

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HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION AND LEADERSHIP IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN CONFLICTS

Michelle Nel

Introduction

After the devastation of the Second World War, the United Nations (UN) was created with the primary mission of maintaining peace and security. With the atrocities still fresh in their memories, member states were eager to prevent a repeat of the devastation caused. They rallied, and the UN Charter consequently sets out the aim of the UN in Article 1:

> To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

These lofty ideals, however, ran into difficulty in the 1990s with the end of the Cold War when the reality of conflicts shifted from international armed conflicts – the type of conflict the UN Charter was tailor-made for – to non-international armed conflicts, a reality not foreseen in 1945 with the inception of the UN. The body of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), applicable to international conflicts, no longer sufficed, and International Human Rights Law (IHRL) became more and more relevant. Not only did the nature of conflicts change but also the number and nature of the role-players.

The conflict was no longer the exclusive domain of nation states but expanded to include a proliferation of armed groups, non-governmental organizations, private military companies, and other non-state actors. This creates an unequal playing field where states can be held accountable in terms of international law, but non-state actors may escape liability. Civilians have become targets, and human rights violations have become weapons.

Human rights: an African perspective

Nowhere is this as true as in Africa. On a continent rife with conflict, the perpetual cycle of war and violence inevitably leads to a denial of basic human rights either as a reason for the

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conflict or as a consequence thereof. Whether by the hands of their own governments, armed groups, or the inaction of other states, without human rights protection, there cannot be any sustainable, lasting peace and security (Lima 2016; Gibney 2016). The aim of human rights is to protect all human beings, whether in times of peace or war, and by virtue of documents such as the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, these rights are seen as universal, and duty is placed on all states to protect their people. Human rights protection has become one of the main purposes of the UN. This is also true for the continent where the *African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights* (ACHPR) aims to protect the basic human rights and freedoms of the African people in particular. Although the ACHPR is less robust in its protection of civil and political rights than a number of other international human rights documents, it goes further than the European and American regional human rights documents in that it provides for individual *and* peoples' rights (Heyns and Killander 2014). This can be seen as a reflection on the African concept of *ubuntu*[1] and the importance placed on the sense of community.

The ACHPR is not the only African document to address the protection of its people. The *Constitutive Act of the African Union* acknowledges the need to "promote peace, security and stability" due to the negative effect of the many conflicts on the development of the continent. It aims to "promote and protect human and peoples" rights in accordance with the *African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights* and other relevant human rights instruments and to "promote respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance". It has been asserted that the change from the OAU to the AU has created huge potential for an increase in the role human rights play in the AU by moving from non-interference to non-indifference, the explicit recognition of human rights and particularly gender rights, as well as a human-centred approach to development (Gawanas n.d.).

The contemporary human rights situation in Africa, however, does not bear out this potential. The 2017/2018 Amnesty International Africa report refers to a "cycle of impunity for human rights violations". The report paints a bleak picture of crackdowns on peaceful protests, attacks on human rights activists, regressive laws restricting the activities of these human rights defenders, as well as the media in their ability to expose human rights violations. Serious human rights violations characterize armed conflicts, and armed groups act with impunity in attacking civilians and committing large-scale war crimes. This is exacerbated by acts of torture and the displacement of people as well as the discrimination against, marginalisation, and abuse of women and girls in acts of sexual violence.

Human rights protection: whose responsibility is it, anyway?

Where people, whether as individuals or as the whole population of a state, are bearers of human rights, the state has a corresponding duty to ensure these rights' protection and enforcement. It is generally accepted that the responsibility for both the protection and the enforcement of human rights – and therefore ultimately the civilian population – lie with governments (Gibney 2016).

Historically the OAU protected the interests of member states, considering the sovereignty of the newly decolonized states as paramount. Article II of the OAU Charter clearly sets out the purpose of the OAU as "promoting the unity and solidarity of the African States" – note here *not* the unity and solidarity *of the African people*, defending the sovereignty of African States and promoting international cooperation, with due regard to, amongst others, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This led to the protection of states protecting the primacy of regime security to the detriment of human security, the 'unity and solidarity' called for being the solidarity of reigning regimes and not of the African people (Ani 2016). The creation of the AU was, amongst others, aimed at moving the stance of this regional body away from

the primacy of state security towards a doctrine of non-indifference and promotion of human security. Although the aim of the AU remains the defence of the sovereignty and independence of member states, this has been tempered by the right of the AU, as set out in Article 4(h), to intervene in a member state where that state has committed the serious international crimes of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. In spite of the purported shift towards human security, serious concerns remain regarding the question of whether non-indifference has in fact translated into the political will required for interventions in the face of gross human rights abuses. Ani (2016) argues that the AU has manifested shortcomings in the attainment of its human rights responsibilities. As long as member states cling to the perceived need of gaining consent from the ruling elite before attempting an intervention, it has not yet made the paradigm shift necessary for prioritizing human rights in the advancement of human security. In many instances, the ruling elite are themselves responsible for the human rights abuses, and the AUs credibility in its ability to protect human rights will suffer.

This inability has manifested in the AUs response to the crises in Sudan and Libya (Ani 2016), and, although the Peace and Security Council recommended an AU intervention in Burundi, they bowed to pressure from Burundi when it was asserted that the government of Burundi would consider any intervention as an invasion of their sovereign territory (Nel and Brits 2017; Al Jazeera 2016). To date, the AU, in spite of having had legitimate cause, has not yet exercised their Article 4(h) intervention right in what could arguably be seen as a lack of contemporary leadership.

In an opinion seemingly less critical of the inability of African leadership to protect human rights, Heyns and Killander (2014, 441) argue that African governments' failure in protecting the human rights of their citizens may lie in the fact that the idea of the enforcement of human rights is either absent or poorly developed within many traditional African societies. Duties imposed by human rights documents are often seen as more 'aspirational' or 'moral' rather than legally enforceable. This opinion is underscored by the fact that the only monitoring mechanism is the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), which is tasked with the promotion and protection of human rights in Africa. The African Commission can make recommendations to heads of state where violations occur, but it does not possess any enforcement mechanism to ensure states abide by its recommendations. Challenges with enforcement are further reflected and exacerbated by the lack of clarity regarding the existence of an adequate African judicial forum for human rights enforcement.

Due to an apparent increase in focus on human rights in the 1990s, the Protocol on the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights was adopted in 2004, shortly after which the AU Assembly decided that this court should merge with the African Court of Justice, a court provided for by the Constitutive Act of the AU but not yet in existence. In 2008, the AU Assembly adopted the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, once again opting for a new iteration (Heyns and Killander 2014). Neither the African Court of Justice and Human Rights nor its predecessor, the African Court of Justice, has rallied the political will for ratification and implementation, denoting a possible lack of leadership.

All indications are that not only is the *protection* of human rights challenged in the African context but also the *enforcement* thereof. In spite of the fact that all 54 African countries had ratified the ACHPR by 2016, the level of atrocities and violence perpetrated against civilians, by both governments and non-state actors, have escalated to the point where the responsibility for civilian protection has fallen on peace support operations, with their mandates now mainly focused on the protection of civilians (POC) and not merely on traditional peacekeeping. Although human rights violations do not lie within the exclusive domain of the state and may also be violated in the private sphere, this chapter now turns to the POC in the face of

serious human rights violations during armed conflict, perpetrated either by the state or by non-state actors and the role that leadership can play.

Human rights violations: protection of civilians during conflict

The scope and need for the protection of civilians has been a concern for the UN since the implementation of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 1949 (Popovski 2014) and, as the need for protection escalates, garner more attention from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The 2001 *Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict* showed that civilians have become the primary victims of armed conflicts, with an increase in the proportion of victims to 75% or more (UNSC Report 2001). In 2017 alone, the UN recorded 26,000 civilian deaths and injuries in just six deployment areas (UNSC Report 2018). As a consequence, the 2018 UNSC *Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict* describes the state of the protection of civilians as "bleak" and set the enhancing of the "respect for international humanitarian and human rights law" as one of its protection priorities. The Secretary-General warns that action in protecting civilians during armed conflict is urgently required and reiterates the importance of the effective implementation of human rights law.

This, once again, reflects the primacy of human rights protection during armed conflict – human rights protection is a sine qua non for the protection of civilians. Babbitt (2009, 613) echoes the words by Khen et al. quoted at the beginning of this chapter: merely stopping physical violence is not enough in order to reach sustainable peace. What is required is what she refers to as "positive peace" where the "social, political, and economic conditions" within a society that lead to actual physical violence must be addressed. She argues that "[t]he integration of human rights principles into conflict resolution processes is a critical way to build pathways towards such positive peace" (Babbitt 2009, 613). Conflict flourishes in, among other conditions, environments of repression and the unequal treatment of groups or communities and is likely to erupt in the volatile period where states transition into democracy – placing "group identity and perceptions of discrimination" at the heart of conflict drivers, inevitably leading to violence and conflict (Babbitt 2009, 614; Mayanja 2013). It is in these situations that leadership plays a critical role, walking a thin line between a conflict resolution and a human rights agenda in order to facilitate sustainable peace.

Since governments seem unable to prevent harm to their citizens, the increasing number of civilians as victims in armed conflict has resulted in POC becoming the main focus of contemporary peace support operation mandates (Gordon 2013; Boulden 2018). A number of UN Resolutions have paid particular attention to the protection of children and vulnerable groups against sexual violence. The protection of civilians is generally approached from a number of different, yet interrelated aspects. One such aspect relates to the engagement of political leaders with other actors and stakeholders in the prevention of conflict. This is done by engaging local stakeholders, working towards community engagement, and assisting local communities (UN Peacekeeping n.d.).

The UN also engages experts in the strengthening of the rule of law and human rights in order to create a protective environment for civilians. For many, the protection of civilians has come to mean a broadening of traditional protection in terms of IHL to include international human rights law (Gordon 2013; Willmot and Sheeran 2013). Most contemporary UN peace operations has a human rights team that assists with the implementation of their human rights mandate, supported by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (UN Peacekeeping n.d.).

The military and police are used for providing security and stability (UN Peacekeeping n.d.). The military should generally be used only as a last resort, but the inability of states and its leadership to protect civilians has led to a situation where it has become necessary for the military to use enforcement and stabilisation methods and mandates, authorizing the use of "all necessary means" to ensure the protection of civilians (Bellamy and Hunt 2015, 1277). This means that POC mandates have become necessary for ensuring the protection of civilians (Boulden 2018). The reality is often that the government, who is supposed to protect its citizens, is often the reason they need protection in the first place, thereby using military means in trying to find a political solution. It is not within the purview of peace operations to achieve the long-term goals of sustainable peace. At most, they can create an environment that allows the actors in the conflict, together with the civilian community, to build their own peace (Bellamy and Hunt 2015).

POC mandates usually manifest in one or more activities. It can require the military to place itself between the threatened civilians and the armed groups, it may require them to position themselves in such a way as to deter attacks on civilians, or it may require the military forces to restrict the movements of the armed groups threatening civilians. Since the presence of peacekeepers has been shown to limit the number of attacks on civilians, this places a heavy burden on those responsible for peacekeeping by creating unrealistic expectations in their ability to create sustainable peace. Bellamy and Hunt (2015) argue that sustainable peace is only possible if it is established by the citizens themselves.

Sexual violence, exploitation, and abuse in conflict zones

Although many examples of gross human rights violations exist, the scourge of sexual violence, specifically in conflict zones, is a matter that has raised considerable debate in the narrative relating to the protection of human rights during times of conflict. Civilians in conflict areas, whether women, children, or men, are particularly vulnerable since the weak institutions caused by protracted conflicts cannot protect them. Victims consequently have no one to turn to and no avenue for justice redress.

In a comprehensive discussion, Heineman (2008) traces the history of sexual violence against women, specifically in the human rights context. She posits that, although the origins of human rights can be traced back to the heightened concern for the individual during the European Enlightenment, protection of these rights in the public sphere required autonomy in the private sphere, a state not available to women, children, and slaves at the time. The focus on civil and political rights placed a gendered and racial perspective on its protection and although the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* also included social and economic rights, the Cold War continued to skew the focus of human rights towards the civil and political first-generation rights, with the second-generation rights of women being subordinated (Heineman 2018). Although the International Tribunal at Nuremberg established rape as a crime against humanity, this was not enforced and prosecuted. It was regarded merely as a common wartime occurrence. With the end of the Cold War and the proliferation of armed conflicts with serious human rights violations, the sexual violation of women in conflict zones started attracting attention but was still considered through a gendered lens – classifying wartime rape as a crime against honour, often the honour of the male relative, instead of being seen as a violation and torture of the woman as victim. It was only in the 1970s that the feminist movement, in their fight for second-generation rights, started including sexual violence in conflict zones within this human rights narrative (Heineman 2018).

The tide slowly turned with the mass human rights atrocities perpetrated in Rwanda and Yugoslavia. The UN International Tribunal for Rwanda was the first international court to

prosecute mass rape as a war crime (Human Rights Watch 1998). The influence of leadership and its potential to advance impunity in this context clearly played out during the Rwanda tribunals. The accused was first charged in 1996 for a number of international crimes, but this first indictment did not include charges of sexual violence due to the lack of political will among fellow high-ranking tribunal members. It was only after serious pressure from Rwanda and a number of international rights groups that the charges were amended and resulted in the first-ever conviction of sexual violence committed during a civil war and a finding that rape constituted an act of genocide (Human Rights Watch 1998). Subsequently, rape was codified in the Rome Statute and came within the jurisdiction of serious international crimes of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Care should, however, be taken not to link sexual violence in conflict exclusively to genocide while it is prevalent in any number of armed conflicts that do not meet the threshold of genocide.

International organisations have now recognized sexual violence in conflict zones as a human rights violation and a war crime (Heineman 2008), and an extensive number of documents exist for addressing the matter of sexual violence in conflict zones. UN Security Council Resolution 1888 (United Nations 2009) recognizes that sexual violence constitutes a threat to global peace and security, and the UN established the Mandate on Sexual Violence in Conflict in 2009 as a means to prevent and address conflict-related sexual violence. The UN Security Council Resolution 1325, establishing the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, set out to remind states of their obligations in terms of international law and established special measures, including the ending of impunity for these grave crimes by taking action against "wartime gender violence", in the protection of women and girls (Kirby 2015). These resolutions and declarations are applicable mutatis mutandis to the African context in that the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, having entered into force in 2005, calls for the protection of the rights of women as stipulated in all international conventions and declarations.

There is an impressive body of conventions, policies, and resolutions within the sexual violence framework, yet this has not appreciatively changed the status quo. The problem lies between the existence of these policies and what Kirby (2015, 460) refers to as a "devastating implementation gap". With Resolution 1325 recommending the drafting of action plans to combat sexual violence, only 36 countries have in fact done so (Kirby 2015). What is needed is not more documents acknowledging the legal responsibility of government but rather the political will and leadership to enforce the already extensive body of documents.

Although outside the scope of this chapter, it is submitted that the reasons for sexual violence against women should be considered in understanding the persistence of this form of human rights abuse. The existing narrative has been strong that rape in the context of conflict zones should be seen as a "weapon of war" (Kirby 2015). There are, however, a number of alternative reasons for sexual violence, such as the capture of women for reproductive labour and the use of sexual violence as a means to punish women seen as traitors during the internal conflicts, to name a few (Heineman 2008). It is not only the enemy who commit rape; sexual offences are also committed by those entrusted with the protection of the very people they ultimately victimise – peacekeepers tasked with POC mandates.

What constitutes sexual violence in conflict has been defined by the UN as any actions of "rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, enforced sterilization, forced marriage, and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated against women, men, girls or boys that is directly or indirectly linked to a conflict" (UNSC 2017, 3). As has been previously highlighted, sexual victimisation is not the exclusive domain of armed groups. The prevalence of the sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by peacekeepers has

necessitated action by the UN in combatting these violations, expressing zero tolerance towards perpetrators. Although SEA includes crimes as set out in the UN definition of sexual violence, the threshold for liability of peacekeepers is much lower and may expose them to prosecution in a much wider variety of action than what is generally understood to constitute acts of sexual violence. The Secretary-General of the UN has defined "sexual exploitation" as "any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another" and "sexual abuse" as "actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions" (UN Secretariat 2003).

There seem to be two distinct streams of accountability for sexual-based violence. One set includes armed groups who subject women, children, and men to acts of sexual violence as part of the conflict. When considering the UN definition, this would equate to sexual offences such as rape and sexual assault, which is generally addressed in most domestic criminal law jurisdictions that adhere to the rule of law. The second set relates to peacekeepers during UN mission deployments, often within POC-mandated deployments, and would include any exploitative actions by peacekeepers, including what would in most domestic jurisdictions be seen as consensual fraternisation. Even a consensual relationship between a peacekeeper and a local citizen may result in liability in terms of the UN Standards of Conduct pertaining to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. The UNs stance towards incidents of SEA is easily justifiable considering the volatile and politically precarious environment of contemporary UN deployments. Peacekeepers, especially those entrusted with the protection of vulnerable civilians, have a duty to protect and not exploit or abuse. Any exploitation and abuse may lead to mistrust between the peacekeepers and those they are duty-bound to protect, endangering the success of their mission.

The UN addresses SEA from three aspects. The first point of approach is that of prevention. This is done by means of training deploying troops, conducting public outreach programmes, and attempting to control the behaviour of peacekeepers by, for example, implementing curfews and designating certain areas as off-limits. The second point of approach is the enforcement of the UN Standards of Conduct. Enforcement entails a range of actions ranging from complaints and investigations to disciplinary procedures. The disciplinary processes may be the weak link in the chain of enforcement, resulting in victims not receiving the justice they deserve. Where members of the armed forces of troop-contributing countries (TCC) are involved, the UN will, after an investigation has shown SEA violations, repatriate the member to his own country with the expectation that the TCC remains responsible for enforcing national jurisdiction – usually in the form of their military legal framework – thereby holding the member accountable for the violations committed in the mission area. Not all TCCs comply with prosecution of violations. Considering the wide net of SEA offences, it is often the situation that what is regarded as a violation of the UN Standards of Conduct is not an offence in terms of the TCCs domestic law. Prosecution would therefore not be possible, resulting in no liability and no accountability. The third point of approach refers to remedial action that can be taken with resources in place for victim assistance and paternity claims.

The focus has been on sexual violence in conflict zones for a number of years, and although significant normative and institutional progress has been made in the decade since the establishment of the Mandate on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Margot Wallstrom, Former UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, urged the UN to put words into practice – implying that the rhetoric is short on implementation (UN Women 2019). Even though countries are supportive of the strategies and initiatives proposed by the UN, the continued prevalence and impunity of sexual violence would strongly indicate that it is not

working. Kirby (2015) propose a number of reasons for the lack of success and argues that the approach towards sexual violence is too limited.

Firstly, he argues that the existing initiatives concentrate too much on military perpetrators to the exclusion of other actors in the conflict theatre responsible for sexual violence (Kirby 2015). This argument is borne out in the focus of the literature on sexual abuse during peace operations – focusing on the UN and their response to peacekeepers as perpetrators of SEA. Of the two distinct streams of accountability previously discussed, it is logical that the UN/peacekeeping dynamic will garner the most attention due to the fact that the UN cannot be seen to harm instead of protect, and it is also arguably the easiest to address since the UN has some level of control over its peacekeepers but none over the armed groups.

Secondly, none of the existing initiatives and resolutions has any strong deterrence value (Kirby 2015). Not only are structures under-resourced, but accountability and attribution of perpetrators are few and far between. The challenges regarding accountability of peacekeepers have been discussed earlier, and the attribution and accountability of other actors are also not guaranteed. Peace is often hard-won due to negotiations and compromise. Compromise often leads to indemnities and would, for perpetrators of sexual violence, result in their escaping liability. The victims would consequently not receive justice, raising the enduring debate of peace versus justice and conflict resolution versus human rights enforcement.[2]

Thirdly, Kirby (2015) argues that successful implementation of preventive sexual violence strategies and initiative requires more attention to the plight of men and boys as victims of sexual violence. The predominant narrative narrows the focus to women and children with little recognition of men as victims of sexual violence (O'Mochain 2015). More research is required into this aspect.

Conclusion: when peacekeepers leave, can the African leadership protect Africa's people?

Considering the UN's involvement in the numerous violent conflicts and the number of human rights abuses on the continent, it is not difficult to argue that the UN has in fact taken on a leadership role in African human rights protection. Considering the earlier discussion on the prominence of peoples' rights and *ubuntu* in the African context, this raises questions regarding the appropriateness of UN initiatives and doctrine, with their focus on individual human rights, to the African context. Ferim (2013) posits that "African solutions for African problems" – the rallying cry for African leaders concerned with foreign meddling in African affairs – is a recognition by African leaders that African societies are different. Its challenges require a different approach from that followed by Western countries, implying that the region and subregions have a better understanding of their own regions, as well as the underlying reasons for their conflicts, and would consequently be in a better position of finding a resolution to the conflict (Ferim 2013). The continent, however, remains plagued by bad governance, violent conflicts and underdevelopment, to name a few and Ferim (2013, 145) rightly asks the question whether African states have the will and the capacity to address these challenges.

With the UN closing down the UN Mission in Sudan (UNAMID) in 2020 and scaling down the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MUNUSCO) by 2022, the time has come to ask whether African leadership is in a position to protect the African people. Mayanja (2013) argues that African leadership reflects bad governance, consistent violations of human rights, and various forms of fraud and corruption, consequently undermining peace and social justice due to a lack of ethical leadership. Whereas leadership can generally be defined

as "the process of persuasion or example by which an individual induces a group to pursue objectives held by the leader or shared by the leader and his or her followers" (Warfield and Sentongo 2011, 85), leadership in the African context is complex and can be best described as multilayered, reflecting three interrelated levels of leadership: (1) the "regime elites" which would include political and religious leaders, (2) the intellectuals and ethnic leaders, and (3) the grassroots leadership (Warfield and Sentongo 2011, 86), each dependent on the other for fluid mobility and negotiations between the different levels. Leadership is rarely limited to only one person and involves citizens, the relationship of the leadership with those citizens, as well as the context of the leadership (Hermann and Gerard 2009). The interrelated levels previously mentioned and how they relate with each other would therefore also play a significant role in determining the success – or not – of a particular leader.

It should be kept in mind that just a leadership has the power to bring about democracy, it has the power to incite violence (Botha 2012). Leadership style and the level of the leadership may therefore be seen as critical in the process of obtaining sustainable peace. It is submitted that irrespective of the leadership style and considering the importance of community and *ubuntu*, the grassroots-level leadership is of particular importance in Africa. Sustainable peace requires the involvement of the whole of society, and any peacebuilding should be approached with a focus on addressing the trauma of conflict suffered by the citizens (Atashi 2009). Sustainable peace will therefore only be reached once the relationships with and among citizens of the state is transformed (Atashi 2009). It is only by listening to its citizens that government will be able to comply with its sovereign duty to protect. This once again underscores the need for the protection and implementation of human rights, as a vehicle to protect these citizens, for the achievement of sustainable peace. Ramcharan (2004, 44) reiterates that "peace that is not accompanied by strategies for the promotion and protection of human rights is unlikely to be a lasting one".

Notes

1 '*Ubuntu* means that a person becomes a person through other persons' (Mayanja 2013, 121). It is an African concept rooted in love, human dignity, and the collective good.
2 For a comprehensive discussion on the challenges of integrating the human rights and conflict resolution agendas, see Babbitt (2009). This discussion falls outside the scope of this chapter.

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