


This article was downloaded by: 10.3.97.143

On: 01 Dec 2023

Access details: *subscription number*

Publisher: *Routledge*

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK



Routledge Handbook of Conflict Response and Leadership in Africa

Alpaslan Özerdem, Sinem Akgül-Açkmee, Ian Liebenberg

The Political Transformation of the North African States in the Post–Arab Spring Period

Publication details

<https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780429318603-18>

Laçın dil Özt

Published online on: 15 Sep 2021

How to cite :- Laçın dil Özt. 15 Sep 2021, *The Political Transformation of the North African States in the Post–Arab Spring Period* from: Routledge Handbook of Conflict Response and Leadership in Africa
Routledge

Accessed on: 01 Dec 2023

<https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780429318603-18>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT

Full terms and conditions of use: <https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms>

This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

15

THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE NORTH AFRICAN STATES IN THE POST-ARAB SPRING PERIOD

Laçin İdil Öztığ

Introduction

In 2010, the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a street vendor, not only caused mass protests in Tunisia but had a region-wide spillover effect by aggravating grievances derived from poverty, corruption, clientelism, and repression in the Arab world. By providing a platform for citizens' demands and fostering their mobilization and empowerment, social media acted as a catalyst for social change. The Arab Spring protests eventually transformed the political trajectory of the Middle East and North Africa. In North Africa, while Morocco remained relatively stable due to the popularity of the monarchy and the reforms undertaken in the immediate aftermath of the eruption of protests in Tunisia (Mohsin and Milbert, 2013), dictators were ousted in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Initially, especially with Tunisia's smooth political transition, the Arab Spring seemed to be a potential for the democratization of the North African region. However, the hopes of Arab Spring were soon dashed.

Tunisia remained an exception rather than the rule as the protests had somewhat destabilizing effects on other North African countries and the Middle East region in general. After the fall of the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia, in Egypt, people from a wide array of political views poured into the Tahrir Square chanting slogans such as, "The People Want to Bring Down the Regime". After violent clashes between the protesters and the police that led to hundreds of civilian deaths, Hosni Mubarak resigned from his post, handing over his power to the army. However, despite the removal of Mubarak from power and Mohammed Morsi's coming to power with Egypt's first democratically organized election, Egypt descended into authoritarianism with the coup d'état orchestrated by General Abdel Fatah el-Sisi in 2013.

The threat of Libya descending into civil war during the Arab Spring protests prompted NATO member states to organize a military intervention in Libya (Operation Unified Protector). With the help of the no-fly zone imposed by NATO members, rebel forces defeated the government forces and killed Gaddafi (Kuperman, 2015). Despite the NATO intervention and the subsequent fall of the Gaddafi regime, no political authority could consolidate its power due to deep-rooted tribal rivalries. The post-Gaddafi period has been dominated by political polarization, civil war, and extremist violence.

This chapter examines the political dynamics in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya in the post–Arab Spring period by giving particular attention to the characteristics of political leadership. This study is built upon the assumption that leadership plays a vital role in countries’ political trajectories. Under the right leadership, societies can become more participatory and peaceful (Liebenberg, 2012). On the other hand, with leaders who abuse state power, authoritarianism is solidified, and the chances of democratization become much lower. Furthermore, leaders’ inability to assert their control might even push countries over the brink of state collapse.

Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, which all took on divergent political trajectories, are characterized by different leadership dynamics. Despite several difficulties, Tunisia has undertaken a relatively successful democratization process. Ennahda’s conciliatory approach during political disputes and the active role played by civil society organizations were instrumental in Tunisia’s tentative step towards democracy. In contrast, in Egypt, President Morsi took a different stand by turning a blind eye to the opposition voices during the constitutional process. Morsi’s non-conciliatory attitude played into the hands of Sisi, who grasped power through a coup d’état. With Sisi’s iron fist leadership style, Egypt has plunged back into authoritarianism that took a personal type of an authoritarian regime. In Egypt, authoritarian stability came at the expense of serious human rights violations, squandered economic resources, along with the country’s dwindling regional leadership prospects. In sharp contrast to both Tunisia and Egypt, Libya has been characterized by lawlessness and violence exacerbated by the elected government’s lack of political leadership.

Tunisia’s path to democracy: Ennahda’s conciliatory approach

After Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation in Tunisia in 2010, young protesters poured into the streets, protesting against corruption and repression in the country and demanding regime change. Shortly after, people from a wide range of the political spectrum, including Islamists, secularists, and civil society organizations, joined the protests (Culbertson, 2016). Like his predecessor Habib Bourguiba, Tunisian leader Zine El Abidine Ben Ali had subordinated the military by keeping it small and depriving it of economic rewards. Instead, he maintained his rule by relying on the police’s support (Bellin, 2012). Resenting being sidelined by the regime during the Arab Spring protests, the Tunisian military did not support Ben Ali. Ben Ali fled the country after the military notified him that it would not intervene to stop the demonstrations (Bellin, 2012).

Before Ben Ali stepped down, he handed his power to Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi. Ghannouchi’s rise to power ignited more protests, resulting in his resignation. In 2011, Tunisia’s first competitive elections were held. The Islamist party Ennahda won more than 40% of the votes in the Constituent Assembly and formed a coalition government with two secularist parties (Congress for the Republic and Ettakatol) (Marks, 2015). Yet Ennahda’s rule was overshadowed by the rising violence and instability in the country. During this period, two opposition politicians were killed by extremists, triggering the mob to attack the US embassy and an American school. Also, thousands of Tunisians went abroad to join jihadist organizations. Even though Ennahda was not responsible for these developments and declared Ansar al-Sharia, Tunisia’s biggest Salafi extremist group, a terrorist organization, it was blamed for creating a political vacuum that played into the hands of Islamist militants (Culbertson, 2016; Marks, 2015).

Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power in Egypt exacerbated fears among Tunisians that Ennahda might bring “Egyptian style Islamism in Tunisia” (Marks, 2015, p. 1). After a series of negotiations, the Ennahda party acquiesced to step down even though it continued to lead the constitutional process (Culbertson, 2016). In 2014, after the consensus reached by secularists and Islamists, the constitution was approved by the Constituent Assembly,

becoming the first constitution written in the Arab world without the influence of a dictator or external power (Frosini and Biagi, 2015).

Nidaa Tunis, a secularist party, won the 2014 parliamentary elections. Mohamed Beji Caid Essebsi became Tunisia's first democratically elected president by winning the 2014 presidential elections (Masri, 2017). Nidaa Tunis's private sector members who had connections with the old regime and the election of Essebsi (who served as a minister under the Ben Ali regime) as president increased concerns that the democratization process could be thwarted. These concerns became more aggravated when Nidaa Tunis was divided into two factions (one led by Hafedh Caid Essebsi, the president's son, and Mohsen Marzouk, a human rights activist). In 2016, Marzouk established a secularist party (Machrouu Tounes). Due to his refusal to cooperate with Nidaa Tunis, Ennahda became the majority party in parliament, prompting fears that it would use the political situation to its advantage. Ennahda's leader, Rached Ghannouchi, relieved these fears by underscoring that Ennahda did not aim at returning to power and that consensus building was more important than the majority rule (Masri, 2017).

The democratic and consensual character of the 2014 constitution and the peaceful transition of power (such as Ennahda's withdrawal from the government amid increasing concerns among the political elites and the society) epitomize the relatively successful democratization of Tunisia in the post-Arab Spring period (M'rad, 2016). Furthermore, the civil society, born out of the Arab Spring protests, acted independently of political authority and played a crucial role in political reforms and the constitution-drafting process (M'rad, 2016). In the immediate aftermath of Ben Ali's fall, the civil society set the agenda for the transition period, even prompting the resignation of Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi and some ministers in his cabinet by successfully steering the consensus between the secularists and the Islamists in the constitution-drafting process. The Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet (which consists of several civil society organizations) was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for its contribution to the pluralistic democracy in 2015 (M'rad, 2016).

Overall, in addition to the strong civil society, the homogeneous population (which prevented the eruption of sectarian or tribal conflicts), the weak military, and the consensual relationship between Islamists and secularists have played important roles in Tunisia's successful democratization process (Grewal, 2019). Specifically, Ennahda's conciliatory leadership style contributed to the peaceful resolution of political disputes and a smooth transfer of power. Furthermore, civil society organizations played a vital role in giving direction to the political leadership. For example, in response to civil society organizations' demands for more freedom and openness, President Essebsi created the Individual Freedoms and Equality Committee to recommend legislative reforms (Youssef, 2018). In line with the committee's proposals, new laws criminalizing violence against women and racial discrimination in 2017 and 2018, respectively, were put in place (Grewal, 2019). With these political reforms, Tunisia's democracy moved in a positive direction. While according to the Freedom House index, Tunisia's status was 'not free' before the revolution, its status changed to 'partially free' in 2011, being elevated to 'free' in 2014 (Freedom House, 2019).

However, Tunisia's democracy rests on fragile ground. The democratization process has not been accompanied by an increase in the welfare of the population. After the revolution, unemployment and inflation rates increased (Grewal, 2019). Tourism, the backbone of the country's economy, also declined, especially after the UK and other European countries advised their citizens not to visit the country, following the 2015 beach attack that killed 39 people (Grewal, 2019; Johnstone, 2018). The deterioration of economic conditions has created permissive conditions for the decrease of popular trust towards democratic institutions. In a survey conducted by Afro Barometer in 2018, 51% of Tunisians stated their dissatisfaction with the functioning

of democracy (Meddeb, 2018). In addition, the number of Tunisians that refused authoritarian alternatives to democratic mechanisms decreased. While in 2013, 71% of Tunisians supported democracy, only 46% of Tunisians stated their support for democracy in 2018 (Meddeb, 2018). Even though democratic institutions were introduced after the revolution and freedom of expression increased, democracy has a long way to go before its consolidation in the country.

Egypt's fallback into authoritarianism under the Sisi regime

When the Arab Spring protests spread to Egypt, millions of people, alienated by political repression and neo-liberal policies implemented in the 1990s (that left many people being worse off through a decrease in economic and social benefits), poured into the streets (Abdelrahman, 2014). While during the protests in Tunisia, the US adopted an ambivalent attitude and gave explicit support to the protestors only after the fall of the Ben Ali regime, the US adopted an unequivocal position in Egypt. After Mubarak's televised speech indicating that he would not immediately step down, President Obama announced that an orderly transition must begin, emphasizing US support to democracy and universal rights in Egypt, even though Mubarak's Egypt was an ally of the US (Robinson, 2011; Haas 2018).¹ The Obama Administration also recommended the Egyptian military not to use violence against civilians (Pressman, 2013). In addition to the recommendation of the US, the sidelining of the military in the late years of Mubarak's rule was instrumental in its withdrawal of support from the Mubarak regime.^{2,3} Following the refusal of the military to use force against the protestors, Mubarak stepped down on 11 February (Makara, 2013).

In parliamentary elections held between November 2011 and January 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) gained 235 seats in the parliament by receiving 47.2% of the votes. Salafist Nour Party came in second by receiving 24.3% of the votes (*BBC News*, 2012a). In the 2012 presidential elections, the Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed Morsi and Ahmad Shafiq, who served as a prime minister under the Mubarak regime, won the first round of elections. By winning 51% of votes in the second round of elections, Mohamed Morsi became Egypt's first democratically elected president (Tabaar, 2013).

In November 2012, President Morsi issued decrees that grant him and the parliament's upper chamber, in which Islamists hold the majority, immunity for the constitution-drafting process. He also granted himself immunity for all his decisions after he came to power (*The Guardian*, 2012). These decrees angered key players from the political opposition. For example, Mohamed El Baradei (the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency), who led the liberal opposition and supporters of the Mubarak regime, demanded the cancellation of the decrees (Pratt and Rezk, 2019). Baradei accused Morsi of usurping 'all state powers and [appointing] himself Egypt's new pharaoh' (quoted in Beaumont 2012).

The decrees also deepened the division within society. Non-Islamists groups, opposing Morsi's efforts to control the constitution-drafting process, took to the streets (Tabaar, 2013). Morsi eventually withdrew the decrees but did not change the date of the constitutional referendum, even though no consensus was reached in the Constituent Assembly on important issues (Pratt and Rezk, 2019). Furthermore, to ensure stability during the constitutional referendum scheduled in December 2012, he gave the military temporary power to arrest civilians (Awad, 2012). In the referendum, while 63.8% of the voters supported the proposed constitution, 36.2% voted against it (*BBC News*, 2012b).

In the new constitution, Islamic law remained the primary source of legislation, and al-Azhar, the highest authority of Sunni Islam was given consultative powers on matters related to Islamic law. Even though the new constitution was accepted with a majority vote, the low

turnout (33%) reveals with poignant clarity, the lack of social consensus on the constitution (*BBC News*, 2012b). A month later, Morsi declared a state of emergency in order to restore the order (Ardovini and Mabon, 2019). The private media, mostly owned by the Mubarak regime's supporters, capitalized on the controversial character of the constitution-drafting process to further stigmatize Morsi (Pratt and Rezk, 2019).

In addition to the constitution-drafting process, the politicization of the country was aggravated by economic and financial problems (Tabaar, 2013). In April 2013, a signature campaign was launched, calling for removing Morsi, and 15 million signatures were collected in a few months (Pratt and Rezk 2019). In July, mass protests shook the country, leading to the resignation of four ministers. The protesters, arguing that Morsi prioritized his interests over Egypt, also demanded Morsi's resignation (*BBC News*, 2013a).

The Egyptian military warned that people's demands should be considered. It gave President Morsi two days to end the political crisis, stressing that if the crisis continued, its own road map would be imposed on the country (*Reuters*, 2012). After President Morsi ignored these warnings, the military suspended the constitution, overthrew Morsi and high-ranking Muslim Brotherhood officials, and called for early presidential elections (Tabaar, 2013; *BBC News*, 2013b). The overthrow of Morsi ignited mass protests in the country. In response, Egyptian security forces again shot and killed hundreds of protesters (Saleh and Finn 2013).

After almost a thousand Muslim Brotherhood supporters were killed by security forces in August 2013 (the Raba Massacre), a state of emergency was declared (Ardovini and Mabon, 2019). General Abdul Fattah el-Sisi, the head of the Egyptian military, became president by receiving 96.1% of votes in the 2014 presidential elections (the voter turnout was 47.5%), whose validity was rightly questioned by international observers (Kingsley, 2014). The 2014 Constitution, approved by 98% of Egyptians, granted extrajudicial powers to the president (Ardovini and Mabon, 2019). Antiterrorism laws, passed in the same year, adopted a very broad meaning of terrorism by considering even the disruption of public order as a terrorist activity (Suto, 2014). The broad labelling of opposition as 'terrorists' or 'agitators' is a typical act of authoritarian leaders who aim to maintain an absolute hold on power.

Under Sisi's rule, many people have been arbitrarily arrested, including Muslim Brotherhood members and supporters. Deaths in police custody have been escalated (Human Rights Watch, 2015a). Thousands of civilians have been tried before military courts (Human Rights Watch, 2019a). Hundreds of people have been given death sentences by criminal courts. As of 2017, Egypt ranked third in the world with its highest number of death sentences (Human Rights Watch, 2019a). Political authorities have justified repressive measures under the cloak of the fight against terrorism (Human Rights Watch, 2019a).

Sisi was re-elected as president by receiving 98% of the votes in the 2018 elections (the voter turnout was 47%). Many opposition candidates withdrew before the elections, citing intimidation as a reason. Ironically, Sisi's only rival in the elections was his political supporter (Davison and Tolba, 2018). In July, the Egyptian parliament passed a law that granted the government more powers to restrict freedom of speech. It also passed the Media Regulation Law that restricts journalists' basic freedoms (Human Rights Watch, 2019a). The Sisi regime is supported by the military and the judiciary that are interested in maintaining their privileges and autonomy. There is no parliamentary independence, as the military controls the parliament. Rivalries among parliamentarians prevent the rise of a dominant party. With these dynamics in play, the Sisi rule has turned into a personalistic authoritarian regime (Darwisheh, 2018–2019).

Under the Sisi regime, in addition to political freedom, the economy also has deteriorated. Billions of dollars spent on the expansion of the Suez Canal did not bring tangible results to the economy. Large infrastructure projects, coupled with austerity measures, have caused rapid

inflation (Mandour, 2017). Despite having the largest army in the Arab world, with its debt-ridden economy, Egypt's chances of projecting power beyond its borders have considerably shrunk (Mandour, 2017). Overall, after Sisi came to power, Egypt has quickly backslid into authoritarianism. Its poor human rights record has worsened, and its leadership position in North Africa and the Middle East has weakened. Sisi's strongman politics came at the expense of Egypt's deteriorating human rights records along with its weakening economic and regional power.

Libya's lack of leadership and its descent into the abyss

Rising to power through a non-violent coup against King Idris in 1969, Muammar Gaddafi ruled Libya with the utmost oppression. He established an arbitrary political system with weak state institutions. Furthermore, he abolished all political parties and eliminated his political opponents (Fraihat, 2016). When Libya witnessed protests a few days after Mubarak's removal, Gaddafi showed no sign of backing down. He threatened to hunt down the protestors and promised to "fight on to the last drop of [his] blood" (quoted in Fahim and Kirkpatrick, 2011). Regime violence against civilians did prompt some defections from the military, but, differing strikingly from Tunisia and Egypt, the Libyan army stood on the side of Gaddafi (Taylor, 2014).

During the protests, the Arab League presented the government with a road map, calling for the ceasefire, protecting civilians, and a dialogue between the government and rebel forces (Campbell, 2013). Likewise, the African Union proposed a road map that included an immediate ceasefire and the realization of political reforms in dialogue with the opposition. While Gaddafi accepted the African Union's proposal, it was rejected by rebel forces that were determined to overthrow Gaddafi (Denyer and Fadel, 2011). The proposal was also ignored by the US and Britain, at loggerheads with Gaddafi's Libya long before the protests (Liebenberg, 2011a).

As the massacre of civilians loomed large, the US, Britain, and France took the lead in the military intervention by invoking the principle of the responsibility to protect (Campbell, 2013). With China and Russia's abstention, the Security Council authorized a no-fly zone and "all necessary measures to protect civilians in Libya" (U.N. Security Council Resolution, 1973, cited in United Nations Security Council, 2011). African leaders, Russia, and China took a 'catnap' when Resolution 1973 was pushed through (Liebenberg, 2011a). In March 2011, NATO started to bomb the Libyan military's positions and imposed a naval blockade to thwart the smuggling of weapons. A few months later, rebel forces captured Tripoli and killed Gaddafi (Haas, 2018). Under Operation Unified Protector, NATO forces destroyed approximately 2,000 targets (Liebenberg, 2011b).

The National Transitional Council (NTC), a loose political organization created by the protesters during the revolution, became a de facto government of Libya between 2011 and 2012 (Taylor, 2014; Fraihat, 2016). Even though the NTC was criticized for allowing the previous regime's supporters who switched sides during the revolution to participate, it was given a political support by the Arab League. In September 2011, it was granted a seat in the UN General Assembly (Buera, 2015). To facilitate a peaceful transition, the NTC established a Fact-Finding and Reconciliation Commission and Ministry for the Affairs of the Families of the Martyrs and Missing (Fraihat, 2016).

In popular elections held in July 2012, General National Congress (GNC) came to power by gaining 200 seats in the parliament (Fraihat, 2016). The GNC's coming to power was resisted by tribal groups that favoured a federal political system (Buera, 2015). That 38% of the registered voters boycotted the elections illustrates the lack of political consensus in the society (Buera, 2015). The GNC seemed to take steps with respect to national reconciliation by considering the recommendations made by the UN and Libya's Fact Finding and Reconciliation

Commission while drafting the transitional justice law. The law was never implemented (Fraihat, 2016). After the militants pressured the parliament to ban former Gaddafi officials from seeking political office, the Political Isolation Law was introduced in 2013 (Gartenstein-Ross and Bar, 2015). Rather than engaging in national reconciliation, the GNC hunted down the old regime's supporters, which undermined any future chances for national reconciliation (Fraihat, 2016).

Against the backdrop of a security vacuum in the aftermath of Gaddafi's overthrow, local governments relied on militias to provide security, resulting in the weakening of the central authority. To bring militias under state control, the Libyan Shield Forces were created in 2012 that worked in cooperation with the army. The Warrior Affairs Commission was created to persuade militias to disarm by offering them alternative job options (Vogler, 2012). Yet these efforts failed at centralizing and monopolizing the political authority.

Rather than being disbanded, revolutionary militias were divided into different factions and competed for territorial control, aggravating the country's already chaotic situation. Competing militias also engaged in terror campaigns against civilians. Towns and tribes witnessed polarization, being labelled either as regime loyalists or anti-Gaddafi revolutionaries (Fraihat, 2016). Black Africans were accused of being supporters of Gaddafi and witnessed discrimination (Campbell, 2013). Military councils were established and operated independently from the government (Fraihat, 2016). The US, Britain, and France, which immediately mobilized for the overthrow of Gaddafi, did not show the same enthusiasm to provide stability in Libya.

Suppressed under Gaddafi, Islamic militants benefited from the political and security vacuum by establishing safe havens and training camps throughout the country (Gartenstein-Ross and Bar, 2015). Libya also witnessed the flow of Islamic militants who escaped from repressive measures in Algeria, Tunisia, and Mali (Gartenstein-Ross and Bar, 2015). Facing an electoral loss in the 2012 elections, Islamists turned to radicalization and violence. After the release of an anti-Islam video (named the Innocence of Muslims) in 2013, Islamist militants attacked the US embassy in Benghazi, causing the death of US Ambassador Chris Stevens. Islamist militants launched an attack on the French Consulate in Tripoli a year later (Mezran and Pack, 2013). The kidnapping of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan by militants in Tripoli once again proved the country's ungovernability. Citing security concerns as a reason, the US and the UK withdrew some of their diplomatic staff from Libya (Aljazeera, 2013).

In May 2014, Khalifa Haftar,⁴ a former general and a militia commander who fought against Gaddafi forces in 2011, launched a terror campaign against Islamist militias in Libya (Operation Dignity). His forces attacked Ansar al-Sharia (a Salafi militia) based in Benghazi. The attacks of Haftar's forces promoted Islamist militants to establish an anti-Haftar alliance named Libya Down. Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) gave air support to Haftar's forces (Fraihat, 2016). His forces also attacked the GNC's building and the parliament to pressure it to disband (Gartenstein-Ross and Bar, 2015).

After the June 2014 elections, the GNC was replaced by a new parliament (the House of Representatives). Abdullah al-Thinni was announced as a caretaker prime minister by the parliament. Due to security concerns, the new parliament moved from Tripoli to Tobruk. Disappointed again with the election results, Islamist militants declared the new parliament unconstitutional by claiming that it consisted of supporters of the old regime (Stephen, 2014). Islamist militias and allies reacted by capturing Tripoli (Operation Dawn). By receiving the support of former GNC members, Islamists established their own government in Tripoli and designated Omar al-Hassi as prime minister (Human Rights Watch, 2015b). Tripoli's capture initiated a civil war between the nationalist militia (pro-government forces) and the Islamist militia (Operation Dawn forces). Even though the international community only recognized the Tobruk

government as Libya's legitimate authority, Operation Dawn forces fought to gain legitimacy and territorial control (Human Rights Watch, 2016).

After Operation Dawn forces captured the airport in Tripoli, the House of Representatives started to support Haftar's forces openly and requested military support from Egypt (Daleh, 2014). Fearing that civil war in Libya might turn into a regional war, Egypt and the UAE gave military support to the Tobruk government. Emirati planes, flying from the Egyptian airbases, launched airstrikes against Operation Dawn forces (Kirkpatrick and Schmitt, 2014). To halt the civil war and establish a national government, in September 2014, the UN initiated peace talks between the warring parties. A month later, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited Tripoli. He urged the warring parties to stop the fighting and underscored the importance of establishing a strong parliament and a strong government in Libya (BBC News, 2014). By implication, this was a call to the leadership to be conciliatory in post-2011 Libya.

In October 2014, Islamic militants who pledged allegiance to ISIS established an autonomous province in the eastern part of Libya and established a Sharia Court and Islamic police (Human Rights Watch, 2015b). ISIS soon captured Derna, provoking the Tobruk government to launch airstrikes against its strongholds. After ISIS kidnapped and killed 21 Coptic Egyptians, Egypt launched airstrikes against ISIS-controlled positions in Derna (Gartenstein-Ross and Bar, 2015). Despite the international condemnation and Egypt's military intervention, the attacks of ISIS continued. In 2015, ISIS captured Sirte and set up governing units in Derna, Benghazi, and Sabratha (Cafireo, 2019). The strategy of ISIS was based on increasing its territorial control and disrupting Libya's oil trade (Cafireo, 2019).

After UN-brokered peace talks, the Libyan Political Agreement (also named as the Skhirat Agreement) was signed in Morocco in 2015, as a result of which the Tobruk and Tripoli governments were unified, forming the Government of National Accord (GNA) (that consists of a Council of Ministers headed by the prime minister) that would be based in Tripoli. The House of Representatives was designated as the state's legislative authority during the transition period (UNSMIL, 2015). Fayeze Al-Sarraj was named prime minister of the GNA.

Like its predecessors, the GNA struggled for legitimacy throughout the country. Khalifa Ghwell, former prime minister of the GNC government, staged an unsuccessful coup d'état against the GNA in 2016, triggering clashes between the militants in Tripoli (Mundy, 2018). Haftar also refused to accept the legitimacy of the GNA. Abdullah al-Thinni, another former prime minister of the GNC, formed a parallel government in the city of al-Bayda (located in the eastern part of Libya) (Missaglia, 2017).

Following the GNA's request, the US military, by cooperating with local fighters affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, defeated ISIS in Sirte in 2016. Subsequently, ISIS switched to guerrilla warfare and continued its suicide attacks (Cafireo, 2019). In April 2019, Haftar's forces attacked Libya's capital Tripoli, claiming to rid the country of Islamist militants and received the political backing of Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and France (BBC News, 2019a). Prime Minister Fayeze Mustafa al-Sarraj accused General Haftar of orchestrating a coup attempt (BBC News, 2019b). In July, the GNA attacked the Al-Jufra airbase used by Haftar's forces (Aljazeera, 2019a). A month later, the GNA accepted UN's call for a ceasefire (even though General Haftar had not responded to the call at the time of writing). The UN mission in Libya (UNSMIL) was given the responsibility for monitoring violations of the ceasefire (Aljazeera, 2019b).

Rather than democratization and reconciliation, political turmoil and civil war have dominated the post-Gaddafi era. The lack of trust between the elected government and militias and the fighting between competing militias render a successful transition extremely difficult (Fraitat, 2016). The elected government could neither abolish militias nor integrate them into the

state's security apparatus (Gartenstein-Ross and Bar, 2015). Many civilians and military courts were abolished throughout the country. The two rival governments control prisons in which many people are arbitrarily held (Human Rights Watch, 2019b). Militant attacks (especially on oil installations) have crippled the economy and public services, triggering many internally displaced people (Human Rights Watch, 2019b).

Civil war and violence have also prompted many people to flee Libya via the Mediterranean Sea, resulting in many deaths. Migrants and asylum seekers, who are sent back to Libya, face ill-treatment in detention centres (Human Rights Watch, 2019b). Taken all together, the post-Gaddafi Libya is characterized by a power vacuum caused by the absence of effective political leadership. The GNA is unable to impose its authority in the country. Prime Minister al-Sarraj does not display leadership characteristics conducive to making Libya a unified country. Along with Libya's lack of leadership, the Western states' lack of interest in Libya's stability and external support given to Haftar forces aggravate lawlessness and instability in the country.

Conclusion

In the post-Arab Spring period, while Tunisia has undertaken a relatively peaceful transition process, Egypt has reverted to authoritarianism. Libya hovers on the brink of state collapse. The divergent paths that the three countries took after the Arab Spring can be linked to their leadership dynamics. While Islamist parties, long-suppressed under authoritarianism, came to power after the toppling of the long-standing dictators, they lacked the political experience to steer their countries. While amid growing concerns, Ennahda impeded Tunisia's polarization by relinquishing power, Morsi's attempts to increase his presidential powers, despite rising concerns, resulted in a military coup. Sisi's strongman politics and the absence of tangible external pressure for democratization prevent Egypt's chances for an accountable and representative government. Differing strikingly from Tunisia and Egypt, Libya's elected government has been unable to assert its authority within its borders that is clearly seen in the emergence of parallel governments.

After Tunisia's independence in 1956, Habib Bourguiba, the first president of Tunisia, embarked upon a Westernization project coupled with a strict separation of religion and politics. He and his successor Bin Ali aimed at thwarting the mobilization of Islamists. In 1988, the establishment of political parties with religious programs was forbidden (Oztig, 2018). Long suppressed under the Bin Ali regime, the Arab Spring provided Ennahda (established first as the Islamic Tendency Movement in 1981) a political opportunity. When Ennahda was in power, its approach was conciliatory, as strikingly seen in its formation of a coalition with two secularist parties and the constitution-drafting process. When political elites and society were concerned that Tunisia was heading towards an Islamist trajectory, Ennahda decided to step down not to strip up further polarization. It also accepted its defeat in the 2014 parliamentary elections, setting a role model for other political parties in the Arab world (El-Hasan, 2019). As mentioned previously, in addition to Islamists' conciliatory approaches, the emergence of a strong civil society after the Arab Spring, the military's weakness laid the groundwork for a successful political transition in Tunisia.

In Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated politicians were allowed to compete in elections since 1984. Yet, against the backdrop of the repressive political environment, they refrained from becoming a major political party that can threaten President Mubarak's interests (Wilmot, 2015). The Muslim Brotherhood established an official party (the FJP) only after the fall of the Mubarak regime. Yet in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, it could not turn its electoral success into a political success to steer the democratization process, mostly because the Egyptian

military, which long enjoyed a privilege position under the Mubarak regime, opposed Morsi's efforts to reorient it under civilian direction (Wilmot, 2015).

Furthermore, Morsi's political standing was weakened because he failed to reach consensus with other political actors that resulted in his loss of potential allies (Kennedy, 2017). In this context, Morsi's decrees to increase his executive powers played into the hands of the military by triggering polarization between Islamists and non-Islamists, thus giving the military a reason to intervene under the cloak of restoring public order (Wilmot, 2015). The strength of the military as an institution, Morsi's uncalculated political manoeuvres, the absence of a vibrant civil society contributed to the ushering in of an era of military rule in Egypt. With the absence of a dominant party, Mubarak's authoritarian dominant party system gave way to strongman politics under the Sisi rule (Darwisheh, 2018–2019).

Along with Syria, Libya stands out as a conspicuous example of how the Arab Spring turned into Arab Winter. Libya's descent into instability can be traced back to the Gaddafi era, during which all state institutions, including the military, were divided along tribal and religious lines (Lutterbeck, 2012). Along with the regular army, there were multiple security forces established to protect Gaddafi and prevent the emergence of an internal threat to his authority (Lutterbeck, 2012). The weakness of state institutions led to the strengthening of tribal and familial ties, resulting in the fracture in the Libyan society (Anderson, 2011). Differing from Tunisia and Egypt, Libya had “no system of political alliances, a network of economic associations, or national organizations of any kind” (Anderson, 2011, p. 6). The weak state institutions, coupled with the lack of national identity among the Libyan society, have prevented the establishment of an effective political authority in Libya. The ineffective political leadership of the current elected government is the result of and contributes to the divisiveness of the Libyan society. Given the elected government's failure in uniting the country and external support given to Haftar forces, it is unlikely that Libya will attain stability in the near future.

Notes

- 1 It should be noted that the US is more interested in keeping Egypt an ally or satellite state than a democracy. Currently, little real pressure is exerted on Egypt to transition to democracy despite the Sisi regime's gross human rights violations.
- 2 Ever since Egyptian independence in 1922, the country's military officers enjoyed massive economic privileges. Under President Hosni Mubarak, who ruled Egypt between 1981 and 2011, the military continued to be the country's economic engine through their industrial, agricultural, and infrastructure activities. However, from the 1990s onwards, Mubarak started to prioritize and privilege his internal security over the military, which resulted in the shrinking of the military's budget (Gotowicki, 1997). Mubarak's neo-liberal reforms further eroded the military's economic power (Bellin, 2012). Mass privileges were given to the new business elite by Gamal Mubarak (Hosni Mubarak's son) and contributed to the military's resentment.
- 3 Obama's decision to support Mubarak's ouster came at the expense of his key advisers (such as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates) and Saudi Arabia, its key ally (Haas, 2018).
- 4 Khalifa Haftar supported Gaddafi in the 1969 coup. However, he turned against Gaddafi after he was sent to Chad for a military mission in 1987 (Libya launched incursions into Chad intermittently between 1980 and 1987 due to a territorial conflict between the two countries) and was captured as a prisoner of war (Barfi, 2014).

Bibliography

- Abdelrahman, M. (2014) *Egypt's Long Revolution: Protest Movements and Uprisings*, London, Routledge.
- Aljazeera (2013) 'US and UK withdraw Libya Diplomatic Staff', 11 May [Online]. Available at www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/05/201351183324644424.html (Accessed 20 August 2019).

- Aljazeera (2019a) 'UN-recognised GNA Attacks Key Haftar Airbase in Central Libya', 27 July [Online]. Available at www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/recognised-gna-attacks-key-haftar-airbase-central-libya-190727135849634.html (Accessed 26 August 2019).
- Aljazeera (2019b) 'Libyan Government Agrees to UN-backed Eid al-Adha Ceasefire', 10 August [Online]. Available at www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/libyan-government-agrees-backed-eid-al-adha-ceasefire-190810064643901.html (Accessed 20 August 2019).
- Anderson, L. (2011) 'Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 90, No. 3, pp. 1–7.
- Ardevini, L. and Mabon, S. (2019) 'Egypt's Unbreakable Curse: Tracing the State of Exception from Mubarak to Al Sisi', *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 456–475.
- Awad, M. (2012) 'Egypt Army Gets Temporary Power to Arrest Civilians', *Reuters*, 10 December [Online]. Available at www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-politics-army/egypt-army-gets-temporary-power-to-arrest-civilians-idUSBRE8B90RU20121210 (Accessed 29 August 2019).
- Barfi, B. (2014) 'Khalifa Haftar: Rebuilding Libya from the Top Down', *Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, No. 22 [Online]. Available at www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote_22_BarakBarfi.pdf (Accessed 23 August 2019).
- BBC News (2012a) 'Egypt's Islamist Parties Win Elections to Parliament', 21 January [Online]. Available at www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16665748 (Accessed 23 August).
- BBC News (2012b) 'Egyptian Voters Back New Constitution in Referendum', 25 December [Online]. Available at www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20842487 (Accessed 29 August 2019).
- BBC News (2013a) 'Egypt Protesters Storm Muslim Brotherhood Headquarters', 1 July [Online]. Available at www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23125387 (Accessed 29 August 2019).
- BBC News (2013b) 'Egypt Army Chief Gen Abdul Fattah al-Sisi Statement', 4 July [Online]. Available at www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23175529 (Accessed 29 August 2019).
- BBC News (2014) 'UN Chief Calls for Peace in Libya during Surprise Visit', 11 October [Online]. Available at www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29583614 (Accessed 26 August 2019).
- BBC News (2019a) 'Khalifa Haftar: The Libyan General with Big Ambitions', 8 April [Online]. Available at www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27492354 (Accessed 26 August 2019).
- BBC News (2019b) 'Libya Conflict: French Missiles Found on pro-Haftar Base', 10 July [Online]. Available at www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48935242 (Accessed 26 August 2019).
- Beaumont, P. (2012) Mohamed Morsi Bars Court Challenges and Orders Hosni Mubarak Retrial', *The Guardian*, 22 November [Online]. Available at www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/22/mohamed-morsi-mubarak-retrial-egypt (Accessed 1 September 2019).
- Bellin, E. (2012) 'Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring', *Comparative Politics*, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 127–149.
- Buera, A. A. (2015) 'Libya's Arab Spring: Revolution against a 42-Year Dictatorship', in Sadiki, L. (ed.) *Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring: Rethinking Democratization*, New York, Routledge, pp. 105–118.
- Cafiero, G. (2019) 'Is ISIS the Real Winner of Hifter's Tripoli Offensive?', *Middle East Institute*, 30 May [Online]. Available at www.mei.edu/publications/isis-real-winner-hifters-tripoli-offensive (Accessed 26 August 2019).
- Campbell, H. (2013) *Global NATO and the Catastrophic Failure in Libya: Lessons for Africa in the Forging of the African Unity*, New York, Monthly Review Press.
- Culbertson, S. (2016) *The Fires of the Spring: A Post-Arab Spring Journey Throughout the Turbulent Middle East*, New York, St. Martin's Press.
- Daleh, M. (2014) 'Dawn of Libya Forces Impose Control on Tripoli', *Al-Monitor*, 25 August [Online]. Available at www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/08/libya-tripoli-control-hifter-tribal-forces.html# (Accessed 26 August 2019).
- Darwish, H. (2018–2019) 'Egypt under Sisi: From an Authoritarian Dominant Party System to Strongman Politics', *JETRO-IDE ME-Review*, vol. 6, pp. 1–20.
- Davison, J. and Tolba, A. (2018) 'Egypt's Sisi Wins 97 Percent in Election with No Real Opposition', *Reuters*, 2 April [Online]. Available at www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-election-result/egypts-sisi-wins-97-percent-in-election-with-no-real-opposition-idUSKCN1H916A (Accessed 25 August 2019).
- Denyer, S. and Fadel, L. (2011) 'Gaddafi Accepts Road Map for Peace Proposed by African Leaders', *The Washington Post*, 10 April [Online]. Available at www.washingtonpost.com/world/african-leaders-arrive-in-libya-in-attempt-to-broker-cease-fire-gaddafi-hopes-for-sympathy/2011/04/10/AF0VH6ED_story.html
- El-Hasan, H. A. (2019) *Killing the Arab Spring*, New York, Algora Publishing.

- Fahim, K. and Kirkpatrick, D. (2011) ‘Gaddafi’s Grip on the Capital Tightens as Revolt Grows’, *New York Times*, 22 February [Online]. Available at www.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/world/africa/23libya.html?pagewanted=all (Accessed 27 August 2019).
- Fraihat, I. (2016) *Unfinished Revolutions Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia after the Arab Spring*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press.
- Freedom House (2019) ‘Data and Resources’ [Online]. Available at <https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world> (Accessed 29 August 2019).
- Frosini, J. O. and Biagi, F. (2015) *Political and Constitutional Transitions in North Africa: Actors and Factors*, New York, Routledge.
- Gartenstein-Ross, D. and Bar, N. (2015) ‘Dignity and Dawn: Libya’s Escalating Civil War’, Research Paper, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, February [Online]. Available at www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Gartenstein-Ross-Barr-Dignity-and-Dawn-Libyas-Escalating-Civil-War-February2015.pdf (Accessed 24 August 2019).
- Gotowicki, S. (1997) *The Role of the Egyptian Military in Domestic Society*, Fort Leavenworth, KA: Foreign Military Studies Office Publications.
- Grewal, S. (2019) ‘Tunisian Democracy at a Crossroads’, Policy Brief, *Brookings* [Online]. Available at www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/FP_20190226_tunisia_grewal.pdf (Accessed 31 August 2019).
- Haas, M. L. (2018) *The United States and the Arab Spring: Threats and the Opportunities in a Revolutionary Era*, New York, Routledge.
- Human Rights Watch (2015a) ‘Egypt’s Political Prisoners’, 6 March [Online]. Available at www.hrw.org/news/2015/03/06/egypts-political-prisoners (Accessed 31 August 2019).
- Human Rights Watch (2015b) ‘World Report 2015: Libya’ [Online]. Available at www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/libya (Accessed 24 August 2019).
- Human Rights Watch (2016) ‘Libya: Events of 2015’ [Online]. Available at www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/libya (Accessed 24 August 2019).
- Human Rights Watch (2019a) ‘Egypt: Events of 2018’ [Online]. Available at www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/Egypt (Accessed 22 August 2019).
- Human Rights Watch (2019b) ‘Libya: Events of 2018’ [Online]. Available at www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/libya# (Accessed 31 August 2019).
- Johnstone, H. (2018) ‘Can Tunisia Revive its Tourist Industry’, *Financial Times*, 3 August [Online]. Available at www.ft.com/content/ce1f38b8-8f5c-11e8-9609-3d3b945e78cf (Accessed 1 September 2019).
- Kennedy, G. (2017) *From Independence to Revolution: Egypt’s Islamists and the Contest for Power*, London, Hurst Publishers.
- Kingsley, P. (2014) ‘Abdel Fatah al-Sisi Won 96.1% of Vote in Egypt Presidential Election, Say Officials’, *The Guardian*, 3 June [Online]. Available at www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/03/abdel-fatah-al-sisi-presidential-election-vote-egypt (Accessed 30 August 2019).
- Kirkpatrick, D. D. and Schmitt, E. (2014) ‘Arab Nations Strike in Libya, Surprising U.S.’, *New York Times*, 25 August [Online]. Available at www.nytimes.com/2014/08/26/world/africa/egypt-and-united-arab-emirates-said-to-have-secretly-carried-out-libya-airstrikes.html (Accessed 24 August 2019).
- Kuperman, A. J. (2015) ‘Obama’s Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention Ended in Failure’, *Foreign Affairs*, March/April [Online]. Available at www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/2015-02-18/obamas-libya-debacle (Accessed 23 August 2019).
- Liebenberg, I. (2011a) ‘Northern Africa, Arabian Springs, Oil and Arrogance: New Uses for R2P in Africa’, *African Renaissance*, Vol. 8, No. 3&4, pp. 34–54.
- Liebenberg, I. (2011b) ‘Forget about Roadmaps to Peace. It’s Gaddafi or Bust!’, *The Thinker*, Vol. 31, pp. 50–51.
- Liebenberg, I. (2012) ‘Africa beyond the Abyss: Community, Democracy, Peace and being a Leader’, I. Liebenberg (ed.) *Into the Future: Leadership for Africa*. SIGLA Occasional Papers, Stellenbosch, SUN MeDIApp. 11–31.
- Lutterbeck, D. (2012) ‘Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil-Military Relations’, *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 28–52.
- M’rad, H. (2016) ‘The Process of Institutional Transformation in Tunisia After The Revolution’, in Grote R. and Röder T. J. (eds) *Constitutionalism, Human Rights, and Islam after the Arab Spring*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 71–89.
- Makara, M. (2013) ‘Coup-proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring’, *Democracy and Society*, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 334–359.

- Mandour, M. (2017) 'The Weakening of Egypt's Regional Role', *Open Democracy*, 24 April [Online]. Available at www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/weakening-of-egypt-s-regional-role/ (Accessed 20 July 2020).
- Marks, M. (2015) 'Tunisia's Ennahda: Rethinking Islamism in the Context of ISIS and the Egyptian Coup', Working Paper, Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at Brookings [Online]. Available at www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Tunisia_Marks-FINALE-5.pdf (Accessed 23 August 2019).
- Masri, S. M. (2017) *Tunisia: An Arab Abnormality*, New York, Colombia University.
- Meddeb, Y. (2018) 'Support for Democracy Dwindles in Tunisia amid Negative Perceptions of Economic Conditions', *Afro Barometer*, Dispatch No. 232, 3 September [Online]. Available at http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r7_dispatchno232_support_for_democracy_dwindles_in_tunisia_1.pdf (Accessed 29 August 2019).
- Mezran, K. and Pack, J. (2013) 'Libyan Stability at Risk', *Foreign Policy*, 2 May [Online]. Available at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/02/libyan-stability-at-risk> (Accessed 30 August 2019).
- Missaglia, N. (2017) 'Main Political and Military Players in Libya Today', in Mezran, K. and Varvelli, A. (eds.) *Foreign Actors in Libyan Crisis*, Milano, Ledi Publishing, pp. 119–135.
- Mohsin, K. and Milbert, S. (2013) 'Turmoil in the Arab World: How Has Morocco Fared?', *Atlantic Council*, 25 January [Online]. Available at www.atlanticcouncil.org/Blogs/Menasource/Turmoil-In-The-Arab-World-How-Has-Morocco-Fared (Accessed 31 August 2019).
- Mundy, J. (2018). *Libya*, Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Oztig, L. I. (2018) 'A Governmentality Approach on the Transformative Role of Authoritarian Secularism', *Zeitschrift für Religion, Gesellschaft und Politik*, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 81–99.
- Pratt, N., and Rezk, D. (2019) 'Securitizing the Muslim Brotherhood: State Violence and Authoritarianism in Egypt after the Arab Spring', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 239–256.
- Pressman, J. (2013) 'Same Old Story? Obama and the Arab Uprisings', in Haas, M. L. and Lesch, D. W. (eds.) *The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the Middle East*, Boulder, Westview Press, pp. 219–238.
- Reuters (2012) 'Egyptian Armed Forces Chief Sets Ultimatum', 1 July [Online]. Available at www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-protests-army-text/egyptian-armed-forces-chief-sets-ultimatum-idUSBRE96014420130701 (Accessed 29 August 2019)
- Robinson, D. (2011) 'Obama Tells Mubarak that Transition 'Must Begin Now'', *Voa News*, 31 January [Online]. Available at www.voanews.com/world-news/middle-east-dont-use/obama-tells-mubarak-transition-must-begin-now (Accessed 20 August 2019).
- Saleh, Y. and Finn, T. (2013) 'More than 200 Dead after Egypt Forces Crush Protest Camps', *Reuters*, 14 August [Online]. Available at www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-protests/more-than-200-dead-after-egypt-forces-crush-protest-camps-idUSBRE97C09A20130814 (Accessed 29 August 2019)
- Stephen, C. (2014) 'War in Libya: The Guardian Briefing', *The Guardian*, 29 August [Online]. Available at www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/29/-sp-briefing-war-in-libya (Accessed 19 August 2019).
- Suto, R. (2014) 'Egypt's New Terrorism Law', *Atlantic Council*, 12 December [Online]. Available at www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/egypt-s-new-terrorism-law (Accessed 31 August 2019).
- Tabaar, M. (2013) 'Assessing (In)security after the Arab Spring: The Case of Egypt', *PS: Political Science & Politics*, Vol. 46, No. 4, pp. 727–735.
- Taylor, W. C. (2014) *Military Responses to the Arab Uprisings and the Future of Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East: Analysis from Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
- The Guardian (2012) 'Egypt's President Grants Himself Far-Reaching Powers', 22 November [Online]. Available at www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/22/egypt-president-far-reaching-powers
- United Nations Security Council (2011) 'Security Council Approves "No-Fly Zone" over Libya Authorizing "All Necessary Measures" to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions', SC/10200 [Online]. Available at www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm#Resolution (Accessed 19 August 2019).
- UNSMIL (2015) 'Libyan Political Agreement' [Online]. Available at <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/Libyan%20Political%20Agreement%20-%20ENG%20.pdf> (Accessed 26 August 2019).
- Vogler, S. (2012) 'Security Challenges in Libya and the Sahel: Workshop Report', *CNA Analysis & Solutions*, December [Online]. Available at www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DCP-2012-U-003450-Final.pdf (Accessed 30 August 2019).
- Wilmot, J. (2015) 'A Commitment to Politics: The Trajectory of the Muslim Brotherhood during Egypt's 2011–13 Political Opening', *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 379–397.
- Youssef, M. (2018) 'A Murky State–Civil Society Relationship in Tunisia', *Open Democracy*, 2 November [Online]. Available at www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/murky-state-civil-society-relationship-in-tunisia/ (Accessed 24 July 2020).