


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COLLEGE TEACHING, INDOCTRINATION, AND TRUST

Anthony Simon Laden

According to a standard conservative talking point, US colleges and universities, overrun by left-leaning faculty, are indoctrinating their students. The implication is that college teachers have abdicated their responsibility to transmit useful and civically valuable knowledge and teach various intellectual skills in favor of a program of ideological conversion to some ungodly mix of socialism, secular humanism, feminism, queer liberation, and critical race theory. As with most of the live fronts in the culture wars, this line of criticism manages to both give expression to a genuine anxiety many parents feel about sending their children to college while at the same time calling forth strident defenses from its target that fail to address that very anxiety. The result is that colleges and their faculty, in defending themselves against what they understand the charge to be, only serve to reinforce the impression that generates the anxiety in the first place. In this essay, I diagnose this failure to adequately respond to the charge of indoctrination as the result of a conceptual mistake, and so propose that the way forward starts with some philosophy. In particular, I argue that the failure begins when college teachers and those defending them hear the charge of indoctrination as one about beliefs – how they are formed and potentially transformed. I suggest, instead, that the underlying concern is not so much about what students come to believe, but rather who and what they trust.

The Conventional Debate

Although there is debate about how, precisely, to characterize indoctrination and to locate its epistemic and moral deficiencies, debates on the topic in political philosophy and the philosophy of education tend to focus on beliefs. It is commonly held that indoctrinating someone, like brainwashing them, involves not merely leading them to form new beliefs, but doing so in an epistemically (and perhaps, morally) inappropriate manner. The debate concerns how to characterize that manner.¹ Thus, indoctrination is said by some to be the inculcation of beliefs that are either false or that are inculcated with no regard to their truth. Others argue that it is a process of belief transmission that in various ways by-passes rational processes of belief formation. A third position holds that the distinctive feature of indoctrination lies in the sort of believing it cultivates, one that aims for the close-minded adherence to the indoctrinated beliefs. All these positions support a background picture whereby those doing the indoctrinating somehow plug a set of beliefs into others directly, so that their efforts cannot be resisted or later rejected. According to this common picture, coming to hold beliefs via indoctrination is different from coming to hold them as a result of a genuinely educative process that includes reflection or the availability of new information. It is this

understanding of what is distinctive about indoctrination that explains why the charge that faculty are indoctrinating their students packs such a rhetorical punch while the otherwise similar charge that faculty are teaching students left-wing world views does not.

Some common replies to the charge of indoctrination suggest that this is how the charge is understood by those who deny it. Consider, for examples, the following three lines of defense:

- 1 College instructors could not directly impart questionable beliefs because they do not have that kind of effectiveness or power. A student in a college classroom will spend 30–40 hours spread out over several months with an instructor, and at most a couple of hundred more engaged in the material of the class, chosen by that instructor. Compared to the 18 or more years that the student has spent at home, with her parents and in a particular community, the time in a single class is completely marginal. Besides, if college teachers had the power to mold their students' beliefs, they would certainly use it to impart beliefs about study habits or class attendance as important paths to success and better grades. Since that seems to be beyond most of our abilities, it is hard to think we are radically transforming students' more deep-seated moral, religious, or political beliefs.
- 2 College instructors are not trying to implant beliefs, but to encourage critical thinking. Even instructors who consciously choose to teach left-wing points of view on controversial topics (as I have done), are not aiming to convert their students, but to make them think hard and well about difficult issues. We consider our teaching a success if the student does that critical and reflective work, regardless of the beliefs they leave the class with.
- 3 To the extent that college teachers are trying consciously to mold their students' values and attitudes, it is not in order to shape them toward partisan positions. Rather, we are concerned to cultivate values that citizens need to sustain the fabric of democracy. That is, even if some of what happens in a university classroom aims at value transformation, it is merely training into democratic citizenship, which is among the legitimate purposes of a university in a democratic society. All of us (not just left-leaning faculty) should want students to learn to respect all other people as political equals, to listen respectfully, and to be committed to basic democratic ideals and norms.

These replies are, in one sense, perfectly good defenses against the charge of indoctrination. First, they by and large accurately describe what goes on in college classrooms: faculty have a lot less sway over the political beliefs of their students than it is often suggested they have; they are not, for the most part, trying to convert anyone; and they are concerned with making their students better citizens, along with their other educational aims. Moreover, these are also defensible things for university teachers to be doing: the society at large should want us to be helping students become more careful and critical thinkers and better citizens. Nevertheless, these replies rarely assuage those making the charge.² That suggests that the heart of the problem to which the charge is giving expression lies elsewhere. Before exploring where the real problem lies, we need a detour into social epistemology and in particular, the role of trust in the acquisition, production, and transmission of knowledge.

Trust and Knowledge

Social epistemology is a somewhat heterogenous field that investigates the role of social relations, institutions, and contexts in knowledge production, acquisition, and transmission. To a large extent, philosophers who work in social epistemology have been interested in trust insofar as it seems to play a role in the transmission and production of knowledge. For instance, it seems that in order to understand how we form beliefs on the basis of other people telling us things, we need to understand

the role trust plays in that process. In what follows, I am mostly concerned with something like the reverse direction: How does the transmission, acquisition, and production of knowledge shape vectors of trust? I argue that it is the transformation of these vectors of trust in the course of a college education that spurs the charge of indoctrination.

To make that thought clearer, we need to see trust in a particular light. In a recent paper, C. Thi Nguyen argues that trust, in at least one of its more ubiquitous forms, can be understood as taking an “unquestioning attitude” toward someone or something (Nguyen forthcoming). When I look at my watch and it says 3:10, I accept that this is the time. I do not try to verify it or look into the watch’s mechanics to make sure its springs are properly calibrated. I enter the information it gives me directly into my thinking processes. In doing so, I take an unquestioning attitude to my watch: I trust what it tells me. We trust the deliverances of our senses and the solidity of the physical objects around us in a similar manner. Think here of the difference in how you walk along a solid sidewalk, and how you walk when feeling your way across marshy ground or crusted snow. Turning closer to the cases that interest us here, we can also trust people and what they tell us in this way. When I trust the stranger in an unfamiliar city to give me directions when I ask, I just take off in the direction she points without hesitation or a quick look at my map. If I trust the *New York Times* to accurately report the monthly unemployment rate, then I do not check their figure against those of other news organizations or government agencies, or spot check the raw data coming out of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In trusting these sources, I give the information I receive from them direct access to my cognitive processes. This allows me to use what they tell me as the material for my thinking rather than the subject of my thinking.³ Because my watch says 3:10, I rush out of my office, suddenly realizing that I am late to pick up my child at school. Because the *New York Times* reported that the unemployment rate is rising sharply, I reconsider leaving my job just now, and begin to worry whether the party currently in power will be able to stay there at the next election.

Nguyen points out that trust of this sort is a necessary form of agency extension: given that we are finite beings and have both finite abilities and particularly finite mental space and processing capacity, we of necessity have to off-load a certain amount of thinking. Trust allows us to do that by letting us take on board directly certain kinds of already processed information, or by otherwise relieving us of the need to verify every step. That means that we cannot survive without a rather large amount of trust.

We misunderstand just how prevalent and complex trust is to our capacity for knowledge if we focus solely on direct testimony and our trust in particular sources. Consider what lies behind my trust in the *New York Times* report about the monthly unemployment rate. If I believe and consider myself justified in believing that the unemployment rate in the United States in December of 2021 was 3.9% because I read it in *The New York Times*, this involves several chains of trust. In order to trust the figure, I have to trust the journalist who reports it. But my trust in her is likely not to be based on any direct knowledge of her. Rather, I trust her because I trust a range of other processes and structures: the hiring process that landed her at the paper, and the editorial process that put this figure on the page. This is what it means for me to trust *The New York Times* more generally. But even those processes do not end the role of trust here. The hiring process trusts the various people who recommended her and the credentialing institutions that certify her competence to report on economic news. She, in turn, trusts, at least to some degree, the Bureau of Labor Statistics to report its finding accurately, and the Bureau trusts its processes of gathering information, those charged with gathering it, and the theories that generate a single figure out of a mess of data. And so forth. If I lose faith in any link along that chain – if I come to think that universities are handing out degrees in journalism or economics without cause or that the basic theoretical work that guides economic modelling is flawed, or that the Bureau has been captured by political interests and is no longer a neutral assembler of data but a partisan actor – then I will not take an unquestioning attitude to the figure I read in my morning paper.

Moreover, in addition to all these chains that lead back from this figure, I rely on another range of watchdog agencies that check up on the reliability of all these connections. Part of what supports my trust that the Bureau has not been corrupted or that the *Times* has not started hiring bad journalists is that I trust that such agencies would ferret this out and make it publicly known. Thus, I can continue to trust these links because I have heard nothing that would tell me to stop doing so. A lot of our beliefs about the world, and practically all of those that we might acquire in a college classroom, rest on these complex webs of institutions that I will call a trust network. When people say that they “believe in facts” or “believe in science,” what they actually mean is that they trust a certain set of institutions and procedures. When others are skeptical of the facts or scientific findings they are exhorted to believe, this is often a result of not trusting those same institutions and procedures.⁴ What we know and believe is a function of which trust networks we inhabit. One way, then, to change someone’s epistemic capacities is to change the trust networks she inhabits.

Trust is also a form of intimacy. When I trust, I give someone or something direct and unmediated access to my judgments, removing the barriers and filters that come from being critical and questioning information that I receive. Trusting involves allowing the trusted in past the walls of my thoughts and psyche, as it were. That is, after all, why it is both necessary and valuable. But, like other forms of intimacy, taking up the unquestioning attitude of trust leaves us vulnerable: to making mistakes and bad judgments, and to being manipulated, among other things. Moreover, because trust is a form of intimacy, the trust networks we inhabit shape not only our epistemic position but our social one. And the connection trust forges between our epistemic and social positions goes both ways. I am more likely to trust what those with whom I am socially connected tell me, but I am also more able to form social connections with people who inhabit the same trust networks as I do. When two people inhabit the same or at least overlapping trust networks, then they have points of reference in common, and this will make it easier for them to talk with one another. For people who occupy different trust networks, easy conversation may be difficult, and this can make forging or sustaining social ties more challenging.

College and the Engineering of Trust Networks

Students enter college with a particular trust network; they accept in an unquestioning way the information they receive from certain people and institutions, and not from others. They can take input from certain kinds of information sources in a fluent way, but not others. Though this may be reflected in the beliefs they hold or the political and moral positions they take, it goes beyond this to capture their networks of intimacy. The trust networks they inhabit are shaped by but also help to sustain their social ties to their families, friends, and communities. Over the course of their time in college, however, the shape of that network changes, sometimes in profound and radical ways. Moreover, these changes are not incidental to the education they receive in college, nor are they the results of educational malpractice.

College classes not only aim to provide their students with new information, but to train them within a discipline. That involves teaching students to understand and access information from certain specialized sources and import that information into their thinking processes directly. Forms of information become legible to students through this training and the result of that legibility is that while they may question certain findings and claims within a discipline, large swaths of the background that informs the discipline is taken on board unquestioningly. In other words, students learn to add various disciplinary sources to their trust networks. So, for instance, although a history student may learn to question the expert claims of an eminent historian, that very questioning will be made possible by an ability to assimilate all sorts of other material directly: information that surrounds the claim, but also information about how historical claims are made and debated, what archival processes are reliable and what counts as evidence for what. Learning all this greatly expands the student’s cognitive reach by extending her trust networks.

Disciplinary training extends both cognitive reach and critical capacities by extending and preserving the epistemic integrity of certain trust networks. But beyond this sort of training of critical capacities, colleges and their instructors aim to teach broader skills of critical thinking. In developing these broader skills, teachers train students to raise questions about a wide variety of things they previously left unquestioned. Training in this sort of critical thinking thus serves to prune students' trust networks. Note that this pruning takes place even if the students' beliefs remain unchanged. A student who learns to subject the beliefs she brought from home to critical scrutiny and decides to affirm them may nevertheless stand in a different relation to those beliefs than she once did. She may hold them, but no longer because she trusts the sources on which she previously relied.

Next, consider what happens in the training for citizenship that college teachers also claim to do. Developing democratic habits involves, among other things, learning to regard those of your fellow citizens who are different or unfamiliar with respect as equals. One aspect of treating others as equals is not to dismiss them and their points of view in an unquestioning way. In other words, learning to treat others equally involves no longer automatically excluding them from the possibility of becoming part of your trust network. Perhaps even more important, a great deal of what gets included under the guise of learning the rules, norms, and values of civic reasoning and civic behavior involves putting trust in certain kinds of authorities and expertise. It involves trusting those with academic and university credentials: the scientific community, published research, the expertise of those with law and medical and engineering degrees, and certain kinds of journalism. It is their trust in these sorts of institutions that ground some people's comfortable claim that they "believe in facts."

Finally, leaving the classroom for a minute, note that when students come to college, they also meet new people, forge new friendships, and attenuate or drop ties to former social circles and friends. College changes their social environment, and this also affects what they trust.⁵

Note, moreover, that in doing this work, college teachers do more than merely give our students the tools to exercise greater and more deliberate control over their trust networks. We actively aim to develop a particular trust network and train our students to rely on it: one that relies on the sort of complex institutional web that allows me to trust the mainstream media, the reports of government agencies, and the knowledge produced by credentialed expertise. We do not just arbitrarily choose these networks and they are not merely the ones we happen to inhabit, although, by and large, we do inhabit them. We think that they are epistemically advantageous: they help us and others know more and more deeply and surely about the world. We have reason to think that inhabiting them improves our understanding. One reason to think so is that the networks themselves are structured to be open to criticism and subject to the discipline of reason.

But even if there are good reasons to inhabit such a network, and so good reasons for college teachers to help their students do so, we should not lose sight of the effect that a transformation of their trust network has on some of our students. Although some students arrive in our classrooms inhabiting more or less the same trust network that we aim to build for them, many others do not. Maybe they trust more fully in religious authorities or the wisdom and passed-down knowledge of their communities. They may be skeptical of the good will or reliability of the sources and institutions we teach them to trust. Perhaps they come from communities who have suffered harm at the hands of those very institutions, or on whom the inhabitants of these trust networks look with a certain condescension or contempt. For those students, a university education not only serves to give them control over their trust networks but aims to radically change their content and shape.⁶ If it succeeds, however, it risks leaving them alienated from the communities and families from which they came, even if it does not change the content of their beliefs and values.

So, even if there are good reasons to build new trust networks for these students in an effort to improve their epistemic standing, in doing so, we also change who they are and which social networks they can comfortably inhabit. In particular, we make it harder for them to fit into the social networks from which they came. Such changes may be reflected in a change in their beliefs,

the sources of those beliefs, or the ways those beliefs are held, but they need not be. And so, the mere fact that college teachers are not converting our students to new beliefs about fundamental matters or manipulating their thought processes in some insidious manner, does not mean we are not changing where they stand, epistemically and socially.

Indoctrination, Revisited

Consider, then, what such a transformation looks like to those with whom a student was originally intimate. A student goes off to college and then starts to take an unquestioning attitude to things and people who they did not trust previously and who those back home may still not trust. They begin to stand at a certain distance from those in whom their families, friends, and communities place their trust. When those we love or care about begin to trust people and sources that we do not, and they begin forming new social ties with people we may not trust, and distancing themselves from their old social ties, it will not look like they have been taught or convinced or have otherwise reflectively changed their beliefs. It will look as if they have been indoctrinated. These are all tell-tale signs that someone is in an abusive relationship, for instance.

This suggests that the basic worry to which the criticism that colleges are indoctrinating students gives expression concerns this transformation of trust networks. So understood, it gives voice to a basic anxiety that comes with being a parent or standing in any intimate relation with others: the fear that the intimacy will be damaged, that one's intimates will drift away, become distant. It also arises from a recognition of an undeniable and central part of what colleges deliberately aim to do, and so it does not miss its mark in the way that the charge of indoctrination understood in terms of belief manipulation is thought to do. This is a charge, then, that warrants not merely a defensive reply, but a genuine response.

If, however, we want to respond and not merely reply to the charge of indoctrination, I think we need to consider head-on just what it is about a college education that can be alienating, and what to do about it. When we ask this question, it turns out that there is an interesting overlap between criticisms of university education from the left and the right. Whereas the criticism on the right is often framed in terms of indoctrination, the one from the left is framed around an idea of inclusion. If the analysis of the charge of indoctrination presented here is on the right track, however, those are versions of the same worry.

Concerns with inclusion center on the need for colleges to recognize the subtle and not-so-subtle ways they are structured to be welcoming to members of various dominant groups while being hostile or unwelcoming to those from marginalized groups or with marginalized identities. Some forms of failures of inclusion involve unstated assumptions that colleges and universities make about their students and faculty: the resources they have access to, or the training in certain forms of social interaction and relation to authority figures (Jack 2019). Others involve a failure to realize the kinds of ethical costs students from marginalized communities end up paying to fit into the cultural world of college and college graduates (Morton 2019). Finally, these critics challenge the assumptions colleges and their faculty tend to make that the trust networks they inhabit and develop for their students are, in fact, trustworthy. The critics point out that when they point out the problems with these assumptions, they are often met with an attitude of dismissive arrogance. They point to the similarity between this attitude and that which colonizers routinely take to colonized populations. Note, however, that all three of these charges point to the potential costs imposed on students and their communities when colleges transform their trust networks, along with charges that the trust networks colleges cultivate may not be as trustworthy as they are made out to be.

The rhetoric of inclusion tends to focus on bases of marginalization like class, disability, race, gender, and sexuality. That of indoctrination tends to focus on political ideology and religiosity. But in both cases, a sound basis of the concern lies with the particular trust networks that colleges aim to

develop for their students: such trust networks are not universal or neutral, and they tend not to align well with the trust networks of communities and populations that do not have a widespread history of college education or commitments to, or a positive history with, the trust networks in which universities and their faculties are anchored. The concurrence between criticisms of indoctrination and of failure to be inclusive are obscured because each side accuses the other of being part of the problem they are criticizing. Among the ideologies colleges are supposed to be indoctrinating their students into are those like radical feminism and anti-racism that developed in part in response to a recognition that mainstream social institutions like colleges were not inclusive. It is thus thought that the primary driver of policies and practices that aim to indoctrinate conservative students are those demanding that colleges be more inclusive.

If, however, we focus less on the content of ideology and belief, and more on the structure of trust networks, the two complaints line up well. Both charges start from the recognition that a college education is designed in part to enmesh students into a certain kind of trust network. They also both recognize that this network is not neutral or universal; it is already the home of some students but not others, and its degree of compatibility with their home networks varies quite a bit. Finally, they both raise genuine concerns about the content of the trust network that colleges develop in their students, even if the content of those concerns is not always the same. In both cases, they perceive that some students are essentially presented a choice in college: to move into the newly acquired trust networks and abandon those from home, or to reject what college offers in an effort to preserve the ties of home.

What, then, might a more adequate response to the charge of indoctrination look like? Here I focus on how it might shape or re-shape what happens in college classrooms, and how college teachers approach their work.⁷ We could start by being more open, honest, and transparent about what the hoped-for effects of our teaching are. Although we should not be trying to convert our students or manipulate them into having beliefs we favor, we can be doing none of that and still working to re-shape their trust networks. Approaching what we do as the engineering of trust networks makes it easier for us to accept the effects of our teaching and to then begin to confront the fact that what we are doing can impose ethical and other costs on our students. Unlike the mere transmission of information or training in particular useful skills, re-engineering someone's trust networks, even in ways that benefit them, is an intimate and awesome task. Teachers can begin to respond to charges of indoctrination by accepting the responsibility that comes with such a task. It would, for instance, make it harder to resort to Pollyannaish comments about transformation or to deflect our responsibility by down-playing the deep effects of what we, collectively, do.

Owning up to this description of what we try to do in our classrooms makes it easier as well to see the trust that is placed in us by the students who sit in our classrooms and the families that send them to us. Having trust placed in you calls for a certain kind of response: a mix of gratitude, care, and reciprocity. When someone trusts you, they honor you in regarding you as trustworthy, and that calls for gratitude in response. At the very least, showing students and families gratitude for the trust they place in us would rule out treating them with contempt or derision, deriding their values or ways of life as merely something to be overcome or escaped. Beyond that, we can show gratitude for the trust that is placed in us by showing due care for that which is entrusted to us. In the case of our students and their trust networks this means several things. First, we need to be attentive to whether or not we are in fact improving our students' trust networks through our efforts at re-engineering them. College teachers can become complacent in our beliefs in the superiority of our own trust networks and ways of knowing, and merely assume that initiating others into those networks will mark an epistemic improvement for them. Most of what gets taught in college classes and most of the transformations in trust networks that happen there no doubt do improve the epistemic position of students, but taking seriously the trust placed in us means being attentive to whether that is always the case and being able to articulate to those who ask how and why it is.

Second, seeing the epistemic position of our students in terms of trust networks helps us see that we are being entrusted with more than their epistemic standing. Showing due care for the trust networks of our students as we work to improve their epistemic standing requires being aware of and concerned about the social effects and costs that such improvement might impose on them, and either not imposing it unnecessarily or helping them address and shoulder those costs when they are inevitable. Teaching them not only how to inhabit a new trust network, but how to build bridges between their new and old trust networks can help them mitigate the social and ethical costs that may come with epistemic improvement. Finally, when we are entrusted with something's care, we also incur obligations toward those who place their trust in us. If you trust me to take care of your prized Ming vase, I should not juggle with it, even if my skills as a juggler mean that I am not putting the vase at any risk. That is because I owe you care as well: not to exploit the anxieties and fears that may come with entrusting something you value to another's care. So, similarly, we should be mindful of what we owe to our students' families and communities who entrust their children's trust networks to us. I do not think we owe them complete deference or help in cementing their own values into our students' networks. But we owe them something like a manifest attentiveness to our students' value and values and, in particular, the role those values play in fortifying their social ties. One way to do that is to work to ensure that our classrooms are safe spaces for doing this kind of work. Safety here does not require freedom from challenge or criticism, but it does require some level of assurance that in the course of making oneself vulnerable to changing, one is not thereby put in danger, whether of failure, ridicule, or condemnation.

The third aspect of an appropriate response to trust is reciprocity. We repay someone's trust in us both by being trustworthy and by returning their trust. Being trustworthy involves more than being competent at the task you have been trusted to do. It also requires a certain manifest responsiveness to the vulnerability and dependence that the trusting person's trust creates for them. One way to manifest such responsiveness is to not ignore or dismiss their challenges and criticisms. In the case of being trustworthy in our efforts to engineer our students' trust networks, this means demonstrating when called on that our own trust networks are worthy of habitation and open to being questioned and challenged. Taking another's challenges seriously and being open to the possibility of their challenges involves accepting a certain kind of vulnerability towards and dependence on them. In other words, we can demonstrate our own trustworthiness by being willing to trust our students with our own trust networks. This need not involve letting our students convert us any more than we expect their trust in us involves them submitting to being converted by us. What it requires is that what they say can change how we think, both about them, and about the world we are helping them figure out and understand. In other words, it turns out that to teach them well, and not indoctrinate them, we also have to be willing to learn from them.⁸

(Related Chapters: 4, 5, 11, 12, 23, 26, 27, 29.)

Notes

- 1 For an overview see Callan and Arena (2009).
- 2 In some cases, the reply fails because the charge is not made in good faith in the first place. Since the person making the charge is trying to score political points or demonize an institution, she is happy to focus on an unrepresentative sample of classroom behaviors that even most faculty would consider educational malpractice. Since I think there is a form of the charge that is made in good faith and is worth engaging with, I am going to ignore the bad faith version of the charge here, even if it is common.
- 3 This is not to say that I cannot at any time turn my attention to the trusted source and investigate it. But then I am no longer treating it as a trusted source.

- 4 This does not imply that facts are subjective or that we are entitled to our own version of the facts. Some trust networks are epistemically better than others, some institutions are more trustworthy than others. The point is that in order to compare epistemic positions, we have to investigate a more subtle and complex social web that centrally involves relations of trust and questions of trustworthiness.
- 5 I explore this avenue by which a college education can transform a trust network in more detail in Laden 2022. For a discussion of the role of friends in working our way out of certain kinds of dysfunctional trust networks, see Nguyen 2020.
- 6 I note here in passing that this suggests that the divide that is sometimes drawn between treating a college education as an opportunity to develop knowledge and skills and treating it as a potentially transformative experience is merely apparent. Insofar as the development of knowledge and skills requires a re-engineering of a student's trust networks, it will also be transformative.
- 7 See Laden 2022 for a broader range of strategies.
- 8 This chapter was prompted by engaging with some work by Gina Schouten, and it has greatly benefitted from conversations and feedback from her, Harry Brighouse, Carrie Welsh, Annette Martín, Sam Fleischacker, Anne Eaton, Paula McAvoy, Jennifer Morton, Sarah Stitzlein, and the members of the Center for Ethics and Education's 2020–21 Summer Graduate Institute. I am grateful to Randall Curren for the opportunity to include it here, and for his final editorial and philosophical suggestions.

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