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CHAPTER FIFTEEN

SYMBOLISM AND MEDIEVAL RELIGIOUS THOUGHT

David d’Avray

A n old but good introduction to Social Anthropology suggests that symbolism is an, if not the, distinguishing feature of religion (which is not here marked off sharply from magic). On the other hand, we have scientific thought, which tends to mean no more and no less than it seems to say. Apart from knowledge for its own sake, its goals are ‘instrumental’: it tries to bring about the results it explicitly specifies. Magic and religion work differently. Their real meaning is not what they literally say. Words and actions, and rituals combining the two, stand for things which the anthropological observer may not immediately appreciate: say, abstractions such as ‘social solidarity’ which the people of a traditional society cannot express in any other way. Expression may be an end in itself, or at least a crucial concomitant of the instrumental function of magical or religious activity. Thus Beattie writes that ‘the chief difference between what we call practical, common-sense techniques for doing things, and ritual or “magico-religious” ways of doing them lies basically in the presence or absence of an institutionalized symbolic element in what is done . . . [A] distinction between these two kinds of activities . . . rests simply on the presence or absence in what is done of a symbolic element . . . I have intentionally not distinguished between magic and religion; both imply ritual, symbolic ideas and activities rather than practical, “scientific” ones’. Yet Beattie goes on to observe that ‘[m]ost modern students of religion would hold, as against Durkheim, that religious belief and practice are more than merely a system of social and moral symbolism’ (Beattie 1970: 202, 203, 212, 221).

Most medievalists will find this schema relatively inapplicable to their material, and the scientific/symbolic dichotomy misleading if religion (and magic) are to be stuffed into the ‘symbolic’ pigeon-hole. When medieval people talked about the Trinity, they were not trying to express something else. They used symbols to understand the Trinity but it was not a symbol itself.

Medieval intellectual life was less ‘scientific’ than that of the past few centuries in one sense: it was relatively weak on the empirical front. There were plenty of practical innovations (Gimpel 1977), but professional intellectuals tended not to dirty their hands with experimentation. As a result, they achieved nothing like the understanding of the workings of the natural world that has come out of the past few centuries. (This should not be regarded as some kind of peculiar shortcoming of...
the Middle Ages. The form of scientific culture which developed in Europe between c.1600 and c.1900, before becoming generally dispersed throughout the globe, is the peculiarity in world history.) It would be arrogant and culture-bound to assume that the modern West’s attempt to understand the central problems of existence – e.g., whether there is a difference in kind as well as in degree between humans and other animals, or whether personal identity continues in any way after death – is any more ‘scientific’ than that of medieval people. Medieval scholars devised a method for analysing these problems: philosophical reasoning based on revealed first principles (i.e. on Scripture, to oversimplify somewhat). In the thirteenth century the idea developed that this kind of theology was a ‘science’ (Chenu 1957). If we grant their premisses and understand ‘science’ to include the kind of deductive reasoning still used today by mathematicians and logicians, then their academic productions can indeed be described as scientific. This side of medieval religion was developed with a degree of sophistication which anyone should find extraordinarily impressive, though the findings of scholastic theologians will be unconvincing to anyone who does not share some of their basic postulates.

A CAROLINGIAN EXAMPLE

Thus medieval religion cannot be reduced to symbolism. Still symbolism was a crucial aspect of it. The following examples (Haymo of Auxerre, *Homilia XVIII, Dominica II post Epiphaniam*, cols. 126–37; cf. Barre 1962: 48, 49, 51, 54, 67) represent a dominant form of thought both in the Carolingian period from which they are taken and in the medieval period as a whole. Haymo of Auxerre is explaining the gospel reading of the marriage feast of Cana in his highly successful homiliary. Symbolism enables him to bring salvation history into a synthesis. The six water jars in the narrative stand for the six ages of history: for instance, the first stands for the period from Adam to Noah, and the last is the cue for discussion of the circumcision and presentation of Christ in the Temple. Haymo gives a short history of the world in this framework (*Homilia XVIII*, cols. 131–5). In his account of the first age, for instance, we find a fairly full précis of the creation of Adam and then Eve, and their first sin. Haymo says that contemplation of the consequences will be a warning to us. God did not spare those who sinned for the first time. Perhaps he will not spare us, since we have had the experience of the sins of so many others before us to warn us. The person who thinks about this and fears to do wrong finds in the first age of history a water jar full of water (‘In prima aetate mundi legimus . . . in prima aetate hydriam aqua plenam’, *Homilia XVIII*, cols 131–2). But this jar full of water is turned into wine if we raise our understanding to a new level. On this level Adam is Christ, formed from immaculate earth (i.e. the Virgin Mary). Eve is the Church. Just as Eve was formed from the side of Adam, so too the Church was formed from the side of Christ when it was pierced by a lance, and blood and water flowed from it (‘At vero, si aliquid altius intellexerit . . . hydria, quam plenam invenerat aqua, conversa est in vinum’, *Homilia XVIII*, col. 132). Earlier in the sermon he dwells on the fact that the marriage at Cana happened, in the words of the gospel, ‘on the third day’. This leads him on to the division of history into (this time) three ages: before the law,
under the law, and under grace; to the Trinity; to the distinction between memory, will, and intellect, and to Faith, Hope, and Charity (‘Et bene die tertia... major autem his est charitas’, Homilia XVIII, col. 128). With the speed of dream associations, different elements of the belief system could be rapidly juxtaposed. It is not a linear and logical procedure, but gives free play to a psychological process of mental association that anyone can observe in themselves if they backtrack over casual sequences of thought.

A feature of these procedures was that they made it possible to keep the Old and New Testaments close together: particularly important in the Carolingian period, with its ‘mentalité vétéro-testamentaire’ (though the Old Testament never lost its central place in medieval religion). The train of thought which started from the marriage on the third day and led on to the Trinity, and so on, ended up with the story of Jonah in Nineveh: ‘Or the number three is perfect, because we read that when the Lord said to Jonah the prophet: “Go to Nineveh the great city, and you will say to this people, forty days more, and Nineveh will be overthrown” (Jonah 3), and he preached, the king immediately came down from his throne, and ordered the people to make a three-day fast. When that was done, the people gave up their iniquity, and turned to the Lord’ (‘Sive ternarius numerus... conversus est ad Dominum’, Homilia XVIII, col. 128).

Symbolism was a form of aesthetic and synthetic thought, helping Haymo and his listeners or readers to keep much of their world-view before their minds at any time. Probably this style of religious thought was as important as any other in the lives of Carolingian monks, though I am not aware that the question has been posed squarely or investigated systematically. Symbolism does not get much attention in the chapters dealing with education, culture, theology and the organisation of thought in the volume of the New Cambridge Medieval History which covers Haymo’s period (Contreni 1995; Ganz 1995). Like the volume as a whole, these chapters are in general admirable. Perhaps symbolism is still regarded by most mainstream historians as a subordinate special aspect of medieval religion and culture, rather than a central part of the system. The subject can hardly be avoided in discussion of the study of the Bible in the Middle Ages (Hamilton 1986: 64–7), though the best historian to treat this theme in depth was more interested in the development of literal exegesis (Smalley 1983, esp. ch. iv; cf. de Lubac 1959–64; Contreni 1995). De Lubac, emphasising the creativity of non-literal exegesis, was a historical theologian rather than a historian, while Contreni emphasised the contributions of the Carolingian Renaissance to literal exegesis (though he notes the allegorical significance of numbers): these contributions were doubtless of great importance, but do they represent the predominant manner of understanding the Bible in the medieval period (de Lubac 1959–64; Contreni 1995: 733–4, 739)? Historians of medieval literature and art cannot avoid talking about symbolism, of course.

**HISTORIOGRAPHY**

One of the best analyses of the role of symbolism in medieval religion is a book by an art historian, Émile Mâle, published at the end of the nineteenth century:
very dated, no doubt, as a study of Gothic cathedrals but still valuable for an understanding of medieval thought and religion (Mâle 1898 (1961)). In the Middle Ages, says Mâle, the world is regarded as a symbol (Mâle 1961: 29). ‘[I]n each being is hidden a divine thought; the world is a book written by the hand of God in which every creature is a word charged with meaning. The ignorant see the forms – the mysterious letters – understanding nothing of their meaning, but the wise pass from the visible to the invisible, and in reading nature read the thoughts of God. True knowledge, then, consists not in the study of things in themselves – the outward forms – but in penetrating to the inner meaning intended by God for our instruction’ (Mâle 1961: 29). For instance, a nut could be taken to symbolise Jesus Christ: ‘“The green and fleshy sheath is His flesh, His humanity. The wood of the shell is the wood of the Cross on which that flesh suffered. But the kernel of the nut from which men gain nourishment is His hidden divinity.”’ (Mâle 1961: 30, citing Adam of St Victor, Sequentiæ, col. 1433). Mâle devotes another chapter (Book 4, ch. I) to the symbolic correspondences found between the Old Testament and the New. In the age of ‘the Gothic image’, as in the Carolingian period, unifying the two Testaments was an important function of symbolism.

It is possible that Mâle influenced Johann Huizinga’s remarkable account of the medieval symbolist mentality, since he too refers to the nut as symbol of Christ (Huizinga 1996: 239). In memorable paragraphs, Huizinga points out that

almost every image could find a place in the huge, all encompassing mental system of symbolism. . . . They never forgot that everything would be absurd if it exhausted its meaning in its immediate function and form of manifestation . . . That insight is still familiar to us as an inarticulate feeling in those moments when the sound of rain on leaves or the light of a lamp on a table penetrates momentarily into a deeper level of perception than that serving practical thought and action. . . . In God, nothing empty or meaningless exists . . . everything originating in Him and finding meaning in Him also crystallised into thoughts articulated into words. And thus comes into being that noble and lofty idea of the world as a great symbolic nexus – a cathedral of ideas, the highest rhythmic and polyphonic expression of all that can be thought. . . . Symbolism created an image of the world more strictly unified by stronger connections than causal-scientific thought is capable of. . . . There is ample room in symbolic thought for an immeasurable variety of relationships among things, since anything with its individual qualities can be the symbol of yet other things, and may with one and the same quality, signify quite various other things. . . . Symbolic thought . . . permeates the idea of anything with heightened aesthetic and ethical value’. (Huizinga 1996: 235–6; 238–9)

Huizinga argued that the symbolic mode of thought was played out by the late Middle Ages (Huizinga 1996: 242, 247). Here he may have been influenced by his general conception of the period as one of decline. Ernst Gombrich argued that Huizinga (and most cultural historians of his time) believed that periods of cultural history each had an inner unity, a sort of centre-point with lines going out to the
different aspects of art, thought, and life: a Zeitgeist in effect (Gombrich 1969: 29).

On this view, the later Middle Ages would be the last phase of a culture’s life, and the symbolist mentality would necessarily be involved in the decline, together with everything else.

Obviously these old classics are not the only concentrated analyses of the symbolist modes of thought in medieval religion. One of the most systematic is that of M-D. Chenu. His essay on ‘The Symbolist Mentality’ argues that the twelfth century, in which the hard-edged logical methods of scholasticism were turning theology into a progressive scientific discipline, was also a creative age of symbolic thought (Chenu 1969: 99–145). He argues that two streams of symbolic thinking were intermingled. One derived from St Augustine of Hippo. He had analysed symbolism in terms of the human mind’s use of signs. The other derived from the Pseudo-Dionysius, who emphasised the real relations of analogy between different things. As Chenu himself points out, both kinds of symbolic thought can be traced back to Neoplatonic inspiration, and ‘in the twelfth century and throughout the whole of the Middle Ages, the two strains were continually crossed and are difficult to distinguish’ (Chenu 1968: 119–28).

Figure 15.1 The Marriage of Adam and Eve. Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, MS. Clm 146, fo. 4r.
For our purposes, elaborate distinctions between different varieties of symbolism and between symbolism and allegory are probably inessential (Engemann 1997; Leisch-Kiesl 1997). A simple and workable conceptual framework would be the following. Symbol and allegory bring out perceived likenesses between distinct things. The symbol is not just a conventional sign of the symbolised, but is believed to share a real similarity with what it stands for. However, there is always a conventional element. The likeness can never be complete. If it were, symbol and symbolised would be just two items in the same class, two cases of the same thing. The conventional element consists in seeing the symbol as the symbolised. In some cases the element of convention is very considerable, as when the similarity is merely numerical. When Haymo of Auxerre makes the wedding on the third day a symbol of the Trinity and of the trio Faith, Hope, and Charity, convention predominates over similarity. In what is called allegory the proportion of convention to similarity also tends to be high. At the other end of the scale, the similarities between symbol and symbolised (whether the latter is real or perceived) are too far-reaching to be taken in at first glance. Exploration of them can be a source of creativity.

This seems to have been the case with the analogy between human marriage and the marriage of Christ and the Church, or the soul, or between the divine and human natures in Christ. Here symbolism penetrates the hard genres of scholastic theologians and canon lawyers, as an important and neglected book by Tomás Rincón has demonstrated in detail (Rincón-Pérez 1971). It was also the inspiration of a much better-known tradition of commentary on the Song of Songs (Matter 1990, 1992). As we shall see shortly, the symbolism of marriage was also a force capable of transforming the social life of Europe.

We have moved forward in historiographical time from Mâle through Huizinga to Chenu. Analysis of medieval religious symbolism has been taken further by contemporary scholars. George Holmes has shown how it was combined with realism in a new kind of pictorial and literary narrative around the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

The essence of the new narrative was the combination of several separate characteristics. First, a limited grasp of spatial perspective of a distinctly pragmatic kind, ... intended to give both buildings and figures a fairly shallow space within which they could be placed to front or rear realistically. Second, a highly developed capacity for drawing figures with roundness and weight, especially when they were heavily clothed with folded draperies. Third, a surface design which gave paintings patterns emphasizing the main features of the action which the painting was portraying, for example the emphasis on the direction of the movement of the figures by the patterns of lines in the partially realistic landscape. Fourth, a constant awareness of the allegorical, symbolical, or figural significance of the subjects of the paintings so that, for example, the scene of *Wedding at Cana* might be placed above the *Lamentation* over the dead body of Christ, as it is in Giotto’s Arena series, because Christ’s miraculous conversion of water into wine foreshadowed the eucharistic conversion of bread and wine into his body and blood as a result of the passion.

(Holmes 1986: 209–10)
Holmes draws a parallel between Giotto and Dante. The poet too combined ‘realism and symbolic suggestion’ (Holmes 1986: 262).

Some of the most interesting ideas about symbolism have come out of gender history. Caroline Walker Bynum has suggested that there was an asymmetry between the use of gender symbolism by male and female writers. The symbolism of ‘gender reversal’ made a powerful point for men. For instance, ‘Richard Rolle underlined his conversion and his rejection of family by fashioning hermit’s clothing for himself out of two of his sister’s dresses’ (Bynum 1991: 36). Male biographers of women use the same kind of symbolism, so that this description of women as ‘virile’ is a spiritual compliment (Bynum 1991: 38). On the other hand, ‘[w]omen either describe themselves as truly androgynous (that is, they use male and female images without a strong sense of a given set of personality characteristics going with the one or the other gender) or as female (bride, lover, mother)’ (Bynum 1991: 39). This thesis may need more testing but it is undoubtedly elegant and attractive.

The role of gender reversal in symbolism has also been explored by Barbara Newman. She points out that in the tradition of bridal mysticism the monk had to play the female role: Christ is bridegroom, the monk is bride. Female mystical writers do not necessarily take on the same female role, for ‘some women forged a more complicated, less stereotypical way that allowed them a wider emotional range’ (Newman 1995: 138). They adopted the language of fin’amour, courtly love, and took on the role of the amie. ‘Like the bride in the Song of Songs tradition, the amie is already part of a couple and thus to some degree fulfilled in love. But her role is more heroic and uncertain, less maternal and nurturing’ (Newman 1995: 145).

These recent studies of symbolism use the language of art- or literary criticism. They give medieval religious symbolism its due: it was a complex and sophisticated form of thought. To understand it, the historian must not be afraid of sophisticated analysis.

**CHRONOLOGY**

How are all these individual scholarly insights to be synthesised? The foregoing discussion has been piecemeal and historiographical precisely because a convincing synthesis of the history of religious symbolism in the period is not yet possible. Nevertheless one may propose a rough and ready framework for others to improve. In the early medieval period, symbolism was all-pervasive but derivative in the interpretation of nature and scripture. It may be guessed that symbolic interpretation substantially outweighed literal interpretation in scriptural exegesis, at least in purely quantitative terms, but that most of the symbolism could be traced back to patristic writings – though we should not be surprised to find originality, especially with a writer such as Bede or in the later Carolingian Renaissance.

In the twelfth century, symbolism’s prominence was relativised. The literal sense of the Bible was investigated much more seriously, most notably by Beryl Smalley’s heroes, Andrew of St Victor and Herbert of Bosham, both influenced by Jewish scholarship (Smalley 1983, ch. iv; Smalley 1973: 83–5). The incipient scholastic method was deployed with startling intelligence. Greek and Arabic science began
to put the understanding of the natural world on a new footing. Nevertheless symbolism did not lose out. It too entered a creative phase. It was Chenu’s achievement to have brought this home. In addition to the aspects on which Chenu concentrated, particular mention should be made of the galvanisation of the bridal mysticism tradition by Bernard of Clairvaux.

In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, symbolism and literal understanding were in equilibrium to a remarkable degree. In the preaching of the friars it could not be said that either predominates. In a different genre, Pierre de Limoges’s treatise *On the Moral Eye* may be symptomatic of its age. It is a combination of scientific analysis and moralisation (i.e. symbolic applications of the scientific exposition). Neither is perfunctory (d’Avray 1985: 279 and n. 4). The balance between realism and symbolism which Holmes found in Giotto and Dante fits this schema well.

The jury is still out on the question of whether ‘symbolism was in decline’ at the end of the period. As argued above, Huizinga’s view may have been overinfluenced by his conviction that medieval civilisation had as it were an individual identity and that it was near the end of its time. An alternative model would be that symbolism continued to flourish until the sixteenth or seventeenth century. It may be tentatively suggested that the Protestant emphasis on the literal sense of the Bible may have penetrated Catholic attitudes also, at the expense of interest in symbolism and allegory. Furthermore, the development of serious empiricism in natural science may have crowded out symbolic moralisation. These are crude schemata, however, scaffolding to be kicked away as soon as possible by a more serious and sustained synthesis.

**CAUSE AND EFFECT**

Up to this point I have confined myself to interpretative description rather than analysis of causes and effects. After a generation of ‘hermeneutic’ anthropology, dominated by the approach of Clifford Geertz, one need not be apologetic about description. All the same, it is natural for a historian to proceed to the analysis of causes and effects.

To begin with causes: a banally obvious explanation of the prominence of symbolic thinking is its prominence in medieval Christianity’s sacred book, the Bible. In Ephesians 5, for example, the union of husband and wife is a symbol of the union of Christ and the Church. In this passage the symbol (human marriage) seems to be part of the message as well as a vehicle for it. In the Old Testament, symbolic language movingly expresses feelings about the people of Israel. To give a single example: ‘Go and cry in the ears of Jerusalem, saying: “Thus says the Lord: I have remembered you, pitying your youth and the love of your espousals, when you followed me in the desert, in a land that is not sown”’ (Jeremiah 2: 2).

Even so, the symbolist mentality’s genesis cannot be explained by the Judaeo-Christian tradition alone. The roots in pagan antiquity are deep (Doerrie 1969: 1–12). The search for meanings below the surface in Homer may have origins in the Orphic movement of the sixth century BC. The veiled meaning of the Delphic Oracle’s answers or of the Eleusinian mysteries encouraged the idea that the literal
surface stood for something beyond it (Doerrie 1969: 2–3). But it was in the post-Augustan period that the symbolist method came into its own, with the help of both Stoic and Neoplatonic philosophy. Analogy became the key to understanding the world. Surface manifestations were mined for hidden meaning. This is the thought-world of second- and third-century writers such as Plutarch, Gellius and Macrobius (Doerrie 1969: 4–7).

In one respect the symbolist mentality of the Middle Ages does owe more to Christian than to pagan antiquity. Historical symbolism is conspicuous by its absence from most pagan classical writers. The conception of Old Testament history as a type or foreshadowing of the New Testament cannot easily be traced back to classical pagan symbolic thought. Plutarch comes close to it with his parallel lives, but he is untypical (Doerrie 1969: 7).

The concept of the Old Testament as a type of the Christian era can be traced back to passages from the New Testament itself (Mâle 1961: 133–45), but the systematic creator of this tradition of interpretation would seem to have been Origen; from him, the train of influence has been traced via Hilary, Ambrose, Augustine, Gregory and Isidore into the mainstream medieval tradition (Mâle 1961: 134–8).

Why did patristic and medieval religious writers find the method so appealing? The symbolism of nature helped them to make sense of the world. More important, it helped them to make sense of the Bible, and especially the parts of the Old Testament that seemed otherwise irrelevant or even shocking to Christians (Hamilton.

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**Figure 15.2** The Marriage Feast at Cana. Paris, Cathedral of Notre-Dame. Choir screen (detail) thirteenth century. Bildarchiv Foto Marburg.
1986: 65–6). It was noted above how symbolism enabled Haymo of Auxerre to bring the two Testaments together within an aesthetic synthesis. It provided an instrument of great aesthetic power, whose appeal extended beyond the elite of highly educated clergy. Sermons and vernacular literature brought the creations of symbolic thinking to a wide public.

Did it hamper the development of a more rigorous literal exegesis? Probably not much. It could be argued that literal exegesis did not make its breakthrough as an intellectual discipline until the nineteenth century (if one leaves aside Bible translation). It was then that historical exegesis on the one hand, and serious reflection about literary forms on the other, opened up new perspectives into the meaning of the Bible. Symbolic interpretation had been in retreat for centuries before this happened.

Our discussion of causes has turned into speculation about effects. One effect of symbolic thinking stands out, as different in kind from anything discussed so far: the effect of marriage symbolism. The ultimate starting point of the story should probably be the comparison between Christ’s union with the Church and a marriage in Ephesians chapter 5, but the proximate starting point would seem to be St Augustine of Hippo. He left the Latin Church a strong and explicit doctrine of the indissolubility of marriage. He did not find indissolubility in Roman Law. Symbolic reasoning seems to play a large part in his doctrine. If marriage represented the union of Christ with the Church, it had to conform to what it symbolised. It had to be unbreakable to perform its representative task properly (Kuiters 1959: 5–11; also Reynolds 1994: ch. XIII; Gaudemet 1989, ch. XII, esp. 567–9). Augustine’s reasoning does not appear to have had much obvious effect for centuries. In the pre-Carolingian period it is remarkable how little even churchmen seemed to worry about indissolubility. In the Carolingian period and afterwards churchmen and others did worry about it, but on the whole men still found it easy to change wives.

In the twelfth century this kind of symbolic reasoning is taken up by influential scholastic theologians, notably Peter Lombard (Rincón-Pérez 1971: 179–89). The crucial development was its impact on Lothario Segni, who became Pope Innocent III at the end of the century. Innocent closed the main loophole through which men had escaped from marriages in the preceding century: he reduced the number of forbidden degrees of consanguinity and affinity from seven to four, and tightened up the requirements for proof in annulment cases. He also took an unbending line even with kings who sought an annulment: most notably with Philip Augustus of France. One argument tried by the French king was that his marriage to Ingeborg of Denmark had not been consummated and that Ingeborg intended to enter a religious order. Innocent was sceptical on both counts, but he liked to tease out the theoretical issues in concrete cases and took the trouble to explain why it was consummation rather than consent that made marriage indissoluble:

since, just as the mingling of the sexes denotes the union between the Word and human nature, since the Word was made flesh and dwelled among us, so too the consent of souls signifies the love between God and the just soul, since he who cleaves to God, is one spirit with him; and therefore just as the bond of union between the Word and human nature cannot be put apart, so too the
conjugal bond between husband and wife cannot be dissolved while they are alive, after they have been made one flesh through the mingling of the sexes; but just as the glue of charity between God and the soul is often dissolved, so too can a conjugal connection be put apart when only the consent of souls exists between the husband and wife.


Innocent was not convinced by the evidence for non-consummation and refused the annulment. The interest of the passage quoted is that it shows how much his thinking about indissolubility was bound up with symbolic reasoning.

Innocent was a politician, but he took ideas seriously. In this case (and others) convictions seem to have mattered more to him than expediency. (The unlucky queen’s father was the king of Denmark, but what was Denmark compared with France?) After Innocent it was very difficult to get an annulment, and by comparison with the preceding period it seems to have been relatively uncommon to try. Probably Innocent’s hard line in high-profile cases had sent a message. His changes in the marriage law had made it much harder to find a case. By this time the Church courts controlled marriage law, which certainly had a big impact on social practice. In this case at least, even though it took centuries, symbolism was a force capable not only of understanding but of changing the world.

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