Normativity*, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

- Gondek, H.-D. and Tengelyi, L. (2011) *Neue Phänomenologie in Frankreich*, Berlin: Suhrkamp.
- Hartmann, N. (1932) *Ethics. Volume III. Moral Freedom*, London: Allen & Unwin.
- Hartmann, N. (1960) *Die Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus*, second edition, Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Haugeland, J. (2013) *Dasein Disclosed*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hegel, G.W.F. (1975) *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Arts*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Hegel, G.W.F. (2010) *The Science of Logic*, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Heidegger, M. (1962) *Being and Time*, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Oxford, Cambridge: Blackwell.
- Heidegger, M. (1984) *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Heidegger, M. (1995) *The Fundamental Problem of Metaphysics*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Heidegger, M. (1998) *Pathmarks*, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Heidegger, M. (2002) *Off the Beaten Track*, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Heidegger, M. (2006) *Sein und Zeit*, nineteenth edition, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer.
- Heidegger, M. (2010) *Being and Time*, trans. by Joan Stambaugh, revised edition, Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Husserl, E. (1966) *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis*, Husserliana vol. XI, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Husserl, E. (1970) *Logical Investigations. Volume II*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Husserl, E. (1973) *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, Dritter Teil: 1929–1935, Husserliana XV, ed. Iso Kern, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff*.
- Husserl, E. (1989) *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. Second Book*, Dordrecht, Boston, MA and London: Kluwer.
- Husserl, E. (2014) *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book*, Indianapolis, IN and Cambridge: Hackett.
- Keiling, T. (2018) "Phenomenology and Ontology in the Later Heidegger," in D. Zahavi (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Phenomenology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 251–267.
- Keiling, T. (2020) "Freiheit und Determination bei Tengelyi," in I. Römer and A. Schnell (eds.), *Phänomenologie und Metaphysik*, Hamburg: Meiner, pp. 213–229.
- Korsgaard, C. (1996) *The Sources of Normativity*, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Kriegel, U. (2015) *The Varieties of Consciousness*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Loidolt, S. (2018) *Phenomenology of Plurality: Hannah Arendt on Political Intersubjectivity*, New York and London: Routledge.
- Mulhall, S. (1994) *Stanley Cavell. Philosophy's Recounting of the Ordinary*, Oxford: Clarendon.
- Ricœur, P. (1991) "Life in Quest of Narrative," in D. Wood (ed.), *On Paul Ricoeur. Narrative and Interpretation*, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 20–33.
- Ricœur, P. (1992) *Oneself as Another*, Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
- Römer, I. (2017) "Was ist phänomenologische Metaphysik?," in M. Gabriel, C. Olay and S. Ostritsch (eds.), *Welt und Unendlichkeit. Ein deutsch-ungarischer Dialog in memoriam László Tengelyi*, Freiburg and München: Alber, pp. 115–130.
- Römer, I. (2020) "Laszlo Tengelyi," in T. Keiling (ed.), *Phänomenologische Metaphysik. Konturen eines Problems nach Husserl*, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, pp. 403–414.
- Shear, J. (ed.) (2003) *Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate*, London: Routledge.
- Schelling, F. W. J. (1989) *The Philosophy of Art*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Tengelyi, L. (1998) *Der Zwitterbegriff Lebensgeschichte*, München: Fink.
- Tengelyi, L. (2004) *The Wild-Region in Life-History*, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- Tengelyi, L. (2007a) "Narratives Handlungsverständnis," in K. Joisten (ed.), *Narrative Ethik. Das Gute und Böse erzählen*, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, pp. 61–73.
- Tengelyi, L. (2007b) *Erfahrung und Ausdruck: Phänomenologie im Umbruch bei Husserl und seinen Nachfolgern*, Dordrecht: Springer.
- Tengelyi, L. (2009a) "Une interprétation narrative de l'action," in P. Kerszberg, A. Mazzù and A. Schnell (eds.), *L'oeuvre du phénomène. Mélanges offerts à Marc Richir*, Bruxelles: Ousia, pp. 197–214.
- Tengelyi, L. (2009b) "Betrachtungen über die Handlungsfreiheit und die Selbstheit des Handelnden," in M. Pfeifer and S. Ropic (eds.), *Das Selbst und sein Anderes. Festschrift für Klaus Erich Kaehler*, Freiburg and München: Alber, pp. 245–258.
- Tengelyi, L. (2012a) "Action and Selfhood: A Narrative Interpretation," in D. Zahavi (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 265–286.

- Tengelyi, L. (2012b) "Nicolai Hartmanns Metaphysik der Freiheit," in G. Hartung, M. Wunsch and C. Strube (eds.), *Von der Systemphilosophie zur systematischen Philosophie. Nicolai Hartmann*, Berlin and Boston, MA: De Gruyter, pp. 277–295.
- Tengelyi, L. (2014) *Welt und Unendlichkeit. Zum Problem phänomenologischer Metaphysik*, Freiburg and München: Alber.
- Tugendhat, E. (1979) *Selbstbewußtsein und Selbstbestimmung*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Waldenfels, B. (2016) *Antwortregister*, second edition, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Wrathall, M. (2015) "Autonomy, Authenticity, and the Self," in D. McManus (ed.), *Heidegger, Authenticity, and the Self*, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 193–214.
- Zahavi, D. (2017) *Husserl's Legacy: Phenomenology, Metaphysics, and Transcendental Philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.