In response to the publication and publicization of the *Pentagon Papers* in *The New York Times* in 1971, Arendt (1972a: 45) states the following:

What has often been suggested has now been established: so long as the press is free and not corrupt, it has an enormously important function to fulfill and can rightly be called the fourth branch of government. Whether the First Amendment will suffice to protect this most essential political freedom, the right to unmanipulated factual information without which all freedom of opinion becomes a cruel hoax, is another question.

To recall, the *Pentagon Papers* revealed to the American nation that their government was lying to them about the situation after World War II (WWII) leading up to the Vietnam War, and this revelation did imperil the First Amendment for some time when *The New York Times* was banned from publishing.

Arendt’s statement addresses two central issues in political theory: (1) the role of the press as a “branch of government,” and (2) the question of the relationship between truth and politics, broadly construed. Focusing on the second issue from a politico-philosophical perspective, I will analyze the much-contested role of truth in politics to highlight the importance of a “right to unmanipulated factual information”—a right that, according to Arendt, is crucial for the freedom of opinion.

What does a right to unmanipulated factual information entail? While the OED, in 2016, seized the moment, and deemed “post-truth” the word of that year—looking back at the activists at the Standing Rock, and considering the *Black Lives Matter* protesters—we can see that the political conscience of our times suggests that there is an indispensable role that truth plays in politics. I maintain that such a right to unmanipulated factual information has to be in place—and in practice—for human beings to be able to make sound political judgments about the world. As such, there is a close relationship between truth, politics, and freedom—a relationship that becomes manifest through political action. To make this case, I will reassess Arendt’s seemingly contradictory remarks about factual truths in her essay entitled “Truth and Politics” to show how factual truths play a normative role in political action.
Drawing on Arendt’s articulation of the world as that which is “in-between” human beings—a space of appearance for plural human existence—that is created in the exchange of opinions and collective action, I demonstrate that factual truths play a key role in politics that brings a new perspective to democratic practice by clarifying the relationship between factual truths and political judgment. By doing so, I aim to elucidate the seemingly rigid distinction Arendt (1968a: 219–20) makes between “truth and knowledge,” and “judgment and decision” as stated in her essay entitled “The Crisis in Culture”:

Culture and politics, then, belong together because it is not knowledge or truth which is at stake, but rather judgment and decision, the judicious exchange of opinion about the sphere of public life and the common world, and the decision what manner of action is to be taken in it, as well as to how it is to look henceforth, what kind of things are to appear in it.

For Arendt, politics does not aim at “knowledge and truth” but rather concerns itself with “judgment and decision.” There are two reasons for this: First, politics happens in the in-between of human plurality; it happens in the exchange of opinions, and not in being guided by an ideal. As such, there is nothing that is intrinsically political. Second, because of this, politics is related to contingent facts about human affairs, which always have the elements of fragility and unpredictability regarding the achievement of the goals that are set upon political action. This chapter takes up the distinction between rational truths and factual truths, and the question of their validity to demonstrate the role factual truths play in politics.

Rational versus factual truths

Arendt’s political thinking is entrenched in interrelated articulations of what she often posits to be clear-cut dichotomies, or distinctions. To begin, I want to take up the seeming contradiction regarding her remarks about factual truths. For this, I would first like to clarify what she understands to be the distinction between a rational truth—a truth based on a so-called determinate concept of what something is (e.g. a square has four equal sides with four right angles, \(2 + 2 = 4\)), or what it should be—and a factual truth, which can have both a descriptive and a normative content, that is created in political debate and discussion. While the validity of a rational truth is contained in such a truth itself, the validity of a factual truth depends upon articulating the possibility of arriving at the normative content of such truth in the exchange of opinions crucial to judgment in the political realm.

Arendt’s most explicit articulation of “factual truth” in relation to politics appears in her essay “Truth and Politics” (Arendt, 1968b). I quote at length:

Factual truth, is always related to other people; it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature. Facts and opinions, though they must be kept apart, are not antagonistic to each other; they belong to the same realm. (Arendt, 1968b: 233–34)

The trouble is that factual truth, like all other truth, peremptorily claims to be acknowledged and precludes debate, and debate constitutes the very essence of political life. The modes of thought and communication that deal with truth, if seen from the political perspective, are necessarily domineering; they don’t take into account other people’s opinions, and taking these into account is the hallmark of all strictly political thinking. (Arendt, 1968b: 236–37)
These statements reveal two distinct characteristics of factual truths: (1) factual truths are political by nature, and (2) they preclude debate, and hence are domineering. Insofar as Arendt understands the essence of politics to be debate, these two characteristics seem to be incompatible with one another. In this section, I want to address this question of their compatibility and offer a reading that renders these two seemingly contradictory statements coherent.

The first of these characteristics suggests that the “status” of factual truths is political, while the second one suggests that their “reception” is antithetical to politics. Taking an epistemic stance regarding the reception of factual truths, that is approaching it as a condition of knowledge can complement the political status of factual truths. This approach allows for an articulation of a more robust account of political action that is not devoid of worldly principles such as equality, public freedom, and justice. My claim is twofold. First, factual truths need to be acknowledged in order to understand a certain situation. That is, these truths cannot be contested. At the same time, factual truths are informative and necessary for opinion-formation.

To be clear, the scope of Arendt’s analysis in “Truth and Politics” is specific to what she distinguishes to be rational and factual truths, and the role they can play in politics. For her, rational truths are marked by how they are accessed; whether it be turning of the soul away from appearances to reality in the Platonic sense, or by experimentation and theoretical deduction as in science. While she stresses that the opposite of rational truths in science is “error” or “ignorance,” in philosophy, it becomes “illusion and opinion” (Arendt, 1968b: 228). By contrast, the opposite of factual truth is “the deliberate falsehood, or lie” (1968b: 245). A careful analysis of what Arendt’s demarcation implies for the formation of political space will be the focus of this chapter.

As Arendt (1968b: 259) does concede explicitly, the political realm is limited, “by those things which men cannot change at will.” The stake in the political realm is what gives us, she suggests, our “bearings” in the world, that is, factual truths (1968b: 257). For Arendt, factual truths are necessary in order to provide the concrete conditions of political judgment formation. How do factual truths give us our bearings? This question can be broached by teasing out three alternative ways to understand truth in its relation to (1) knowledge (truth as one of the conditions of knowledge, understood in the traditional sense of “justified true belief,” or cognitive content), (2) evidence (which admits of degrees with regard to correspondence), and (3) a claim to (or of) truth (where there is also a claim to authority). 5

Arendt is not interested in the first two options, for reasons I will briefly explain below. However, in taking up the question of the role of factual truth in relation to political space, she also wants to exclude the third option from becoming relevant to political debate and decision. For a claim to truth that is sufficiently authoritative bears the possibility of destroying the capacity to create a political realm altogether since for Arendt the essence of politics is debate, or simply put, an exchange of opinions.

First, truth understood as a condition of knowledge regards the truth of a statement where a subject can be held to have a justified true belief (hence, knowledge) only so long as there is a state of affair that corresponds to the subject’s belief. Such truth, while essential for our basic existence and capacity of action, is not readily relevant for the purposes of understanding political decision in guiding our concerted political action. By contrast, in the context of political discussion, the facts that we are talking about are in need of interpretation. At the same time, this interpretation requires us to have a certain attitude of “disinterestedness” in a world of what Arendt calls “universal interdependence” (Arendt, 1968b: 237). This is to say that knowing a factual truth, insofar as such knowledge can be gathered from one’s peers or from the newspaper, only becomes meaningful when it is discussed with others in a
manner to understand the world and to form an opinion, that is, by making such an opinion appear in the world.

Next, Arendt brings together the notions of truth and evidence in terms of “factual evidence.” And she (1968b: 239) correctly deems that insofar as such evidence is established “through testimony by eyewitnesses—notoriously unreliable—and by records, documents, and monuments, all of which can be suspected as forgeries,” it bears within itself the possibility of being denied through “false testimony.” To be sure, it is in this sense that neither the internal and external accounts of truth discussed above nor the justificatory articulation of evidence can be readily excluded from an articulation of political discussion, and they are in fact intimately linked to one another. But my interest lies elsewhere.

Central to my aim in this chapter is the third alternative, namely, truth understood in its relation to a claim to (or of) truth. This relationship is more complicated than it at first seems. While Arendt herself does not endorse such a distinction, I argue that a distinction that can be maintained between a claim—that is, the “how”8 of a claim—and the descriptive and normative content of what is claimed can help us demonstrate the coherence of Arendt’s seemingly incompatible statements to which I alluded earlier.

The normativity of factual truths

Factual truths are about what is happening in our “common world” and about the “common world” itself. It is for instance a factual truth that “In August 1914 Germany invaded Belgium” (Arendt, 1968b: 235). Inasmuch as this factual truth describes a historical phenomenon, it keeps open the reasons and the meaning of this invasion for debate that can be tackled by a group of historians who may or may not agree on certain aspects of the invasion, notwithstanding their agreement on the fact of the invasion itself.

By contrast, the statement that “all human beings are equal” is not a factual truth, rather it is a moral ideal to which we aspire and for which we strive. Nonetheless, it is also a statement that appears in our most cherished declarations of human rights and whose truth we do not want to dispute. This brings me to Arendt’s critical denial of the factual validity of human rights, not to dismiss them, but to point to the fact that human rights do not entail any enforceable praxis on their own—that is, without being taken up and decided to be performed by individuals that make up a community themselves. In this sense, political equality, for instance, is manifested in the actualization of equality of participation.

In her discussion Arendt (1968b: 242) states that “Jefferson declared certain ‘truths to be self-evident’” to argue further that when he stated that “we hold these truths to be self-evident,” this claim to truth remains a speech-act that needs to be performed in plurality. This means that the purported self-evidence of his statement “stands in need of agreement and consent” instead of merely being put forth as “the truth” (1968b: 242). There is, then, a performative aspect of articulating certain truths that are purported to be self-evident. The validity of such a claim (to truth), which Arendt (1968b: 243) calls an opinion, “depends upon free agreement and consent; they are arrived at by discursive, representative thinking; and they are communicated by means of persuasion and discussion.” In other terms, what Jefferson may have understood as the straightforward utterance of natural law, Arendt contends, can only become what it is when it is understood to rest on a judgment that we can share. It is in this sense that the validity of an opinion depends on a sort of agreement—or judgment. This point is crucial in articulating the normative role that factual truths may play in political debate. Simply put, a mere claim to truth, on its own, does not invite political discussion, due to the complexity of the performative structure of a claim. By contrast, a claim insofar
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as it is motivated by factual truth can invite further discussion of the decisions to be taken in political debate, and establish a normativity that can be fruitful in guiding action.

Let me give an example of the validity conditions of claims to truth by distinguishing between the performance of “claiming x” and “x (gaining the status of) holding true.” For instance, when one asserts that “Life starts at stage X,” the statement can be understood at two levels: (1) as a descriptive statement, which, in turn, requires the interpretation of (2) a normative content. The disagreement in this case stems from what one means by the phrase “start of a life” and what normative assumptions these terms carry in relation to one another. The notion of life may imply a plethora of normative valuations: that life must be preserved, or that life is sacred, or that the potential of life requires the articulation of a rights-bearing subject. On the other hand, the start of such life may imply sentience or consciousness following one’s presuppositions. Such a claim may preclude the discussion between equal parties, when one imagines pro-life and pro-choice parties involved in a debate as to the right of preserving life in the context of the abortion of a fetus.

While the pro-life party could argue that the life of the zygote should be preserved for the fetus is considered a potential rights-bearing subject; the pro-choice party would contend that life understood as a potential does not have moral force in determining the potential-mother’s decision regarding a possible abortion. Since the two parties do not have a “common meaning” of the term “life,” their disagreement cannot be resolved for they do not start from similar assumptions. If the statement were instead that “Fetuses feel pain at stage Y,” it would have been a “factual truth” rather than a “claim to truth” with a normative ground that can be uncovered in debate. Such a truth then bears the possibility to invite as well as inform a discussion on how this truth can guide our decisions and actions regarding the moral permissibility of abortion. Understood thus, factual truths bring to focus an openness to interpretation and discussion, and they become necessary for opinion-formation.

Central to Arendt’s articulation of opinion is a Kantian tenet of thinking, as she makes clear when she states:

[Kant] believes that the very faculty of thinking depends on its public use; without ’the test of free and open examination,’ no thinking and no opinion-formation are possible. Reason is not made to ’isolate itself but to get into community with others’. (Arendt, 1989: 40, 40n92)

In contending thus “no opinion is self-evident” (Arendt, 1968b: 238) opinion-formation is itself a relational act. As Arendt (1963: 268–69) writes:

Opinions are formed in a process of open discussion and public debate, and where no opportunity for the forming of opinions exist, there may be moods—moods of the masses and moods of individuals, the latter no less fickle and unreliable than the former—but no opinion.

Arendt’s point is poignant: a public may have moods, but no opinion. Opinion-formation rests on the conditions of open discussion and public debate which are twofold: (1) that there is a public that has come together to discuss and debate certain issues, and (2) that there are factual truths available to this public, that can render their discussion, and by extension individuals’ opinions on the subject matter meaningful and freely formed. Understood thus, the availability of factual truths becomes a necessary condition in a political debate, which involves well-informed parties who practice their freedom of opinion. For Arendt
(1968b: 237), articulated thus, opinion becomes distinct from “interest,” understood as a private or collective reality for “the quality of an opinion, as of a judgment, depends upon its impartiality.” This articulation of opinion may sound counterintuitive to our modern ears, but Arendt’s conviction stems from her re-articulation of the Kantian “enlarged mentality,” which she understands as the vehicle of representative thinking to argue that

[the very process of opinion formation is determined by those in whose places somebody thinks and uses his own mind, and the only condition for this exertion of the imagination is disinterestedness, the liberation from one’s own private interests.11

Arendt’s contention brings to focus the fact that opinion is not equivalent to one’s idiosyncratic conviction about what interests one or one’s group. Disinterestedness brings to focus the element of publicness that is required of political judgment. As such, private interests cannot be the proper motivation to enter a public space wherein the free formation of opinion and exchange can happen. Opinion, in this sense, entails a responsibility of thinking, i.e., of thought that which one may reliably defend in contradistinction to something that one may just utter—or believe—without being able to explain one’s reasons for believing it. To be sure, one may also be deceived in what they take to be reasons for their opinions, and the possibility of recovering the factual truths that inform opinions is exactly why political discussion matters.

Since opinions are formed in plurality and exchange—which is what create a common world in response to the world itself—interests cannot be what grounds the creation of a common world, or our common responsibility for it. Responsibility here denotes the ability to respond, which can only be preceded by an epistemic stance of combining “factual truths” and understanding so as to be able to judge and initiate action. On my reading, then, opinion—formation not only retains its public status, but also gains an essential spatial aspect.

The spatial aspect of political judgment elucidates an element of political discussion in showing that it is not only the possible points of view that count in creating this enlarged mentality; but, rather, the actual discussion and hearing of others’ points of view becomes crucial in explaining the import of principled political action that recovers the plurality of human existence.12 Next, I will explore the question of validity of factual truths, and the role such validity plays in deliberating about our political decisions.

**The validity of factual truths**

The validity of factual truths is closely linked to the question of the meaningfulness of knowledge of certain factual truths. For Arendt (1994: 310) such meaningfulness is in consonance with understanding: “Understanding is based on knowledge and knowledge cannot proceed without a preliminary, inarticulate understanding.” The issue at stake is action. That is, while one can have a basic knowledge of certain facts, these facts on their own do not entail action: the meaning of factual truths relates to what may be relevant to action (either speech or deed or both). In turn, the commitment to respond to the world which takes its bearings from factual truths is what makes room for an understanding that exceeds a preliminary understanding, insofar as it is combined with political judgment that creates meaning in a plurality of others.

Conceding that the role of understanding is to make knowledge meaningful,13 I argue against Arendt’s (1968b: 255) own conviction that the evaluation of factual truths is “one of the various modes of being alone,” and that it is a “standpoint outside the political realm”
which makes political commitment, in her terms, impossible. The absence of an elucidation of the connection between factual truths, opinion, and action is the reason for Arendt’s conviction. If such meaning resides in public debate, then the motivating factor for the public manifestation of a shared meaning corresponds to the relationship between factual truths and participation:

Facts inform opinions, and opinions, inspired by different interests and passions, can differ widely and still be legitimate as long as they respect factual truth. Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed and the facts themselves are not in dispute. In other words, factual truth informs political thought just as rational truth informs philosophical speculation. (Arendt, 1968b: 234)

Arendt’s claim not only suggests that factual truths are necessary where freedom of opinion is concerned, but also that the legitimacy of opinion is dependent upon an attitude of respect for factual truths. She understands opinion not in terms of validity, as in the case of truths, where, in her terms, the element of coercion corresponds to the validity of any truth claim. “All truths,” she (1968b: 235) asserts, “—not only the various kinds of rational truth but also factual truth—are opposed to opinion in their mode of asserting validity,” for “truth carries within itself an element of coercion.”

Arendt elucidates how rational and factual truths are arrived at differently but once established as true, “they are beyond agreement, dispute, opinion, or consent” (Arendt, 1968b: 235). The validity of rational truths is determined by the process by which they are arrived at, which belong to the faculty of cognition aimed at uncovering rational truths. For example, the assertion that “the sum of 2+2 equals 4” can be arrived at by counting, or linear regression, or rational deduction. The process by which this knowledge is established, indeed, has an “element of coercion.” For the assertion that “the sum of 2+2 equals 4” is a truth whose validity cannot be contested. One either comes to know the conclusion to be the case, or one simply does not know how to count.

Politically speaking, what is crucial for Arendt is that the validity of rational truths does not require an exchange of opinions. By contrast, the validity of factual truths gains meaning in being discussed. If the essence of political thinking resides in such an exchange, where, in Arendt’s terms, “factual truth informs political thought,” we must ask where the validity of a factual truth resides. On my view, the most viable candidate here is political judgment, which confers upon this factual truth, meaning. As Arendt (1968a: 217) states, “the capacity to judge is a specifically political ability,” as “the ability to see things not only from one’s point of view but in the perspective of all those who happen to be present.” Judgment, in this sense, is a human capacity that requires the conditions of impartiality and disinterestedness. These conditions underline the normative dimension of political judgment Arendt does not explicitly account for.

Hence, while factuality has a stubborn characteristic of “thereness” (Arendt, 1968b: 253), its validity and meaning comes from how one understands factual truths in relation to others who share one’s world. Tracy B. Strong (2013: 360) stresses that “the validity of political judgments depends not so much on the actuality that and of what one knows as on one’s capacity to acknowledge the opinions of others.” Strong rightly wants to emphasize that factual truth by itself is not sufficient to enable one to form a political judgment, but that the capacity to acknowledge (that is, recognize) others’ opinions is what enables, so to speak, judgment formation that Arendt deems possible only in a community with others. While I agree with Strong’s overall contention, I maintain that this is too quick a leap. The crucial point about
the validity of factual truths is that it is not self-evidently coercive. Factual truths demand a response from the individual. It is in this sense that these truths become motivating factors in being willing to partake in the public realm.

**A possible objection: the status of the lie**

What role does the lie play in politics? While political action as a human performance requires speech in action, which discloses, Arendt suggests, “what [he] [the actor] does, has done, and intends to do” (1958: 179), she states elsewhere that “[he] [the liar] is an actor by nature; he says what is not so because he wants things to be different from what they are—that is, he wants to change the world” (1968b: 246). This attitude is precisely why she contends that to lie is an action and that “our ability to lie—but not necessarily our ability to tell the truth—belong among the few obvious, demonstrable data that confirm human freedom” (Arendt, 1968b: 246). Yet for Arendt, “words can be relied on only if one is sure that their function is to reveal and not to conceal” (Arendt, 1972b: 163).

To recall, the opposite of factual truth is the deliberate falsehood, or the lie. The deliberate falsehood and lie can be seen in cases where political lie/propaganda covers over the emergence of a political space where political debate can happen among equals. I maintain that a lie forecloses the responsible attitude towards our political existence together. Let me explain why. First, the liar is in a quasi-sovereign position to manipulate the truths of the world. This seems like a “response” to the world through and through. The act of lying in this sense still points to the freedom of the human being: the capacity to say/do otherwise, and hence change the world in a certain sense, or present it as it is not. The motive behind lying is to change the world—or an aspect thereof. Isn’t this exactly what political action does? Don’t political actors aim to change the world when they act? The liar acts in accordance with her self-interest, which is not world-oriented, but rather, if one wills, utility-oriented. Even though the liar’s action aims at changing the world, lying cannot be inspired by a “worldly principle,” but only by instrumental motives.

Lying cannot create a world of plurality and equality, for it destroys the very foundation on which such a world can rest. This is why the attitude of the liar is irresponsible in a twofold manner: the attitude of liar not only lacks worldly principles, but it also covers over the “factual truths” and incapacitates the individual (or an audience as such) to exercise her freedom of opinion. The lie introduces a rupture in the individual’s thinking and opinion-formation; the bridge between factual truth and judgment is thereby corrupted. The act of lying—whether one is the agent of the act itself or the receiving party—does not comply with the element of impartiality, which is necessary to exercise the freedom of opinion. Even though lying manifests the freedom of the individual and hence is called an “action,” it cannot be a political action because it lacks worldly principles and cannot admit of a plurality of opinions.

**Conclusion**

What I have demonstrated thus far is that factual truths cannot be excluded from Arendt’s account of political action, and that there is a necessary relationship between factual truths and opinion-formation in political space.

If we are to take seriously a “right to unmanipulated factual information,” then the preservation of factual truths themselves is crucial to make possible the basic conditions of freedom of opinion. Having outlined the role that factual truths play in politics, I hope to have arrived at a more robust account of principled political action that established the connection
between the knowledge of certain factual truths and the political judgments and decisions of actors in a political space. Based on what gives us our bearings in the world, that is, the validity and meaning of factual truths arrived at by debate and discussion, a responsible decision can capitalize the characteristic of political action as its own end without reducing it to an arbitrary performance without worldly principles.

We are now in a better position to understand what Arendt (1968b: 254) means when she says:

The political attitude toward facts must, indeed, tread the very narrow path between the danger of taking them as the results of some necessary development which men could not prevent and about which they can therefore do nothing and the danger of denying them, of trying to manipulate them out of the world.

The world, the “space of appearance” as such, is the “in-between” of our existence, which makes community possible in the first place. This “in-between” depends upon our capacity to create meaning through our political judgments rather than to found and be founded by a rational truth. In conclusion, this Arendtian articulation of the relationship between factual truths and political action—where the relationship is manifested through the correspondence of our political judgments—gives us the world as the “place of responsibility.”

Notes

1 This chapter is adapted from Yasemin Sari, “Arendt, Truth, and Epistemic Responsibility,” Arendt Studies, Volume 2, 2018, pp.149–70. https://doi.org/10.5840/arendtstudies20185311. I have updated material for the purposes of publication and modified the argument to exclude the novel claim of the original work, that is, the identification of epistemic responsibility as an action-guiding principle that is implicit in Hannah Arendt’s account of political action.

2 The court injunction, to be sure, was overturned by the Supreme Court and the Times was able to resume publishing: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/30/insider/1971-supreme-court-allows-publication-of-pentagon-papers.html.

3 Arendt asserts that there is “no right to touch factual matter itself” (Arendt, 1968b: 234), which she leaves undeveloped.

4 For a detailed elaboration on the role of principles in Arendt’s account, see (Sari, 2018).

5 This account of truth can admit of both an internal and external account of truth, elucidated in the respective accounts of Plato (1992) and Hobbes (1994), as they are found in the former’s The Republic, and in the latter’s Leviathan.

6 This is one reason why an Arendtian decision cannot be read in purely decisionistic terms.

7 In this essay, she alludes to the removal of Trotsky’s name from the historical account of the Russian Revolution as an example.

8 By this I mean what philosophers of language underscore as the perlocutionary force of a claim that is the meaning of its performance of as a speech-act.

9 I will limit my discussion here to what may become the topic of public debate—and inspire political action—putting aside the debate about whether these truths may be understood as brute facts or not. Insofar as the concern is politics, the elements of interpretation and debate become crucial.


11 (Arendt, 1968b: 237, my emphasis). The discussion of the element of disinterestedness that accompanies the act of opinion-formation has been one of the central tenets of understanding Arendt’s conception of political judgment and has received ample attention by feminist scholars. Cf. (Zerilli, 2005).

12 See also (Benhabib, 1988). For a discussion of “enlarged mentality” see (Arendt, 1989: 42–44).


14 For further discussion on judgment, see (Arendt, 1971, 1989). See also (Bernstein, 1989), and (Sari, 2020).
The text is revised to retain part of the argument about Arendt’s take on “factual truths” and “political judgment” without losing its meaning.

I agree with James Phillips’ articulation of “opinion as a construct” to be what is at stake for Arendt’s defense of opinion against truth (Phillips, 2013: 102).

References


