


This article was downloaded by: 10.3.97.143

On: 03 Dec 2023

Access details: *subscription number*

Publisher: *Routledge*

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK



The Routledge Companion to Animal–Human History

Hilda Kean, Philip Howell

Animals, agency, and history

Publication details

<https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780429468933-9>

Philip Howell

Published online on: 03 Sep 2018

How to cite :- Philip Howell. 03 Sep 2018, *Animals, agency, and history from: The Routledge Companion to Animal–Human History* Routledge

Accessed on: 03 Dec 2023

<https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780429468933-9>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT

Full terms and conditions of use: <https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms>

This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

9

ANIMALS, AGENCY, AND HISTORY

Philip Howell

Introduction

Most of us who have written and taught animal–human history will have at one time or other encountered profound scepticism at the very idea that animals have agency, even before we come to whether such agency might be accessible to historians. These objections are usually conjoined. Thus the author of a 1974 spoof in the *Journal of Social History* asserted the ‘full historical power’ of the domestic animals he (she?) was purporting to consider.¹ This ‘strangely prophetic’ text now serves as an instructive prolegomenon to the subsequent development of animal–human history, to the extent that for many practitioners today the ‘full historical power’ – or the historical agency – of nonhuman animals is not in the least bit controversial.² Given the passage of time, it is as a result almost exponentially dispiriting to see the same gesture trotted out in the recent hoaxing of the German journal *Totalitarianism and Democracy*. In a ‘Plea against Academic Conformism’, ‘Christiane Schulte’ and her (his?) collaborators denounce what they see as the ‘anti-humanism’ inherent in ‘Human–Animal Studies’, singling out for opprobrium the ‘thesis of animal “agency”’.³ Each burlesque, for all their forty years’ distance, attacks not merely the enterprise of animal studies, but the project of an animal–human *history*. They do this – from opposite ends of the political spectrum – by labelling the historical study of animal agency no more than a fad or a freak: condemning liberal–progressive pieties on the one hand, spurious radicalism on the other.

The question for today’s historians is not, however, whether or not nonhuman animals have agency. The risk in any such catechism is of rehearsing and rehashing anthropocentric attitudes.⁴ Attempting to ‘recover’ animals’ historical agency would only be to reproduce the assumptions that ‘made it possible to ask such a question in the first place’ – so Walter Johnson remarked about chattel slaves in the United States; the real question is ‘to ask what historians mean (and what they miss) when they talk about “agency”’.⁵ That is, as Drew Swanson has recently written, ‘animal agency is real, whether or not historians recognize and theorize it; the challenge is making this agency do historical work’.⁶ In setting out to review this ‘historical

work', convinced that animals' agency is 'an empirical question rather than a philosophical or ontological presupposition' I lay out three distinct, if necessarily interrelated, approaches to the problem of researching and narrating animals' historical agency, highlighting examples and exemplars as I do so.⁷ Nevertheless, since part of the problem has always been that widely divergent and incompatible conceptions of agency are involved, I have to begin by setting out as briefly and as straightforwardly as I can some of the most important genealogies of 'agency'.

Agency, anthropocentrism, and some alternatives

Firstly, talk of 'agency' inevitably calls to mind the thoroughly overdetermined notions of free will and moral responsibility, for all that these ideas raise more problems than answers when applied to animals and their histories.⁸ In a recent discussion of contemporary racehorses as performers and protagonists, Shelly R. Scott asserts that 'with agency comes choice and responsibility because it is rooted in free will', but immediately signals our difficulties with a reference to her animal subjects, as animals, not being allowed 'free reign'.⁹ A simple typo, for sure, but an instructive one, for it enacts the familiar contrast between the sovereign human subject ('reign') and the very constraints ('rein') that we associate with nonhumans.¹⁰ If we take, say, Rousseau's definition of the 'freedom of will' as the freedom to disobey the law of nature – the possession of 'moral liberty' as opposed to 'natural liberty' – then such 'free will' by definition excludes nonhuman animals.¹¹ In ethical terms, no nonhuman animal can ever be more than a 'moral patient' (a thing or being towards which 'moral agents' have responsibilities).

If we prefer, we can substitute for 'free will' any one of the other 'occult' qualities that have been put forward as exclusively human possessions.¹² In the Cartesian tradition, it is the human capacity to *reason* that famously sets humans apart and alone. Descartes' views on animals are readily simplified, even traduced, but the standard interpretation of the Cartesian method has not been much more than modified.¹³ Here, the Cartesian subject (autonomous, sovereign, individual) is made dependent upon an a priori separation from the Cartesian object (automata, determined, inferior) – among whose ranks we must of course number every single other animal.¹⁴ We can nuance this basic argument by appealing to a spectrum or hierarchy of attributes, with nonhuman animals lacking what are usually referred to as the higher- or second-order attributes that define full personhood.¹⁵ The question of 'agency' sometimes revolves around whether other animals can be said to exercise their actions in a mutual, meaning-full, world, one in which the mirrored agency of others is fully recognised – but the answer cometh that they cannot. In Heidegger's phenomenology, to take an idiosyncratic but iconic argument, the 'knowing agent' of the Cartesian tradition is replaced with the world-shaping 'engaged agent', but nonhuman animals are regarded as being so very 'poor in world' that to talk of their 'freedom' or 'agency' would be patently absurd.¹⁶ In this zero-sum game our sovereign agency as human individuals seems to depend on (other) animals being relegated en masse to their own, distinctly inferior, 'kingdom'. Humans may be supposed to exercise sovereign agency over other animals precisely to demonstrate our capacity for 'self-rule', and to shore up the defences against a Hobbesian state of nature in

which true freedom is impossible.¹⁷ Human sovereignty arguably descends from the very possibility of a property right in animals, conferring as it does so an *historical* life that is denied to those constitutive others who possess only a brute, creaturely, existence.¹⁸

In social theory and social history, to take a different tack entirely, agency can be conceived of as the complement and correction to an overweening emphasis on the structuring power of ‘society’ or ‘culture’ (or, less often, ‘nature’). In the ‘structure–agency’ debate, so-called, agency refers to the ‘negative capacity’ of individuals to empower themselves beyond the constraints of their social and institutional worlds, to ‘co-constitute’ rather than simply be determined by those ‘social’ structures. An influential emphasis has been on the role of the individual as an active social agent in promoting historical change, in negotiating the power of cultures, institutions, of society itself, and in resisting even the most oppressive and seemingly authoritarian regimes.¹⁹ This is a more likely resource for animal–human historians than the abstractions of moral philosophy, not least because agency defined in this way became a master category of the New Social History, a movement to which the historical concern with animals is in some senses an extension.²⁰ The expansion of the category of personhood, and the focus on collective as well as individual agencies, especially that of the marginalised and the oppressed, the anonymous and brutalised masses, is promising – for just as we have been taught to understand that even the most down-trodden of peoples, the most swinish of multitudes, have not been utterly deprived of agency or power or historical significance, so have animal–human historians been at pains to argue that neither are nonhuman animals wholly subjugated.

Once again, however, the anthropocentric presumptions of our theories are disabling, as we might perhaps expect from a self-consciously ‘social’ theory and ‘social’ history. For Marx, for example, the human animal can develop into an historical individual only through the structures of human society, for even where animals live collectively they lack the productive labour that comes from conscious, collective human activity.²¹ Marianne Elisabeth Lien has recently pointed out how this contrast between man and animal in Marx (even in the more nature-focussed, early Hegelian Marx) is enacted through the notion of agency, so that “‘making history’ through consciously working on his or her surroundings delineates *Anthropos* as an object of study’.²² It is not really surprising that in the working out of the structure–agency debates animals have routinely been excluded. The political theorist Alex Callinicos all too grandly asserts, for instance, that ‘the task of the historian is [to] uncover the eternal conflict between human agents and the objective conditions of their existence’.²³ As a noted practitioner, William Sewell’s words might carry more authority with historians, but he too has proved unwilling to include nonhuman others, stating that ‘a capacity for agency – for desiring, for forming intentions, and for acting creatively – is inherent in all humans. . . . a capacity for agency is as much a given for humans as the capacity for respiration’.²⁴ Such interventions exemplify the thwarted promise of both social theory and social history for any more-than-human history. The problem lies, as it does with metaphysical speculations, in the anthropocentric presuppositions written into the notion of agency from the start, which is to say: anthropocentrism in, anthropocentrism out. Here, ‘agency’ is so tightly defined that no nonhuman animal, nothing *but* a human being, could ever make history.

What if we turn, instead, to what has been called ‘deep history’?²⁵ Attempts to avoid both the anthropocentric abstractions of moral philosophy and the etiolated conception of agency derived from classical social theory might be pursued by looking to work on agency and action in the behavioural and life sciences, and beyond (including those historical disciplines that have paid more than passing attention to the physical sciences, such as archaeology and anthropology).²⁶ We would still have a distinction between ‘differentialists’, who insist on nonhumans’ lack of agency, and their ‘assimilationist’ critics, affirming a spectrum of capacities shared by all animals. So the distinctiveness of human beings in the development of the complex sociocognitive phenomenon referred to by Albert Bandura as ‘self-agency’ might be set against the recognition of a vast range of ‘self-directed agents’, of which humans are only the most sophisticated.²⁷ These discussions inevitably involve the modelling and specification of the precise level of self-awareness, self-reflexivity, and self-control required, and it may be asking too much of historians to be very familiar with these discussions.²⁸ But while we must be aware of the dangers of cherry-picking conclusions from the natural sciences and their allied disciplines and subdisciplines, we should at least be able to take stock of how humans’ capacities have evolved alongside and in contradistinction to that of other animals.²⁹ As Steve Best puts it, the task would then be to interpret history

not from an evolutionary position that reifies human agency as the autonomous actions of a Promethean species, but rather from a co-evolutionary perspective that sees nonhuman animals as inseparably embedded in human history and as dynamic agents in their own right.³⁰

Doing ‘deep history’ is not simply adding the insights of ‘natural’ science to ‘history’ and the humanities, however – this would simply be to follow, rather listlessly, the *pas de deux* of ‘nature’ and ‘culture’.³¹ It is abundantly clear, if ‘restoring to humans and non-humans a common fate’ is our aim, that we have to rethink the nature–culture opposition, even if, especially if, ‘human agency’ is at stake.³² The profound rethinking and redistribution of agency that comes from such an ambition is deeply disorientating to those who see any compromising of human privilege merely as a species of ‘antihumanism’.³³ The sociologist Frank Furedi, for instance, laments what he supposes is the very ‘annihilation of human agency’ in any ‘posthumanist’ ‘Big History’:

What is really at stake here is not the timescales being investigated by history, but the nature of historical imagination itself. The new historical outlooks seek to shift the focus of history away from any human-centred approach to the past, and towards the depiction of material and natural processes as the key influences on history. According to this viewpoint, anthropocentric history, as the Big History people call it, is a conceit, since human beings have actually had very little to do with the really important events of the past 13 billion years. In effect, what used to be understood as history becomes a minor sub-branch of geology and biology. The emphasis on Big or Long or Deep history is underwritten by an (often unconscious) impulse to downgrade the humanist ideal of *people* making history.³⁴

For Furedi, history by definition should have as its focus the ‘story and development of humanity’, seemingly to the exclusion of the history of everything else.³⁵ This is a quite impossible stance, however, and one that animal–human historians should summarily reject.³⁶ We simply cannot filter out a ‘pure’ human world from a world of animals and things:

The world is filled not, in the first instance, with facts and observations, but with *agency*. The world, I want to say, is continually *doing things*, things that bear upon us not as observation statements upon disembodied intellects but as forces upon material beings . . . Much of everyday life, I would say, has this character of coping with material agency, agency that comes at us from outside the human realm and that cannot be reduced to anything within that realm.³⁷

Andrew Pickering’s work in science studies (from which these words are taken) is a particularly useful reference point, but we should also mention the sociology of science associated with Bruno Latour and his colleagues (so-called ‘Actor–Network Theory’ or ANT), the ‘vital materialism’ of the philosopher Jane Bennett and others involved in the ‘material turn’, the various attempts to go beyond language to the embodiment of experience collected under the unsatisfactory rubric of ‘non-representational theory’, or – for the very enthusiastic – the virtually uncategorisable work of the philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (whose discussion of ‘becoming–animal’ is particularly relevant).³⁸ It is impossible to sum up such diverse work here, not to mention their points of difference, save to say that agency is no longer considered as a property or possession of a few, but is rather inherent in the world and its myriad relationships – thus Pickering refers to ‘dances of agency’, Latour *et al.* to ‘networks’, and Deleuze and Guattari to ‘assemblages’.³⁹ There are also important links to the theory of ‘affordances’, which refers to the opportunities offered by the environments from which no animal or organism can be separated: that is, it is the *relations* between organisms and their surroundings (objects, other organisms, opportunities), as they are sensed and perceived, that make action possible and thus make up what we call agency.⁴⁰ The central point, however, is that agency is better seen as the product of the *relations* between a whole series of agents in a dynamic system.⁴¹ In the very plainest terms, agency is out there in the world rather than in us (and us alone) as human beings: as Jane Bennett reminds us, ‘There was never a time when human agency was anything other than an interfolding network of humanity and nonhumanity’.⁴²

Historicising animal agencies

A relational and situated definition of agency, one that happily extends past the borders of the human, and is installed in the world we all inhabit, is surely to be preferred to the anthropocentric alternatives we inherit from moral philosophy and social theory. Even if we accept these accounts, though, and they have become somewhat dulled by repetition, how can we incorporate their insights into our animal–human histories? Some have argued that we simply cannot. The historian Ingrid Tague, for instance,

as a prologue to a fine study of pets in eighteenth-century Britain, states the problem with such clarity and conviction that it justifies lengthy quotation:

This work both engages with and departs from much of the work in animal studies when it comes to the question of animal agency . . . Animals have had a significant impact on human history, . . . Nevertheless, we cannot write a history of animals in the same way that it is possible to write human history. We do not have access to animal experiences even to the extent that we have access to the experiences of the poor and illiterate, who also left no written records. We can only explain animal behavior with reference to our own, human thoughts and feelings . . . As a historian, then, I focus unapologetically on humans. I am interested in animals primarily because of their impact on human life, rather than the other way around – not because I think animals are unimportant, but because ultimately the study of history must be a study of humans.⁴³

This is a stance that parallels, in part, the position taken by Erica Fudge in her landmark essay ‘A left-handed blow’: that the history of animals is strictly speaking ‘impossible’, given our dependence as historians on textual sources and conventions.⁴⁴ We will see shortly that this does not in fact mean that historians cannot speak of animal agency, as Tague supposes, but it is worth stressing at this point that even Fudge’s measured reservations about the history of animals are not beyond challenge. Other historians have pointed out that archives both familiar and unfamiliar provide palpable and prolific traces of animals’ agency.⁴⁵ We are enjoined, moreover, to read our sources in different ways, not merely carefully brushing history ‘against the grain’ but also, rather more energetically, rowing ‘against the current’.⁴⁶ It has been persuasively argued that animal–human historians should make more use of oral history, ethnography, and literary sources, of material culture and its ‘vibrant matter’, as well as cultivating new ways of looking and new ways of writing, particularly about the sensory impact of animals.⁴⁷ All are very effective strategies to combat the anthropocentrism of conventional history, and to enlarge our accounts of animals’ agency.

Ascribed animal agencies

If we move to the specific ways in which animal agency may be narrated by historians, however, we should start with what I would call *ascribed agencies* (the plural is of course a gesture towards the problems in essentialising ‘agency’). For even if we admit Tague’s reservations, and the arguments for the centrality of representation, histories of how animal agency has been understood are plainly possible. Indeed, the conditions under which nonhuman animal agency has historically been recognised and authorised must be one of the principal subjects for any animal–human history worth the name. This is how Susan Pearson and Mary Weismantel put it: ‘Instead of understanding agency as a transcendent feature of being – one we can see anywhere if only we look hard enough – we would do better to ask how agency has been defined historically, and how agentic powers have been constructed and distributed through social formations’.⁴⁸ This formulation does not have to mean the discursive and social

construction of animal agency alone, but it is clear that historians can contribute and have contributed to such accounts.⁴⁹ Peter Dinzelbacher's discussion of the famous trials of animals in the European Middle Ages, for instance, is advertised as a contribution not to the history of animals per se but rather to the history of *mentalities*.⁵⁰ Even if we do not accept at face value the notion that priests, lawmakers and laypeople endowed pigs, dogs, horses, oxen, cats, fish, even swarms of insects, with moral agency and responsibility, the historical fact that culpability for crimes and sins could in some circumstances be extended to nonhumans is striking, and deserves our attention as historians of attitudes if not necessarily of the animals themselves.⁵¹

A particularly important example of this *ascription* of animals' agency is the individuation of animals, their endowment with character and personality. A certain individuality and quasi-personhood has long been conferred on breed animals, animals in warfare, and many others, with companion animals, zoo animals, and performing animals perhaps the very best exemplars. Animal performers and celebrities are specially blessed, or cursed, with such accoutrements of agency: and many have left accounts of themselves, via human amanuenses, in the form of animal biographies and 'autobiographies'.⁵² The most well known is Jumbo, the Barnum circus elephant and first international animal superstar, who was biographed shortly after his tragic death in 1885.⁵³ Narratives written by humans about named animals, even from the animal's perspective, do not attest to animal agency in themselves, of course: we are always conscious that humans are speaking for these animals. When Jumbo's keeper Matthew Scott writes that 'If poor, dear old Jumbo could but speak he would join in what I say', even the most naïve reader might be expected to demur.⁵⁴ The fact that many such animal biographies are part of a genre of 'it-narratives' (or 'novels of circulation', in which nonhuman animals take their place alongside other objects passed around as property from one owner to another) suggests that animals are reduced to the status of things as much as they are raised to that of persons.⁵⁵ Focusing on the learned pigs, horses, dogs, and even geese that were a passing fad on the eighteenth-century British stage, Monica Mattfield reflects that real animal agency is not espoused but effaced.⁵⁶ The most violent erasure of the animal occurs when such names as 'Jumbo' – or we can think of 'Shamu' the orca in our own day – function as trademarks or brands.⁵⁷ Here the property of a name becomes only another detachable thing to be commodified and circulated, principally for human purposes and profit.

All the same, we have to be careful that we do not, as historians, reproduce this effacing of animal agency even as we recognise the power of representation. Speaking *for* animals does not have to reduce animals to mere objects, 'active phantoms' at best.⁵⁸ Sympathy or sentiment may constitute a distinctive counter-tradition, one that at its most progressive is able to 'cut across even the bounds of species to establish a shared first-person form of life'.⁵⁹ As Keri Cronin points out, the representation of speaking animals 'allowed readers and activists to recognize animal agency, but also existed as a site in which to imagine further articulation of nonhuman agency and voice'.⁶⁰ Writing about animals' agency might well function as the subversive exploration of the speculative space of human and animal nature, taking in 'the dissonant, the unconventional, the aberrant, and the unbounded'.⁶¹ Indeed, we do not have to choose between the history of the representation of animal agency and the history of that agency itself, for they are always inseparable. Nonhuman animals are not merely

passive objects of knowledge, lay or scientific, but have actively contributed, through their actions, physical traits, and their nonhuman charisma to the stories told about them, including their *histories*.⁶² In Erica Fudge's words, 'the production of meaning and order is the work of many, and not always human, agents'.⁶³ It is vital for the historian to accept that animals have the power to enter the space of human consciousness, 'to pry apart forms of agency and the human subject', rather than their animality merely being colonised and constructed and coded by cultural forms.⁶⁴ Or, as Laura Brown pleasingly puts it, 'imaginary animal-kind has both created complex human society and also given animals themselves a role in human history – the potential to affect and alter human culture'.⁶⁵

If I can single out just one text as exemplary of this focus on ascribed agencies in animal–human history, it would be Fudge's work on the discourse of reason in early modern England, and her 2006 book *Brutal Reasoning* in particular.⁶⁶ Fudge examines a very familiar theme, the role of reason in making out distinctions between humans and animals, and its role in silencing and erasing animals from history.⁶⁷ But she approaches this task by exploring the range of ways in which early modern people (laypeople as well as 'experts') raised the capacity of nonhuman animals to reason, and the possibility of human beings not having, losing, or taking leave of their rationality. Fudge sets out then precisely to challenge the effacement of the animal from history, the positioning of historiography itself as a Cartesian discourse, by allowing this thoroughly ambiguous history of perceptions of animality and humanity to raise questions about 'agency' itself:

A broader notion of agency might allow us a way of rethinking not only how we conceptualize the arrangements of culture and the structures of thought that organize humans' perception of animals and of themselves in the past – it might also allow us to rethink how it is that we understand the history of being human, and from that gain a better understanding of what it means to be a human now.⁶⁸

Agonistic animal agencies

This important qualification of the degree of anthropocentrism involved in representations of animal agency takes us closer to what we can think of as the direct, proactive historical agency of nonhuman animals – though I prefer to speak here of *agonistic animal agencies* (again preferring the ambiguous and indeterminate plural). Here, the emphasis is less on the ascription of agency by human beings (however collaborative) as on the actions of nonhuman animals themselves – particularly insofar as these actions push back against the pressures and presumptions of the human-dominated world. The historian Dorothee Brantz notes that one of the problems we face is that historians such as William Sewell have not granted animals the ability to transform human structures, taking us explicitly back to the terms of the structure–agency debate.⁶⁹ Susan Nance takes a similar tack in drawing a distinction between 'agency' and 'power', insofar as animals' agency is restricted when compared to humans' physical and imaginative organisation of the world and its inhabitants.⁷⁰ These arguments and distinctions are hardly unimpeachable, but their intent is clear

enough: animal–human historians should seek to demonstrate the role of animals not only in but also *against* a human-dominated world.

The most obvious example in the historiography is the theme of *resistance*. We might recall that the pseudonymous ‘Charles Phineas’ mocked the very notion, speaking of animals’ ‘constant but concealed rebellion’, but a number of academics and activists have fleshed out this theme entirely sincerely and seriously, passionately and politically.⁷¹ For some, this claim revolves around the disruptive existence of animals who simply refuse to cooperate with the projects and plans of human beings – not just the ‘wild’ animals formally placed outside the lines of civilisation (and who ‘fought back . . . with fang and claw’ to avoid becoming captives and commodities), nor their ‘liminal’ cousins who live in human spaces without being under human control, but also those ‘domesticated’ and most obviously dominated nonhumans.⁷² Thus, in a discussion of attempts to extend control and civility over early nineteenth-century New York City’s swinish multitudes, Catherine McNeur can assert that it was not only hog owners who opposed the moral and sanitary plans of the respectable: the pigs themselves ‘stubbornly grunted in resistance’.⁷³ This is an appealing image, but it is not merely a rhetorical flourish – animal–human historians have been quick to argue that animals actively resisted their subordination. David Gary Shaw’s formulation of animals as history’s ‘secret agents’ makes this point memorably and subtly: for him, and others, nonhuman animals *became* historical subjects *through* resistance, however cryptically.⁷⁴

Such resistance may be thought of as predominantly subversive, a weapon of the brutalised and the weak, expressed in footdragging (hoofdragging?) rather than in open revolt. It is clear though that for others a more collective and conscious resistance is envisaged. In the introduction to his book *Fear of an Animal Planet*, for instance, Jason Hribal is introduced, rather jarringly, as the Michelet of the animal rebels whom he portrays as self-consciously and purposefully ‘making their own history’.⁷⁵ Hribal could hardly be more unequivocal: ‘They have a conception of freedom and a desire for it. They have agency’.⁷⁶ This refrain becomes positively anthemic in the hands of Matthew Candelaria, who writes of ‘vermin’ (in the terms of human disdain) exhibiting ‘an agency that is above and beyond that of other animals . . . potent symbols of the animal subject: free of human bondage, masters of their world and ours’.⁷⁷ There is a tendency in such hyperbole to up the historical ante, to see ‘resistance’ as a kind of animal freedom-fighting, and animal–human history as a chronicle of animal mutinies and *émeutes*. Indeed, the slogan (borrowed from Emma Lazarus) of contemporary critical animal studies – ‘none are free until all are free’ – suggests this characteristic elision of agency with ‘freedom’. The problem, as Walter Johnson argued with regard to slave revolts, is ‘the absence of a detailed consideration of politics in any notion of “agency” which conflates activity with “resistance”’.⁷⁸ There is an inevitable tendency to portray lack of overt resistance as acceptance of the conditions of existence, of cooperation or even collaboration: as Vinciane Despret has noted, ‘When animals do what they know is expected of them, everything begins to look like a machine that is functioning, and their obedience looks “mechanical”, a word that conveys its meaning very well’.⁷⁹ In short, the uncritical adoption of ‘resistance’, wearing its ethical and normative judgements on its sleeve, runs the risk of reducing the actions of animals to ‘(resistant) features of the system that enslaved

them'.⁸⁰ We might reasonably question not just the possibility but the politics of adopting the 'animal standpoint' in this fashion.⁸¹

A discussion of animals' agency as historical actors surely does not have to be narrated in precisely the same terms as human riots, revolts, and revolutions for it to be worthy of recording. There has been for instance a productive turn in animal–human history to understanding the *specificity* of animals' existence, attempting to consider their species-life rather than their collectively subjugated status. This necessitates placing some of our attention and effort as historians into understanding the *nature* of these animals. Kelly Enright is right to insist on the need for animal–human historians to understand animals as animals, to evaluate their actions in their irreducible specificity, for 'understanding animal behavior is integral to understanding what people saw and what they did not see when looking at animals'.⁸² Perhaps the main avenue here has been through a turn to animal welfare science (AWS), and the signal example of this approach is Susan Nance's recent monograph on the agency of elephants in the golden age of the American travelling circus.⁸³ On the one hand, Nance provides us with a detailed exploration of how animal individuality and agency functioned within the generic conventions, audience expectations, and corporate needs of the circus in its heyday, and she persuasively portrays the performances of elephant 'characters' as trapped within these conventions as much as they were by the bars of their cages. Thus the elephant functioned, Nance argues, in one of two roles: either as the genial or jovial elephant presented to the public as part of the business of the circus as usual, or alternately as the 'rogue' or 'mad' elephant who ran amok when things went wrong. What Nance does, without implying that social and cultural constructions are everything, is to show that the elephant's individual agency was principally *perceived* by circus audiences and readers through these discursive lenses, with the results both reinforcing and qualifying human power and privilege: the conjoining of elephant and human agency as a 'battle of wills' acknowledges animals' agency as much as it affirms human mastery – for there would be no spectacle at all without the threat and the thrill of the animal turning on his or her 'master'.⁸⁴

Nance is at pains to insist on the reality of animals' lives, actions, and experiences, however, and to show that this elephant agency can be reconstructed, with care. She does this by turning to the insights of contemporary ethology and animal welfare, confident in the belief that no evolutionary change can be rapid enough to invalidate this understanding of elephant behaviour. By doing so Nance can speak about elephants rejecting their routines and their trainers' demands: 'elephants periodically altered or rejected movements that were uncomfortable, tiring, seemingly pointless, or otherwise undesirable in some way we cannot know'.⁸⁵ In her most explicit formulation, Nance suggests that these circus elephants were engaged in 'rejecting the conditions of their experience'.⁸⁶ Nance does not buy into all the connotations and pitfalls of 'resistance', but she can stress, bolstered with ethological authority, that captive elephants exercised an agency that was a central part of the history of the travelling circus:

Elephants owned by these companies did not collectively and consciously resist circus management as a group of humans might, by sabotaging key equipment, engaging in slowdowns or strikes, or simply quitting. Yet the

routines of their captivity caused elephants to behave in species-typical ways that often produced the same effects.⁸⁷

Assembled agencies

Nance's approach, persuasive as it is, is not the only way of writing of animals' agency in history, however. For a start, her account focusses on animals 'exotic' to the shores on which they ended up, their 'otherness' firmly part of their entertainment appeal, and their 'training' a brutal affair of ropes, pulleys and hooks. As a history of animal–human interaction, we are never allowed to forget that this is indeed a 'battle of wills' between an animal that ought to be in the wild and its masters. Accordingly, this narrative of agency feels at times too close to that described by the liberal political philosophers Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka as characteristic of traditional animal rights theory (ART), where there is a strict divide between animals that should be 'allowed' to live 'independently', and those that we illegitimately domesticate and dominate.⁸⁸ Donaldson and Kymlicka prefer to put the focus on the very different obligations we have to other animals depending on the specific relations and interactions we have with them, with all the consequences this has for how we understand animal agency:

The capacity for agency seems to vary widely amongst animals. An adaptive and social animal like a dog, rat, or crow is capable of great behavioural flexibility, of choosing between options depending on context and needs. Other animals are more tightly 'scripted'; they are 'niche specialists' who cannot readily adapt to changes in their environment, either because their needs are inflexible, or because they lack the cognitive flexibility to explore alternatives. But any plausible theory of animal rights must be attentive to the potential for animal-initiated forms of interaction, and for animal agency in response to human-initiated interaction.⁸⁹

What other histories of animal agencies might be told, bearing in mind these strictures on the variety and complexity of our relationships with other animals? The final thematic that I want to put forward here, and in some ways I think it is the most useful and nuanced, focusses on the ways in which animals' agency should not be thought of in agonistic terms, set apart from the complex mesh of relationships between people and other animals. Consonant with what has been argued above, perhaps the most important responsibility on the historian is to consider instead the 'embedding' or 'distribution' of agency within heterogeneous assemblages of people, nonhuman animals, and environments: this is the focus on what I would like to call here *assembled agencies* in animal–human history.

Let us take 'domesticated' and 'liminal' animals in turn, as illustrations of these histories and geographies of assembled animal–human agency. One obvious example is the agency involved in the relationship between human beings and domestic animals. We might think in one register of animal agencies utilised in the service of humans – consider the histories of war or police dogs, for example – but should these examples be considered still too subordinate, too instrumentalised, consider the training of

animals as assistants or companions.⁹⁰ The emphasis on companionship is something that many historians have explored in some depth, myself included.⁹¹ I have discussed for instance the ways in which the simple business of taking the dog for a walk became, in the crises represented by the rabies panics in late nineteenth-century Britain, politically or ‘biopolitically’ problematic.⁹² With Michel Foucault’s theorisation of ‘governmentality’ in mind (that is, the ways in which governments enter into calculated apportionments of responsibility to their subjects), I extend his focus on the ‘conduct of conduct’ to the animals at the other end of the leash: their *conduct* (their actions, comportment, appearance – their agency, if you will) is inseparable from that of their human companions, who need to demonstrate to the representatives of the state and to their fellow citizens that they are, complementarily, ‘responsible owners’. The agency of the dog – his or her ability to enjoy the open air and to escape the confines of the house – is both compromised by fears about vicious and rabid animals in the public streets and enabled by the actions of their human companions. In this ‘assemblage’ of agencies the ‘conduct of conduct of conduct’ (here I have pointedly risked the *reductio ad absurdum*) links the state, the human being, and the nonhuman animal.⁹³

For the uncommitted, the case of guide dogs may be rather simpler, for it is particularly obvious that the human being has to be trained alongside her or his animal assistant, and therefore that agency can in no wise be equated with autonomy – here the agency of the (disabled) human is dependent in large part upon the agency of the animal. As the relational theories of agency described above suggest, *dependency* and *agency* are not exclusive. Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka borrow the concept of ‘dependent agency’ from disability studies, arguing that the political agency of non-human animals might be nurtured in the same way that some humans may trust in our assistance and love, in eliciting or interpreting their interests, preferences, and goals.⁹⁴ We can readily see, as historians, how the agency of animals and humans has been assembled in these ways, even to the extent that animal and human exhibit a kind of hybrid agency. The modern guide dog movement, for example, began in 1929 with the work of the dog breeder and philanthropist Dorothy Harrison Eustis at the first *Seeing Eye* schools in Nashville and New Jersey.⁹⁵ Mrs Eustis’s initial inspiration will serve to illustrate, even to the most confirmed anthropocentrist, the usefulness of the concept of ‘dependent agency’:

It was as though a complete transformation had taken place before my eyes. One moment it was an uncertain blind man, tapping with a cane, the next it was an assured person, with his dog firmly in hand and his head up, who walked toward us quickly and firmly, giving his orders in a low confident voice. That one quick glimpse of the crying need for guidance and companionship in the lonely, all-enveloping darkness stood out clearly before my swimming eyes. To think that one small dog could stand for so much in the life of a human being, not only in his usual role of companion but as his eyes, sword, and shield and buckler!⁹⁶

Instead of considering animals’ agency in these situations as no more significant than that of a cane or a stick, we should recognise a reciprocal training in acts of

communication, even the creation of ‘moral beings capable of being endowed with certain rights and duties’.⁹⁷

What, finally, of ‘liminal’ (or ‘commensal’) animals – those who exist alongside us but not in any straightforward sense *with* us?⁹⁸ These are often animals that we write off as ‘pests’ or ‘vermin’, animals who cannot easily be individualised, let alone loved, species that we are tempted to think of as little above automata. But these are also animals whose agency is assembled with ours. One final exemplar is Dawn Day Biehler’s *Pests in the City: a history of flies, bedbugs, roaches and rats in late nineteenth- and twentieth-century America*.⁹⁹ These animals choose to inhabit what we like to think of as ‘our’ spaces, but without choosing to engage with human beings much beyond the opportunities that we offer. They are dependent on us nevertheless, and on the jerry-built landscapes we have constructed – for by accident human beings have created a host of spaces, microgeographies, ‘affordances’, for these animals to inhabit, survive, propagate, and flourish. Flies, for Biehler, are iconic ‘agents of interconnection’, but all her ‘pests’ are ‘entangled’ with urban history, even as these animals showed scant respect for its anthropocentric narration, as they ‘scurried, hitchhiked, scuttled, and buzzed across the borders of public and private space’.¹⁰⁰ Flies and bedbugs, rats and roaches are not, to return to Matthew Candelaria’s paean to non-human animal agency, ‘free of human bondage’.¹⁰¹ What the historian has to do instead is recognise, with Biehler, how their agential histories are bound up with, ‘assembled’ with, that of the city, and with the fate of the (typically racialised) urban poor, with the state, and indeed with our historically evolving *knowledge* of animal nature. Indeed, what makes Biehler’s account so peculiarly instructive is that she brings together the stresses on ascribed and agonistic agencies described above, showing for instance how our human knowledge of these animals and their agency is central to this history – without taking this as an ethological truth about their nature, nor discounting the active agency of these animals themselves.¹⁰² Thus Biehler runs the agency of flies – to take her first ‘pest’ – against the developing understanding, in entomology, pest control, and sanitary reform, of the ‘agency of flies’ (and she makes a point of noting that this was a phrase used by turn-of-the-century American social investigators and urban health officers). In so doing Biehler reconstructs the historical ascription of flies’ agency while at the same drawing on the benefits of entomological understanding of the nature of flies. In other words – in contrast I think to Nance, who separates ethology from history – Biehler integrates our knowledge of animal agency with the historical significance of that agency. She shows how that knowledge about flies and their agency was operationalised, in order to police people as much as pests, and to extend the purview of the state. What we have, ultimately, is a dynamic history of the agency of flies and other ‘pests’, as we understand such agency now, and as people in the past understood it.

Conclusions

There is signal worth in ending with the agency of flies – because of their seeming historical insignificance, their resistance to the kind of ascriptions of agency with which I began this chapter. These sovereign and imperial genealogies of agency would seem at first sight to offer little or nothing for animal–human history, reminding us

only of that ‘immensely powerful alliance of intellectual forces’ that has ‘conspired against the view that animals could truly be agents’.¹⁰³ Many of the arguments that have traditionally clothed human beings with ‘agency’ now look, however, at best well-worn and at worst distinctly shoddy. The life sciences, the development of ‘deep history’, work in science studies and beyond – point to a *relational* conception of agency that is far more inclusive, and at the same time, far more demanding of us as historians. The three pathways that I have separated out here depend in part on precisely where we align ourselves with regard to the more or less anthropocentric accounts and definitions of ‘agency’, and though I have forwarded *assembled agencies* as a way to the most critical and effective histories, this is not to discount the productive possibilities for animal–human histories of the other options. I know also that in drawing such clear distinctions I risk simplification, for these approaches are often interrelated. Still, it is essential for the historian to be as clear as possible about the presuppositions of his or her research, about what is ultimately being claimed in the name of agency, not least because it is all too easy for both supporters and antagonists of animal–human history to select definitions to suit their different interests. The issue remains what we take such ‘agency’ to mean, how the agency of nonhuman animals can and should be related to the agency possessed and practised by human beings – and, most importantly for us, how we might, as historians, study and narrate this agency or agencies. The responsibilities of the historian are obvious, for ‘historians working with the idea of agency across species must still tell stories’.¹⁰⁴ My colleague Hilda Kean is surely right to put the stress on ‘the choices, agency if you will, of those seeking to transform such actions into history’.¹⁰⁵ One last instance of ‘dependent agency’, and not the least important, is the reliance of nonhuman animals on responsible and informed historians for narrating their contribution to history.

Notes

- 1 C. Phineas, ‘Household pets and urban alienation’, *Journal of Social History* 7, 3 (1974): 334–343, 343.
- 2 E. Fudge, ‘A left-handed blow: writing the history of animals’, in N. Rothfels (ed.) *Representing Animals*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2002, 3–18, 5.
- 3 C. Schulte, ‘Der deutsch-deutsche Schäferhund – Ein Beitrag zur Gewaltgeschichte des Jahrhunderts der Extreme’, *Totalitarismus und Demokratie* 2 (2015): 319–334. The article is not accessible online but can be found here: www.enricoheitzer.de/2016/02/18/sch%C3%A4ferhund-gate/, last accessed 11 July 2016. ‘Schulte and friends’ have explained and justified their hoax in the articles ‘Commissar Rex an der Mauer erschossen’ and ‘Holen wir uns die Agency zurück’ available at www.heise.de/tp/artikel/47/47395/1.html and www.heise.de/tp/artikel/47/47395/2.html, last accessed 11 July 2016.
- 4 Z. Tortorici and M. Few, ‘Writing animal histories’, in M. Few and Z. Tortorici (eds.), *Centering Animals in Latin American History*, Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2013, 1–28, 14.
- 5 W. Johnson, ‘On agency’, *Journal of Social History* 37, 1 (2003): 113–124, 114.
- 6 D.A. Swanson, ‘Mountain meeting ground: history at an intersection of species’, in S. Nance (ed.), *The Historical Animal*, Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press, 2015, 240–257, 214.
- 7 E. Benson, ‘Animal writes: historiography, disciplinarity, and the animal trace’, in L. Kalof and G.M. Montgomery (eds.), *Making Animal Meaning*, East Lansing MI: Michigan State University Press, 2011, 3–16, 7.

- 8 For 'free will', see R. Kane (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will*, second edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. The 'moral agency' of nonhuman animals is attracting increasingly substantial discussion: see M. Bekoff and J. Pierce, *Wild Justice: The Moral Lives of Animals*, Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 2009; G. Clement, 'Animals and moral agency: the recent debate and its implications', *Journal of Animal Ethics* 3, 1 (2013): 1–14; P. Shapiro, 'Moral agency in other animals', *Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics* 27, 4 (2006): 257–273.
- 9 S.R. Scott, 'The racehorse as protagonist: agency, independence, and improvisation', in S.E. McFarland and R. Hediger (eds.), *Animals and Agency: An Interdisciplinary Exploration*, Leiden: Brill, 2009, 45–65, 47.
- 10 Even of course if the claim to sovereign absolutism is evidently delusory: think of Shakespeare's un-kinged Richard II, brought to the level or lower of his roan Barbary: 'I was not made a horse,/And yet I bear a burthen like an ass' (*Richard II V. v.* 92–93).
- 11 R. Wokler, 'Rousseau's two concepts of liberty' in G. Feaver and F. Rosen (eds.), *Lives, Liberties and the Public Good: New Essays in Political Theory for Maurice Cranston*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1987, 61–100.
- 12 For 'occult qualities', see J. Rodman, 'The liberation of nature?' *Inquiry* 20, 1–4 (1977): 83–131, 91.
- 13 For a recent reaffirmation, see M.R. Miller, 'Descartes on animals revisited', *Journal of Philosophical Research* 38 (2013): 89–114.
- 14 K. Oliver, *Animal Lessons: How They Teach Us to be Human*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2009, 26.
- 15 We can cite the cognitive capacity for self-interpretation, the 'beliefs' necessary even to have 'desires', the fundamental preconditions for the ownership of experience, for 'self-ownership', and so on. See as an example the positions taken by the philosopher Donald Davidson and his recent interrogator Helen Steward on 'propositional attitudes': D. Davidson, 'Rational animals', *Dialectica* 36, 4 (1982): 317–327; H. Steward, 'Animal agency', *Inquiry* 52, 3 (2009): 217–231.
- 16 See C. Taylor, 'Engaged agency and background in Heidegger', in C. Guignon (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, second edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 202–221.
- 17 S. Donaldson and W. Kymlicka, 'Unruly beasts: animal citizens and the threat of tyranny', *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 47, 1 (2014): 23–45, 28.
- 18 D.J. Wadiwel, 'The war against animals: domination, law and sovereignty', *Griffith Law Review* 18, 2: (2009): 283–297, 158. See also D.J. Wadiwel, 'The will for self-preservation: Locke and Derrida on dominion, property and animals', *SubStance* 43, 2 (2014): 147–161.
- 19 Johnson, 'On agency', 189. See P. Burke, *History and Social Theory*, Cambridge: Polity, 2005, 136, on the 'return of the actor'.
- 20 See H. Ritvo, 'History and animal studies', *Society and Animals* 10, 4 (2002): 403–406; S. Swart, "'But where's the bloody horse?": textuality and corporeality in the "animal turn"', *Journal of Literary Studies* 23, 3 (2007): 271–292.
- 21 'The animal is immediately one with its life-activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It is *its life-activity*. Man makes his life-activity the object of his will and consciousness' (Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* (1844), quoted in A. Callinicos, *Making History: Agency, Structure, and Change in Social Theory*, second edition, Leiden: Brill, 2004, 23.
- 22 M.E. Lien, *Becoming Salmon: Aquaculture and the Domestication of a Fish*, Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 2015.
- 23 Callinicos, *Making History*, 2.

- 24 W.H. Sewell, 'A theory of structure: duality, agency, and transformation', *American Journal of Sociology* 98, 1 (1992): 1–29. Sewell doubles up on his anthropocentrism by insisting that only human beings could count as the collective agents necessary for historical action: 'Agency entails an ability to coordinate one's actions with others and against others, to form collective projects, to persuade, to coerce, and to monitor the simultaneous effects of one's own and others' activities' (21).
- 25 See D.L. Smail, *On Deep History and the Brain*, Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 2008; D.L. Smail, 'Neuroscience and the dialectics of history', *Analise Social* 47, 4 (2012): 894–909. For a contrast, and how not to do 'deep history', see D. Laibman, *Deep History: A Study in Social Evolution and Human Potential*, Albany NY: SUNY Press, 2007. Laibman's rational choice model of human evolution is clear from the very outset that 'Humans . . . have the capacity (and necessity) for agency in a way that other animal species do not' (9).
- 26 'Hominins have always been constituted by the agency of persons and things. Our history is a material history, not just a succession of thoughts or speech acts. If deep time is to figure in our histories, then we need narratives that can triangulate between agents and materials': A. Shryock, T.R. Trautmann, and C. Gamble, 'Imagining the human in deep time', in A. Shryock and D.L. Smail (eds.), *Deep History: The Architecture of Past and Present*, Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 2011, 21–54, 30. See also M.H. Johnson, 'Conceptions of agency in archaeological explanation', *Journal of Anthropological Archaeology* 8, 2 (1989): 189–211.
- 27 I give these two references simply as contrasting examples of such work on agency: A. Bandura, 'Toward a psychology of human agency', *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 1, 2 (2006): 164–180; W.D. Christensen and C.A. Hooker, 'Self-directed agents', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 31, Sup. 1 (2001): 18–52.
- 28 See P. Haggard and B. Eitam, *The Sense of Agency*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- 29 T. Newton, 'The turn to biology', *The Sociological Review Monographs* 64 (2016): 117–133.
- 30 S. Best, 'The rise of critical animal studies: putting theory into action and animal liberation into higher education', *Journal of Critical Animal Studies* 7, 1 (2009): 9–52, 17. Relevant work in the life sciences and beyond takes in neuroscience, cognitive science, psychology, cybernetics, phenomenological biology, ecological psychology, ethology, animal welfare science.
- 31 *Pas de deux* is borrowed from P. Descola, *The Ecology of Others*, Chicago IL: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2013, 85.
- 32 Descola, *Ecology of Others*, 63. D. Brantz, 'Introduction', in D. Brantz (ed.), *Beastly Natures: Animals, Humans, and the Study of History*, Charlottesville VA: University of Virginia Press, 2010, 1–13, 4.
- 33 For 'posthumanism' critique of humanistic visions of subjectivity coincident with conscious agency and dominion over the natural world, see R. Braidotti, *The Posthuman*, Cambridge: Polity, 2013, 101, and N.K. Hayles, *How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics*, Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999, 288.
- 34 F. Furedi, "'Big History": the annihilation of human agency', 24 July 2013, available at www.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/frank_furedi_on_history/13844#.VzCVVRUrL_8, last accessed 11 July 2016.
- 35 Furedi, 'Big History'.
- 36 As Susan Nance puts it, 'there has never been any purely human space in world history. We must account for nonhumans as living beings – not merely representations – in order to find the fullest possible explanation of history and to avoid simply engaging in self-flattery

- or self-deception': S. Nance, *Entertaining Elephants: Animal Agency and the Business of the American Circus*, Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013, 7.
- 37 A. Pickering, *The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency, and Science*, Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995, 6, emphasis in original.
- 38 Excellent introductions are afforded by B. Latour, *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005; J. Bennett, *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things*, Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2010; N. Thrift, *Non-Representational Theory: Space, Politics, Affect*, second edition, London: Routledge, 2007, but there is no real alternative to diving straight in to G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, *A Thousand Plateau: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987.
- 39 Thus Marianne Elisabeth Lien, considering the farming of salmon, sees the agency of fish as 'a distributed property of the entire salmon assemblage' (Lien, *Becoming Salmon*, 168).
- 40 For James Gibson's theory of affordances, first published in 1979, see J.J. Gibson, *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception*, classic edition, New York: Psychology Press, 2015; see also A. Chemero, 'An outline of a theory of affordances', *Ecological Psychology* 15, 2 (2003): 181–195. Such ideas are influenced by earlier work by Jacob von Uexküll, and the Husserlian concept of *Umwelt*.
- 41 Other ways of expressing this 'relational agency' are these terms, among others: 'embedded agency'; 'extended agency'; 'distributed agency'; 'dependent agency'; 'lateral agency'.
- 42 Bennett, *Vibrant Matter*, 21.
- 43 I.H. Tague, *Animal Companions: Pets and Social Change in Eighteenth-Century Britain*, University Park PA: Penn State University Press, 2015, 9. Tague accepts of course that her eighteenth-century animal companions were 'living, breathing beings that had a direct impact on the lives of the humans with whom they interacted' (8), but she insists that we cannot speak of their historical agency.
- 44 Fudge, 'A left-handed blow'.
- 45 Benson, 'Animal writes'. See also Z. Tortorici, 'Animal archive stories: species anxieties in the Mexican national archives', in S. Nance (ed.), *The Historical Animal*, Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press, 75–98, 95, on the 'reverberations of individual connections with images of animals, textual representations of animals, and animals living in the past'.
- 46 Fudge, 'A left-handed blow', 14; J. Soluri, 'On edge: fur seals and hunters along the Patagonian littoral, 1860–1930', in M. Few and Z. Tortorici (eds.), *Centering Animals in Latin American History*, Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2013, 243–369, 263.
- 47 Benson, 'Animal writes'; S.J. Pearson and M. Weismantel, 'Does "the animal" exist? Toward a theory of social life with animals', in D. Brantz (ed.), *Bestly Natures: Animals, Humans, and the Study of History*, Charlottesville VA: University of Virginia Press, 2010, 17–37; Bennett, *Vibrant Matter*. See also N. Rothfels, 'Touching animals: the search for a deeper understanding of animals', in Brantz (ed.), *Bestly Natures*, 38–58, and S. Swart, 'Zombie zoology: history and reanimating extinct animals', in S. Nance (ed.), *The Historical Animal*, Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press, 2015, 54–71, 70.
- 48 Pearson and Weismantel, 'Does "the animal" exist?' 27.
- 49 For social or 'cultural construction' of agency, see J.W. Meyer and R.L. Jepperson, 'The "actors" of modern society: the cultural construction of social agency', *Sociological Theory* 18, 1 (2000): 100–120.
- 50 P. Dinzelbacher, 'Animal trials: a multidisciplinary approach', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 32, 3 (2002): 405–421. On animal trials, see the classic works by E.P. Evans, *The Criminal Prosecution and Capital Punishment of Animals: The Lost History of Europe's Animal Trials*, London: Faber and Faber, 1987, and W.W. Hyde, 'Prosecution and punishment of

- animals and lifeless things in the Middle Ages and modern times,' *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 64, 7 (1916): 696–730, together with more recent reflections: P.S. Berman, 'Rats, pigs, and statues on trial: the creation of cultural narratives in the prosecution of animals and inanimate objects', *New York University Law Review* 69 (1994): 288–326; G. Teubner, 'Rights of non-humans: electronic agents and animals as new actors in politics and law', *Journal of Law and Society* 33, 4 (2006): 497–521.
- 51 A contemporary comparison is the jarring use of the word 'murder' by the film director Werner Herzog, referring to the bear that killed the animal activist Timothy Treadwell. See also D. Lulka, 'Consuming Timothy Treadwell: redefining human agency in light of Herzog's *Grizzly Man*', in S.E. McFarland and R. Hediger (eds.), *Animals and Agency: An Interdisciplinary Exploration*, Leiden: Brill, 2009, 67–88.
- 52 On 'animal celebrities', see D.C. Giles, 'Animal celebrities', *Celebrity Studies* 4, 2 (2013): 115–128; L. Brown, *Homeless Dogs and Melancholy Apes: Humans and Other Animals in the Modern Literary Imagination*, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2010, 113–143; H. Keenleyside, 'The first-person form of life: Locke, Sterne, and the autobiographical animal', *Critical Inquiry* 39, 1 (2012): 116–141. For an example of the 'animal apparatus' of Hollywood 'stardom', see C.E. White, 'Tony the wonder horse: a star study', in S. Nance (ed.), *The Historical Animal*, Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press, 2015, 289–306. Some performing animals might be considered as doubly endowed with agency – as animals who were attractions in their own right, and as animal actors represented in their biographies as reflecting on their career on the boards: see M. Dobson, 'A dog at all things: the transformation of the onstage canine, 1550–1850', *Performance Research* 5, 2 (2000): 116–124.
- 53 For recent biographical and quasi-biographical attention see P. Chambers, *Jumbo: This Being the True Story of the Greatest Elephant in the World*, London: Andre Deutsch, 2007; S. Nance, *Animal Modernity: Jumbo the Elephant and the Human Dilemma*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015; J. Sutherland, *Jumbo: The Unauthorised Biography of a Victorian Sensation*, London: Aurum Press, 2013.
- 54 M. Scott, *Autobiography of Matthew Scott, Jumbo's Keeper*, Bridgeport CT: Trow's Printing Company, 1885, 96.
- 55 An introduction to 'it-narratives': M. Blackwell (ed.), *The Secret Life of Things: Animals and Objects in Eighteenth-Century Fictions of Circulation*, Lewisburg PA: Bucknell University Press, 2007.
- 56 M. Mattfield, "'Genus porcus sophisticus": the learned pig and the theatrics of national identity in late eighteenth-century London', in L. Orozco and J. Parker-Starbuck (eds.), *Performing Animality: Animals in Performance Practices*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, 57–76, 66.
- 57 On the representation and effacement of animals see: S. Baker, *The Postmodern Animal*, London: Reaktion, 2000; J. Berger, *Why Look at Animals?* London: Penguin, 2009; A.M. Lippit, *Electric Animal: Toward a Rhetoric of Wildlife*, Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2000; N. Rothfels (ed.), *Representing Animals*, Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 2002.
- 58 Lippit, *Electric Animal*, 54. An example: Rebecca Onion persuasively argues that the agency of sled dogs is central to the stories that were told about Alaska, about the frozen North, about American whiteness and masculinity, but she goes on to aver that 'in these stories, the actions of the dogs are useful more for human thought than for the animals themselves, leaving their actual agency up to question': R. Onion, 'Sled dogs of the American North: on masculinity, whiteness, and human freedom', in S.E. McFarland and R. Hediger (eds.), *Animals and Agency: An Interdisciplinary Exploration*, Leiden: Brill, 2009, 129–155, 154.

- 59 Keenleyside, 'The first-person form of life', 140.
- 60 J.K. Cronin "'Can't you talk?'" Voice and visual culture in early animal welfare campaigns', *Early Popular Visual Culture* 9, 3 (2011): 203–223, cited in H. Kean, 'Challenges for historians writing animal–human history: what is really enough?' *Anthrozoös* 25, Sup 1 (2012): s57–s72, s59.
- 61 Brown, *Homeless Dogs*, 2; see also V. Richter, *Literature After Darwin: Human Beasts in Western Fiction, 1859–1939*, Houndmills: Palgrave, 2011.
- 62 For 'nonhuman charisma', see J. Lorimer, *Wildlife in the Anthropocene: Conservation after Nature*, Minneapolis MN: Minnesota University Press, 2015. For science, Donna Haraway has argued that great apes were not passive agents of knowledge, and contributed 'authorship' to scientific narratives: D. Haraway, *Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science*, New York: Routledge, 1989.
- 63 E. Fudge, *Brutal Reasoning: Animals, Rationality, and Humanity in Early Modern England*, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2006, 191–192.
- 64 S. McHugh, 'Literary animal agents', *PMLA* 124, 2 (2009): 487–495.
- 65 Brown, *Homeless Dogs*, 18.
- 66 Fudge, *Brutal Reasoning*.
- 67 In such a forbiddingly presumptive discourse, reason is turned into 'an inherent possession of the individual, rather than the product of actions or of a network that relies on and includes animals': Fudge, *Brutal Reasoning*, 191.
- 68 Fudge, *Brutal Reasoning*, 188.
- 69 Brantz, 'Introduction', 3.
- 70 S. Nance, 'Introduction', in S. Nance (ed.), *The Historical Animal*, Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press, 2015, 1–16, 3; Nance, *Entertaining Elephants*, 97.
- 71 Phineas, 'Household pets', 343.
- 72 The quotation is from D.E. Bender, *The Animal Game: Searching for Wildness at the American Zoo*, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2016, 52.
- 73 C. McNeur, *Taming Manhattan: Environmental Battles in the Antebellum City*, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2014, 27, 39.
- 74 D.G. Shaw, 'The torturer's horse: agency and animals in history', *History and Theory* 52, 4 (2013): 146–167; V. Despret, 'From secret agents to interagency', *History and Theory* 52, 4 (2013): 29–44.
- 75 J. St. Clair, in J. Hribal (ed.), *Fear of the Animal Planet: The Hidden History of Animal Resistance*, Petrolia CA: Counterpunch, 2010, 16.
- 76 Hribal, *Fear of the Animal Planet*, 26.
- 77 M. Candelaria, 'The microgeography of infestation in relationship spaces', in S.E. McFarland and R. Hediger (eds.), *Animals and Agency: An Interdisciplinary Exploration*, Leiden: Brill, 2009, 301–320, 302.
- 78 Johnson, 'On agency', 115.
- 79 Despret, 'From secret agents to interagency', 43.
- 80 Johnson, 'On agency', 116.
- 81 For the 'animal standpoint', see the passionate advocacy of Best, 'The rise of critical animal studies', 17: 'Whereas nearly all histories, even so-called "radical" narratives, have been written from the human standpoint, a growing number of theorists have broken free of the speciesist straightjacket to examine history and society from the standpoint of (nonhuman) animals. This approach, as I define it, considers the interaction between human and nonhuman animals – past, present, and future – and the need for profound changes in the way humans define themselves and relate to other sentient species and to the natural world as a whole'. Critical reflections on perspectivity and agency can be accessed in Despret, 'From secret agents to interagency'.

- 82 K. Enright, 'Why the rhinoceros doesn't talk: the cultural life of a wild animal in America', in Brantz (ed.), *Beastly Natures*, 108–126. Helen Cowie rightly reminds us (with zoo and menagerie captives in mind) that 'As real living beasts . . . exotic animals also exerted some agency over their interactions with the public, connecting with spectators on a more visceral level as huge, ferocious, noisy or hungry beings who could be fed, ridden or touched': H. Cowie, *Exhibiting Animals in Nineteenth-Century Britain: Empathy, Education, Entertainment*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, 5–6.
- 83 Nance, *Entertaining Elephants*. For an introduction to AWS see M.S. Dawkins, 'A user's guide to animal welfare science', *Trends in Ecology & Evolution* 21, 2 (2006): 77–82.
- 84 Nance, *Entertaining Elephants*, 127.
- 85 Nance, *Entertaining Elephants*, 154.
- 86 Nance, *Entertaining Elephants*, 10.
- 87 Nance, *Entertaining Elephants*, 174.
- 88 S. Donaldson and W. Kymlicka, *Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- 89 Donaldson and Kymlicka, *Zoopolis*, 66.
- 90 C. Pearson, 'Dogs, history, and agency', *History and Theory* 52, 4 (2013): 128–145; N. Pemberton, 'Hounding Holmes: Arthur Conan Doyle, bloodhounds and sleuthing in the late-Victorian imagination', *Journal of Victorian Culture* 17, 4 (2012): 454–467, N. Pemberton, 'Bloodhounds as detectives' dogs, slum stench and late-Victorian murder investigation', *Cultural and Social History* 10, 1 (2012): 69–91.
- 91 P. Howell, *At Home and Astray: The Domestic Dog in Victorian Britain*, Charlottesville VA: University of Virginia Press, 2015; K. Kete, *The Beast in the Boudoir: Petkeeping in Nineteenth-Century Paris*, Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1994; Tague, *Animal Companions*.
- 92 P. Howell, *At Home and Astray*, 150–173.
- 93 Howell, *At Home and Astray*, 151–152.
- 94 For 'dependent agency' see Donaldson and Kymlicka, *Zoopolis*, 104–108.
- 95 See M. Ascarelli, *Dorothy Harrison Eustis and the Story of the Seeing Eye*, West Lafayette IN: Purdue University Press, 2010.
- 96 Ascarelli, *Dorothy Harrison Eustis*, 35.
- 97 See Haraway, *When Species Meet*; C. Wolfe, *Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal*, Minneapolis MN: Minnesota University Press, 2003, 95.
- 98 A.H. Gibson, 'Beasts of burden: feral burros and the American West', in S. Nance (ed.), *The Historical Animal*, Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press, 2015, 38–53, 40. See also K. Nagy and P.D. Johnson, *Trash Animals: How We Live with Nature's Filthy, Feral, Invasive, and Unwanted Species*, Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2013.
- 99 D.D. Biehler, *Pests in the City: Flies, Bedbugs, Cockroaches, and Rats*, Seattle WA: University of Washington Press, 2013.
- 100 Biehler, *Pests in the City*, 4.
- 101 Candelaria, 'The microgeography of infestation', 302. But see also 305: 'the vermin demonstrate their agency and actively participate with humans in the habiting of space'.
- 102 Biehler also draws on what we know of flies to relate urban history from their point of view, choosing to use 'who' and 'he' and 'she' instead of 'which' and 'that' and 'it', even in the case of maggots emerging from wet sludge: Biehler, *Pests in the City*, 33.
- 103 Steward, 'Animal agency', 228.
- 104 Swanson, 'Mountain meeting ground', 256.
- 105 Kean, 'Challenges for historians', s60.

References

- Ascarelli, M. *Dorothy Harrison Eustis and the Story of the Seeing Eye*, West Lafayette IN: Purdue University Press, 2010.
- Baker, S. *The Postmodern Animal*, London: Reaktion, 2000.
- Bandura, A. 'Toward a psychology of human agency', *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 1, 2 (2006): 164–180.
- Bekoff, M. and Pierce, J. *Wild Justice: The Moral Lives of Animals*, Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 2009.
- Bender, D.E. *The Animal Game: Searching for Wildness at the American Zoo*, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2016, 52.
- Bennett, J. *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things*, Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2010.
- Benson, E. 'Animal writes: historiography, disciplinarity, and the animal trace', in L. Kalof and G. M. Montgomery (eds.), *Making Animal Meaning*, East Lansing MI: Michigan State University Press, 2011, 3–16.
- Berger, J. *Why Look at Animals?* London: Penguin, 2009.
- Berman, P.S. 'Rats, pigs, and statues on trial: the creation of cultural narratives in the prosecution of animals and inanimate objects', *New York University Law Review* 69 (1994): 288–326.
- Best, S. 'The rise of critical animal studies: putting theory into action and animal liberation into higher education', *Journal of Critical Animal Studies* 7, 1 (2009): 9–52.
- Biehler, D.D. *Pests in the City: Flies, Bedbugs, Cockroaches, and Rats*, Seattle WA: University of Washington Press, 2013.
- Blackwell, M. (ed.), *The Secret Life of Things: Animals and Objects in Eighteenth-Century Fictions of Circulation*, Lewisburg PA: Bucknell University Press, 2007.
- Braidotti, R. *The Posthuman*, Cambridge: Polity, 2013.
- Brantz, D. 'Introduction', in D. Brantz (ed.), *Beastly Natures: Animals, Humans, and the Study of History*. Charlottesville VA: University of Virginia Press, 2010, 1–13.
- Brown, L. *Homeless Dogs and Melancholy Apes: Humans and Other Animals in the Modern Literary Imagination*, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2010.
- Burke, P. *History and Social Theory*, Cambridge: Polity, 2005.
- Callinicos, A. *Making History: Agency, Structure, and Change in Social Theory*, second edition, Leiden: Brill, 2004.
- Candelaria, M. 'The microgeography of infestation in relationship spaces', in S.E. McFarland and R. Hediger (eds.), *Animals and Agency: An Interdisciplinary Exploration*, Leiden: Brill, 2009, 301–320.
- Chambers, P. *Jumbo: This Being the True Story of the Greatest Elephant in the World*, London: Andre Deutsch, 2007.
- Chemero, A. 'An outline of a theory of affordances', *Ecological Psychology* 15, 2 (2003): 181–195.
- Christensen, W.D. and Hooker, C.A. 'Self-directed agents', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 31, Sup. 1 (2001): 18–52.
- Clement, G. 'Animals and moral agency: the recent debate and its implications', *Journal of Animal Ethics* 3, 1 (2013): 1–14.
- Cowie, H. *Exhibiting Animals in Nineteenth-Century Britain: Empathy, Education, Entertainment*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
- Cronin, J.K. "'Can't you talk?'" Voice and visual culture in early animal welfare campaigns', *Early Popular Visual Culture* 9, 3 (2011): 203–223.
- Davidson, D. (1982) 'Rational animals', *Dialectica* 36, 4 (1982): 317–327.

- Dawkins, M.S. 'A user's guide to animal welfare science', *Trends in Ecology & Evolution* 21, 2 (2006): 77–82.
- Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateau: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987.
- Descola, P. *The Ecology of Others*, Chicago IL: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2013.
- Despret, V. 'From secret agents to interagency', *History and Theory* 52, 4 (2013): 29–44.
- Dinzelbacher, P. 'Animal trials: a multidisciplinary approach', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 32, 3 (2002): 405–421.
- Dobson, M. 'A dog at all things: the transformation of the onstage canine, 1550–1850', *Performance Research* 5, 2 (2000): 116–124.
- Donaldson, S. and Kymlicka, W. *Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Donaldson, S. and Kymlicka, W. 'Unruly beasts: animal citizens and the threat of tyranny', *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 47, 1 (2014): 23–45.
- Enright, K. 'Why the rhinoceros doesn't talk: the cultural life of a wild animal in America', in D. Brantz (ed.), *Beastly Natures: Animals, Humans, and the Study of History*, Charlottesville VA: University of Virginia Press, 2010, 108–126.
- Evans, E.P. *The Criminal Prosecution and Capital Punishment of Animals: The Lost History of Europe's Animal Trials*, London: Faber and Faber, 1987.
- Fudge, E. 'A left-handed blow: writing the history of animals', in N. Rothfels (ed.), *Representing Animals*, Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 2002.
- Fudge, E. *Brutal Reasoning: Animals, Rationality, and Humanity in Early Modern England*, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2006.
- Furedi, F. "'Big History": the annihilation of human agency', 24 July 2013, available at www.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/frank_furedi_on_history/13844#.VzCVVRUrL_8, last accessed 11 July 2016.
- Gibson, A.H. 'Beasts of burden: feral burros and the American West', in S. Nance (ed.), *The Historical Animal*, Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press, 2015, 38–53.
- Gibson, J.J. *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception*, classic edition, New York: Psychology Press, 2015.
- Giles, D.C. 'Animal celebrities', *Celebrity Studies* 4, 2 (2013): 115–128.
- Haggard, P. and Eitam, B. *The Sense of Agency*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Haraway, D. *Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science*, New York: Routledge, 1989.
- Hayles, N.K. *How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics*, Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999.
- Howell, P. *At Home and Astray: The Domestic Dog in Victorian Britain*, Charlottesville VA: University of Virginia Press, 2015.
- Hribal, J. *Fear of the Animal Planet: The Hidden History of Animal Resistance*, Petrolia CA: Counterpunch, 2016.
- Hyde, W.W. 'Prosecution and punishment of animals and lifeless things in the middle ages and modern times', *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 64, 7 (1916): 696–730.
- Johnson, M.H. 'Conceptions of agency in archaeological explanation', *Journal of Anthropological Archaeology* 8, 2 (1989): 189–211.
- Johnson, W. 'On agency', *Journal of Social History* 37 (2003): 113–124.
- Kane, R. (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will*, second edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Kean, H. 'Challenges for historians writing animal-human history: what is really enough?' *Anthrozoös* 25, Sup 1 (2012): s57–s72.

- Keenleyside, H. 'The first-person form of life: Locke, Sterne, and the autobiographical animal', *Critical Inquiry* 39, 1 (2012): 116–141.
- Kete, K. *The Beast in the Boudoir: Petkeeping in Nineteenth-Century Paris*, Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1994.
- Laibman, D. *Deep History: A Study in Social Evolution and Human Potential*, Albany NY: SUNY Press, 2007.
- Latour, B. *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Lien, M.E. *Becoming Salmon: Aquaculture and the Domestication of a Fish*, Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 2015.
- Lippit, A.M. *Electric Animal: Toward a Rhetoric of Wildlife*, Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2000.
- Lorimer, J. *Wildlife in the Anthropocene: Conservation after Nature*, Minneapolis MN: Minnesota University Press, 2015.
- Lulka, D. 'Consuming Timothy Treadwell: redefining human agency in light of Herzog's *Grizzly Man*', in S.E. McFarland and R. Hediger (eds.), *Animals and Agency: An Interdisciplinary Exploration*, Leiden: Brill, 2009, 67–88.
- Mattfield, M. "'Genus porcus sophisticus": the learned pig and the theatrics of national identity in late eighteenth-century London', in L. Orozco and J. Parker-Starbuck (eds.), *Performing Animality: Animals in Performance Practices*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, 57–76.
- McHugh, S. 'Literary animal agents', *PMLA* 124, 2 (2009): 487–495.
- McNeur, C. *Taming Manhattan: Environmental Battles in the Antebellum City*, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2014.
- Meyer, J.W. and Jepperson, R.L. 'The "actors" of modern society: the cultural construction of social agency', *Sociological Theory* 18, 1 (2000): 100–120.
- Miller, M.R. 'Descartes on animals revisited', *Journal of Philosophical Research* 38 (2013): 89–114.
- Nagy, K. and Johnson, P.D. *Trash Animals: How We Live with Nature's Filthy, Feral, Invasive, and Unwanted Species*, Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2013.
- Nance, S. *Entertaining Elephants: Animal Agency and the Business of the American Circus*, Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013.
- Nance, S. *Animal Modernity: Jumbo the Elephant and the Human Dilemma*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
- Nance, S. 'Introduction', in S. Nance (ed.), *The Historical Animal*, Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press, 2015, 1–16.
- Newton, T. 'The turn to biology', *The Sociological Review Monographs* 64 (2016): 117–133.
- Oliver, K. *Animal Lessons: How They Teach Us to be Human*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.
- Onion, R. 'Sled dogs of the American North: on masculinity, whiteness, and human freedom', in S.E. McFarland and R. Hediger (eds.), *Animals and Agency: An Interdisciplinary Exploration*, Leiden: Brill, 2009, 129–155.
- Pearson, C. 'Dogs, history, and agency', *History and Theory* 52, 4 (2013): 128–145.
- Pearson, S.J. and Weismantel, M. 'Does "the animal" exist? Toward a theory of social life with animals', in D. Brantz (ed.), *Beastly Natures: Animals, Humans, and the Study of History*, Charlottesville VA: University of Virginia Press, 2010, 17–37.
- Pemberton, N. 'Bloodhounds as detectives' dogs, slum stench and late-Victorian murder investigation', *Cultural and Social History* 10, 1 (2012): 69–91.
- Pemberton, N. 'Hounding Holmes: Arthur Conan Doyle, bloodhounds and sleuthing in the late-Victorian imagination', *Journal of Victorian Culture* 17, 4 (2012): 454–467.

- Phineas, C. 'Household pets and urban alienation', *Journal of Social History* 7, 3 (1974): 334–343.
- Pickering, A. *The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency, and Science*, Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
- Richter, V. *Literature after Darwin: Human Beasts in Western Fiction, 1859–1939*, Houndmills: Palgrave, 2011.
- Ritvo, H. 'History and animal studies', *Society and Animals* 10, 4 (2002): 403–406.
- Rodman, J. 'The liberation of nature?' *Inquiry* 20, 1–4 (1977): 83–131.
- Rothfels, N. (ed.), *Representing Animals*, Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 2002.
- Rothfels, N. 'Touching animals: the search for a deeper understanding of animals', in D. Brantz (ed.), *Beastly Natures: Animals, Humans, and the Study of History*, Charlottesville VA: University of Virginia Press, 2010, 38–58.
- Schulte, C. 'Der deutsch-deutsche Schäferhund—Ein Beitrag zur Gewaltgeschichte des Jahrhunderts der Extreme', *Totalitarismus und Demokratie* 2 (2015): 319–334, available at www.enricoheitzer.de/2016/02/18/sch%C3%A4ferhund-gate/, last accessed 11 July 2016.
- Scott, M. *Autobiography of Matthew Scott, Jumbo's Keeper*, Bridgeport CT: Trow's Printing Company, 1885.
- Scott, S.R. 'The racehorse as protagonist: agency, independence, and improvisation', in S.E. McFarland and R. Hediger (eds.), *Animals and Agency: An Interdisciplinary Exploration*, Leiden: Brill, 2009, 45–65.
- Sewell, W.H. 'A theory of structure: duality, agency, and transformation', *American Journal of Sociology* 98, 1 (1992): 1–29.
- Shapiro, P. 'Moral agency in other animals', *Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics* 27, 4 (2006): 257–273.
- Shaw, D.G. 'The torturer's horse: agency and animals in history', *History and Theory* 52, 4 (2013): 146–167.
- Shryock, A., Trautmann, T.R., and Gamble, C. 'Imagining the human in deep time', in A. Shryock and D.L. Smail (eds.), *Deep History: The Architecture of Past and Present*, Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 2011, 21–54.
- Smail, D.L. *On Deep History and the Brain*, Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 2008.
- Smail, D.L. 'Neuroscience and the dialectics of history', *Analise Social* 47, 4 (2012): 894–909.
- Soluri, J. 'On edge: fur seals and hunters along the Patagonian littoral, 1860–1930', in M. Few and Z. Tortorici (eds.), *Centering Animals in Latin American History*, Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2013, 243–369.
- Sutherland, J. *Jumbo: The Unauthorised Biography of a Victorian Sensation*, London: Aurum Press, 2013.
- Swanson, D.A. 'Mountain meeting ground: history at an intersection of species', in S. Nance (ed.), *The Historical Animal*, Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press, 2015, 240–257.
- Steward, H. 'Animal agency', *Inquiry* 52, 3 (2009): 217–231.
- Swart, S. "'But where's the bloody horse?": textuality and corporeality in the "animal turn"', *Journal of Literary Studies* 23, 3 (2007): 271–292.
- Swart, S. 'Zombie zoology: history and reanimating extinct animals', in S. Nance (ed.), *The Historical Animal*, Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press, 2015, 54–71.
- Tague, I.H. *Animal Companions: Pets and Social Change in Eighteenth-Century Britain*, University Park PA: Penn State University Press, 2015.
- Taylor, C. 'Engaged agency and background in Heidegger', in C. Guignon (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, second edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 202–221.
- Teubner, G. 'Rights of non-humans: electronic agents and animals as new actors in politics and law', *Journal of Law and Society* 33, 4 (2006): 497–521.

- Thrift, N. *Non-Representational Theory: Space, Politics, Affect*, second edition, London: Routledge, 2007.
- Tortorici, Z. 'Animal archive stories: species anxieties in the Mexican national archives', in S. Nance (ed.), *The Historical Animal*, Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press, 2015, 75–98.
- Tortorici, Z. and Few, M. 'Writing animal histories', in M. Few and Z. Tortorici (eds.), *Centering Animals in Latin American History*, Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2013, 1–28.
- Wadiwel, D.J. 'The war against animals: domination, law and sovereignty', *Griffith Law Review* 18, 2 (2009): 283–297.
- Wadiwel, D.J. 'The will for self-preservation: Locke and Derrida on dominion, property and animals', *SubStance* 43, 2 (2014): 147–161.
- White, C.E. 'Tony the wonder horse: a star study', in S. Nance (ed.), *The Historical Animal*, Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press, 2015, 289–306.
- Wokler, R. 'Rousseau's two concepts of liberty' in G. Feaver and F. Rosen (eds.), *Lives, Liberties and the Public Good: New Essays in Political Theory for Maurice Cranston*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1987, 61–100.
- Wolfe, C. *Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal*, Minneapolis MN: Minnesota University Press, 2003.