


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GLOBAL DEMOCRATIC EDUCATIONAL JUSTICE*

Julian Culp

Introduction

Philosophical work on educational justice has had an overwhelmingly domestic focus.¹ It was largely shaped by theories of domestic justice in the era before political philosophers were thinking about global justice or human rights. The intense and wide-ranging debates on global justice within contemporary political philosophy have hardly influenced the current debates on educational justice. We now have theories of global justice and so it is time to think about global justice and education.² Indeed, several philosophers and educational theorists have already recognized the need for a cosmopolitan or global form of citizenship education that would enable future citizens to live up to the national-border transcending responsibilities that they have in a globalized world (Nussbaum 1996, 1997; Suárez-Orozco 2007; Sander & Scheimpflug 2011; Gaudelli 2016). In that way they already affirm a central premise of the global justice discourse, which is that all persons enjoy rights that deserve recognition not only from co-citizens and national governments but also from citizens of other states as well as from inter- and transnational actors such as international organizations or multinational corporations. Socio-economic rights to be free from extreme poverty, for example, are often conceived in this way (Pogge 2007). Nevertheless, philosophers and educational theorists have paid only scant attention to the question as to which rights to education, if any, can be justified as a matter of global justice. Their discourse on educational justice has remained domestic in its scope and focused mainly on the question of which rights to education co-citizens must mutually recognize.

The aim of this chapter is to transcend the domestic framing of the current discussion on educational justice by presenting a democratic conception of global educational justice. The next two sections situate this democratic conception of global educational justice within the philosophical discourses on educational and global justice. More specifically, they present the “cosmopolitan plateau” of the contemporary discourse on global justice as well as the domestic focus of the existing conceptions of educational justice. Following that, the chapter will lay out my conception of global democratic educational justice, by first explaining the democratic conception of global justice on which it relies.

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The Cosmopolitan Plateau of Global Justice Theorizing

Criticisms of the domestic framing of John Rawls's (1971) conception of justice as fairness have been an important focus of the debate on global justice.³ Rawls limited the validity of his liberal egalitarian principles of justice – the equal liberties principle, the fair equality of opportunity principle, and the difference principle – to the national basic structure of a liberal democratic state.⁴ Rawls did not justify principles of justice for the global basic structure but maintained merely that in international affairs “natural duties ... hold between persons irrespective of their institutional relationships ... [which should inform] the conduct of states” (Rawls 1971: 115). Charles Beitz argued, however, that Rawls's understanding of justice as fairness gives it global rather than merely domestic applicability; his account of fair terms of social cooperation applies to global society because 20th century economic and political globalization has given rise to a global basic structure that could only count as a fair system of cooperation if it were regulated by Rawls's principles of justice as fairness (Beitz 1999: 150–153).

Accordingly, Beitz insisted that Rawls's methodological device of the original position should be used and modified so that principles of global justice for the global basic structure would be chosen behind an appropriately adapted veil of ignorance (150–153). As in Rawls's theory, the point of this veil of ignorance thought experiment is to simulate a fair choice of principles by imagining that parties who choose the principles know nothing about themselves, such as their natural talents or social background. In addition, however, Beitz argued that in a *global* original position scenario the parties should be conceived as not knowing their national citizenship. In that way, he maintained, the principles that would be chosen in such a global original position would not unduly favor the members of any nation-state over those of any other. And while Beitz held that the parties of such a global original position would also select Rawls's principles of justice as fairness, he insisted that the scope of these principles would have to be global, as their purpose was to regulate the global basic structure. Beitz thereby justified the conclusion that lack of basic liberties, global fair equality of opportunity, and global economic inequalities that are not to the greatest advantage of the least well off should count as global injustices. Hence, moral problems in international affairs should not only be answered by drawing on “natural duties ... [that] hold between persons irrespective of their institutional relationships,” as Rawls had suggested (Rawls 1971: 115). The global basic structure should also be assessed on the same principles of justice that Rawls applied within individual societies.

In recent years, the contemporary discourse on global justice has become much more diversified. The major positions in this discourse, which I will outline below, are national or statist conceptions, globalist conceptions, as well as inter- and transnational conceptions (cf. Culp 2014). What is more, the discourse has now reached – following Mathias Risse's terminology – a “cosmopolitan plateau” (Risse 2012: 10).⁵ It has reached such a plateau in the sense that all the major positions within the global justice debate – including Rawls's (1999) conception of global justice in *The Law of Peoples* – accept that there are some universally valid, human rights that all persons possess no matter where they reside. What is distinctive about these rights is that they are, as Beitz observes, “a matter of international concern” (2009: 105–106).⁶ They entail responsibilities of justice to contribute to their realization not only on the part of the respective national governments, but also on the part of the international community. Thus, there is no longer any major position within the current global justice debate that would limit the scope of justice to the confines of the nation-state.

The most minimal of these positions are national or statist positions, according to which *sufficientarian* principles of justice are globally valid, whereas *egalitarian* principles of justice are valid only within states. Michael Blake (2001), David Miller (2007), and Gillian Brock (2009) recognize, for example, that all states and the international community have responsibilities of justice to ensure that a sufficientarian threshold of justice is met in all countries so that nobody, no matter where they reside, suffers from the under-fulfillment of basic needs or a lack of personal autonomy. Yet global

socio-economic inequalities of opportunity or outcome do not count as global injustices according to these positions. By contrast, the globalist conceptions of Beitz (1999), Gosepath (2001), Pogge (2002), Moellendorf (2002), Tan (2004), and Caney (2005) affirm that egalitarian principles of distributive justice have global validity and that the relations among all persons globally must be such that there is no justice-relevant interpersonal inequality. On Caney's (2005: 122) luck-egalitarian understanding of global justice, for example, this means that no person, no matter where that person resides, should be worse off than any other person through no fault of her own.⁷

Furthermore, there are also inter- and transnationalist conceptions of global justice, according to which the question of global justice is not only whether all persons are entitled to some sufficientarian or some egalitarian entitlement of justice. In addition, further central questions of global justice are how to arrange justly the relations between states (Rawls 1999; Pettit 2010; Culp 2014), as well as the relations between states and non-state actors such as multinational corporations (cf., O'Neill 1991; Forst 2001; Fraser 2009). These inter- and transnationalist positions do not disagree with the national or statist positions that some sufficientarian threshold of justice must be met globally. Yet they add that there are also inter- or transnational principles of justice that should govern the relations between states and non-states actors. Rawls (1999: 65, 71–78), for example, has accepted in *The Law of Peoples* that all societies need to accept a set of basic human rights and that the international community has a duty to work towards the fulfillment of these rights whenever they remain unmet. In addition, Rawls (1999: 42n) has also recognized the need for principles of international justice that regulate the global background structure that shapes the interactions among states.

The Domestic Focus of Theories of Educational Justice

Despite this *global turn* in the theorizing of justice, however, conceptions of educational justice have remained mainly state-centered in their orientation. Theorists of educational justice have relied on domestically conceived conceptions of social justice and have used them as normative foundations for their respective conceptions of educational justice. As an illustration of this, consider that Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift have defended their respective and joint conceptions of equal educational opportunity (Brighouse 2000; Swift 2003; Brighouse & Swift 2006, 2009, 2014) based on alternative interpretations of the fair equality of opportunity principle that Rawls has defended as a principle regulating access to occupational opportunities within (relevant) nation-states.⁸ Likewise, Elizabeth Anderson (2004, 2007) and Debra Satz (2007) rely on a relational or democratic conception of social justice that Anderson (1999) and Samuel Scheffler (2003) initially developed for conceptualizing the demands of social justice within the nation-state.⁹ Similarly, Gina Schouten (2012) unfolds her prioritarian conception of educational justice by way of explaining what the demands of an interpretation of Rawls's difference principle are within education and schooling. And as I have already mentioned, Rawls defends his difference principle as a requirement of social justice within a liberal-democratic nation-state and not as a requirement of global distributive justice. Finally, Krassimir Stojanov's (2011) recognition-theoretic conception of educational justice is based on Axel Honneth's Hegelian understanding of what justice requires within the nation-state.

The domestic orientation of the contemporary debate on educational justice does not imply that the theorists of educational justice deny there are principles of global justice or hold that considerations of justice are only relevant within the confines of the nation-state. Theorists of educational justice may or may not have settled views about which proposed principles of global justice are the most defensible, and they may or may not have settled views about whether their preferred accounts of educational justice are globally applicable.¹⁰

Due to this domestic basis of the existing conceptions of educational justice it is high time to reflect on how to understand principles of *global* educational justice that have conceptions of global justice as their normative foundations. The next section makes a step in that direction by way of

presenting one distinctively democratic conception of global educational justice that is based on a democratic conception of global justice. The breadth of conceptions of global justice makes it possible to lay out various related conceptions of global educational justice.¹¹ Accordingly, my presentation of just one conception of global educational education in the next section does not at all exhaust the conceptual possibilities of articulating global educational justice. Nevertheless, my presentation clearly demonstrates the possibility of conceiving educational justice in a global as opposed to a domestic manner. It also reveals important questions that such a global conception of educational justice must answer, and which have thus far been neglected due to the domestic framing of the debate on educational justice. Above all, this is the question of how important the realization of domestic educational justice within a single state is relative to the realization of global educational justice within all states.¹²

A Democratic Conception of Global Justice¹³

In this section I outline the basic ideas of a democratic conception of global justice, which I employ as the foundation for developing a democratic conception of global educational justice in the next section.¹⁴ In a nutshell, the most important requirement of a democratic conception of global justice is to establish structures of justification that allow everyone to veto or block the justifications that are given within political discourses for how to go about addressing political conflicts and problems.¹⁵ The central demands of global educational justice that follow from this conception are the formation of personal moral and public autonomy through educational public policy so that persons are not dominated in their personal development and can effectively participate in political decision-making processes.

One important point of departure of the democratic conception of justice is Iris Young's challenge of what she refers to as the "distributive paradigm" in theorizing justice (Young 1990: ch. 1; 2000). Instead of focusing on how resources are distributed, she argues, it is necessary to focus on the structure of the decision-making processes that lead to a distribution of resources in the first place. Young calls for displacing "the distributive paradigm in favor of a wider, process-oriented understanding of society, which focuses on power [and] decision-making" (1990: 37). Similarly, Rainer Forst urges avoiding a purely distributive "picture" of justice and highlights the importance of recognizing a political "picture," as well (2012: ch. 12; 2014: ch. 1). This political picture relies on the idea that all moral persons possess a *basic moral right to justification* that entitles them "to demand and provide justifications" for how they are treated and "to challenge false legitimations" of their social and political orders (Forst 2011: 9). This basic right relies on a conception of moral respect for persons, according to which morally respecting persons means behaving towards them in ways that are *morally justifiable* to them.

Forst's account, which draws on Jürgen Habermas's discourse theory of morality, states that the standards of a moral justification consist of the criteria of *generality* and *reciprocity*.¹⁶ Generality means that a moral justification must not be justifiable solely to those persons who share a specific socio-political context and particular conceptions of the good. Rather, generality requires the justification to be justifiable to all persons, regardless of whether they belong to the same socio-political contexts and endorse the same conception of the good. Further, reciprocity requires that the justifications given must not be one sided. Justifications should not be articulated in a manner that privileges certain persons by exempting them from certain moral requirements. Nor must justifications regard the interests of certain persons as facts of nature and thus beyond reasonable criticism. The two criteria of generality and reciprocity, then, express more concretely what it means to show respect to others "by treating them," as Rawls once put it, "in ways that they can see to be justified" (1971: 516).

Arguably, this means that social and political institutions must be justifiable to their members in such a way that they can come to see themselves as *authors of their* institutions. Therefore, such institutions must be perceivable as the result of a reasoning process in which nobody has been

arbitrarily excluded and nobody has enjoyed the privilege of counting as a greater justificatory authority than anyone else. On a more practical level, this means that fundamentally just social and political orders must afford all their members appropriate social and political roles through which they can encounter one another on an equal footing in the exchange of reasons concerning which norms should underlie their common institutions. Accordingly, a theory of justice must provide an account of the effective social and political *structures of justification* that enable persons to call into question the justifications that are given for certain social and political contexts that, among other things, lead to a specific distribution of goods and scheme of production. The demand for such basic structures of justification is the most fundamental requirement of a democratic or discourse theory of justice (Forst 2001: 174, 176; 2012: *passim*).

Building on Forst's discourse theory of justice, I endorse an *internationalist* conception of global democratic justice. It holds that basic or fundamental global democratic justice requires that the national representatives of internally sufficiently just states ought to have sufficient justificatory power in international processes of opinion and will formation that affect the lives of their members (cf. Culp 2014: ch. 5).¹⁷ These international processes of opinion and will formation are international political discourses in which official or formally recognized political agents deliberate and negotiate empirical and normative questions that have an effect not only on their respective national political communities but also on the world at large.

More specifically, those who represent states that are internally sufficiently just must participate in the construction of the material or substantive principles of justice that will count as internationally valid. Accordingly, state representatives must be capable of partaking in discursively determining the substantive principles that will serve as normative building blocks for a just international order.¹⁸ While such international processes must transmit the viewpoints of the members of the respective national population, it is also necessary that, additionally, citizens from various states can voice their demands through *transnational* processes of opinion and will formation. In this way these citizens will be able to co-determine international decision making.¹⁹

Furthermore, this internationalist conception of global democratic justice requires institutionalizing basic structures of justification at the *intranational* or domestic level. The reason for this is that the justifications for any kind of global order must be justifiable to citizens in their capacity as normative authorities. Otherwise, the international processes of opinion and will-formation cannot be properly thought of as being justifiable to all those who are impacted by the decisions reached in these processes. Those who are impacted in such ways must also become politically capable of critically examining the choices that the representatives of states made.

Global Democratic Educational Justice²⁰

Democratic educational justice requires that educational public policies are democratically adequate (cf. Anderson 2004, 2007; Satz 2007), and to count as such, these policies must form persons' personal moral and public autonomy.²¹ Public autonomy refers to persons as public subjects who can participate in public decision-making processes by cooperating with others in reasoning critically about the public ends of their respective political communities. This reasoning concerns the understanding, the application, and the construction of mutually justifiable principles of justice. From the perspective of democratic educational justice such public autonomy is of fundamental importance because it is through public deliberation that persons determine how to arrange their social and political order.

Among other things, this requires that persons learn to accept the fact of reasonable pluralism about conceptions of the good. They must recognize that securing basic civic and political liberties such as liberty of thought, liberty of speech and liberty of assembly unavoidably leads to a situation in which citizens come to endorse different conceptions of the good. For if persons are free to use these liberties, then the exercise of reason makes it the case that they will come to formulate and adhere to

different conceptions of the good. After all, they have different kinds of experiences in their lives and interpret in different ways the concepts that they use in order to render these experiences sensible to them in relation to their understanding of themselves and members of groups.²² In addition, they must also be “reasonable” in the sense of being able to be properly motivated to comply with the institutional rules that correspond to the principles that they have justified intersubjectively. According to this ideal of public autonomy, individuals therefore should become joint authors of the social and political orders that they inhabit, and they should be willing to maintain “their” normative orders by following these orders’ political rules.²³ So they must also feel bound by a responsibility of justice to follow those norms that have been intersubjectively justified.

But in addition to furthering public autonomy, democratic educational justice also demands that educational public policies promote personal moral autonomy. Personal moral autonomy refers to the capacity to act morally in the sense of being able to act according to moral norms that are justified by the criteria of reciprocity and generality (cf. Forst 2002: 268). This idea of personal moral autonomy demands that persons should be aware that they have an individual right to reason about which ends they would like to pursue in their private lives. After all, the criterion of generality requires that all practical norms are justifiable to all persons, and the criterion of reciprocity holds that persons need not accept any conception of the good simply because someone else has proposed this conception. All persons count as equally authoritative concerning “ethical” questions of what the good life involves.

The basic idea of personal moral autonomy is thus also that of non-domination, according to which others must not arbitrarily interfere in one’s life (cf. Costa 2011: 86). Like public autonomy, personal moral autonomy is inextricably linked to the moral right to justification because this right means that no individual is entitled to decide for another individual how to lead his or her life. Accordingly, the possession of this right requires the development of personal moral autonomy through educational public policy so that persons are not subject to the arbitrary imposition of other persons’ will regarding what conception of the good to accept and follow.

Recall that the fundamental political requirement of this democratic conception of global justice is to build appropriately arranged basic structures of justification at the domestic and at the international levels. These structures must enable domestic and international political discourses that discursively determine further principles of global justice. When recognizing this conception as the normative ground of educational public policy, the educational rights to public and to personal moral autonomy that constitute my global conception of democratic educational justice should have two features. First, the *scope* of validity of fundamental – or “primary” – rights to democratically adequate education that ensures the enjoyment of both public autonomy and personal moral autonomy must be viewed as global or universal. These rights to democratically adequate education must be fully realized within all states. Second, the *content* of these fundamental rights to democratically adequate education must not be limited to an education that is merely effective in facilitating participation in democratic decision making domestically. Rather, educational public policies must also enable citizens to participate in international decision-making. This means that such policies must contribute to the realization of citizens’ capabilities of partaking in transnational political discourses, since these discourses are one central mechanism through which citizens can shape international decision making.

One way in which to emphasize this specific content of the rights to democratically adequate education is to differentiate between the right to *domestically* democratically adequate education and the right to *internationally* democratically adequate education. A global conception of democratic educational justice requires the realization of both rights. Curren and Metzger argue that the preparation for participation in international decision-making procedures through appropriate forms of educational public policy is crucial on grounds of legitimacy (2017: ch. 6). They maintain that “legitimacy rests on transparency, which requires understanding of what is at stake, hence a wealth

of relevant education for all who may directly or indirectly be parties to the negotiation or subject to the terms of cooperation it yields – in short, everyone in the world” (2017: 170).

Yet in addition to these fundamental rights to domestically and internationally democratically adequate education, my conception also includes further – “secondary” – rights to those kinds of education that are justified within properly arranged basic structures of justification. Thus, it also consists of these further rights to education that are justified within such structures of justification at the domestic as well as at the international levels. So relative to the way in which appropriately structured domestic and international deliberations justify further rights to education, these further or secondary rights also constitute demands of global democratic educational justice. These further or secondary rights might be certain rights to equal educational opportunity or rights to education that benefit the least well off.²⁴

Since this conception of global democratic educational justice consists of fundamental (or primary) and further (or secondary) rights to education that must be realized not only domestically but within all states, the question arises of how to rank these rights in terms of their moral importance. In particular, the question arises as to whether a state, once the fundamental rights to democratically adequate education have been entirely realized in this state, should pursue the domestic realization of further, secondary rights to education, or whether the state should rather aim at realizing the fundamental rights to education of citizens from other states.²⁵ In my view, in such a case the fundamental rights to democratically adequate education of citizens from other states are in principle morally more important than the domestic realization of any further or secondary rights to education domestically.

For example, consider a state in which democratically adequate education already has been achieved. Should the state now use additionally available educational resources for realizing equal educational opportunity domestically rather than supporting the realization of fundamental rights to democratically adequate education in other states? My conception maintains that, other things being equal, the available educational resources should be employed for realizing the fundamental rights to democratically adequate education in other states rather than for realizing domestic equal educational opportunity.

Finally, when it comes to determining in greater detail which agents should prioritize the realization of the fundamental rights to democratically adequate education that my global conception of democratic educational justice defends, my first answer is that those who can, should. Thus, I claim that all states that have already fulfilled the primary rights to education domestically as well as the educationally relevant international organizations – such as, above all, the OECD, UNESCO, and UNICEF – bear the moral responsibility for realizing the fundamental rights to democratically adequate education of all citizens within all states. The reasoning underlying this claim is that these are especially powerful actors that have the capacity for assuming such responsibility without having to sacrifice other goods of greater moral importance. In addition, those who benefit or contribute to a global institutional order that reproduces global educational injustices also bear moral responsibilities for reducing these injustices (cf. Pogge 2002; Young 2007, 2011). It is difficult to identify with precision the agents that benefit and contribute in this way, yet it is reasonable to assume that those who belong to upper echelons of the income and wealth distributions and those who occupy influential roles in culture, economy, and politics are the bearers of such responsibility.

These general answers do not offer determinate replies to further questions about moral responsibility for realizing the fundamental rights to democratically adequate education. These questions include: Are there any other reasons for ascribing responsibility to certain actors for realizing global educational justice – reasons that are based on considerations of international law? How should the moral responsibility for achieving global democratic educational justice be divided among states? Are there any actors other than states that bear a similar kind of moral responsibility? If yes, how should the moral responsibility for global democratic educational justice be divided among

these various kinds of actors? Although my initial answers do not offer detailed replies to these questions, they offer a determinate approach for answering these questions. For the kind of basic structures of justification that it argues should be erected are also meant to facilitate democratic deliberation within domestic and international political discourses about how to allocate justly the responsibilities for achieving global democratic educational justice.²⁶

Conclusion

Conceptions of educational justice are closely connected to more far-reaching conceptions of social justice that usually serve as their normative foundations.²⁷ Hence, it does not come as a surprise that the diversity and subtlety of conceptions of social justice that has emerged since the last quarter of the 20th century has given rise to a corresponding variety of conceptions of educational justice. These latter conceptions include liberal egalitarian, democratic, prioritarian, and recognition-theoretic perspectives. However, whereas the discourse on social justice has been globalized since the 1990s, the debate on educational justice has remained mainly domestic, or state-centered, in its normative orientation. To overcome the curious neglect of the philosophical debate on global justice that is underlying this domestic orientation, this chapter has presented a democratic conception of global justice as well as a corresponding conception of global democratic educational justice. In that way this chapter has shown but one way in which the global justice discourse can inform the debate on educational justice. Given the diversity of conceptions of global justice, many other conceptions of global educational justice are also conceivable.

This chapter has also maintained that the exploration of the concept of global educational justice has overlooked normative importance, since the demands of educational justice at the domestic level need to be understood in the context of the demands of educational justice at the global level. It is unreasonable to bracket the discussion of global education justice on the presumption that fulfilling demands of global educational justice is of negligible normative relevance for as long as an ideal of a domestically conceived conception of educational justice is not yet fully fulfilled. It is normatively more appropriate to hold, as I have done in the case of my democratic conception of global educational justice, that states and their citizens should seriously concern themselves with furthering educational justice in other states once they have reached a basic or fundamental level of educational justice at the domestic level. Yet it is only through conceiving educational justice from a global perspective that the relative weight or priority of domestic rights to education vis-à-vis global rights to education elsewhere becomes clearly visible.

In addition, the discussion of my democratic conception of global educational justice has revealed that a global perspective provides insights concerning the appropriate formulation of the contents of rights to education. In the case of my democratic conception, one of these insights has been that educational public policies must also prepare persons for their participation in international decision-making processes. This is because they have a right to justification that entitles them to challenge false legitimations, regardless of whether they occur at the domestic or at the global level. And so, it is of paramount importance to pursue this *global turn* in the theorizing of educational justice.

(Related Chapters: 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 34.)

Notes

- 1 Cf. Culp (2020) for an overview of the contemporary philosophical debate on educational justice.
- 2 Unless specified otherwise, the central focus of this chapter is *school education*.
- 3 Work on rights of succession and the ethics of humanitarian intervention, e.g., by Buchanan (1991), were early steps toward addressing larger questions of global justice, starting around 1990.
- 4 See Rawls (2001: 42–43) for the ultimate formulation of these three principles.

- 5 Risse's terminology is itself an adaptation of the term "egalitarian plateau" that Kymlicka (2000) uses to describe the competing conceptions of social justice.
- 6 As Beitz (2009: 105–106) puts it: "Whatever else is true of human rights, they are supposed to be matters of international concern in the sense that a society's failure to respect its people's human rights on a sufficiently large scale may provide a reason for outside agents to do something."
- 7 Caney (2005:122) explains this as follows: "The point can be put in more colloquial terms: in recent years the term 'postcode lottery' has been employed in Britain to criticize the situation in which people who lived in the jurisdictions of different councils have very unequal access to health and education. This, it was said, was unfair for it is wrong that someone should get less simply because he or she lives in one place rather than another. The cosmopolitan point is simply to radicalize this and to see through its logic at the global level."
- 8 Cf. also Gosepath (2014). There are strong and weak versions of the conception of educational justice as equal educational opportunity, which Brighouse and Swift (2009, 2014) call the meritocratic conception and the radical one, respectively. The weak version states that all citizens with equal (natural) talents and equal motivation to use their talents should have equal chances for formal educational achievement. By contrast, the strong version holds that all citizens with equal motivation to use their talents, but irrespective of the relative level of their talents, should have equal chances for formal educational achievement.
- 9 See also Randall Curren (1994) and John White (1994) for threshold conceptions of educational justice.
- 10 Brighouse and Swift (2011: 122), for example, have recognized the moral importance of supporting members of other nation-states by arguing that "even if national relationship goods were very valuable, we'd still need to know the opportunity cost of their production as far as other goods are concerned, and why an individual could legitimately pursue them for herself and her fellow nationals rather than helping others to realize them."
- 11 Zwarthoed (2019), for example, has analyzed whether it is justifiable to defend autonomy as an educational aim at the global level. In addition, Schwartz (2019) has focused on the question of what is owed to children of primary and secondary school age who are living outside their country of origin.
- 12 Again, while many theorists of educational justice, like Brighouse and Swift (2011), are likely to recognize this point, they have not yet fleshed out its theoretical and normative implications.
- 13 This section heavily draws on ch. 2 of my book *Democratic Education in a Globalized World – A Normative Theory* (2019: 33–44).
- 14 My defense of the democratic or discourse-theoretic conception of justice follows the ground-breaking work of Forst (2002, 2012), as I will further explain in the remainder of this chapter. In Culp (2015), I offer a critical comparison between this democratic way of conceiving justice and the luck-egalitarian conception of justice that Cohen (2008) defends.
- 15 I follow Peters' (2007: 217) definition of the term "discourse," which I use interchangeably with the term "deliberation," and which emphasizes that claims that are part of a discourse claim to be grounded on appropriate reasons: "*Discourse*," he explains, "occurs if empirical statements, descriptions or reports, explanations, interpretations, proposals prescriptions, normative judgments or evaluations are supported by some kind of justification, by some argumentative backing, or by some presentation of evidence."
- 16 For an explication of the criteria of reciprocity and generality, see, Forst (2002: 68–69, 133–134; 2012: 80–81); on the research program of a discourse-theoretical moral philosophy, see Habermas (1990).
- 17 For other internationalist accounts, see Buchanan (2004), Ronzoni (2009), Christiano (2010), Pettit (2010).
- 18 See also Habermas (2008: 334) for his proposal for a transnational negotiation system among states. For similar internationalist accounts, see Christiano (2010), Pettit (2010).
- 19 Despite the importance of transnational social movements and political discourses for my conception of global democratic justice, I nevertheless refer to it as an *internationalist* rather than a transnational conception. There are three features of my conception of global justice that make it appropriate to label it as an internationalist one. One such feature of my conception of global justice is that it assumes that the international system of states can in principle realize fundamental global justice. It neither calls for anarchy nor for world government, but for a democratic international system. Another relevant feature is that my conception of global justice holds that (democratic) states and (democratically constructed) international law are central bearers of rights and responsibilities of global justice. States and international law play a central role for both conceptualizing and realizing global justice. Finally, my conception of global justice is compatible with the view that different states will domestically realize certain conceptions of social justice in different ways. It recognizes the importance of issues of justice across, between, and beyond states, but also maintains that social justice needs to be realized in context-specific ways in different states.
- 20 This section heavily draws on ch. 2 and 3 of my book *Democratic Education in a Globalized World – A Normative Theory* (2019: 33–44, 77–79).

- 21 Other philosophers of education who put particular emphasis on the public autonomy to participate in processes of democratic decision making are De Wijze (1999) and Costa (2004).
- 22 See Rawls (2005: 54–58) on what he calls the “burdens of judgment.”
- 23 This metaphor of joint authorship does not mean that my conception of public autonomy assumes that all individuals will eventually gather and decide together which laws should be put in place and which policies should be implemented. That would be an unrealistic utopian claim. “Joint authorship” can, however, play the role of a regulative idea that practically informs actions and policies even if not everyone participates in collective decision making and even if there is no unanimous agreement on how to decide.
- 24 To clarify, by arguing philosophically for the moral primacy of rights to democratic education I do not mean to suggest that the political discourses about how to achieve democratic education will become superfluous. For example, it is necessary to spell out in greater detail what is meant by a right to democratic education that is “adequate.”
- 25 One can question whether states are entitled to realize first the rights to democratic education of their citizens, before attempting to realize the rights to democratic education of citizens from other states. One reason why states have this entitlement is the consideration that the most efficient way for realizing all rights to democratic education is to ascribe primary responsibility for realizing citizens’ rights to democratic education to their respective states. Another reason is that using a state’s resources to realize rights to democratic education elsewhere cannot be legitimately decided unless that state’s citizens already enjoy democratic rights.
- 26 See Culp (2016) on why this is an adequate way to allocate responsibility for global justice.
- 27 Forst (2017) has coined the term, a “normatively dependent concept,” in order to describe this kind of relationship between two normative concepts such as educational justice and social justice.

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