


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21

ANIMALS AND VIOLENCE

Medieval humanism, ‘medieval brutality’,
and the carnivorous vegetarianism
of Margery Kempe*Karl Steel***Human domination and human reason in the middle ages**

The division between humans and nonhuman animals was central to medieval European Christianity’s professional thought. Many of these medieval claims have persisted long into the present, chiefly, that among forms of mortal life, only humans possess language, free will, and moral responsibility. A study of medieval thinking and practices of dividing humans from animals thus offers a chance to rethink contemporary methods of dividing humans from nonhumans, in part because the very uncanniness of medieval articulations of these divisions – belonging at once to the Middle Ages and a present that believes itself to have surpassed the medieval – may render modern humanisms equally unfamiliar.

The dominant element of medieval humanism is its being a zero sum game: the human claim to rationality accompanied a claim that among mortal life, *only* humans were rational. Practices of violence and domination were key to these claims. Augustine of Hippo (354–430), the late antique Bishop of Carthage whose voluminous writings remain foundational to the Christian intellectual tradition, neatly demonstrates how this works. Early in his *City of God*, Augustine considers the problem of the Decalogue’s sixth commandment, ‘thou shalt not kill’. In this section, written in the wake of the fall of Rome, Augustine delegitimises Roman suicide by claiming that human life ultimately belongs to God; almost as an aside, he argues that the rest of mortal life belongs to us. He sneers at any idea that the sixth commandment could shelter humans and animals both: why not protect flowers too, then? Augustine thinks the answer obvious: plants can be killed because they ‘have no sensation’, while animals, because they do not ‘share the use of reason with us . . . both their life and death are subject to our needs’.¹ Proving the disassociation of animals from humans required proving both that animals lacked reason and that humans had it. Augustine had already taken up these interlinked problems forty years earlier, in his treatise *On the Free Choice of the Will*. Rather than establishing that humans possess

reason (a crucial foundation for free will) by describing scenarios where this capacity was practised (for example, the many decisions necessary for writing a philosophical treatise), Augustine instead observes that while animals may sometimes get the better of humans, in the general course of things they submit to our routine domination. He observes that we therefore must have something they lack, and, with an astonishing logical leap, names this mysterious quality ‘reason’.² In his logic, the human subordination of animals both justifies their subordination and provides the hard evidence that humans are the one form of rational worldly life. In sum, the ongoing, repeated domination of animals is the surest proof that the human exists, if the human is defined, as it often was, as the form of life that was mortal *and* rational.

Formulations like this were common throughout the Middle Ages. Perhaps the strangest belongs to the ninth-century ‘Letter on the Cynocephali’ by Ratramnus, Abbot of Corbie (died c. 870). When the missionary Rimbart heard rumours that a race of dog-headed people (the ‘Cynocephali’) lived in the far north, he sought advice from Ratramnus.³ Ratramnus’s response, no doubt based upon Corbie’s well-stocked library, explained that the Cynocephali might be reasonable; although they were said to communicate by barking rather than spoken language, they nonetheless wore clothing (and therefore were modest) and lived in settled communities. Ratramnus needed one more fact to complete his argument: the Cynocephali kept livestock, and since no other species were masters of other animals, the Cynocephali must have rational souls, and therefore merit hearing the word of God.

We can witness similar productions of human difference in Christian scriptural exegesis. Faced with the legacy of Deuteronomy 25:4, which forbade farmers from muzzling oxen as they tread corn, the commentary of the apostle Paul explains that the law cannot possibly concern animals, but rather meant only that ‘he that plougheth, should plough in hope; and he that thrasheth, in hope to receive fruit’ (1 Corinthians 9:10).⁴ Guibert of Nogent’s twelfth-century treatise against Judaism reacts with even more incredulity to Deuteronomy 22:6–7, which allows eggs to be taken from the nest of a wild bird, but demands that the adult bird herself be left alone: instead of interpreting the verse, he just dismisses it altogether as patently absurd.⁵ The final verse of Jonah 4:11 features God’s compassion for Nineveh’s population, which comprises the persons in it who ‘know not how to distinguish between their right hand and their left, and many beasts’. Here, humans and animals alike receive God’s consideration; they are not split by cognitive or spiritual difference, but united by their shared ignorance, possession of life, and exposure to injury. Augustine’s commentary intervenes to argue that regardless of what the scripture itself says, God could take no interest in the animals in themselves (‘non servat propter ipsa’), because animals were made for humans, not humans for animals. As Augustine’s commentary ringingly concludes, ‘quae enim spes in pecoribus?’ [what hope do livestock have?].⁶

Although claims like these elevate human life in general, they also produce a category of naturally subordinate life, applicable just as readily to animals and humans both. People with intellectual impairments were typically characterised as animals, as with Henry de Bracton’s assertion in his thirteenth-century legal compilation that the insane ‘are not far removed from brute beasts which lack reason’, and on this

basis barred from inheriting or bequeathing property.⁷ A medieval anti-Semitic legend developed in late medieval England held that Jews were descended from pigs, arguing implicitly that anyone who refused to eat pigs was socially equivalent to pigs; a similar charge held that Muslims refused pork because pigs had eaten their prophet while he lay helpless in an epileptic fit.⁸ A late medieval French satiric poem declared that peasants might as well go on all fours and eat nothing but stubble.⁹ Medieval misogyny, most vigorously promulgated by celibate male clergy, held that women were both more bodily and more irrational than men, and, like animals, required guidance and correction by more fully rational forms of life. Then, as now, the defence of human rights at the expense of the animal put most humans in peril. Humans who were thought by dominant groups to possess the full range of human capacities were far less numerous than those humans thought to have been made only to be mastered by their intellectual and emotional superiors. Rethinking the supposedly natural subordination of nonhumans to humans, and the function of this subordination in proving the presence or absence of ‘reason’, is therefore advantageous for the majority of both animals and humans.¹⁰

Rethinking the time and space of ‘medieval brutality’

Given such medieval attitudes, it should be no surprise that examples of cruelty to animals in this period are easy to compile. William Fitz Stephen’s thirteenth-century portrait of London lauds the city for its entertainments, which include wrestling, target-shooting, and riverboat jousting, and also spectacular fights to the death between bulls or boars and dogs.¹¹ The fourteenth-century Middle English poem *Cleanness* adapts Jesus’s parable of the rich man’s feast, so that, like a good English magnate, he proclaims the completion of preparations with a hearty ‘my bulls and my boars are baited and slain’ [my boles and my bores arn bayted and slayn].¹² And one early sixteenth-century English recipe meant for a convalescent begins notoriously: ‘Take a red Cock that is not too olde, and beate him to death, and when he is dead, fley him and quarter him in small peeces, and bruse the bones everye one of them’.¹³

Typical modern responses to records like these do not, however, emphasise the links between medieval and modern human supremacy, but rather habitually present the people of the Middle Ages as themselves ‘brutal’. ‘Medieval brutality’, a cliché in the general culture – as with this, from the *New York Times*: ‘experts in radicalization said that understanding the process by which people fell for the medieval brutality of a religious ideology is vital to combating it’ – flatters modernity by characterising the medieval as filthier, crueller, and more ‘ferocious’ (from the Latin *ferox*, wild animal, as ‘brutal’ comes from the Latin *brutus*, ‘beast’).¹⁴ In this self-regard of modernity, the medieval is not just more violent than the present; in its ‘savagery’ (from *saeva*, ‘raging’), it is more animal: closer to beasts, more intimate with them, and unthinkingly prone to what is presumed to be ‘animalistic’ behaviour.¹⁵ Recall the mud-caked peasants of *Monty Python and the Holy Grail* (dir. T. Gilliam and T. Jones 1975), the lupine pagan temptress of *Marketa Lazarová*, one of František Vlácil’s medieval existential tragedies (1967), or the damp, fleshy, fecal crowds in the streets and noble courts of Alexei German’s unendurable ‘medieval’ science-fiction film, *Hard to be a God* (2013). Assumptions like these hold that the past is cruel, the present civilised;

the past superstitious, the present rational; and by extension, the past animal, bound unthinkingly to outmoded traditions and stupid, pointlessly cruel violence, while the present is human, able to master its instincts, refuse supposedly biologically hardwired hierarchies, and open itself to create a future of its own design.

Typical mappings of the human to the modern are arguments about space as well as time. Kathleen Davis observes that eighteenth- and nineteenth-century colonial administrators developed the concept of the ‘superstitious feudal Middle Ages’ to divide European modernity from colonies they preferred to think of as still trapped in the past (indeed, given the specifically European origins of the category ‘medieval’, and its insidious modern uses, it may be wisest to reserve the term only for a European historical period).¹⁶ The same assumptions of modernity persist into the present in a ‘developmental narrative’, as Geraldine Heng writes, ‘whose trajectory positions’ the Global West as modern ‘and the rest of the world as always catching up’.¹⁷ As a result, rethinking the cultural interchangeability of the Middle Ages and the animal, particularly in characterisations of violence, is at least implicitly a way to rethink what Kathleen Davis called the ‘politics of time’ and the inequities they justify.

One key way to rethink such politics is simply to recognise the heterogeneity of interactions between humans and nonhumans in the Middle Ages. While cruelty to animals was certainly not uncommon, this does not mean, for example, that medieval people were more ‘in touch with’ or less hypocritical in their use of animals than modern people. During this period of supposed ‘medieval brutality’, we can witness an unease about violence against animals, whose hypocrisy would be at home within a supposedly more enlightened modernity.

Alongside the evidence of bear- and bull-baiting, we can observe, for example, that it is not just the moderns who try to conceal how humans use and use up animal life. The difference between the English words for animal (cow, pig, sheep) and the analogous French words for meat (beef, pork, mutton) has long been a favoured classroom example of class ideology. The Francophone nobility of post-conquest England got their meat cooked and served, while their Anglophone inferiors carried out the actual husbandry and inevitable killing. The laws of well-organised cities of the later Middle Ages insisted that animals be slaughtered out of sight, and that offal be sold separately and less visibly than flesh. In London, waste products were not to be discarded in the Thames between Westminster and the Tower, to keep them from being seen by sacred and secular potentates both. Notable too is the fact that medieval butchers, although not uncommonly organised into powerful civic guilds, could also be considered unruly, dangerous to civic order, and more prone than others to committing murder.¹⁸

Dives and Pauper, a fifteenth-century Middle English moral treatise, preserves an especially complicated account of such attitudes in its commentary on the sixth commandment. Like Augustine, it proves that the prohibition of killing does not apply ‘both to men and beasts’, and insists that the Latin verb *occidere* (‘to kill’) should be translated into English as ‘manslaughter’. It nevertheless imposes one requirement: that animals be slaughtered only on those occasions ‘when it is profitable to them [that is, mankind] for food or for clothing or to avoid injury from the beasts which are injurious to men’; no one should ‘slay [animals] out of cruelty or for the gratification of idle desires and depravity’, as humans ‘should have mercy on beasts and

birds and not harm them without cause and pay attention to their being God's creatures'.¹⁹ Historians of animal rights often favourably cite this passage as an early argument in favour of animal welfare; it may be that, but it is also a demand that animals should be slaughtered for only instrumental purposes.²⁰ In this passage from *Dives and Pauper*, appropriate causes for killing animals are those that use up the animal's life on the way to satisfying some human practical, material need – food, clothing, or self-defence; inappropriate causes are those that treat the death of the animal as an end in itself. In other words, the sinful killing of animals occurs when their killers are insufficiently indifferent to animal death. The sin is the acknowledgment that animal life has value in itself.

For *Dives and Pauper*, proper killers work to reduce animals to utter materiality, while violent killers work on the animal's very life – its presence, its prolongation, its end. The obverse of this sin would be to slaughter humans without 'cruelty and vanity', without grief or mourning or sadistic delight. For this would be a failure to acknowledge that humans, to be human, must possess something more than what can be calculated as a 'profit'. Slaughtering humans must therefore not be simply a job, but a sin, a horror, a drive, or an irresistible pleasure. One of Poggio Bracciolini's late medieval tales speaks of a teenage serial killer who, when caught, 'fessus est se plures alios comedisse, idque se agere, quoniam sapidiores reliquis carnibus viderentur' [confessed that he had eaten many other (children), and that he had done this because they seemed tastier to him than any other flesh].²¹ Though this excessive pleasure in the death and savour of humans – not uncommon in medieval accounts of anthropophagy – is a horror, the very repetition of it *as* a horror divides human life from animal life, keeping animals where they should be, conceptually reserved as mere tools for human use.

The lived experience of medieval people with animals could of course be still more complicated than this. Although university thinkers insisted that humans could have no direct charity for animals, in practice, medieval people had non-functional, affectionate relationships with animals. This should be no surprise: James Serpell established that keeping pets is not a uniquely modern or Western trait but one general to humans of whatever class, culture, or period. Records of medieval animals obviously kept not for guarding houses, capturing game, or any other obvious practical purpose, speak of domestic deer, badgers, monkeys, parrots, and squirrels. Late medieval Paris had a lively market in imported Syrian cats.²² The fourteenth-century *Saxon Mirror*, a German law code surviving in hundreds of manuscripts, requires owners to pay compensation if their domestic dogs, wolves, deer, bears, or monkeys cause any damage.²³ The canonisation dossier of Thomas of Cantilupe includes a miracle in which he resurrected a supplicant's dormouse, trodden upon accidentally by a clumsy knight.²⁴

Even apart from these supposedly 'non-functional' animals, medieval people had emotional ties to the animals they used to guard their houses, to kill other animals, and to pull things or ride on. The knights of medieval romance mourn, some to the point of madness, when their steeds are killed beneath them (for example, in the *Awyntyrs of Arthur*).²⁵ English hunters bent coins over the heads of ailing hawks to attract the beneficent attention of saints, and some kings even sent their sick birds on pilgrimage.²⁶ Finally, Walter Map tells a story about a rich man who entered his barn

‘and approached each oxen in turn, shook up their fodder, running his hand along the backbone of each, approvingly and fondly, instructing each by name to eat’.²⁷ They worked for him; they would end their lives of labour by being slaughtered and eaten; but at least he knew them individually; and, as the story concludes, should a deer hide itself from hunters among his herd, the rich man, even in darkness, would immediately identify it, eject it, and have it put to death. These are his working animals, and ultimately his food animals, but he still loves them. The split between notions of utility and uselessness, between ends in themselves and mere tools, is here as elsewhere unsustainable. Such splits raise the demand for proving that medieval people could ‘really’ love animals to a degree that could scarcely be fulfilled if it were applied to any other interpersonal relation.

The common notions that medieval people were somehow more bestial than moderns, somehow ‘closer to’ or ‘more authentic’ in their dealings with animals must be resisted, rethought, and recognised as a pernicious, persistent error. First, the belief in human superiority has not yet abandoned faith in immaterial, hierarchical categories. As demonstrated in Vinciane Despret’s *What Would Animals Say if We Asked the Right Questions?*, quasi-theological categories such as ‘instinct’ persist in contemporary thought about animals. This is the case even among scientists, serving to sequester humans from nonhumans, and justifying ongoing, cruelly useless experiments to prove ‘truths’ of animal behaviour – about ‘natural dominance’ for example – determined long before their experimental ‘proof’.²⁸ Suspending the certainty of the uniquely human category of reason, and the abilities that supposedly accompany it, would go far towards bettering the condition of animals, and perhaps even to remapping political chronologies and geographies that ‘animalise’ vast swaths of the human world.

We also require a richer on-the-ground sense of lived practices and a concomitant suspension of facile notions of historical development. We can observe, for example, that while medieval Christian Europe had no organised societies for the prevention of cruelty towards animals, in practice, given its absence of both industrialised meat production and laboratory science, it was almost certainly less quantitatively cruel to nonhumans than twenty-first century industrialised democracies. This is not to claim a causal relation, even an inverse one, between these various practices, but rather to insist at least on a fuller, less straightforward mapping of the relation between intellectual history (in which Augustine and Aquinas and the other usual suspects insist that animals have no moral considerability) and the more complicated negotiations of lived experience. My next section provides an extended example of such negotiations.²⁹

Margery Kempe’s carnivorous vegetarianism

The following restores to the Middle Ages the cultural complexity often denied it by a modern self-satisfaction that makes the era little more than either a barbaric anticipation of modernity or its less decadent origin, or both. My subject is the fifteenth-century bourgeoisie, contemplative, preacher, troublemaker, and pilgrim, the extraordinary Margery Kempe (c. 1373–after 1438). The centrepiece, through her amanuenses, is what represents itself as the first English-language autobiography.

Kempe studies have generally sought to locate her in relation to contemporary practices of late medieval spirituality; to praise her as a figure of resistance to patriarchal rationality; to understand her *Book* as a conscious effort to refashion her experience as a hagiography; and even to argue that key sections of the work, or even the whole work, are fictional.³⁰ Only rarely have critics attended to her long-standing refusal to eat meat and her tendency to weep sorely at the sight of animal suffering. Those that have done so have tended to understand Kempe only in relation to intrahuman practices of hospitality (as an unruly table guest who refuses the food everyone else enjoys) or they take her, like *Dives and Pauper*, as a kind of early advocate for animal rights.³¹ I argue that Kempe practises what might be called a ‘carnivorous vegetarianism’, a practice of avoiding meat that has little to do with kindness to animals, a ‘healthy diet’, or the ecological motivations of many modern vegetarianisms. The overdetermined, particularly medieval logic of this dietary practice becomes clear if we suspend our certainties about human difference from animals and attend more closely to general cultural discourses of meat-eating and fleshly embodiment as well as to Kempe’s own gender, age, and life experience as mother and independent woman.

Around the year 1409, Christ granted Margery Kempe his first long visionary visitation, in which he commands her to

forsake that which you love best in this world, and that is eating of flesh. And instead of that flesh, you shall eat my flesh and my blood, which is the true body of Christ in the sacrament of the altar [forsake that thou lovyst best in this world, and that is etyng of flesch. And instede of that flesch thow schalt etyn my flesch and my blod, that is the very body of Crist in the sacrament of the awter].³²

Despite the exertions of pilgrimage, and despite bullying from her fellow travellers, she keeps the vow for years, begrudgingly having some meat only for ‘a lytyl whyle’ (Chapter 26) when her confessor insists on it. Not until Christ himself intervenes, years later, does she fully ‘resort ageyn to flesch mete’, and only then because Christ wants her to build up her strength for another pilgrimage. Obedient on both occasions to her divine lord, she gets ‘to have her fast and eat it’ too.³³

In her fifteenth-century England, Kempe’s decision to forgo meat for years on end would have been unusual for a secular woman, but was otherwise perfectly orthodox.³⁴ Kempe could have gone much further and still remained within the church: the twelfth-century Alpais of Cudot, for example, is said to have survived for years while eating nothing but Eucharistic hosts.³⁵ Even had she not been fairly wealthy, meat would still not have been necessarily rare in Kempe’s diet. Late fourteenth-century harvest workers in eastern and southern England would have received nearly a pound of it daily during the labouring season.³⁶ She would have gone without meat not because of its scarcity but for religious reasons: by the later Middle Ages, Latin Christendom required its adherents, even laypeople, to abstain from meat for nearly a third of the year, mostly during the fasting season of Lent. Monks tended to do still more, and the Carthusian order of monks, whose practice Kempe’s most closely resembled, did the most of all, by requiring that their adherents keep to an entirely meatless diet.

Generally speaking, ‘meat’ did not include fish or animals identified as fish, nor barnacle geese and newborn rabbits.³⁷ Such animals were held to be not alive in the way humans and other terrestrial animals were, and therefore unlikely to stir up our lust (as Aquinas explained), or, more simply, because in Genesis 3:17–18, God cursed only the earth, and not the waters.³⁸ Early medieval monastic rules tended to forbid all but the sick from eating quadrupeds and sometimes even birds; later monks developed loopholes by distinguishing forbidden *carnes* (freshly cooked meat recently cut from the joint) from licit *carnea* (pre-cooked, pre-salted meat), so much so that a monk, like the twelfth-century Samson, Abbot of Bury St Edmunds, could earn high praise for eating neither.³⁹

Carthusians would have none of this. After centuries of debate, even the chancellor of the University of Paris weighed in. Jean Gerson’s 1401 *De non esu Carnium Carthusienses* admitted that while abstinence from meat was bad for the health, so too were mercantile voyages and nearly all other human endeavours; as a result, Carthusians could hardly be faulted for damaging their health for God, so there was no legitimate reason for their critics to charge them, as they often did, with homicide.⁴⁰ Carthusian attitudes towards meat-eating found themselves promulgated outside the cloister in works such as the enormously popular Middle English *Mirror of the Blessed Life of Jesus Christ*, a meditative guide that explains that Christ ate meat only once, at the Last Supper, where Christ’s typological role as the sacrificial, sacramental Paschal lamb made eating symbolically useful.⁴¹ Carthusian approval for Kempe’s ascetic diet is also suggested by the so-called ‘red ink annotator’, an early sixteenth-century reader of the sole extant manuscript of Kempe’s *Book*. Willing at times to delete or even rewrite passages to suit his doctrinal preferences, he leaves the margin blank when Kempe first stops eating meat, but when she takes it up again, at folio 78v, he writes ‘fleysche’ near the passage, and draws a box around it: it may be too much to suggest that he was disturbed by this change in Kempe’s religious practices, but he certainly found her new divergence from his own vows remarkable.⁴²

In Kempe’s England, the common heresy was not one of not eating meat, but of eating it at the wrong times, and without due regard for its special importance. Peter of Cluny’s adversarial history of Peter of Bruys provides as bold an example as one could wish for: in the twelfth century, he dined on meat that he had roasted in front of a church, on Good Friday, on a pyre of disarticulated crucifixes.⁴³ The early fifteenth-century heretics of Norwich – a town some 40 miles from Kempe’s own King’s Lynn, which she visited frequently – broke with the church with far less fanfare, by saving leftover meat to eat on fast days, or by declaring that anyone could eat fish or flesh whenever they liked, with regard only for their personal gustatory preference.⁴⁴ This studied carelessness was punished with a temporary diet of bread and water, or, in one case, bread and ale, simultaneously depriving these heretics of meat and returning them to the penitential cycle of eating imposed upon all belonging to the community of the faithful.

The heretics who had worried the church the most were the so-called Cathars, who ‘shun all flesh . . . but not for the same reason as monks and others living spiritually abstain from it’ [Carnem omnem vitant. . . non ea causa qua monachi, aut alii spiritualiter viventes ab ea abstinent], as Eckbert of Shönau complained in his 1163 sermon in praise of meat-eating. Eckbert laughs at the Cathars for believing

that since some vast prince of shadows ('quemdam immanem principem tenebrarum') created the material world, they should not eat meat, the most material of foods.⁴⁵ Eckbert pretends to regret that there had been no Cathar present to whisper his doctrine in Noah's ear after the flood, when God first authorised this new meaty diet. Putting aside ongoing debates about the historical existence of Cathars, it is because of stories about beliefs such as these that one late-medieval defender of Carthusian dietary restrictions explains 'unlike certain heretics, [we] hold like other Christians that all God's creatures are good', which is to say, inherently good for food.⁴⁶

While medieval ethnographers were willing to imagine fully vegetarian, entirely peaceful cultures, kind to animal life and even all things, they deposited them in the far east, or the distant past of the classical 'Golden Age', before humans took up carnivorousness, warfare, and commerce.⁴⁷ Good Christians, even Carthusians, were supposed to want to kill and eat animals, and to recognise that God had given them animals for exactly this purpose. They were encouraged to refuse this pleasure, but they were supposed to refuse it *as* a pleasure, so that the Christian year, even for laypeople, may be understood as an elaborate management and refinement of the satisfactions of abstinence. This is how Kempe fasts: the orthodoxy of her restricted diet is marked by what Christ says to her: leave off eating what 'thou lovest best'.

The significant strain for her own culture is Kempe's own fleshly embodiment of a simultaneous restraint and enjoyment, which linked her to animals and the incarnated Christ himself even as she materialised the culturally loaded category of 'woman'. Karma Lochrie's foundational study of Kempe argues that the 'primary human conflict' for medieval Christianity was not body against soul, but 'the life of the flesh against the life of the spirit'.⁴⁸ The body was neutral and passive, doing nothing on its own. Kempe's *Book* tends to use 'body' to represent whole things: her body as a whole, or her husband's, or Christ's, either hanging on the cross or in the form of the Eucharist. The body, neatly bordered, coherently designates an individual. But flesh was 'heaving', 'pervious', and 'heterogeneous – neither body nor soul, but carnal and spiritual at the same time', for it was both materiality and materiality's own disturbingly autonomous disorder.⁴⁹ When Kempe awaits an Archbishop's interrogation, she 'stod styll, tremelyng and whakyng ful sor in hir flesch wythowtyn ony erdly comfort' (Chapter 13), standing still and trembling at the same time, as if she were commingled with another, unquiet self. Like Kempe herself, flesh was a woman: as Augustine explained in his commentary on Psalm 140, 'your flesh is like your wife . . . it lusts against you like your wife' [*caro tanquam coniux est . . . Concupiscit adversus te, tanquam coniux tua*].⁵⁰ Flesh is sex (as in 'fleschly knowyng' [Chapter 9] or 'fleschly comownyng' [Chapter 3]). It draws us away from spirit ('fleschly affeccyon' [Chapter 28]). Flesh is meat, because Middle English vocabulary, like the Latin *carnis*, did not distinguish between 'meat' and 'flesh' (the Middle English 'mete' simply meant 'food' in general). And finally, Flesh is sometimes the edible body of Christ, recreated every time Catholic priests performed a Mass. Kempe's flesh therefore simultaneously recalled the body in its irrational motivations, its lustiness, its vulnerability and edibility, and its sublime Eucharistic incarnation.

A short poem included in a fifteenth-century Middle English Carthusian devotional anthology helps illustrate the operations of this densely tangled node of signification.

It imagines a falconer who entices a restless bird to return by showing it a hunk of 'rede flesche': so too, explains the poem, does Christ draw us back, so that we can join him on the 'cros of penaunce' through 'discrete poneyschyng of thi body'.⁵¹ Jessica Brantley dryly remarks that 'the poem sets up a number of complex equivalences': Christ is falconer, but also meat, while the reader is a falcon who becomes both 'meat and crucified savior' through penance, which for a Carthusian means the lifelong penance of forgoing meat, which they do not do without pleasure but rather preserve it as a mastered element of the self.⁵² The Carthusian poem lacks only an explicit reference to gender. Elsewhere, the same Carthusian compilation imagines a once beautiful woman beset in the grave by hectoring and hungry vermin, gradually argued into coming to terms with her edibility and putrefaction.⁵³ The debate's first page features an illustration of a cloaked man kneeling before a crucifix on which hangs a nearly naked Christ figure, whose white flesh bleeds redly from its every surface.⁵⁴ The manuscript's (male) readers are encouraged to identify with this suffering flesh, to be repulsed by the suffering flesh in the grave, and to recognise that this dynamic of identification and disidentification, swerving from one edible flesh to another, one divine and the other profane, is required because of their own fleshly frailty. Flesh, especially suffering flesh, runs through this Carthusian compilation in all its forms: edible, suffering, disdained, repulsive, feminised, and the stuff of redemption.

Kempe was a woman, a mother, a single woman, and an older person (in her fifties) and widow by the time she has the book written down: her culture would have made her into a figure of flesh in its danger, its filth, its concupiscence, its edibility, all that a masculinised order sought to render governable by abjecting it from itself (so that 'your flesh . . . lusts against you, like your wife').⁵⁵ Widows were considered to be sexually knowing; as in *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*, or Chaucer's *Wife of Bath's Tale*, older women were often portrayed as repulsive.⁵⁶ Her contemporaries prefer that she either hew to these roles or be silent. Failing that, they prefer her to be a hypocrite, so she confirms the truth of what they believe her to really be. They accuse her of pushing aside a red herring at one meal in favour of a tastier, more expensive pike (Chapter 9); by calling her both a Lollard heretic (Chapter 13 and many other places) and a Jew (Chapter 52), they accuse her of disdaining their social pleasures, particularly of Christ's Eucharistic flesh; they prefer to believe she is not actually chaste but rather that she sneaks off regularly with her husband to 'woodys, grovys, er [or] valeys to usyn the lust of her bodiis' (Chapter 76). On her pilgrimages, her fellow travellers insist she eat meat, stop weeping, and keep her conversation about holiness to herself (Chapter 27). She carries on, inhabiting, refusing, and inhabited by flesh, on terms that both enact prejudicial certainties and deny them, because she is living as a woman, sometimes as a wife, and as the embodiment of worldly desire.

Similarly dense identifications operate in Kempe's identification with suffering. When Christ first orders Kempe to eat no flesh but that of his own body, he promises too that 'you shall be eaten and gnawed at by the people of the world as much as any rat gnaws on the stockfish' [Thow schalt ben etyn and knawyn of the pepul of the world as any raton knawyth the stokfysch (Chapter 5)]. Kempe twice compares herself to being meat chopped up for stew: 'If it were your will Lord, I would for

your love and for the magnifying of your name be chopped as small as meat for the pot' [Yyf it wer thy wille, Lord, I wolde for thi lofe and for magnyfying of thi name ben hewyn as smal as flesch to the potte' (Chapter 57; also see Chapter 84)]. She goes without (animal) meat; she eats the (divine) meat of the Eucharist; she imagines herself as meat, chopped up, butchered, gnawed.

The most insistently public form her piety takes, her writhing and wailing, make her even more animal-like, as they cut her off from the articulate voice that was among the definitive features of rational humankind. When she first receives her white garment, a multivalent symbol of purity, she emits her strongest wails yet, so that people 'said that she howled as if she were a dog' [seyd that sche howlyd as it had ben a dogge' (Chapter 44)]. And when she sees animal suffering, she too suffers:

If she saw a man who had a wound or a beast of whatever sort, or if a man beat a child before her or smote a horse or another beast with a whip, if she might see it or hear it, she thought that she saw our Lord be beaten or wounded in the same way that she saw the man or beast beat or wounded, whether in the field or in the town, whether alone by herself or among the people.

Yf sche sey a man had a wownde er a best wheþyr it wer, er zyf a man bett a childe be—for hir er smet an hors er an-oþer best wyth a whippe, zyf sche myth sen it er heryn it, hir thowt sche saw owyr Lord be betyn er wowndyd lyk as sche saw in þe man er in þe best, as wel in the feld as in þe town, & be hir-selfe [a]lone as wel as a-mong þe pepyl. (Chapter 28)

In a superb study, Lisa Kiser enumerates several other comparisons between Christ's and animal suffering in late medieval English religious writing. She points out how Kempe's comparison differs from expected patterns (in late medieval drama, for example) by beginning with animals and then moving to Christ. From this, Kiser proposes that, in Kempe's weeping, we witness a rare, even precocious instance of both 'emotional fervor and moral disapproval' over the suffering of animals.⁵⁷

Kempe's compassion is not, however, for animals so much as it is for injuries in general, whether animals or human. More importantly, Kempe has no interest in preventing this suffering; rather, she passionately seeks out suffering, joins with it, and renders it, whatever its form, an occasion for entanglement with the suffering of Christ. A typical scene from the *Book* has Kempe see Christ's 'precious tender body, rent and torn with scourges all over' [hys precyows tendyr body, alto rent and toryn wyth scorgys (Chapter 28)], whereupon she collapses and shouts 'with a loud voice, wonderfully turning and wresting her body every which way, stretching out her arms as if she had died' [wyth lowde voys, wondyrfully turnyng and wrestyng hir body on every syde, spredyng hir armys abrode as yyf sche schulde a deyde (Chapter 28)], or as if she were herself hung on the cross. This is empathic identification with suffering, but without any desire to end it. All the affective elements that we might think necessary for the development of animal rights, and even critical animal philosophy, are present, yet all they do is exacerbate the need to encounter suffering animals. This is not to accuse Kempe of not being 'good enough' from a modern animal-rights perspective: that would be absurd. It is rather to keep open the

chance to observe the real strangeness of Kempe's animal identifications and carnivorous vegetarianism.

However much her religious ecstasies may be contextualised, even normalised through analogues in other late medieval mystics or contemplatives, her *Book* always insists on how shocking her contemporaries find her frenzied identifications. Kempe performs this identification in and through her flesh, in public. Though she does rationally dispute with professional clergy to defend herself from charges of heresy, she expresses herself most characteristically through ecstatic weeping and dog-like howling. More accurately, none of this is her performance or expression so much as it is a performance, an expression, generated impersonally through and in the flesh, in all its qualities at once as desiring, vulnerable, edible, disdained, and sacred. This performance is not wholly deliberative, not wholly human, often not linguistic, but through all this an indelibly gendered 'physical piety'.⁵⁸ I join with Myra Seaman in stressing that 'Kempe's state is supposedly beyond human, yet it remains utterly human as well: embodied, and intensely physical', which is to say, that she is also animal and divine and woman and mother and widow, and that the medium that makes all this possible, and at once so familiar and shocking to her contemporaries, is the flesh.⁵⁹

This is one picture of medieval relations to violence against animals. If the human domination of animals, and the refusal to recognise their lives as having any value in themselves, displays itself most spectacularly in their being routinely killed and eaten by humans, then forgoing meat might seem to be a refusal of human mastery, and, with that, a refusal of the human domination of animals essential to what Agamben memorably called 'the anthropological machine'.⁶⁰ In some contexts, such as the 'Golden Age' literature alluded to above, medieval writers did characterise vegetarians this way: Alexander the Great often sneeringly calls Dindimus, king of the Brahmans, a beast, in part because Dindimus eats no meat. Margery Kempe's long-standing refusal of meat, however, is less about refusing human mastery of animals than it is about mastering the flesh by other means: not by killing and eating animals, but by taming the flesh that was simultaneously the delicious possession of animals and the unruly, pleasurable stuff that made up one's own self. Flesh was no mere object, but a way in which matter embodied desire and material disorder, material without being reducible to an *inert* materiality. Animals were fleshy; in their irrationality and savour, they were also embodiments of this problem of the flesh. Humans were fleshy too. For a human to eat animals meant dominating them, but *not* eating them also meant dominating what they represented.

This complicated picture is now very far removed from popular conceptions about 'medieval brutality' and violence against animals. Medieval philosophy and doctrine tend to provide a clear line between humans and animals, frequently proving the existence of the category of the human by appealing to the human dominance of animals. This material excludes animals from humans altogether, denying them any direct moral considerability, excluding them from the human community, and arguing, even, that the most 'charitable' use of an animal was to put it to use, through labour or butchery.⁶¹ Among all this, lived practice could be a great deal more complicated, as could medieval philosophy too (Blaise of Parma, for example, hypothesised that, like insects, beings with rational souls could spontaneously generate from mud).⁶²

The Middle Ages produced many stories of saints taking animals under their protection, of knights forming intimate partnerships with their steeds and even lions, and stories like Kempe's, about a simultaneous identification and mastery of a fleshiness shared with both humans and animals, which sought out suffering without any desire to end it.⁶³ Closer attention to such historical heterogeneity will not, of course, erase distinctions between the Middle Ages and the present, but it will push aside certainties about distinctions between the medieval and modern in favour of a more complicated picture, one that might take 'brutality', that quality of being bestial, as something other than violence, something other than the past, something other than what has been, or cannot be, left behind.⁶⁴

Notes

- 1 Augustine of Hippo, *The City of God against the Pagans*, Book 1–13, trans. R.W. Dyson, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, 33.
- 2 Augustine of Hippo, *Free Choice of the Will*, trans. T. Williams, Indianapolis IN: Hackett Publishing, 1993, 13.
- 3 Ratramnus of Corbie, 'Ratramnus and the dog-headed humans', in P.E. Dutton (ed. and trans.), *Carolingian Civilization: A Reader*, second edition, Peterborough ON: Broadview Press, 2004, 452–455.
- 4 Biblical quotations are from the Douay Rheims English translation of the Latin Vulgate.
- 5 J.P. Migne (ed.), *Patrologiae Cursus Completus: Series Latina*, 217 volumes, Paris, 1844, Volume 156, 524B. Throughout, translations from Migne are mine.
- 6 Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus*, Volume 35, 2413.
- 7 For the Bracton and similar medieval statements, see I. Metzler, *Fools and Idiots? Intellectual Disability in the Middle Ages*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016, 108, 114, 120, 154. For an important posthumanist engagement with disability and animality, M.Y. Chen, *Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect*, Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2012.
- 8 Examples include the Middle English accounts of the childhood of Jesus from British Library, Harley 3954 and Harley 2399, in C. Horstmann (ed.), *Sammlung altenglischer Legenden*, Heildesheim: Georg Olms, 1878; N. Daniel, *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image*, Oxford: Oneworld, 1993, 99–130.
- 9 A. Jubinal (ed.), *Jongleurs et trouvères; ou, choix de saluts, épîtres, rêveries et autres pièces légères des XIIIe et XIVe siècles*, Paris: J.A. Merklein, 1835, 107–109.
- 10 A now classic articulation of this point is the paraphrase and amplification of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak by C. Wolfe, *Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist Theory*, Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 2003, 7.
- 11 W. Fitz Stephen, *Norman London*, trans. F. Stenton, New York: Italica Press, 1990, 58.
- 12 A.C. Cawley and J.J. Anderson (eds.), *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight; Pearl; Cleanness; Patience*, London: Dent, 1991, line 55.
- 13 'A.W.', *A Book of Cookrye*, London: Edward Allde, 1587, image 13.
- 14 K. Bennhold, 'Same anger, different ideologies: radical muslim and neo-Nazi', *The New York Times*, 5 March 2015, last accessed 30 June 2016.
- 15 For the *Times*' most recent use of 'Medieval Savagery', see K. Davis, *Periodization and Sovereignty: How Ideas of Feudalism and Secularization Govern the Politics of Time*, Philadelphia PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008, which quotes former Secretary of State John Kerry.
- 16 See Davis, *Periodization and Sovereignty*, and K. Davis, 'Convolutions of time: why an "early modern" period?', presented at 'Common Eras: Law, Literature, and the Rhetorics

- of Commonality in Medieval and Renaissance England', Freie Universität Berlin, 19 May 2016.
- 17 G. Heng, 'The invention of race in the European Middle Ages 1: race studies, modernity, and the Middle Ages', *Literature Compass* 8, 5 (2011): 258–274, 264; see also C. Dinshaw, *Getting Medieval: Sexualities and Communities, Pre- and Postmodern*, Durham NC: Duke University Press, 1999, 183–206; B. Holsinger, *Neomedievalism, Neoconservatism, and the War on Terror*, Chicago IL: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2007; and C. Monagle and L. d'Arcens, "'Medieval" makes a comeback: what's going on?', *The Conversation*, 22 September 2014, last accessed 12 October 2016.
 - 18 K. Steel, *How to Make a Human: Animals and Violence in the Middle Ages*, Columbus OH: Ohio State University Press, 2011, 207–220.
 - 19 P.H. Barnam (ed.), *Dives and Pauper*, Volume 2, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976, 33.
 - 20 The earliest such reference may be an April 1897 article by one Abbot Gasquet in *The Dublin Review*, reprinted in the anonymously edited anthology *The Church and Kindness to Animals*, 1906, 170–171. Favourable citations continue into this century.
 - 21 P. Bracciolini, *Facetiarum*, Krakow, 1592, 109. My translation.
 - 22 J. Serpell, 'Pet-keeping and animal domestication: a reappraisal', in J. Clutton-Brock (ed.), *The Walking Larder: Patterns of Domestication, Pastoralism, and Predation*, New York: Routledge, 1989, 10–21; K. Walker-Meikle, *Medieval Pets*, Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2012.
 - 23 M. Dobozy (trans.), *The Saxon Mirror: A Sachsenspiegel of the Fourteenth Century*, Philadelphia PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999, 111–112.
 - 24 Societé des Bollandistes (eds.), *Acta Sanctorum: October I*, Antwerp, 1765, 675.
 - 25 In T. Hahn (ed.), *Sir Gawain: Eleven Romances and Tales*, Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 1995, lines 554–555.
 - 26 R.S. Oggins, *The Kings and Their Hawks: Falconry in Medieval England*, New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2004, 105.
 - 27 W. Map, *De Nugis Curialium, Courtiers' Trifles*, revised edition, ed. and trans. M.R. James, C.N.L. Brooke, and R.A.B. Mynors, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983, 515–516.
 - 28 V. Despret, *What Would Animals Say if We Asked the Right Questions?*, trans. B. Buchanan, Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2016.
 - 29 For Augustine and Aquinas see L. Gruen, 'The moral status of animals', in E.N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2014 edition), last accessed 11 October 2016.
 - 30 The field of Kempe studies is vast. For a compelling recent example, with ample citations of the scholarly tradition, N.N. Sidhu, *Indecent Exposure: Gender, Politics, and Obscene Comedy in Middle English Literature*, Philadelphia PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016, 149–187. Sidhu's claims about Kempe's fictionality should be supplemented with S. Sobceki, "'The writing of this tretys": Margery Kempe's son and the authorship of her book', *Studies in the Age of Chaucer* 37, 1 (2015): 257–283.
 - 31 C. Mazzoni, 'Of stockfish and stew: feasting and fasting in the Book of Margery Kempe', *Food and Foodways* 10, 4 (2002): 171–182; M. Raine, "'Fals flesch": food and the embodied piety of Margery Kempe', *New Medieval Literatures* 7 (2005): 101–126; L.J. Kiser, 'Margery Kempe and the animalization of Christ: animal cruelty in late medieval England', *Studies in Philology* 106, 3 (2009): 299–315.
 - 32 M. Kempe, *The Book of Margery Kempe*, L. Staley (ed.), Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 1996, Chapter 5. I will cite Kempe in the body text by chapter for ease of consultation across other editions. For a modern English version, see M. Kempe, *The Book of Margery Kempe*, trans. A. Bale, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
 - 33 S. Salih, 'Margery's bodies: piety, work, and penance', in J. Arnold and K.J. Lewis (eds.), *A Companion to The Book of Margery Kempe*, Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2004, 161–176, 170.

- 34 M.D. Bailey, 'Abstinence and reform at the council of Basil: Johannes Nider's *De abstinentia esus carniuum*', *Mediaeval Studies* 59, (1997): 225–260; D.M. Bazell, 'De esu carniuum: Amald of Villanova's defense of Carthusian abstinence', *Arxiu de Textos Catalans Antics* 14 (1995): 227–248; D.M. Bazell, 'Strife among the table-fellows: conflicting attitudes of early and medieval Christians toward the eating of meat', *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 65, 1 (1997): 73–99.
- 35 C.W. Bynum, *Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women*, Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1987.
- 36 C. Dyer, 'Changes in diet in the late Middle Ages: the case of harvest workers', *Agricultural History Review* 36, 1 (1988): 21–37, 28.
- 37 M. Van der Lugt, 'Animal légendaire et discours savant médiéval: la barnacle dans tous ses états', *Micrologus* 10, (2000): 351–393.
- 38 T. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947, 2a2ae q. 147, a. 8; see also Alcuin, *Quaestiones in Genesim*, in Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus*, volume 100, 518B.
- 39 B.F. Harvey, *Living and Dying in England, 1100–1540: The Monastic Experience*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, 40; Jocelin of Brakelond, *Chronicle of the Abbey of Bury St Edmunds*, trans. D. Greenway and J. Sayers, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, 36.
- 40 J. Fleming, 'When "meats are like medicines": Vitoria and Lessius on the role of food in the duty to preserve life', *Theological Studies* 69, 1 (2008): 99–115, 101–103.
- 41 N. Love, *The Mirror of the Blessed Life of Jesus Christ: A Reading Text*, M.G. Sargent (ed.), Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2005, 51 and 377.
- 42 K.A.-M. Bugyis, 'Handling the Book of Margery Kempe: the corrective touches of the red ink annotator', in K. Kerby-Fulton, J.J. Thompson, and S. Baechle (eds.), *New Directions in Medieval Manuscript Studies and Reading Practices*, Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014, 138–158; British Library Additional MS 61823, f. 9r. The manuscript is viewable online through the British Library's manuscript interface.
- 43 Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus*, volume 189, 771C–D.
- 44 N.P. Tanner (ed.), *Heresy Trials in the Diocese of Norwich, 1428–31*, London: Offices of the Royal Historical Society, 1977, 46.
- 45 Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus*, volume 195, 17B, volume 195, 14C.
- 46 D.J. Falls, *Nicholas Love's Mirror and Late Medieval Devotio-Literary Culture: Theological Politics and Devotional Practice in Fifteenth-Century England*, New York: Routledge, 2016, 37.
- 47 K. Steel, 'A fourteenth-century ecology: "The Former Age" with Dindimus', in C. van Dyke (ed.), *Rethinking Chaucerian Beasts*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, 185–199.
- 48 K. Lochrie, *Margery Kempe and Translations of the Flesh*, Philadelphia PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991, 19.
- 49 Lochrie, *Margery Kempe and Translations of the Flesh*. The book often uses 'heaving'; for later two adjectives, 4 and 39.
- 50 Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus*, volume 37, 1835; for further discussion, Lochrie, *Margery Kempe and Translations of the Flesh*, 19–20; S. Biernoff, *Sight and Embodiment in the Middle Ages*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, 26–34.
- 51 British Library Additional MS 61823, f. 9r. The manuscript is viewable online through the British Library's manuscript interface.
- 52 J. Brantley, *Reading in the Wilderness: Private Devotion and Public Performance in Late Medieval England*, Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007, 132.
- 53 For one discussion, E. Robertson, 'Kissing the worm: sex and gender in the afterlife and the poetic posthuman in the Late Middle English "a disputation betwyx the body and wormes"', in E.J. Burns and P. McCracken (eds.), *From Beasts to Souls: Gender and Embodiment in Medieval Europe*, Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013, 121–154.

- 54 British Library Additional MS 37049, f. 33r.
- 55 For discussion of the *Book's* ambiguous dating of Kempe's widowhood, see T. Williams, "'As thu wer a wedow": Margery Kempe's wifehood and widowhood', *Exemplaria* 21, 4 (2009): 345–362.
- 56 S. Niebrzydowski (ed.) *Middle-Aged Women in the Middle Ages*, Woodbridge: DS Brewer, 2011.
- 57 Kiser, 'Margery Kempe and the animalization of Christ', 315. For a representative sympathetic citation from outside medieval studies, K.W. Perlo, *Kinship and Killing: The Animal in World Religions*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2009, 89.
- 58 Salih, *Margery's Bodies*, 162. This paragraph owes a great deal to feminist materialisms; for an excellent representative, see S. Alaimo, *Bodily Natures: Science, Environment, and The Material Self*, Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 2010. J. Bennett, *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things*, Durham NC, Duke University Press, 2010, is by now a classic.
- 59 M.J. Seaman, 'Becoming more (than) human: affective posthumanisms, past and future', *Journal of Narrative Theory*, 37, 2 (2008): 246–275, 258.
- 60 A. Agamben, *The Open*, trans. K. Attell, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2004, 38; for an essential critique of Agamben and animals, see D. Lacapra, *History and its Limits: Human, Animal, Violence*, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2009, 163–177.
- 61 T. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, 2a2ae, q. 25, a.3.
- 62 M. Van der Lugt, *Le Ver, le démon et la vierge: les théories médiévales de la génération extraordinaire: une étude sur les rapports entre théologie, philosophie naturelle et médecine*, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2004, 176–181.
- 63 For a good anthology of such stories, see D. Bell (ed.), *Wholly Animals: A Book of Beastly Tales*, Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1992.
- 64 For an excellent model of doing cultural history without epistemic breaks, see the opening chapters of S. Mentz, *Shipwreck Modernity: Ecologies of Globalization, 1550–1719*, Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2015.

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Conclusions



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