


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EDUCATIONAL PROBLEMS OF MASS MIGRATION

Danielle Zwarthoed

Introduction

Educational problems of mass migration pertain to both education and migration. Broadly construed, education refers to all the processes that modify children and adults' beliefs, knowledge, desires, values, habits, capabilities, competences and actions. Normative discourses about education, such as this chapter, tend to think of education as an intentional process that constructively engages and develops a learner's mental and other capabilities, with the aim of benefiting society, the educated person, or both. According to R. S. Peters, education develops the mind by initiating learners into activities or forms of knowledge in such a way that they "know what they are doing" (Peters 1965). Hence ideological manipulation, commercial advertising and brainwashing do not count as education in this sense. Normative discourses with prescriptive ambitions also tend to regard education as a process under the responsibility of well-identified organizations such as schools, universities, or families, to which moral responsibilities and duties can be ascribed. Yet we could include the news media as well as state programs and NGOs that facilitate the integration of new immigrants by providing language courses, for instance.

Migration is a subgenre of geographical mobility. It is the mobility of humans who aim to change residence. Our contemporary world is divided in sovereign states and most people take for granted that sovereignty includes the right to control one's own borders and to decide who can get in.¹ Hence, we generally take migration to be *international* migration. Migration thus refers to the mobility of humans who cross international borders with the aim of changing residence. The so-called "migration crisis" of 2015, when the war in Syria caused an increase in the number of asylum seekers in the European Union and in North America, nurtured the perception that we live in an era of unprecedented mass migrations. However, historians call for caution (e.g., Lucassen & Lucassen 2017). Migrations seem to have been a structural feature of many past human societies, although the Industrial Revolution and the transport revolutions of the 19th and 20th centuries probably contributed to an increase of long-distance mobility. Yet the one million migrants who crossed the Mediterranean Sea in 2015² seems quite a small number of people to accommodate for wealthy countries, compared to the 40 million European civilians displaced during and after the Second World War (Gatrell 2013: 89) or to the five and a half million refugees who left Afghanistan for Pakistan and Iran following the wars that started with the Soviet invasion in 1979 (Gatrell 2013: 255). The Afghan case reminds us that South-North migratory movements are but a fraction of global migrations. Eighty percent of refugees live in low- or

intermediate-income countries. In Europe, 70% of international migrants originate in European countries (UN 2020).

Bearing these facts in mind, this chapter will argue that philosophy of education should avoid the *sedentary* assumption that those who are educated will stay and live in the country and society in which they were educated (Culp & Zwarthoed 2020: 6). This cannot be a valid *empirical* assumption, since it is invalidated by the very fact that significant numbers of people migrate and that this phenomenon it is not just an anomaly of our times, but a structural feature of human societies throughout history. If it is a *normative* assumption, that is, if philosophers of education have good reasons to believe that sedentary ways of living are superior to nomadic ones, then we (and especially those of us who are international migrants) are owed a reasonable explanation as to why this is the case. Pending this reasonable explanation, an account of philosophy of education that takes for granted that education should prepare humans to live in the country in which they receive most of their education would suffer from a *sedentary bias*.

Three methodological comments are in order. First, this chapter is an exercise in non-ideal theory understood as “realistic theory” (Valentini 2012), that is, normative theorizing that takes into account feasibility constraints. More precisely, two feasibility constraints will be accounted for. First, although strong justice-based arguments support open borders (e.g., Carens 1987, 2013: 225–254; Oberman 2016; Sager 2016), in the near future states are unlikely to give up the right to control their own borders and decide who should get in. Second, despite the fact that states have the *right* to control their borders, most do not have the capacity to fully prevent migrants from illegally crossing their borders, which involves very high financial and human costs. A world of closed borders is nearly as utopian as a world of open borders. Our world is a world of semi-open borders. Second, the approach expounded here is value pluralist. More specifically, it suggests that educational systems should be shaped by the following rather uncontroversial values: justice, reciprocity, care, compassion, feeling of belonging, and absence of alienation. Third, this chapter will expound reasons supporting the existence of *pro tanto* moral obligations regarding education and migration, but these *pro tanto* reasons could be overcome by other reasons in favor of other moral obligations. For its conclusions to be prescriptive, other moral considerations should be taken into account.

International migration poses at least three challenging issues for philosophy of education. Tackling these challenges may be a first step in avoiding the sedentary bias, that is, the view that education should only prepare humans to live in the place in which they received most of their education. The first challenge is the relevance of citizenship education for children and teenagers who, once they reach adulthood, won’t get citizenship in their country of residence. The second challenge is equality of opportunity for students whose families do not possess the linguistic and cultural capital needed to succeed in the country of arrival. The third challenge is the problem of the fair distribution of educational costs and benefits in a world in which people do not always work and pay taxes in the countries that paid for their education. These challenges are discussed in the sections that follow.

Citizenship Education and Migration

I shall start with an anecdote. On October 16, 2020 a French History and Civics teacher named Samuel Paty was assassinated by a terrorist after showing satirical cartoons depicting the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad, during a Civics lesson on freedom of expression.³ Commemorations were to be held in all French schools on the first school day after the attack. The French Minister of Education selected a letter of Jean Jaurès, a famous French Socialist politician from the beginning of the 20th century, to be read to students. The letter is titled *Lettres aux instituteurs et institutrices* (“Letter to primary school teachers”). I teach History and Civics in a public high school in the suburbs of Paris and I remember colleagues gathered to read and discuss the letter before class. Many of them had

previous experience teaching in so-called “tough” high schools and were concerned with students’ reactions. A colleague read Jaurès’s letter loudly and stopped at the italicized sentence:

Children in your care will not only have to write and decipher a letter, read a sign in a street corner, add and multiply. *They are French* and must know France, its geography and its History, its body and its soul.

(Jaurès 1888)

My colleague added the following comment: “Well, at this point, half of the students won’t listen to us anymore.” He was pointing to the fact that a significant proportion of our students either do not have French citizenship or come from families whose members are not French.

The letter was chosen with, I believe, well-meaning intentions. The idea was to reconcile students with their teachers and, beyond that, to reconcile French society. Yet the very choice of this document, as my colleague’s comment emphasizes, shows that such an idea of French society really is an *idea*. This is the normative ideal of the nation-state characterized by ethnic homogeneity and little human mobility. Migrants are not unwelcome, but they are expected to settle for good and to integrate or assimilate so as not to disrupt the ethnic homogeneity deemed necessary for the stability of democratic institutions.⁴ Integration and assimilation involve the rapid acquisition of citizenship.

There are several problems with this view. These problems point mostly to the discrepancy between this utopian view and the real-world composition and history of our societies. *In abstracto*, this view is beautifully consistent. Yet holding such a view requires being blind to the historical fact that many nation-states such as France, Great Britain, or the Netherlands, to name a few, did conquer colonies whose inhabitants had a language, a culture and a religion that was different from the conquering nation’s one. Moreover, it seems many colonial powers never really tried to assimilate the colonized population so as to make them full members of the metropole’s national community. France, which is often seen as the successful outcome of a policy of integrating newcomers into an ethnically homogeneous nation state since the 19th century, did implement unabashedly multiculturalist policies in its colonies. The *sharia*, the Islamic law, was part of the French legal system in colonial Algeria (1830–1962) and applied to all the Muslim subjects (Blévis 2003; Schacht 1964: 97). A remnant of these multiculturalist policies is the institution of Islamic polygamy, which was maintained until 2013 in the French territory of Mayotte. Now, colonization facilitates circulation between the metropole and its colonies. Hence a high proportion of working immigrants after World War II originated in the colonies or the former colonies, colonies whose culture did not only happen to be different from the culture of the metropole but had been deliberately preserved as such. A second problem with the normative ideal of the nation-state is that the economy, and especially the ageing European and East Asian economies, needs immigrants who may have foreign cultural backgrounds to maintain decent dependency ratios. According to the European Commission:

The EU is ... facing a series of long-term economic and demographic challenges. Its population is ageing, while its economy is increasingly dependent on highly skilled jobs. Furthermore, without migration the EU’s working age population will decline by 17.5 million in the next decade. Migration will increasingly be an important way to enhance the sustainability of our welfare system and to ensure sustainable growth of the EU economy.

(European Commission 2015: 14)

Unless patriotic sentiments are strong enough for people to accept raising an additional child for the sake of the sustainability of the welfare state, to accept the dirty, dangerous and demeaning work that

immigrants often do, or to give up retirement before the age of 76, it is very likely the economy will continue to rely on international immigrants, documented or not. Besides economic factors, human beings must often rely on migration to address their problems of security, poverty, love, dissatisfaction, and so on.

A third problem is that immigration is not always followed by the rapid acquisition of citizenship. Some immigrants are undocumented. Others do not fulfil the requirements to become a citizen. In countries such as Switzerland, acquiring citizenship is a long and difficult process. Some migrants cannot legally obtain two citizenships, and many legitimately hesitate to give up citizenship in their country of origin. Some are unsure of the long-term economic prospects in the receiving countries. Others plan to return to the country of origin after accumulating enough capital. Some war refugees wish to return once the conflict ends, which may happen sooner or later.

If we accept that some students are unlikely to acquire citizenship once they reach adulthood, what are we to do with citizenship education? Answering this question requires defining what citizenship is. So far, I have assumed that citizenship is (i) attached to a particular nation state and (ii) primarily defined by a set of legal rights (such as the right to vote or the unconditional right to stay) and obligations (such as mandatory military service wherever it still exists). Both assumptions can be dropped. Against defenders of more or less liberal patriotic and particularistic education, such as William Galston and Eamon Callan (e.g., Callan 1999; Galston 1989), some philosophers support programs of cosmopolitan education based on a moral rather than legal understanding of citizenship. Martha Nussbaum grounds her view of cosmopolitan education on a version of moral universalism combining Kantianism with a moral psychology that emphasizes compassion (Nussbaum 1996, 2019). Randall Curren defends an ethic of universal respect which, combined with the fact of our interdependence, implies that moral agents have a responsibility to cooperate at a global level to address world scale issues such as climate change. A program of global citizenship education should prepare children and teenagers to become apt members of the global community (Curren & Dorn 2018).

The facts of migration call for cosmopolitan education with content overlapping the global civic education advocated by Nussbaum and Curren, but the justification is different. The argument is that it may be wrong to teach national citizenship education to children who are not and may not become nationals in the future. It is wrong, first, because it wastes these children's time as well as taxpayers' money for no good reason, time and money that could be used for more useful educational enterprises such as language courses. Second, it makes these children feel *alienated*.⁵ Teaching national citizenship to foreigners makes them feel that they do not belong. Such feeling, especially for teenagers whose self-esteem is often quite fragile, may be destructive. It would not be in the interest of the student, who would be deprived of a very basic need, the need to belong, as well as a sense of her self-worth, because teaching her something she does not need implicitly conveys the message that she is a second-class student. Such education might not be in society's interest either, since alienated teenagers and young people might be more likely to adopt antisocial behaviors (other things being equal).

This argument does not imply that programs of citizenship education aimed at *all* children should be suppressed or restricted to cosmopolitan education. Cosmopolitan education could substitute for particularistic forms of education as far as the cultivation of feelings of belonging and of moral sentiments is concerned. The goal is to make students feel that, wherever they come from and wherever they may go, they *belong*. Immigrant children deserve as much as anyone else an education that makes them feel they can be full members of a community and that accumulating identities need not be an issue (on multiple identities, see Sen 2007).

This argument does not imply that multicultural education should replace patriotic education either. Multicultural education, understood as an education aiming at teaching students the culture of a particular, subnational, community, so as to strengthen feelings of belonging to this community

(perhaps at the costs of patriotic feelings), also suffers from a sedentary bias. Migrants do not just cross national borders. They also cross cultural borders and should be prepared to navigate between different cultural worlds, which is an educational experience in itself. An immigrant child might genuinely wish to assimilate into the culture of the receiving society and thus feel alienated if she is taught that her parents' national identity defines her. Hence, there are reasons to believe multi-cultural education as defined above should also be optional.

This argument, finally, does not imply that migrant students should not be taught useful knowledge and skills needed to pursue opportunities in their receiving countries, some of these knowledge and skills being often part of programs of civic education. Knowledge of the receiving country's history (but pointing to the fact that this history is connected to the history of other geographical areas), geography and institutions (including those that deal with migrants such as asylum offices or the European Union), mastering the language and the cultural codes, and acquiring critical thinking skills, are examples of such educational contents. In other words, citizenship education is morally acceptable as long as it does not make immigrant students feel that they do not belong.

Such education would have implications for the education of sedentary students too. It could foster decentration, that is, the "intellectual process of overcoming positional biases, combatting egocentrism and questioning one's prejudices" (Vandamme 2020). It could encourage students to base their self-esteem and self-respect not on the fact that they are nationals of the country they live in, but on their potential and capacities as human beings. It could equip these students with the tools they need to critically assess media discourses on immigration and migratory policies.

Equality of Opportunity and Migration

The sedentary bias poses a second challenge for philosophy of education, pertaining to equality of opportunity. Equality of opportunity is a principle of educational justice endorsed by many philosophers of education, policy makers and lay citizens. Philosophers of education have outlined and discussed various understandings of this principle (see Culp 2020; Jencks 1988). Rather than defend a particular account of educational justice in this chapter, I will assume that societies owe their members a fair share of educational resources to secure adequate or equal social and economic opportunities. An implication of such a view is that the arbitrary effects of students' social and economic backgrounds on educational outcomes should be mitigated. This may concern what governments should do as a matter of justice, but also parental rights and duties. Regarding parental rights and duties, Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift have discussed (and partially rejected) the controversial implication that socially and culturally advantaged parents may have no right to give their children unfair advantages in educational opportunities, such as by reading them bedtime stories (which can be justified as an aspect of intimate family relationships) or sending them to elite schools (which are specifically designed to provide competitive advantages and cannot be defended on the basis of parental rights) (Brighouse & Swift 2014). Applying this discussion to the case of immigrant students raises the issue of whether their personal experience with migration disadvantages or benefits them (Stojanov 2020).

In what follows, I shall investigate two crucial features of migrants' experiences that may hamper their educational opportunities: language and migratory status. The *pro tanto* reason to believe the influence of these features on students' opportunities ought to be mitigated is that immigrant students who are still minor children are not responsible for the fact that their background may turn out to be disadvantageous in terms of educational opportunities. As Stojanov puts it, from a responsibility-sensitive view of justice, in the case of minor children, the distinction between voluntary and forced migration is morally irrelevant to define the justice-based obligations society owes them, since children did not choose to leave (or stay in) their home country (Stojanov 2020: 36). If

migration imposes morally arbitrary disadvantages on children, they may be owed some forms of compensatory education as a matter of justice.

Students whose parents are foreign immigrants may not speak the *language* of the receiving country in their homes. Some immigrant students arrive in the receiving country without knowing its language. If they are of school age, they will have started their studies in another language and may struggle to catch up in the receiving country. Moreover, if it turns out that they live in a socially disadvantaged neighborhood, the version of the national language they will speak with their friends is likely to significantly differ from the school's standardized and written language, and they may not have the cultural codes needed to know in which context slang is or is not appropriate.

Such issues attracted the attention of sociolinguists in the 1970s. Two diverging accounts of the causes of students' difficulties suggested two diverging paths of action (Bautier 1998). The first account, which, following sociolinguist Elisabeth Bautier, may be termed the *relativist* one, assumes that all languages and all language forms are equally valuable. Whether fluency in a language and a language form happen to be an advantage in the pursuit of educational and socioeconomic success is the arbitrary outcome of power relationships. The prescriptions that follow from such diagnosis may be interpreted in two ways. First, one could argue that the world in which some languages and some language forms arbitrarily dominate others should not exist anymore. However, a world free of such linguistic domination is certainly not in the immediate reach of educational agents. Thus, a less ambitious recommendation may be to avoid stigmatizing migrant (or socially disadvantaged) children's language and language forms and to avoid imposing the school's form of language. Such an approach is (in the short run) beneficial to immigrant children's self-esteem. However, one can imagine that, in our competitive educational system and labor market, this is highly counter-productive as far as equality of opportunity is concerned.

The second account, in its most extreme form, views the linguistic background of immigrants as well as socially disadvantaged children as a "sociocultural disability." The practical implication is that these children should be taught to replace the language they speak at home with the school's language and language form. If serious efforts are invested in this endeavor, the linguistic obstacle to equal opportunities for immigrant children will be lifted. However, the *sociocultural disability* account raises a couple of problems. First, it does not question the fact that one specific language and one specific language form is dominant. Arbitrary power relationships between native speakers and newcomers remain intact. Not to mention the additional perversity that not all native languages of immigrant students (and, henceforth, not all immigrant students) are treated equally. English-speaking, French-speaking, and German-speaking parents living abroad often proudly boast that they speak their native language at home with their children, thus conferring on them an enormous advantage in the global competition for interesting and well-paid jobs. This is not the case with Bambara-speaking, Berber-speaking or Pashto-speaking parents. Even Arabic, Chinese or Russian, which might turn out to be significant languages for success in the global job market, are rarely considered as such by the educational institutions of receiving countries. As Jim Cummins puts it, "Bilingualism was good for the rich and bad for the poor" (Cummins 2000).

Second, the *sociocultural disability* premise that children should be taught to replace the language they speak at home with the school's language and language form may alienate immigrant students from their families because it implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) conveys the message that it is not worth investing time in perfecting their mother tongue. However, possessing a rich and nuanced language is a crucial constituent of loving and affectionate relationships. Language provides irreplaceable tools to formulate and add nuance to ideas, to defend one's perspective, to affirm one's values, to end conflicts, to express feelings and emotions, and so on. Hence, by treating immigrants' mother tongue as a "handicap," this approach may deprive immigrants of the family relationship goods emphasized by Brighouse and Swift (Brighouse & Swift 2014). Third, since language is closely

connected to identity, a policy that disparages immigrant students' mother tongue may negatively affect their self-esteem and their self-respect.

These criticisms of the *sociocultural disability account* do not necessarily imply that schools should teach children in their native language. In places in which children arrive speaking dozens of different languages, this would be too costly. However, these criticisms suggest that the attitude of schools towards speakers of non-dominant languages should evolve. These languages should not be labelled as an obstacle to learning and instructors should be encouraged (and helped) to train and adapt their teaching methods to this particular context.

To address this dilemma, sociolinguists like Elisabeth Bautier recommend explicitly teaching students that the uses and values of languages and language forms are context-dependent. In the school context as well as in the labor market, students should be taught that the school's standardized and written language is the most valuable and that mastering it is a decisive advantage. They should be taught that *written language is not spoken language put down in writing*. Its conventions are different and more exacting than those of spoken language. In other contexts, however, other languages and language forms may be more valuable.

More generally, recent research in sociology and linguistics suggests that a crucial explanation of educational failure is that culturally and socially disadvantaged students do not fully understand educational institutions' culture, codes, methods and expectations (Bonnéry 2007). Immigrant and working-class parents often endorse so-called "traditional" pedagogies and their children do not always grasp the logic underlying pedagogical methods such as discovery learning or inquiry-based approaches. Stéphane Bonnéry cites the telling example of an 11-year old immigrant student, Amidou. Students are taught for the first time how to draw a geography map: mountains must be colored brown, lowlands green. Amidou, who has been told by his parents, who are West African immigrants, to be obedient and hard-working at school, applies himself to reproducing the teacher's map as accurately and neatly as possible. The day of the graded assessment, he has worked hard to learn the teacher's map by heart. But the teacher, who wants to verify whether students grasped what she takes to be the most important point, that is, learning the cartographic language, assigns *another map* to be colored according to geographic relief. Amidou is outraged and feels a deep sense of injustice. He even wonders whether the teacher is racist.

Such situations are rather frequent in classrooms that welcome students whose parents are not acquainted with the school's language, codes and culture. It is labelled by sociolinguists as a "socio-cognitive misunderstanding." Amidou's feelings signal there is also an injustice going on there, although the teacher cannot be held responsible for that. She genuinely wanted her students to succeed and tried her best. The injustice here is not really an injustice in the distribution of resources either, although decreasing class sizes and improving continuing education for teachers would surely help. This is more an issue of justice *in* education, "that is, in teaching, curriculum development, assessment and classroom interactions" (Stojanov 2020: 35). Addressing this injustice requires adequate teacher training. Teachers can fulfil their caring responsibilities towards immigrant students if they are equipped with the tools and capacities needed to distance themselves from the way they conceive the learning process (which they often model on their own) and understand the way their students conceive this learning process. This requires a mix of theoretical knowledge, classroom observation, moral imagination and compassion.

As to *migratory status*, in our world migrants do not have an unconditional right to stay, unless they are permanent residents. Some forms of migratory status, such as the status of undocumented migrants, are extremely fragile. However, migratory status is not a valid reason to deprive a person her right to education. Yet when undocumented migrants are summarily deported, those who are students are deprived of the continuity of learning, which is crucial for educational success and access to adequate social and economic opportunities. Securing an adequate level of educational opportunities for migrant students therefore provides a *pro tanto* moral reason to provide them with a stable

migratory status until they complete the level of education they are entitled to. When states fail to fulfil this obligation, schools may have to take up the slack and engage in proactive protection of their immigrant students by undertaking whatever course of action is needed to slow or hamper the deportation process (Geron & Levinson 2020).

The Funding of Education and Migration

Securing immigrant students' fair share of opportunities may involve additional costs for receiving societies. To put it briefly, there are three potential views as to how immigrant children's education should be financed. The first view (call it the *universalist* view) is that the allocation of educational benefits should be blind to whether students are citizens or not. This view may be grounded on a universalist ethic that affirms that migrants are owed their fair share of educational opportunities on the mere ground that they are human beings. According to the "ought implies can" principle, the receiving state owes them these opportunities insofar as it is capable of delivering them. The second view (call it the *dual treatment view*) stipulates that the state owes only its citizens their fair share of educational opportunities. Migrant students may be owed just enough educational opportunities to fulfil their basic human needs. Note that an implication of this view is that migrants' country of citizenship should continue funding their education abroad so as to secure them their fair share of educational opportunities. This is in line with the practices of some wealthy countries that subsidize high-quality education for expatriates (think about the *lycée français*), but not with the practices of less advantaged countries. The third view (call it the *reciprocity-based* view) stipulates that, insofar as non-citizen migrants are liable to the same level of taxation as citizens, and thus contribute to the financing of public education, they and their children are owed the same level of publicly funded educational opportunities. The moral intuition underlying this view is captured by the fairness principle (Rawls 1999: 96). This principle states that, when agents contribute to a joint cooperative venture, they are entitled to the same level of advantage as other participants. How contributions and advantages are to be distributed depends on the justice principles that regulate the cooperative scheme. The important point is that entitlements to benefits are grounded on contribution rather than citizenship. This *reciprocity-based* view is an interesting compromise between the first and the second views and might be the most likely to seem reasonable to both citizens and migrants. But this is a hypothesis that has yet to be proven, and detailed discussion of the relative merits of these views is beyond the scope of this chapter.

So far, we have discussed whether states should fund the education of immigrants so as to secure their fair share of educational resources and thereby access to a fair level of social and economic opportunities. Another issue is that, in a world characterized by high levels of international mobility, states may subsidize the education of nationals who emigrate abroad once they become adult and are capable of contributing to the cooperative scheme. Brain drain – the emigration of high-skilled professionals who, had they stayed, might have contributed to the improvement of the economic and social conditions of their compatriots – seems highly problematic from a justice perspective.

The empirical picture is, however, perhaps more complicated than that.⁶ The presence of a significant highly educated population can benefit its compatriots in various ways. Critiques of brain drain argue that the departure of highly educated people imposes negative externalities on those who remain (Bhagwati & Hamada 1974). However, recent evidence suggests "brain drain" may benefit countries of emigration under some conditions (Docquier & Rapoport 2012: 683). Immigrant workers' remittances contribute to the mitigation of poverty. Potential emigration prospects incentivize citizens of low-income and intermediate-income countries to invest more in education, which is beneficial if they end up staying (Beine et al. 2001, 2008; Docquier & Rapoport 2012: 699). Educated diasporas facilitate technology transfers and foreign investments, and they may favor improvements of the quality of governance and political institutions in their country of origin

(Docquier & Rapoport 2012: 709). The extent to which brain drain is beneficial or detrimental also depends on emigration rates. According to economists, the net effect of brain drain is positive for countries whose emigration rate is lower than 15–20%. However, it is negative when emigration rates are higher (Beine et al. 2008; Docquier 2007).

Let us move from the empirical facts to normative issues. Reciprocity is a key issue when discussing brain drain. In countries of emigration, families, educational institutions, taxpayers, and others bear significant material and non-material costs to educate future emigrants. Do countries of immigration owe something to countries of emigration in virtue of these countries' contribution? Once again, the moral intuition at stake is captured by the fairness principle. If different countries jointly participate in a potentially mutually advantageous cooperative migration scheme, those who have contributed their share have a legitimate claim to a similar contribution on the part of those who benefit from the fact that immigrants have been educated elsewhere. The fairness principle prohibits violations of reciprocity such as free-riding and exploitation.

Free-riding or exploitation occurs in specific conditions (Olsaretti 2013). First, for someone to be a free-rider, she must be a *net* beneficiary of the cooperative venture – in this case the international migration and education scheme. In other words, countries of immigration free-ride on the educational system of countries of emigration if they are all-things considered better off than if they had not accepted those highly-skilled immigrants. This seems plausible enough.

Second, participation in a joint cooperative venture – a migration scheme – should be voluntary (otherwise, this is not cooperation but “theft”). If the educational efforts of countries of emigration purport to benefit destination countries, then they can be deemed voluntary. This is generally not the case, although there are exceptions. For instance, the Philippines deliberately train more nurses than the country needs so as to send them abroad and benefit from their remittances. Investments in English language courses may serve the same purpose. The voluntariness condition can also be interpreted in a weaker sense. One could say that, insofar as education systems aim at educating the young, *whoever the ultimate beneficiary is*, this is sufficient to deem voluntary their participation in any migration scheme involving the mobility of educated people. In other words, they are said to voluntarily participate in this migration scheme just because they choose to educate children, and in a world of semi-open borders such choice may involve the possibility that these children could use their talents and skills abroad.

The third condition is that the joint product of the cooperative venture be a public or a socialized good. Thus, fairness assessments of brain drain situations actually consider educated migrants as a public good. This may sound bizarre. Public goods are non-excludable and often non-rivalrous. A non-excludable good is a good anyone can access and consume. A non-rivalrous good is a good whose supply is not affected by people's consumption. Fresh air is a non-excludable and non-rivalrous good. Now, migrants are not a public good in the way air is, because institutional interventions are required for the product of their labor to benefit the society they live in. Therefore, in the same way as children are “socialized goods” rather than “public goods” (Olsaretti 2013: 252), migrants may be considered a “socialized good.” The social and institutional interventions that turn migrants into “socialized goods” are, first, the welfare system and, second, the way the crossing of borders is organized. The welfare system involves states paying for a more or less significant part of the education of its population. The money mostly comes from taxpayers, although states can also benefit from international aid, borrow money, or even constrain central banks to “create” it. It is thus extremely difficult to trace and identify the exact person who actually paid for a person's education. As to the way the crossing of borders is organized, receiving countries enjoy a high level of discretion to admit or exclude immigrants, whilst sending countries are, in principle, not allowed to prevent their people from emigrating.

This results from the asymmetric treatment of exit and entry by international law. But this also results from the asymmetry of power between immigration and emigration countries. Countries of

immigration enjoy greater control insofar as they have the capacity to sanction undesired immigrants by denying them a stable legal status, which renders these undocumented migrants vulnerable to various kinds of abuse. Countries of emigration often do not have the capacity to sanction emigrants. Countries of immigration are thus able to purposely set up a social security system and open their borders to additional workers and taxpayers, while sending countries are unable to prevent the redirection of the product of their efforts to foreign countries and their residents.

Brain drain is a violation of the fairness principle if it amounts to free-riding. If the international migration scheme at stake results in sending countries being net contributors to the education of receiving countries' population, we have a situation of free-riding. And if the international migration scheme additionally makes sending countries worse off than they would have been otherwise, we have a situation of exploitation. The normative implication of the fairness principle is that countries that receive educated migrants who contribute to their wealth should compensate sending countries' educational efforts. International "welfare state" agreements stipulating that receiving countries should participate in the funding of education in sending countries may solve the issue without depriving educated people of their right to emigrate.

So far, I have assumed that the sole beneficiaries of the educational system in countries of emigration are countries of immigration, that is, their citizens and residents. However, the migrants themselves benefit from the education they received. From this observation, one could infer that emigration restrictions are justified. However, emigration restrictions are a morally acceptable solution to brain drain only in very limited circumstances, for instance when there are good reasons to believe emigrants owe their compatriots their labor and that they could not adequately compensate them otherwise (Oberman 2013). An alternative approach would be to argue that compensation is all that can be expected of educated migrants. This is Gillian Brock's view (Brock & Blake 2015). This compensation could be in cash (taxes) or labor (public service). Michael Blake, however, argues in the same book that compensation in labor is impermissible from a liberal-minded perspective. According to Blake, labor is more akin to organs and body parts than to money. Requiring emigrants to compensate for the education they receive with additional years of public service would thus threaten their bodily integrity.

There are, however, no good reasons to believe that only migrants owe monetary compensation for the education they received in their country of emigration. This is so because education has positive spillover effects on the society they live in as well as on the society they come from. In other words, the beneficiaries of migrants' education are not just the migrants themselves, but also the receiving society and, in some cases, the sending society. The receiving society should therefore compensate the sending society that educated these migrants. Migrants might also be expected to compensate for the education they received, but this compensation might not necessarily be paid in the form of a specific tax such as the famous Bhagwati tax. Insofar as immigrants pay taxes in their country of residence, if this country were ready to compensate sending countries for the net benefits they derive from the education of foreign residents, immigrants would actually indirectly contribute to the educational system they benefited from.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that philosophy of education must set aside the assumption that people will stay in the society in which they receive their education. Citizenship education solely aimed at prospective citizens may wrong immigrant students who may not stay by triggering feelings of alienation. Insofar as immigrant children did not choose their country of residence, they are owed the same share of educational resources as well as the same level of economic and social opportunities as the citizens of their country of residence. The mitigation of the effects of immigrant students' background on their opportunities and educational outcome raises difficult moral issues. The

discrepancy between the school's language and cultural codes, on the one hand, and those of the migrants' family, on the other hand, may estrange successful migrant students from their relatives. The sovereign right of states to determine migrants' legal status (and thus to deport them) may be in tension with the continuity of learning required for access to adequate educational opportunities. Finally, the complex issue of brain drain shows that, given the structural mobility of human beings, the normative theorizing of the funding of education should not limit itself to national borders.⁷

(Related Chapters: 2, 15, 17, 19, 20.)

Notes

- 1 I shall not address the issue of whether borders should be open, which is beyond the scope of this chapter. Joseph Carens (1987) presents a classic case for open borders.
- 2 In 2015, 1,015,078 migrants reached Europe by crossing the Mediterranean Sea (216,054 in 2014). Cf. HCR, Operational Portal. Mediterranean Situation., 2018. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean>, consulted on October 27th, 2018.
- 3 The terrorist was not one of Paty's 8th grade's students, but a radicalized 18-year-old Muslim who wanted to become a "martyr" and learned about Samuel Paty from an angry parent connected to him through social media.
- 4 For a philosophical argument in favor of such a view, see for instance the works of Michael Walzer and David Miller (Miller 2016; Walzer 1983).
- 5 For an analysis of immigrant children's feelings of alienation and estrangement in L. Cantet's film *Entre les murs* (2008), based on the autobiographical novel of a French teacher, see Fonseca de Carvalho (Fonseca de Carvalho 2020).
- 6 What follows is an adaptation of a section in a chapter co-written with Axel Gosseries (Gosseries & Zwarthoed 2016).
- 7 I am grateful to Randall Curren for his careful reading and pertinent comments and suggestions. Remaining errors are my own.

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