This article was downloaded by: *10.3.97.143*
On: 01 Dec 2023
Access details: *subscription number*
Publisher: *Routledge*
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK



Routledge Handbook of Conflict Response and Leadership in Africa

Alpaslan Özerdem, Sinem Akgül-Açkmee, Ian Liebenberg

Civil Society Groups' Peace Activism and Media in Kenya

Publication details
https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780429318603-25
Zacharia Chiliswa
Published online on: 15 Sep 2021

How to cite :- Zacharia Chiliswa. 15 Sep 2021, *Civil Society Groups' Peace Activism and Media in Kenya from:* Routledge Handbook of Conflict Response and Leadership in Africa Routledge
Accessed on: 01 Dec 2023
https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780429318603-25

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT

Full terms and conditions of use: https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms

This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 16:47 01 Dec 2023; For: 9780429318603, chapter21, 10.4324/9780429318603-25

21

CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS' PEACE ACTIVISM AND MEDIA IN KENYA

Zacharia Chiliswa

Introduction

On February 28, 2008, nearly two months after the disputed presidential elections results and ensuing violent protests, deaths, massive human displacement, and the destruction of properties, there was palpable and crippling fear and anxiety throughout Kenya of not overcoming the political impasse. When the former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in the company of the two political arch-rivals, the incumbent President Mwai Kibaki and the opposition leader Raila Odinga, emerged at the president's office – Harambee House – the attention of most Kenyans and the global audience was fixed on what he was going to say next. "We have a deal", Mr Annan announced to the eagerly awaiting local and international press corps. Then Mr Annan ushered handshakes and pleasantry exchanges between the two rival political camps. The optics of the camaraderie between the members of Kibaki's Party of National Unity (PNU) and Mr Odinga's Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) appeared to produce an aura of hope in the wake of the abrasive campaigns and interethnic violence. Under the African Union (AU) Panel of Eminent Personalities chaired by Kofi Annan, a political settlement between Mr. Kibaki and Mr. Odinga was reached resulting in the formation of a grand coalition government. Besides facilitating the creation of a coalition government, the political settlement, called the National Accord, recommended many other structural and institutional reforms. Under the rubrics of transitional justice – a systematic institutional and structural response to widespread gross human rights violations, including historical injustices. The National Accord opened a new chapter in the politics of Kenya, setting into motion mechanisms that would help tackle new grievances and past grievances communities had suffered. Although the Accord was embraced across the political divide, there was disgruntlement – about the legitimacy of the grand coalition government, the modalities of political power sharing within the coalition government and how to deal with the divisive question of gross human violations and other historical injustices.

Kenya's post-election violence interventions make it clear that leadership is both a necessary antecedent and consequent condition for sustainable conflict management and resolution. The crisis presents an opportunity to interrogate, from multi-stakeholder perspectives, the various forms and practices of leadership in (post)conflict situations. Undoubtedly, the Annan-led mediation team brought to bear certain qualities of leadership to the political crisis for them to obtain respect: trust and cooperation from the warring parties – PNU and ODM. Earlier interventions

DOI: 10.4324/9780429318603-25

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 16:47 01 Dec 2023; For: 9780429318603, chapter21, 10.4324/9780429318603-25

by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazier, and other former African heads of state seemed to bear no fruit. The two politicians, Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga were less willing to dialogue (Lindenmayer and Kaye, 2009, p. 5). In this respect, it is convincing to interrogate how leadership "traits, characteristics, power relations, skills and capabilities or actions and behaviour" (Northouse, 2016, p. 5) can influence both the actors in a political crisis and conflict situations. The AU mediation team, uniquely christened "the panel of eminent personalities", seems to exploit the cultural practices within African societies associating leadership with "special traits or characteristics some individuals possess" (Northouse, 2016: 5). A critical question to pose about the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) process is how varied forms of leadership manifested by the actors involved (re)shaped the texture and contours of the National Accord.

On the one hand, within a short period, the Accord enabled the warring parties, although grudgingly, to cooperate on some far-reaching institutional changes – promulgating a new constitution for Kenya in 2010. On the other, it failed to ensure full implementation of the outcomes of the two public inquiries: the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (CIPEV), which investigated the root cause of political violence, and the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) that, among other issues, investigated gross human rights violations and abuses by state institutions and public officers. More important is why the transitional justice demands in the National Accord never gained public traction in the 2013 and 2017 elections. While it is vital to get warring factions to the mediation table, it is also necessary to pay attention to how all concerned parties perceive and conceptualize the peace being sought. As Caplan argues, "embedded in every peacebuilding strategy, stated or otherwise is a particular conception of peace that informs that strategy" (Caplan, 2019, p. 13).

Objectives of the study

This chapter is interested in the leadership role of civil society groups in communicating peace, that is, how peace activists' communicative practices can influence the everyday discourse of doing peace and violence. The increased access to interactive media platforms enables unprecedented ways for people to engage in societal processes, including violent conflicts. The emerging media practices can affect some features of peace activism, namely: "the form and content of peace messages; the diverse individual and groups social interactions, and the situation – election campaigns as the context and practices in which communication occurs" (Powers, 1995, pp. 192–193). The leadership role of civil society groups is relevant to creating innovative ways for individuals and groups to cope with the effects of increasingly mediatized conflicts and violence. Leadership in this sense is adaptive – focusing the attention of individuals and groups to the adaptation required in response to the challenges (Northouse, 2016, p. 257) of hateful online content, cyber-bullying, automated political messaging, or surveillance.

Furthermore, the effects of the multitude of voices brought into conversations, transpose once localized and offline social relationships and interactions (of kinship) and conflicts (hateful content and disinformation) into 'how experiences of peace and conflicts are made and remade at the local level through the actions of individuals and groups' (Ginty, 2017, p. 9). These transposed experiences can intensify individuals' or groups' sense of community by how people are "persistently connected" to the goings-on in their neighbourhoods (Hampton, 2017, pp. 127–128). Therefore, the leadership role of civil society groups in communicating peace is adaptive – enabling individuals and groups to cope with the effects of rapidly changing media of information and communication and how it contributes to "effective means of assessing progress towards achievements of a fortified peace" (Caplan, 2019, p. 2).

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 16:47 01 Dec 2023; For: 9780429318603, chapter21, 10.4324/9780429318603-25

Post-election violence in Kenya happened in changing media spaces. Until 2002, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) regime-controlled news media in Kenya. Journalists were routinely harassed or arrested, and media outlets were shut down for criticizing the regime (Nyabuga and Mudhai, 2009, p. 44). The liberalization of media and communications systems led to the rapid growth in mobile telephony and FM radio stations. By 2012, according to the Media Council of Kenya (MCK), "five of the ten most popular Kenyan radio stations broadcasted in vernacular languages" (MCK, 2012, p. 3). During the 2007/2008 political crisis, monitoring reports singled out live phone-ins shows on vernacular radio stations and the surge in the use of short-text-message service (SMS) for spreading inflammatory and hateful contents (IRIN, 2008; KNCHR, 2008b, p. 8). In 2017, mobile phones subscriptions had reached 41 million (CAK, 2017, p. 10) up from 12.9 million in 2008 (CAK, 2009, p. 8). In 2017 elections, mobile phones and SMS were key platforms for campaigns by various groups (CAK, 2017). Additionally, accessible mobile telephony seemed to influence programming on community FM radio stations to incorporate live phone-in shows (Ismail and Deane, 2008, p. 4). Recent media performance report indicates that talk shows at 17.3% are the third most popular genre of local content behind religious, 17.7%, and music, 38.8% programming (CAK, 2018, p. 31).

In Africa, and in Kenya in particular, the widespread use of new digital tools is hailed for disrupting the old ways of doing things and injecting new dynamism in helping bridge the gap of the people excluded from the mainstream economy and for spurring creativity and innovations (Mutsvairo and Karam, 2018, pp. 4–5; Ndemo, 2017; Nyabuga and Ugangu, 2018, p. 192). Some authors (Kamau, 2016, p. 118; Ndemo, 2017) even see the increasing access to online media platforms as proxies for solving the penetrating problems of poor governance and political apathy among the youth or for inducing entrepreneurship and development. However, James Bridle calls it "computational thinking, the belief that whatever practical or social problem societies face, a software application can be deployed for it" (Bridle, 2018, p. 15). After the 2007/2008 political crisis, Kenya saw a proliferation of ICT-based peace initiatives, such as Sisi Ni Amani, *UWIANO Platform*, Ushahidi, Picha Mtaani, Umati, and PeaceTech Lab Africa, that engage citizens in conflict management and resolution online. The assumptions moving many of these initiatives might be, for efficient delivery of peace and conflict management solutions, automation is necessary, and it depends on "improved data collection, organisation, and analysis" (Kahl and Larrauri, 2013, p. 2). Emerging media practices can be a factor in peace and conflict management if the practices transform and intensify peacebuilders and their publics' relationships and interactions as they might result in new relations, spaces and practices. In that, by mobilizing individuals and groups to take part in an intervention, peace activists and their communities co-create media practices and spaces for peacebuilding. What is the role of peace activism within the emerging online media practices? Specifically, in situations where the plan for peace is not shared by a wider public or not transparent, it can be a tool for silencing dissent or political manipulation. In Kenya, the efforts to bring justice to the victims of the 2007/2008 post-election violence have drawn protracted disputes between the civil society groups and some government officials and politicians. Successive governments have ignored the recommendations of several judicial public inquiries, including the recent and most extensive, the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) and Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (CIPEV).

Nevertheless, peace campaigns continue to dominate general elections. Several authors (Galava, 2015, p. 238; Lynch et al., 2019, p. 604; Odote, 2020, p. 6; Willis, 2015, p. 105) have criticized the pervasive peace campaigns – they enable political regimes to stifle robust public debates on difficult political issues such as the persistence of social inequalities and marginalization across tribes. In Kenya, since the 1990s, civil society groups including non-governmental

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 16:47 01 Dec 2023; For: 9780429318603, chapter21, 10.4324/9780429318603-25

organizations (NGO), faith-based organizations (FBO), international non-governmental organizations (INGO), community-based organizations (CBO), and individual activists have helped to provide the public with civic education (Wanyande, 2009, p. 14). Furthermore, to date, civil society groups remain an integral part of Kenya's development agenda, in conflict management, peacebuilding, and the safety and security of individuals or communities. The latest government report shows that there are over 11,000 registered non-government organizations, of which 8,893 are active (NGOs-Board, 2019, p. 17). In 2018, the annual budget of about 3,000 NGOs out of 8,000 that reported their programme activities to the government was US$1.5 billion (NGOs-Board, 2019).

Data sources

For analyses and discussions, the study relied on a variety of data sources, including cross-sectional survey (N = 241) and structured interviews (N = 20) of members of public and grassroots peace groups, respectively. Empirical data were sourced from PeaceTech Lab Africa's Kenya Election Violence Prevention and Response Programme (KEVP), designed to address the risks of political violence in Kenya during the 2017 elections in the counties of Nairobi and Nakuru. The counties of Nairobi and Nakuru are both multi-ethnic. They are vulnerable to ethnic tensions and violence during elections as documented by two judicial commissions of inquiry into causes of tribal clashes (Akiwumi et al., 1999, p. 23; Waki et al., 2008, p. 78). PeaceTech's use of online media platforms for conflict management is illustrative of the adaptive leadership role (Northouse, 2016) that civil society groups play in promoting the uptake of innovative communication interventions and bridging technology access gap among grassroots groups. The adoption and application of any ICT-based responses are context-specific; it gains meanings according to "what users have to do with the artefact to achieve their objectives" (Kirkpatrick, 2008, p. 4). As this study found out, the use of online media for conflict management among grassroots is diversely represented.

In Kenya, for instance, mobile telephony is now embedded in most financial services and transactions across sectors of the economy (CAK, 2020, p. 11). Besides, online media practices among many Kenyans are emerging as vital spaces for creating locally driven counter-narratives of collective security (Nyabola, 2018, p. 109). Thus this case study supplies data to aid in systematic reflections about the leadership role of civil society groups in rapidly changing contexts and how various actors are coping. The focus on online media is not to suggest or ignore other information and communication platforms, but to provide a way of reflecting on the emerging media practices and how they (re)shape various societal processes. Besides, the use of the phrase 'online media' rather than a specific social media tool is to emphasize the idea that people concertedly use these platforms. In some contexts, specific media platforms – WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter, radio, mobile phones, or community centres, might be more popular than others but remain entangled.

Activism and media of information and communication

Debates about the role of media of information and communication within social movements might favour the view that these technologies are the driving force behind changes in society, emphasizing their liberating potentials for the excluded (Castells, 2012; Shirky, 2011). Alternatively, those sceptical of these tools point out that "political and economic elites and states use these technologies to control, surveil, and limit the power of social movements and grassroots" (Fominaya and Gillan, 2017, p. 389; Morozov, 2011). For instance, in Africa: Uganda, Rwanda,

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 16:47 01 Dec 2023; For: 9780429318603, chapter21, 10.4324/9780429318603-25

Kenya, South Africa, and Zambia are among 45 countries worldwide known to use targeted spyware software on journalists, human rights defenders, and political opponents (Marczak et al., 2018). With increasingly mediatized societal processes, online media practices such as surveillance, Internet shutdowns, repression, and political manipulation are rampant (Shahbaz and Funk, 2019). These emerging online media practices are now part of political issues peacebuilders have to contend with, particularly in contexts of deeply divided societies.

Moreover, these critiques underscore the role media technologies play in the "making of the vision of the world and the practical operations by which groups are produced and reproduced" (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 23). In deeply divided societies, online media tools can make it easier for elites to produce and reproduce the fault lines of nations. In Kenya, during elections, campaign messages are regularly vernacularized into cultural fables, songs, and sayings to engage and pull crowds, challenging 'national' media discourses and symbols. The concept of vernacularization is here used in the sense of what Russell Hochschild calls deep story – "the story feelings tell, in the language of symbols. It removes judgement. It removes fact. It tells us how things feel" (Hochschild, 2016, p. 135).

Throughout this chapter, the concept of online media refers to "social spaces as outcomes of what individuals/groups do with media, creating social relations and structures that enable or constrain the everyday practices" (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 110). One's sense of (in)security within their communities can be shaped to some extent by online media practices such as early warning and response mechanisms to potential or actual incidences of violence. These media practices intensify individuals/groups connections to their locales because of the "multiple relationships and voices behind news stories" (Sundar, 2016). This study found that there seems to be a significant relationship between people who frequently used online media platforms and their likelihood of their thinking that their communities have changed. Perhaps the increased access to and use of online media resulted into (new) spaces, relations, and voices that intensified the experiences of their community because of a "sustained awareness and persistent connection" (Hampton, 2017, p. 134). Also, it can mean that because of layering effects of online media practices, it transformed the social dynamics in the community through the prominent role that vernacularized stories, rumours, and fake news now play in the everyday experiences of life and activities.

Discussions and data presented in this chapter also follow Schatzki's definition of social practices as an "open temporally unfolding nexuses of doings and sayings" (Schatzki, 2002, p. 72). Voting and peace campaigns, for instance, as political practices comprise routinized "bodily performances (public rallies and vote casting), symbolic meanings (voters' attitudes and orientations), and use of objects (media practices)" (Mattoni and Treré, 2014, p. 258; Shove et al., 2012, pp. 145–146). Because voting is a periodic exercise, it becomes ways of doing politics and peace. Voting and peace activism in the context of Kenya, then become practices suffused with identity-based politics and fragmented political groupings. So, when citizens call into a live radio talk show or take part in online conversations during an election, they bring to life these practices. Online peace activism, in this context, co-creates new spaces and social practices for negotiating varieties of interventions. Where diverse voices are allowed into a conversation, the political context can be transient – "all that individuals and groups in a particular place and time are saying and doing about an issue" (Wolfsfeld, 2015, p. 24). Thus, the shifting landscape of the media of information and communication can influence the 'who', the 'what', or the 'how' of peace and conflict resolution. In the sense that rampant misinformation and rumours enabled by emerging media practices now pose a significant challenge to the leadership role of civil society groups in post-conflict situations, specifically to the work of "truth-recovery and truth-narration" (Girelli, 2017, p. 43). In such circumstances, affected communities look up to

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 16:47 01 Dec 2023; For: 9780429318603, chapter21, 10.4324/9780429318603-25

peacebuilders to provide leadership in articulating "political agenda required to accommodate emerging political issues" (Street, 1992, p. 10) including the challenge of online fake news and misinformation to the credibility of public processes, the robustness of civic engagement and public trust.

In the next section, the attention now turns to the analysis and discussion of findings of the study and likely implication for the leadership role of civil society groups in communicating peace.

Discussions

In Kenya, during elections, campaign messages are regularly vernacularized into cultural fables, songs, and sayings to engage and pull crowds, challenging national media discourses and symbols. For instance, both the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) and the Commission Investigating Post Election Violence (CIPEV) recorded testimonies of how call-in shows on FM radio stations enabled individuals to make unregulated hateful statements and how vernacular radio stations played music that intensified feelings of ethnic hatred; coded terms, such as *madoadoa* (spots)*, bunyot* (enemy), *sangara* (wild grass), were routinely used against other tribes (KNCHR, 2008a, p. 85; Waki et al., 2008, p. 295). Vernacularized online media practices, it seems, breaches public sphere norms of producing rational social relations and space – public space mediated and moderated by reasoned arguments, open to scrutiny, and can generate consensus (Habermas, 1984, p. 10). In the context of peace activism in Kenya during the elections of 2017, the general finding (see Table 21.5) is that there seems to be a significant relationship between people who frequently used online media platforms and the likelihood of their thinking their communities have changed.

Online media practices and collective security

For individuals and groups who frequently access and use online media, the media represented their collective security, alternative information sharing and learning platforms, and spaces for interaction and engagement. This finding puts focus on how emerging online media practices relate to vernacularized media spaces and therefore to influencing the texture of everyday peace and violence. The reason is that, where social relations and voices are layered and vernacularized, it can intensify tensions in the various ways individuals and groups "perceive peace/violence; conceive peace/violence; or live peace/violence" (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 40). During emergencies and crises, online media can enable unmatched ways of accessing sources and information, including rumours. Rumour "constitutes a relation to the authority of divulging secrets, suggesting hypothesis and constraining authorities to talk while contesting" (Kapferer, 2013, p. 14). In its diverse forms, online media platforms have expanded options for citizens to access and also co-create spaces of their own, enabling alternative narratives to the official sources. Kapferer argues that rumours "arouse vicarious participation and involvement. When something terrible has happened, the audience itself feels as though it were the victim" (Kapferer, p. 130). In this sense, then, online media practices enable individuals and groups to change some aspects of official voice/source, including how they relate with authorities. Such influence of online media practices reflects the communicative effects of vernacularized messages on peace activism. The cited examples in the CIPEV and KNCHR reports show how vernacularized messages were exploiting accessible online media platforms during elections, creating new spaces for live phone-in sessions for the users. Online media practices in this sense are outcomes of new social relations and actions of the citizens online – it enables surveillance, cyber-bullying, online as

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 16:47 01 Dec 2023; For: 9780429318603, chapter21, 10.4324/9780429318603-25

community space, or online as space for monitoring and early warning mechanisms, producing new social relations and practices. Online media practices as social spaces thus implicate the mainstream media spaces that claim to be 'national'. The emerging online media practices appear to layer the public media spaces with a multiplicity of information sources and voices from diversified or reinforced social spaces and relations. In Benedict Anderson's concept of imagined community, "[T]he rising of vernacular languages can lead to a decline of an imagined community – the nation" (Anderson, 2006, p. 42). In Kenya, vernacular radio stations have "transformed the diverse ethnic languages, creating a possibility for novel forms of imagined communities" (Anderson, 2006, p. 46).

Collective security, alternative information sharing, and learning spaces

By the end of 2019, Kenya had 22.86 million Internet users, of whom 22.22 million accessed the Internet via mobile phones, spending over four hours daily online. Additionally, there were 8.80 million active social media users, with WhatsApp, YouTube, and Facebook as the top three online platforms (Kemp, 2020). This rapid growth makes online media platforms vital sources of news, advertising, and campaigns platforms. During the 2017 general elections, most political actors extensively used online platforms for political campaigns (Imende, 2017). GeoPoll and Portland, reporting on the impact of false information during elections, found that 49% of respondents regularly referenced online social media for news about the general election (GeoPoll and Portland, 2017, p. 9). In an exposé – *Data, Democracy and Dirty Tricks*, Channel 4 News revealed how the discredited data company, Cambridge Analytica (CA) played a crucial role in influencing both the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections in Kenya. From retrieved CA website archives, in the 2013 presidential election, CA surveyed 47,000 respondents, profiling them along political issues of concerns, levels of trust in key politicians, voting behaviours/intentions, and preferred information channels. In an interview with Channel 4 News undercover reporter, CA Chief Executive Officer Alexander Nix, and his Managing Director of Political Global, Mark Turnbull, are recorded explaining how they clandestinely aided Uhuru's Party of National Unity (TNA), later Rebranded Jubilee Party (JP) to target and manipulate voters' fears along tribal lines (CA, 2018; Davis, 2018). Privacy International (PI, 2017) reveals that an American-based digital media company, Harris Media, ran both the websites hosting "The Real Raila" video – attacking the opposition leader Raila Odinga – and "Uhuru For Us" video – portraying the incumbent, Uhuru Kenyatta as peace-loving leader. These controversial documentaries, "The Real Raila" and "Kenya in 2020", were scripted to evoke apocalyptic images of Kenya if the opposition leader, Raila Odinga, was elected president, and micro-targeted online media users (Valencia, 2017).

How is this related to the way individuals view online media? If users represent online media as spaces for collective security, alternative information sharing, and social spaces for learning, then peacebuilders need to appreciate how vernacularized stories and spaces can influence peace activism and violent conflicts. A multitude of vernacularized voices can transpose once localized and offline social relationships, interactions, and practices (of kinship) or conflicts to "the making and remaking of experiences of peace/conflicts at various levels of society" (Mac Ginty, 2017). The election campaign of 2017 shows just how vulnerable communicating peace in deeply divided societies can be.

This study found (see Tables 21.1–21.5) that groups and individuals frequently using online media platforms for peacebuilding attributed it with positive influence within their communities. Online media, they suggested, enhanced their sense of security within communities, 30.7%, or provided alternative platforms for information sharing, learning, and response to challenges,

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 16:47 01 Dec 2023; For: 9780429318603, chapter21, 10.4324/9780429318603-25

Table 21.1 Contribution of online peace activism to communities

Experience of online peace activism in your village			
		Frequency	*Valid percentage*
Valid	Wider access, coverage, and interactive platform	75	31.1
	Exclusion for people with no digital skills, tribal groups, and poor	37	15.4
	Expanded opportunities to engage and learn about peace among different groups	65	27.0
	Safe way to engage in the situation of insecurity	6	2.5
	Others (not yet online, lack of data bundles)	8	3.3
	No response	48	19.9
	Bullying and harassment made easy	2	0.8
	Total	241	100.0

Table 21.2 How activists view the contribution of online media to communities

At an organization level, what difference has online activism made in communities you serve?			
		Frequency	*Valid percentage*
Valid	Affordable platforms for reaching a larger population than town hall meetings	3	15.0
	Convenient platforms for local communities' public engagement	11	55.0
	An accessible platform for excluded and marginalized	3	15.0
	Enhanced sense of community and peaceful coexistence	3	15.0
	Total	20	100.0

Table 21.3 Online media and collective security

Use of online platforms for peacebuilding and community for feeling safer			
		Frequency	*Valid percentage*
Valid	Yes	184	76.3
	No	30	12.4
	No response	27	11.2
	Total	241	100.0

22.8%. They echoed similar views within the grassroots peace groups who viewed online media as convenient platforms for local communities' public engagement, 55%. Most respondents, 76.3%, thought the sense of safety among communities could be attributed to the increased use of online media platforms for peace because it enhanced their community mechanisms for monitoring cases of (in)security, early warning, and response to potential or actual incidences of violence. Alternatively, accessible platforms for organizing increased their sense of community.

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 16:47 01 Dec 2023; For: 9780429318603, chapter21, 10.4324/9780429318603-25

Table 21.4 Why users feel safer because of online activism

If yes, why do you think the community feels safer?			
		Frequency	*Valid percentage*
Valid	Increased awareness, publicity, and space for engagement	26	10.8
	Communities have accessible platforms for organizing and action	35	14.5
	Enhanced community mechanisms for monitoring, early warning, and response	79	32.8
	Increased sense of community & acting together	31	12.9
	Others	12	5.0
	No response	58	24.1
	Total	241	100.0

Table 21.5 Cross-tabulation: frequency of use and feeling safer

Correlations				
		How often do you use online media for peace activism?	*Online platforms use and community for feeling safer*	*Ever been affected by online misinformation?*
How often do you use online media for peace activism?	Pearson correlation	1	0.357**	0.619**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.000	0.000
	N	241	241	241
Online platforms use and community for feeling safer	Pearson correlation	0.357**	1	0.434**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000		0.000
	N	241	241	241
Ever been affected by online misinformation?	Pearson correlation	0.619**	0.434**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.000	
	N	241	241	241

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The emerging online media practices (re)create new social relations and social spaces. This point reinforces Anderson's idea that social activities around 'print' technology, in this case online media platforms, can transform existing social realities – social spaces to create possibilities for novel forms of imagined communities. If individuals and groups experience an enhanced sense of (in)security in their neighbourhoods, it is because of the many-layered webs of new social relations powered by how they "share stories far more swiftly and widely, and from diverse sources" (Polletta and Callahan, 2017, p. 400). Also, it is illustrative of how citizens' online media practices can transform existing social relations by "disrupting the official voice/source" that binds relationships together. The enabled multitude of voices in online spaces are like the "people's first free, unregulated radio station" (Kapferer, p. 14).

To some extent, the emerging online media practices are illustrative of the changing view of media among some actors: "media as a target to be destroyed or as a weapon to be used to attack the moral support and cohesion of opposing groups or as vast platforms for conversations, sharing, and argumentation" (Kaempf, 2013, p. 601; Rid and Hecker, 2009, p. 13). In this study (see Table 21.6), for instance, the findings of the user's worries and fears while online and how

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 16:47 01 Dec 2023; For: 9780429318603, chapter21, 10.4324/9780429318603-25

Table 21.6 Worries users have while online

What worries you most when using online platforms?			
		Frequency	*Valid percentage*
Valid	Exclusion of those with no access to online media	10	4.1
	Others (lack of data bundles, nothing)	19	7.9
	Loss of privacy and identity theft	26	10.8
	Hacking and scam sites	24	10.0
	Incitement, fake information, and rumours	25	10.4
	cyberbullying, stalking, and intimidation	36	14.9
	Surveillance by government and threats of arrest	6	2.5
	Explicit and graphic content	4	1.7
	Fear of being misunderstood	27	11.2
	No response	64	26.6
	Total	241	100.0

peace organizations view media can be interpreted as a part of this effect. This study found that online users fear and worry about, among other reasons, the threats of cyberbullying, stalking, and intimidation, 14.9%; about loss of privacy and identity theft, 10.8%; and about incitement to violence, false information, and rumours, 11.4%. It underlines the fact that various actors can view media differently. Nevertheless, these multiple ways of interpreting media spaces have influence, depending on "what people do with media" (Postill, 2010, p. 6). In Rid and Hecker's view, "information is becoming more social and local – messages from friends and family strengthen ties with families and closer-knit groups" (Rid and Hecker: p. 209).

Online media practices as spaces for access, interactions, and engagement

As information and communication become more social and localized, as Rid and Hecker argue, it is likely to produce exclusionary "social systems, institutions, social structures and social spaces" (Fuchs, 2019, p. 143; Rid and Hecker, 2009). This study found (see Tables 21.7 and 21.8) that some users (4.6%) viewed online media as limited to robust public engagement – it undermined their capacities to be part of and contribute to the emerging online community spaces. However, if the practices of online peace activism are represented as spaces for access and interaction (31.1%) and engagement opportunities (27%) among users, then the challenge of exclusion can be overcome. In addition, online peacebuilding for organizations, it represented practical and accessible ways of reaching a larger audience (60%) or spaces for citizens inclusion and engagement (20%).

Implications of online practices to (re)making of social expectations

In contexts where online media practices are embedded in peace activism, the role of peacebuilders is to establish "sets of processes out of which the agency of people organized and identified as citizens" (Musco, 2009) produce social spaces and relations that make and remake the everyday experience of peace (Mac Ginty, 2017). By helping create and moderate media practices, such as online neighbourhood watch groups or short-text/audiovisual services, peacebuilders can facilitate the making and remaking of social expectations and norms. The reason is

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 16:47 01 Dec 2023; For: 9780429318603, chapter21, 10.4324/9780429318603-25

Table 21.7 Experiencing online peacebuilding in villages

Experience of online peace activism in your village			
		Frequency	*Valid percentage*
Valid	Wider access, coverage, and interactive platform	75	31.1
	Exclusion for people with no digital skills, tribal groups, and poor	37	15.4
	Expanded opportunities to engage and learn about peace among different groups	65	27.0
	Safe way to engage in the situation of insecurity	6	2.5
	Others (not yet online, lack of data bundles)	8	3.3
	No response	48	19.9
	Bullying and harassment made easy	2	0.8
	Total	241	100.0

Table 21.8 How organizations view online peacebuilding

Describe online peace activism within your organization.			
		Frequency	*Valid percentage*
Valid	Safe space for citizen inclusion and engagement	4	20.0
	Effective and accessible way of reaching a larger audience with peace actions	12	60.0
	A platform for connecting and sharing ideas within peacebuilding groups	2	10.0
	No response	2	10.0
	Total	20	100.0

that, if online media platforms are conceived and perceived as spaces of social interactions and engagement by users as this study show, then the leadership role of peacebuilders is to enhance experiential acts of peace that individuals and groups expect of others. For instance, in Kenya during elections, many actors tend to portray generalized beliefs and expectations that violence will mar the electoral process (Ellison and Bisson, 2017; ICG, 2017). With such widespread expectations and assumptions, individual voters within their neighbourhoods and other social spaces can expect that other citizens will engage in acts undermining peace.

To what extent can online media practices enable and constrain users' social expectations of and preferences for peace? The findings of this study can be interpreted in the light of how people's social expectations about peace and violence during elections shape their 'mutual alignment with varied opinions' (Powers, p. 204). William Trotter refers to this phenomenon as "securing homogeneity advantage by members of a group being sensitive to the behaviour of their fellow" (Trotter, p. 29). Other authors characterize it as "political homophily – the number of outbound ties directed to users who share political orientation" (Bakshy et al., 2015; Colleoni et al., 2014, p. 324). The following episode further illustrates this point. Like other previous elections, the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections saw significant political realignments. The most dramatic political alliance was between Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto under The National Alliance

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 16:47 01 Dec 2023; For: 9780429318603, chapter21, 10.4324/9780429318603-25

(TNA), and the International Criminal Court (ICC) had named both for being behind the 2007/2008 post-polls violence (BBC, 2010). Nakuru, the epicentre of the 2007/2008 post-polls violence became the birthplace of the new Uhuru–Ruto alliance, casting itself as victims being fought by both internal and external forces (BBC, 2012). Meanwhile, the opposition party's coalition – Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD) under Raila Odinga – fronted justice for the post-election victims. However, the Uhuru–Ruto political alliance seemed to transform the contours of the 2007/2008 post-polls violence. The unity narrative penetrated deep into the minds of their respective communities – the voices demanding justice were muted. The news media with the baggage of how they reported the 2007/2008 crisis were under immense political pressure to propagate peace than to take a critical stance on issues of justice for victims of historical injustices.

The melodrama of the Uhuru–Ruto political alliance vernacularized the story of the ICC indictments. The countywide unity rallies "instrumentalised the epic journey to ICC for the confirmation of charges by manipulating and mobilising" (Bräuchler and Budka, 2020, p. 15) ethnic "instinctive impulses" (Trotter, p. 79) to move their members from the narrative of justice for the victims of the violence to that of betrayal and outside interference. Projected into online media spaces and mediated by many layers and webs of new social relations, vernacularized stories may have entangled the users in moral dilemmas. This entanglement sheds light on how emerging online media practices can influence the things people will do with their media spaces and how absorbed individuals and groups can be in potential conflicts and causes for peace (Bräuchler and Budka, 2020, p. 18). In other words, if online media practices positively influence users, it "gives opportunities and contexts for individuals and groups to transcend conflict-calming measures to encompass more positive actions linked with conflict transformation" (Mac Ginty, 2014). However, if negatively influenced, online media practices can mobilize and reinforce "irrational opinions and beliefs" (Trotter, p. 44). When talking about the emerging online media practices, what groups do with media concerning peace and conflicts – how they conceive it and experience it in their locale – is of critical importance. The inherent tensions within a society are revealed in how individuals and groups negotiate among various representations of peace in cultural activities, sports, clean-ups, and dialogue meetings, and in lived experiences of vernacularized stories of peace and violence with regard to their feelings about ethnic hatred or unity (Waki et al., 2008).

Conclusion

The leadership role of peacebuilders in communicating peace should "mobilise, motivate, organise, orient, and focus the attention of individuals/groups to address and resolve" (Northouse, 2016, p. 259) the challenges that emerging media practices pose to deeply divided societies. In this sense, communicating peace should focus not only on increasing the access and use of the online media platforms but also on how the users view these media relative to the "rules that govern everyday life in deeply divided societies" (Ginty, 2014, p. 548). This is because the ubiquity of online media can give new impetus to the role of vernacularized stories, rumours, and fake news come to play in the everyday activities and experiences of peace and violence. That is, if media practices of texting peace messages or online neighbourhood groups lead to the "creation of communities, and transmission values and beliefs" (Power, p. 199), it is because they intensify group sensitivities to generalized social expectations and beliefs in how individuals and groups are connected. The relevance of this is in situations where elites, including peace activists, are trying to influence processes by "controlling important events, the flow of information and the ability to mobilise broad consensus to support their policies" (Wolfsfeld, 2015, pp. 24–25).

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 16:47 01 Dec 2023; For: 9780429318603, chapter21, 10.4324/9780429318603-25

The practice of peace activism occurs because a group of people are engaged in it, and it constitutes specific relationships and interactions (Powers, p. 204). These relationships and interactions can determine how media practices influence social contexts. In this respect, understanding social expectations and preferences that motivate peace and acts of violence in the emerging online media practices are at the core of social change (Bicchieri, 2017, p. 111). Therefore, what people do with media, in this context, depends on how the news media enters their social relationships and practices, what meanings and symbolism they invest it with, and what it represents (Hughes, 1987, p. 51; Kirkpatrick, 2008, p. 2; Pinch and Bijker, 1987, p. 25; Street, 1992, p. 10). For peace activists as communicators, securing approval in society is a crucial plank for sustaining impactful exchanges within their local communities. This calls for a more in-depth study of how activists can influence circumstances under which new relations and practices are possible. This study demonstrated that, among most respondents, increased use of online media for activism enhanced their sense of community, perhaps because users can feel more connected to and sustained by kinship relations – as helped to "maintain, reinforce and disseminate" their cultures (Powers: p. 206).

Finally, this study has illustrated that the contexts of peace and violence in Kenya might have been (re)shaped by two interrelated media practices: the surge of vernacularizing the media spaces and stories (from both individual citizens and licenced news media), and pervasive use of online media to access, share, and generate content. These practices have had effects on communicative spaces beyond what people do with the media. This study has also illustrated how online media practices can give new impetus to vernacularized stories – tapping into common fears and threats, making peace initiatives perpetually vulnerable to competitive politics.

References

Akiwumi, A. M., Bosire, S. O., and Ondeyo, S. C. (1999) *Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya*. Nairobi [Online]. Available at http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/CommissionReports/ReportoftheJudicialCommissionAppointedtoInquireintoTribalClashesinKenya.pdf

Anderson, B. (2006) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London, Verso.

Bakshy, E., Messing, S., and Adamic, L. A. (2015) Exposure to Ideologically Diverse News and Opinion on Facebook. *Science*, vol. 348, no. 6239, pp. 1130–1132. doi:10.1126/science.aaa1160

BBC (2010) *Kenya Election Violence: ICC Names Suspects* [Online]. Available at www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11996652 (Accessed 20 May 2020).

BBC. (2012) *Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto Confirm Kenyan Alliance*. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-205788 (Accessed 20 May 2020).

Bicchieri, C. (2017) *Norms in the Wild: How to Diagonise, Measure, and Change Social Norms*. New York, Oxford University Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1989) Social Space and Symbolic Power. *Sociological Theory*, vol. 7, no, 1, pp. 14–25. doi: 10.2307/202060

Bräuchler, B., and Budka, P. (2020) Introduction: Anthropological Perspectives on Theorising Media and Conflict. In P. Budka and B. Bräuchler (Eds.), *Theorising Media and Conflict*. Oxford, Berghahn Books.

Bridle, J. (2018) *New Dark Age: Technology and the End of the Future*. London, Verso.

CA (2018) *Case Studies: Kenya* [Online]. Available at https://ca-political.com/casestudykenya2013/

CAK (2009) *Sector Statistics Report: April – June 2008/09*. Nairobi [Online]. Available at https://ca.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Sector-Statistics-Report-Q4-2008-09.pdf

CAK (2017) *First Quarter Sector Statistics Report for the Financial Year 2017/18: July – September 2017*. Nairobi [Online]. Available at https://ca.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Sector-Statistics-Report-Q1-2017-18.pdf

CAK (2018) *Fourth Quarter Sector Statistics Report for the Financial Year 2017/18*. Nairobi [Online]. Available at https://ca.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Quarter-Four-sector-statistics-report-for-the-Financial-Year-2017-18.pdf

CAK (2020) *Second Quarter Sector Statistics Report for the Financial Year 2019/20*. Nairobi [Online]. Available at https://ca.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Sector-Statistics-Report-Q2-2019-2020-1.pdf

Caplan, R. (2019) *Measuring Peace: Principles, Practices, and Politics*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Castells, M. (2012) *Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age*. Cambridge, Polity Press.

Colleoni, E., Rozza, A., and Arvidsson, A. (2014) Echo Chamber or Public Sphere? Predicting Political Orientation and Measuring Political Homophily in Twitter Using Big Data. *Journal of Communication*, vol. 64, no. 2, pp. 317–332. doi:10.1111/jcom.12084

Davis, A. (Writer). (2018) *Here's How Cambridge Analytica Played a Dominant Role in Kenya's Chaotic 2017 Elections*. In C. New (Producer). London: Channel 4 News.

Ellison, S., and Bisson, D. (2017) *Carter Center Statement on Kenya's Pre-Election Period* [Press release] [Online]. Available at www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/kenya-pre-election-statement-July2017.pdf

Fominaya, C. F., and Gillan, K. (2017) Navigating the Technology-media-movements Complex. *Social Movement Studies*, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 383–402. doi:10.1080/14742837.2017.1338943

Fuchs, C. (2019) Henri Lefebvre's Theory of the Production of Space and the Critical Theory of Communication. *Communication Theory*, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 129–150. doi:10.1093/ct/qty025

Galava, D. (2015) From Watchdogs to Hostages of Peace: The Kenyan Media and the 2013 General Elections. In F. Otieno (Ed.), *New Constitution, Same Old Challenges: Reflections on Kenya's 2013 General Elections*. Nairobi, Society for International Development.

GeoPoll, and Portland (2017) *The Reality of Fake News in Kenya*. Nairobi [Online]. Available at www.portland-communications.com/pdf/The-Reality-of-Fake-News-in-Kenya.pdf

Ginty, R. M. (2014) Everyday Peace: Bottom-up and Local Agency in Conflict-affected Societies. *Security Dialogue*, vol. 45, no. 6, pp. 548–564. doi:10.1177/0967010614550899

Ginty, R. M. (2017) Everyday Social Practices and Boundary-Making in Deeply Divided Societies. *Civil Wars*, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 4–25. doi:10.1080/13698249.2017.1343410

Girelli, G. (2017) *Understanding Transitional Justice: A Struggle for Peace, Reconciliation, and Rebuilding*. London, Palgrave Macmillan.

Habermas, J. (1984) *The Theory of Communicative Action*, T. McCarthy, Trans. Vol. 1. Boston, Beacon Press.

Hampton, K. N. (2017) New Communication Technologies and the Future of Community. In P. Messaris and L. Humphreys (Eds.), *Digital Media: Transformations in Human Communication*. New York, Peter Lang.

Hochschild, A. R. (2016) *Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right*. London, The New Press.

Hughes, T. P. (1987) The Evolution of Large Technological Systems. In W. E. Bijker, T. P. Hughes, and T. J. Pinch (Eds.), *The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology*. Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press.

ICG (2017) *Kenya's Rift Valley: Old Wounds, Devolution's New Anxieties* (Africa Report N°248). Brussels [Online]. Available at https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/248-kenya-s-rift-valley-old-wounds-devolution-s-new-anxieties.pdf

Imende, B. (2017) Uhuru, Raila Teams Take Campaign Wars Online. *The Star*. Available at www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017-06-06-uhuru-raila-teams-take-campaign-wars-online/ (Accessed 17 April 2020).

IRIN (2008) Spreading the Word of Hate [Online]. Available at www.irinnews.org/report/76346/kenya-spreading-word-hate

Ismail, J. A., and Deane, J. (2008) *The Kenyan 2007 Elections and Their Aftermath: The Role of Media and Communication*. London [Online]. Available at https://downloads.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/trust/pdf/kenya_policy_briefing_08.pdf

Kaempf, S. (2013) The Mediatisation of War in a Transforming Global Media Landscape. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 67, no. 5, pp. 586–602. doi:10.1080/10357718.2013.817527

Kahl, A., and Larrauri, H. P. (2013) Technology for Peacebuilding. *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 1–15. doi:10.5334/sta.cv

Kamau, S. C. (2016) Engaged Online: Social Media and Youth Civic Engagement in Kenya. In B. Mutsvairo (Ed.), *Digital Activism in the Social Media Era: Critical Reflections on Emerging Trends in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Cham, Switzerland, Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-40949-8_6

Kapferer, J. N. (2013) *Rumors: Uses, Interpretations, & Images*. London, Transaction Publishers.

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 16:47 01 Dec 2023; For: 9780429318603, chapter21, 10.4324/9780429318603-25

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 16:47 01 Dec 2023; For: 9780429318603, chapter21, 10.4324/9780429318603-25

Kemp, S. (2020) *Digital 2020: Kenya*. London [Online]. Available at https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2020-kenya

Kirkpatrick, G. (2008) *Technology and Social Power*. Basingstoke, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.

KNCHR (2008a) *On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Rights Account of Kenya's Post-2007 Election Violence*. Nairobi [Online]. Available at https://kenyastockholm.files.wordpress.com/2008/08/pev-report-as-adopted-by-the-commission-for-release-on-7-august-20081.pdf

KNCHR (2008b) *On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Rights Account of Kenya's Post-2007 Election Violence*. Nairobi [Online]. Available at https://kenyastockholm.files.wordpress.com/2008/08/pev-report-as-adopted-by-the-commission-for-release-on-7-august-20081.pdf

Lefebvre, H. (1991) *The Production of Space*, D. Nicholson-Smith, Trans. Oxford, Blackwell.

Lindenmayer, E., and Kaye, J. L. (2009) *A Choice for Peace? The Story of Forty-One Days of Mediation in Kenya*. New York, International Institute of Peace.

Lynch, G., Cheeseman, N., and Willis, J. (2019) From Peace Campaigns to Peaceocracy: Elections, Order and Authority in Africa. *African Affairs*, vol. 118, no. 473, pp. 603–627. doi:10.1093/afraf/adz019

Marczak, B., Scott-Railton, J., McKune, S., Razzak, B. A., and Deibert, R. (2018) *Hide and Seek: Tracking NSO Group's Pegasus Spyware to Operations in 45 Countries*. Toronto [Online]. Available at https://citizenlab.ca/2018/09/hide-and-seek-tracking-nso-groups-pegasus-spyware-to-operations-in-45-countries/

Mattoni, A., and Treré, E. (2014) Media Practices, Mediation Processes, and Mediatization in the Study of Social Movements. *Communication Theory*, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 252–271. doi:10.1111/comt.12038

MCK (2012) *The Performance of Vernacular Radio Stations in Kenya*. Nairobi [Online]. Available at www.academia.edu/10293813/THE_PERFORMANCE_OF_VERNACULAR_RADIO_STATIONS_IN_KENYA_The_Performance_of_Vernacular_Radio_Stations_in_Kenya_Monitoring_Report

Morozov, E. (2011) *The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom*. New York, Public Affairs.

Mutsvairo, B. and Karam, B. (2018). Key Developments in Political Communication in Africa. In B. Mutsvairo & B. Karam (Eds.), *Perspectives on Political Communication in Africa*. Cham, Switzerland, Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-62057-2_1

Ndemo, B. (2017). The Paradigm Shift: Disruption, Creativity, and Innovation in Kenya. In B. Ndemo and T. Weiss (Eds.), *Digital Kenya: An Entrepreneurial Revolution in the Making*. London, Palgrave Macmillan.

NGOs-Board (2019) *Annual NGO Sector Report 2018/19*. Nairobi. Available at https://ngobureau.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ANNUAL-NGO-SECTOR-REPORT-2018-2019.pdf

Northouse, P. G. (2016) *Leadership: Theory and Practice* (7th ed.). London, Sage.

Nyabola, N. (2018) *Digital Democracy, Analogue Politics: How the Internet Era Is Transforming Politics in Kenya*. London, Zed Books.

Nyabuga, G., and Mudhai, O. F. (2009) "Misclick" on Democracy: New Media Use by Key Political Parties in Kenya's Disputed December 2007 Presidential Election. In O. F. Mudhai, Wisdom J. Tettey, and F. Banda (Eds.), *African Media and the Digital Public Sphere*. New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

Nyabuga, G., and Ugangu, W. (2018) Romancing the Media: A Critical Interrogation of Political Communication in Presidential Elections in Kenya. In B. Mutsvairo and B. Karam (Eds.), *Perspectives on Political Communication in Africa*. Cham, Switzerland, Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-62057-2_12

Odote, C. (2020) The 2013 Elections and the Peace Narrative (2013–2015). In N. Cheeseman, K. Kanyinga, and G. Lynch (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Kenyan Politics*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

PI (2017) *Business as Usual? How Western Data Analytics Companies Are Peddling Fear in Fragile Democracies* [Online]. Available at https://privacyinternational.org/node/1000

Pinch, T. J., and Bijker, W. E. (1987) The Social Construction of Facts and Artifacts: Or How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other. In W. E. Bijker, T. P. Hughes, and T. J. Pinch (Eds.), *The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology*. Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press.

Polletta, F., and Callahan, J. (2017) Deep Stories, Nostalgia Narratives, and Fake News: Storytelling in the Trump Era. *The American Journal of Cultural Sociology*, vol. 5, pp. 392–408. doi:10.1057/s41290-017-0037-7

Postill, J. (2010) Introduction: Theorising Media and Practice. In B. Bräuchler and J. Postill (Eds.), *Theorising Media and Practice*. Oxford, Berghahn Books.

Powers, J. H. (1995) On the Intellectual Structure of the Human Communication Discipline. *Communication Education*, vol. 44, no. 3, pp. 191–222. doi:10.1080/03634529509379012

Rid, T., and Hecker, M. (2009) *War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age*. Westport, CT, Praeger Security International.

Schatzki, T. R. (2002) *The Site of the Social: A Philosophical Account of the Constitution of Social Life and Change*. University Park, PA, The Pennsylvania State University Press.
Shahbaz, A., and Funk, A. (2019) *Social Media Surveillance*. Washington, DC [Online]. Available at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-on-the-net/2019/the-crisis-of-social-media/social-media-surveillance
Shirky, C. (2011) The Political Power of Social Media: Technology, the Public Sphere, and Political Change. *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 90, no. 1, pp. 28–41 [Online]. Available at www.jstor.org.brad.idm.oclc.org/stable/25800379
Shove, E., Pantzar, M., and Watson, M. (2012) *The Dynamics of Social Practice: Everyday Life and How It Changes*. London, Sage Publications Ltd.
Street, J. (1992) *Politics and Technology*. London, Macmillan.
Sundar, S. S. (2016) Why Do We Fall for Fake News? *The Conversation* [Online]. Available at https://theconversation.com/why-do-we-fall-for-fake-news-69829
Valencia, R. (2017) Trump-Tied Media Company Spread Fake News and Online Attacks in Kenya's Presidential Election, Report Finds. *Newsweek* [Online]. Available at www.newsweek.com/trump-hired-media-company-led-online-attacks-kenyas-presidential-election-748891
Waki, P., McFadyen, G., and Kambale, P. (2008) *Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence*. Nairobi [Online]. Available at https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/kenya-commission-inquiry-post-election-violence-cipev-final-report
Wanyande, P. (2009) Civil Society and Transition Politics in Kenya: Historical and Contemporary Perspective. In P. Wanyande and M. A. Okebe (Eds.), *Discourses on Civil Society in Kenya*. Nairobi, African Research and Resource Forum.
Willis, J. (2015) "Peace and Order are in the Interest of Every Citizen": Elections, Violence and State Legitimacy in Kenya, 1957–74. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 99–116. Available at www.jstor.org/stable/44715386
Wolfsfeld, G. (2015) *Making Sense of Media and Politics: Five Principles in Political Communication*. New York, Routledge.

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 16:47 01 Dec 2023; For: 9780429318603, chapter21, 10.4324/9780429318603-25