


This article was downloaded by: 10.3.97.143

On: 10 Dec 2023

Access details: *subscription number*

Publisher: *Routledge*

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## **Routledge Handbook of Conflict Response and Leadership in Africa**

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### **The Role of IGAD in Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution**

Publication details

<https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780429318603-11>

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**Published online on: 15 Sep 2021**

**How to cite :-** Billy Agwanda, Uur Yasin Asal, Ahmad Shoaib Ghulam Nabi, Israel Nyaburi Nyadera. 15 Sep 2021, *The Role of IGAD in Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution from:* Routledge Handbook of Conflict Response and Leadership in Africa Routledge

Accessed on: 10 Dec 2023

<https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780429318603-11>

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## 8

# THE ROLE OF IGAD IN PEACEBUILDING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

## The case of South Sudan

*Billy Agwanda, Uğur Yasin Asal, Ahmad Shoaib Ghulam Nabi,  
and Israel Nyaburi Nyadera*

### Introduction

International organizations have played a critical role in promoting international peace and security since the end of the Second World War. Specifically, the United Nations has been an important actor and anchor of peace through forging negotiations and peace enforcement missions. These efforts can be credited for the decline of interstate conflicts. However, the world has witnessed a sharp increase in conflicts between states and non-state actors since the end of the Cold War, and what has been of concern is the declining presence and influence of the UN in addressing these new forms of protracted conflicts. This has opened a gap for regional organizations to play a role in peace processes. The rise of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) from a development forum to an active mediator in peace and conflict resolution provides a unique example to examine the involvement of regional actors in international peacebuilding.

Africa has been struggling with different forms of conflict for over half a century, and the input from international actors has elicited mixed reactions. On the one hand, the efforts by international organizations and states outside the continent can be seen as a reflection of cooperation in dealing with global challenges. Alternatively, the involvement of external actors can be criticized as neo-colonialism. More recently, a new view that African problems need African solutions has increasingly gained momentum in the continent, and this can be attributed to the re-emergence of the African Union and other regional organizations as leading actors in the continent (Agwanda & Özoral, 2020). This perhaps accounts for the increasing roles of African regional organizations in peacebuilding.

The case of South Sudan has become an embodiment of what Langston Hughes in his poem “Harlem” referred to as a “dream deferred” (Hughes, 2020). In 2011, when South Sudan declared independence, many people shared in the joy of the world’s newest state. But it is the South Sudanese political leaders and citizens who perhaps best described this joy. President Salva Kiir in a brief address after the declaration of independence said, “We have waited for more than 56 years for this. It is a dream that has come true. This land has seen

untold suffering and death. We have been bombed, enslaved, and treated worse than a refugee in our own country. We have to forgive, though we will not forget”. Mr George Garang, an English teacher who lost 13 members of his family in the 11-year war of independence, and one of the thousands of South Sudanese celebrating in the streets when asked about his thoughts on the independence replied, “[M]y whole body feels happy” (New York Times, 9 July 2011).

But events after 2013 raised fundamental questions regarding the future of South Sudan. While the new state emerged from a diplomatic outcome, the nature of the new government and organization of the society in general were shaped by legacies of civil wars during the struggle for independence. One such legacy is mistrust between groups and a perception that ownership of political power leads to either dominance or marginalization as had been the experience of the Southerners before independence (Nyadera et al., 2019).

Hardly had the government settled and developed a framework for development that President Salva Kiir sacked his Vice-President Riek Machar on allegations of plotting a coup (Agwanda & Asal, 2020). The political power struggle that ensued quickly escalated into violent ethnic clashes engulfing the whole country. The intensity of the violence was further amplified by the fact that it involved the Nuer and Dinka ethnic groups, two of the most dominant ethnicities in South Sudan (Lyman et al., 2014).

Although there can often be an accumulation of historical differences between ethnic groups, circumstantial factors such as the sacking of Riek Machar, cannot evoke conflict in the magnitude witnessed in South Sudan unless active participants channel such grievances towards a path of war (Chereji & Wratto, 2013). Political leaders tend to whip up ethnic emotions and draw ethnic groups into violent clashes with each other to achieve certain political goals. Nonetheless, the overarching narrative for the breakout of conflict is that an attempted coup against Salva Kiir had been foiled.

On the morning of 16 December 2013, decked out in full military gear, President Kiir addressed the nation and claimed that a military coup attempt orchestrated by soldiers allied to Vice-President Riek Machar had been foiled. Machar, on the other hand, waited until 18 December 2013 to make a public statement in which he dismissed the allegations by Salva Kiir and instead accused him of fabricating an attempted coup to settle political differences with his political opponents. As tensions escalated, militia groups largely from the Nuer ethnic group seized control of cities such as Bor on 2 January 2014. President Kiir responded to the loss of Bor by declaring a state of emergency in both Jonglei and Unity states that were largely controlled by rebels allied with Riek Machar (Tiiptamer, 2019; Blanchard, 2016). As fighting spread from Juba to other parts of the country, civilians fled, and the Uganda Peoples Defence Force (UPDF) supported SPLA to launch an offensive and recapture Bor city from opposition forces on 18 January 2014.

Within two days of fighting in Juba and its immediate outskirts, more than 1,000 people were killed, and the numbers continued to grow, with total displacement by the end of February 2014 reaching 900,000 persons, some 167,000 of whom crossed into neighbouring countries (Day et al., 2019). Ultimately, after nearly five years of intense conflict, approximately 400,000 people have died, and more than 4.5 million people have been displaced (Le Quach, 2018). The conflict has been exacerbated by frequent droughts and famine, leading to a dire humanitarian crisis. In 2018, for instance, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that 7.1 million people in the country were facing starvation since the outbreak of the conflict. Cognizant of the fragile nature of the state from the time of independence, IGAD as platform for security cooperation in the region, emerged as a critical actor in the resolution of the conflict and peacebuilding.

## Contextual overview of the conflict

The experience of two civil wars between the southern and northern regions of Sudan had caused the death of over 2 million people and a legacy of fragile state (Lai & Thyne, 2007). While the liberation war ended, an army constituted of more than 100,000 soldiers and several rebel groups remained active (Wassara, 2015). These conditions nurtured a system of *fragile politics* whereby political discourses are conducted within the framework of political patronage, ethnic divisions, and politicized violence. Widespread underdevelopment and weak operational capacity of the state confined within a few cities meant that South Sudan had begun its statehood as a very fragile state (Barber, 2011). The political economy conceived at independence was so fragile that it was easily manipulated by a system of political patronage overseen by political elites (Maxwell & Santschi, 2014). This has become a constant factor in the conflict as several groups perceive that the only way to economic empowerment is through access to political power.

*Politicization of identity:* The conflict in South Sudan supersedes the light description of an ethnic conflict. At a higher level, tribal identity is an important component of power distribution across key public institutions. According to Aalen and Schomerus (2016), different levels of government institutions reflect and are often identified with particular ethnic groups in South Sudan and, as such, are perceived as avenues for accumulating resources, protecting valuable territory, and defending tribal interests. Thus, the political differences between Kiir and Machar are not just personal but also reflect competition over the ability to allocate power in a manner that can enable them to galvanize communal support (Rolandsen, 2015).

At a lower level, intercommunal conflicts are a common feature of South Sudan's socio-political discourse. The periods before, during and after the civil war, fighting between different communities because of cattle rustling, and revenge attacks contributed to many deaths. The localized nature of these conflicts has often deterred the reach of state authority because approximately 80% of South Sudan's population is domiciled in rural areas (Lacher, 2012). This consequently established a strong cultural attachment to traditional authority (traditional chiefs) who are vested with the responsibility to address local disputes (Zink, 2016). However, the presence of government-appointed county commissioners, who comparatively enjoy lesser legitimacy but have more resources under their authority, also means that their respective roles are often clashing.

*Violence and state:* One important feature that was recognizable prior to independence, was a cross-cutting national, regional, and international understanding of the highly problematic nature of SPLM/A. Without undergoing significant transformational process, SPLM/A turned from a rebel group into a government. Despite the absence of a political party culture which is an essential aspect of good governance, the international community provided support for SPLM/A against its liberation war with Khartoum. Peter Adwok who served as Minister for Higher Education before the conflict began in 2013, described SPLA by arguing, "The SPLA, instead of being a genuine national liberation movement, turned into an agent of plunder, pillage, and destructive conquest" (Nyaba, 1997: 51).

Between 2013 and 2018, the UN, domestic civil societies, and other international organizations have done extensive documentation of human rights violations by both the government and opposition groups, including undermining the distribution of humanitarian aid (Jok, 2016; Lucey & Kumalo, 2017). The government largely represented as SPLA and the opposition (SPLA-IO) have been accused of indiscriminate targeting of civilians and committing crimes against humanities which could potentially lead to judicial prosecutions in future (Day et al., 2019).

## **Intervention efforts**

### ***United Nations***

Prior to the outbreak of countrywide fighting from December 2013, a UN peacekeeping mission was already underway in South Sudan. Through the authorization of resolution 1996 on 8 July 2011, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan was established with a mandate for one year subject to review. The primary mission of UNMISS was to consolidate peace and security and to facilitate the achievement of stable political conditions ideal for socio-political and economic development of South Sudan.

During the first few days of clashes, tens of thousands of South Sudanese fled to UNMISS camps in Juba, Bor, Melut, Malakal, and Bentiu to seek refuge from violence (Zambakari et al., 2018). In partnership with other humanitarian aid agencies, the eight UNMISS camps spread across the country provided safety for approximately 85,000 civilians. The influx of civilians in UN operational bases having been unprecedented, the new challenge necessitated the need for reinforcement both in terms of humanitarian aid as well as security forces personnel.

The UN Security Council responded to this need through resolution 2132 passed on 24 December 2013 for the deployment of additional troops and police to support UNMISS operations (See Table 8.1). The number of interim troops was increased from 7,000 to 12,500 soldiers, and an additional 1,323 police personnel were drawn from the Formed Police Units (FPU) under the United Nations Police Division (UNIPOL) to serve in UNMISS. Due to the urgent nature of the crisis, troops and police personnel were mobilized from other UN missions such as the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID); UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI); UN Stabilization Mission in DR Congo (MONUSCO); and UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).

### **Involvement of IGAD in South Sudan**

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has increasingly become a critical component in Eastern Africa's integration efforts. Having transformed from a regional body addressing natural disasters to overseeing regional security, IGAD has become an active actor in Eastern Africa since 1986. The organization has taken key responsibilities in conflict mediation processes in Sudan, Somalia, and South Sudan albeit with mixed results. When conflict broke out in Juba, IGAD immediately dispatched members of its Council of Ministers to persuade the government and opposition forces to cease fire and agree to partake in a peaceful conflict mediation process.

This fact-finding mission resulted in the first heads of state and government summit held in Nairobi on 27 December 2013. IGAD appointed three representatives drawn from Kenya, Ethiopia, and Sudan to facilitate the mediation process as special envoys. The summit was attended by presidents from Djibouti (Ismail Omar), Kenya (Uhuru Kenyatta), Somalia (Hassan Mahmoud), Uganda (Yoweri Museveni), First Vice-President of Sudan (Bakri Hassan Saleh), and Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Sudan (Dr Barnaba Marial Benjamin). Additionally, IGAD and the African Union were represented in the summit by IGAD Executive Secretary Eng. Mahboub Maalim and Deputy Chairperson of the AU Commission Ambassador Erastus Mwencha.

During this summit, the IGAD Assembly issued a communique in which, among other directions, instructed its Council of Ministers to engage the Government of South Sudan, contact Riek Machar who had escaped to exile, and involve other key stakeholders in peacebuilding.

The summit also directed that urgent measures be undertaken to ensure that an all-inclusive dialogue conducted on a face-to-face basis is convened by 31 December 2013. The communique condemned acts of sexual violence, murder, targeting of civilians or unarmed combatants, looting and all other forms of criminal acts perpetrated by any actor and demanded that those responsible must be held accountable by their de jure or de facto leaders. The IGAD member states also committed to continue monitoring the conflict and, if necessary, coordinate the evacuation of member state citizens from South Sudan (IGAD, 2013).

The Nairobi Summit paved the way for the mediation process to commence, and after three weeks of negotiations in Addis Ababa, an Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities was signed on 24 January 2014. During the negotiations by IGAD, complications arose from opposition groups who protested the treatment of detainees by the government and continued presence of the Uganda People Defence Forces. These two issues had stimulated conditional demands from the opposition that, unless they were met, no ceasefire agreement would be signed.

The January 2014 Agreement established, among other provisions, five key points. Firstly, all belligerents declared to cease all hostilities or any other actions that could undermine the peace processes. Secondly, hostile propaganda that could fuel ethnic hatred must immediately stop. Thirdly, parties committed to end attacks on civilians and protect human rights, life, and property, as provided for in various national, regional, or international legal instruments. Fourth, all the parties agreed to provide safe passage to areas that need humanitarian interventions. The agreement also established a monitoring and verification mechanism (MVM) under IGAD to monitor the implementation of the Agreement.

However, this agreement was not upheld. Less than two weeks after its signing, violent clashes were witnessed in Unity state, Jonglei, and the Upper Nile regions (See Figure 8.1). Whereas the government and opposition groups had agreed to participate in this peace process, their attitudes did not reflect genuine commitments in this regard. The government was convinced that it had the legitimacy, material, and military capability to challenge opposition groups and win the contest militarily and therefore saw no value in conditional negotiations (Phillip-Apuuli, 2015).




Figure 8.1 Conflict events (January–October 2014)

Source: Authors' analysis

After the resumption of conflict in February 2014, no ceasefire agreement was achieved for several months as the parties missed several deadlines established to accept a peace agreement. Nonetheless, following another round of concerted efforts by the IGAD mediation team with the support of the US, UN, AU, Norway, and UK, both the government and the opposition were pressured back to the negotiating table in August 2015 (Nyadera, 2018). The regional and international communities threatened the leaders with punitive sanctions should they fail to take concrete measures and sign a new peace deal.

After the collapse of this agreement, an Agreement to Resolve the Crisis in South Sudan (ARCSS) was signed on 1 February 2015. This agreement, mediated by IGAD, also failed to establish lasting peace, and conflict broke out again (See Figure 8.2). In August 2015, IGAD succeeded in establishing another deal dubbed Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. Unlike the other deals, President Kiir openly vented his opposition to the deal, and it is only through regional and international pressure that he signed the agreement one week later after walking out during the mediation process (Bereketeab, 2017). He criticized the deal as an attack on the sovereignty of the South Sudan.

The August 2015 peace deal had provisions for a transitional government of national unity; permanent ceasefire and transitional security arrangements; humanitarian assistance and reconstruction; resource, economic, and financial management arrangements; transitional justice, accountability, reconciliation, and healing; parameters of permanent constitution; and a joint monitoring and evaluation commission. Notably, the transitional government of national unity was to be established from a coalition of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), SPLM-IO, former political detainees, and other political parties engaged in the mediation processes. Additionally, the executive was to be shared in the ratio of 53%, 33%, 7% and 7% for GoSS, armed opposition groups, former detainees, and other political parties respectively.

Whereas the 2015 peace agreement is largely conceived as fair to the parties involved, the failure of its implantation led to renewed violence between government and opposition forces after two months. Riek Machar accused Salva Kiir of making unilateral decisions when he attempted to establish 18 additional states (Agwanda & Asal, 2020). Additionally, President Kiir was labelled as an obstacle to the implementation of the 2015 Agreement after collapse of the deadline to establish a Transitional Government of National Unity by January 2016 (Baker, 2016; De Vries & Schomerus, 2017).




Figure 8.2 Conflict events and fatalities (January 2014–April 2018)

Source: Authors' analysis

After nearly five years of conflict and failed peace agreements, IGAD renegotiated the 2015 Agreement on 12 September 2018 in Khartoum to establish the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The signatories of this agreement included the Transitional Government of National Unity of the Republic of South Sudan (TGoNU), SPLM/A-IO, the South Sudan Opposition Alliance, former detainees, and Other Political Parties (OPP). One of the unique features of this revitalized deal is that it provided for the position of the First Vice-President Riek Machar to oversee issues pertaining to governance and an additional four vice-presidents who are to be nominated by the TGoNU (2 positions), SSOA (1 position), and FD (1 position who shall be a woman) (IGAD, 2018). As of May 2021, despite reports of human rights violations and few instances of conflict, the IGAD-mediated and guaranteed 2018 Agreement, still managed to guarantee elements of fragile peace even though the slow implementation of the Agreement was increasingly highlighted as a potential catalyst for renewed conflict.

### Weaknesses of IGAD peace processes

The first intervention of IGAD in the South Sudan conflict occurred two days after fighting broke out in Juba as a fact-finding mission. Henceforth, the displacement of over 4.5 million people and the death of over 400,000 others in five years, reflects the weaknesses of the organization as a guarantor of regional peace and security. This chapter identifies four key internal and external factors that contributed to the inability of the organization to provide strong leadership in the resolution of the conflict.

The *organizational structure of IGAD* undermines objective decision-making processes. This is because the supreme policymaking and regulatory power rests on the heads of states in the region. The centralization of decision making within the heads of governments overrides IGAD's Secretariat organ; consequently, instead of pursuing policies that might benefit South Sudan, several decisions regarding the conflict have been made from the primary consideration of the national interests of member states. The Secretariat has often been relegated to the peripheries of mediation processes partly due to the fact that it based in Djibouti while the South Sudan mediation office is stationed in Ethiopia. Therefore, other than making arrangements for summits to discuss the conflict, the Secretariat plays a minimal role in the day-to-day conflict resolution processes. Additionally, despite the existence of a mediation support unit roster of experts created in 2011 under the IGAD Peace and Security Strategy 2010–2014, they were not involved in the conflict mediation process, which became highly politicized (Phillip–Apuuli, 2015).

Secondly, IGAD lacks the ability to conduct an independent *deployment of peace and deterrence force*. Healy (2014) highlights that IGAD first suggested the deployment of 5,500 troops in January 2014 to support the implementation of the Agreement on the Secession of Hostilities. However, member states such as Uganda had already taken unilateral decisions to deploy the Uganda Peoples Defence Force (UPDF) to fight alongside the government against opposition groups. As a member of IGAD policy and regulatory organ, such actions are a clear manifestation that Uganda had developed bias towards the conflict, thereby failing to meet one of the fundamental pillars of mediation, the principal of neutrality. Also, due to commitments of troops by member states such as Kenya which had a significant number of troops deployed in Somalia and Sudan (Dafur), there were fears that the initial 5,500 troops needed for immediate deployment to oversee peace could not be raised from IGAD member states. This perhaps explains why member states outside the IGAD cooperation framework such as Rwanda and Burundi, were invited to contribute troops (Beswick & Jowell, 2014). Moreover, there is the issue about financing. Critical peace and security operations within IGAD are significantly dependent on donor funding.



The IGAD peace processes have been greatly undermined by the *non-commitment of the conflict belligerents*. Between 2013 and 2018, approximately ten peace agreements were signed between government and opposition groups. But the absence of political commitment led to violations of several peace agreements. The conflict belligerents have all been obstacles to IGAD's peace mediation processes, with deadlocks taking several weeks to be resolved. For instance, just before the first mediation talks began in 2013, SPLM/A-IO demanded that Ugandan troops be withdrawn from the conflict and that all political detainees be released unconditionally. The government, on the other hand, argued that these political detainees were behind an attempted coup and as such, had to face charges of treason against the state (Akol, 2014).

Fourth, there is *lack of strong sanctions* against the government and individual leaders in South Sudan. Whereas global leaders such as the US, Norway, the UK, and the UN called for sanctions on the arms embargo, IGAD member states were reluctant to do so. Strong economic ties between the South Sudan government and regional neighbours hindered any actions pertaining to the imposition of strong economic sanctions on both South Sudan and high-ranking political leaders involved in the conflict. Kenya, for instance, has been reluctant to imposing economic sanctions on South Sudan because of long-term economic interests regarding investments in road, rail, and oil export pipeline constructions. Additionally, South Sudanese political elites have substantial investments in properties, particularly in Kenya and Uganda (Dessalegn, 2017).

The IGAD peace processes were weakened by *lack of united purpose and coordination*. The mediation processes were overseen from multiple fronts, leading to an increase in timeline for conflict resolution. Within IGAD, there were mediation efforts by the Secretariat; another mediation team overseen by Special Envoys from Kenya, Ethiopia, and Sudan; and the extraordinary summits convened by IGAD heads of state and government. During the 2015 mediations, the process was further enlarged to incorporate a new framework referred to as IGAD-Plus. This new alliance constituted the AU Commission, the UN, the EU, Troika (US, UKm and Norway), China, and an AU high-level committee (Algeria, Chad, South Africa, Rwanda, and Nigeria). Moreover, in an attempt to reunite three groups that had emerged within SPLM, the ruling parties of South Africa and Tanzania initiated the Arusha intra-party dialogue process (Copeland, 2015).

### **Strength of the IGAD leadership experience in South Sudan**

The transformation of IGAD to an organ overseeing peace and security in the region is plausible. Nonetheless, despite this new mandate in the context of South Sudan having been challenged often by issues of mistrust amongst member states, political sensitivity over interventions in conflicts, and constraints on capacity, IGAD has increasingly consolidated its vision of being a peace and security actor. This mandate has been strengthened by the institutionalization of the Political Affairs Programme, which has a special emphasis on peace and security as well as the establishment of the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism, the Office of Special Envoys, and the IGAD Security Sector Programme.

These specialized institutions within the IGAD peace and security architecture have been very critical in the conflict mediation processes in South Sudan. As highlighted earlier, IGAD quickly dispatched conflict monitors to South Sudan immediately after the conflict broke out on a fact-finding mission on government and opposition groups. This is similar to the Office of Special Envoys, who were dispatched to establish contact and initiate the first attempt at conflict resolution. The quick action by IGAD after the conflict broke out in December 2013 yielded the first peace talks in Ethiopia in January 2014.

Moreover, unlike in the past when IGAD was heavily dependent on information from research institutes, the South Sudan peace process also saw the incorporation of civil society organizations as partners under the IGAD Conflict Early Warning Mechanism largely because of the capacity of civil society organizations to reach the grassroots levels and provide information regarding the status of conflict, its impact, and its causes. This partnership enabled IGAD to access critical information regarding the conflict in order to apply more pressure on the warring parties to come to an agreement on ending the conflict.

The leadership of IGAD as a regional body also became crucial in initiating negotiations. Its institutional legitimacy anchored the peace talks because unilateral interventions from neighbouring countries were likely to exacerbate the conflict. For instance, Uganda had already made clear indications for its support to the government of South Sudan when it deployed the Uganda People Defence Force to fight alongside the government against opposition forces. Sudan, on the other hand, was perceived by the government of South Sudan as a supporter of the opposition groups against the government. Thus, the leadership provided by IGAD became an ideal compromise for both the opposition groups and government as it could enable some extent of neutrality in the peace negotiation processes.

The consistency of IGAD despite the several violated peace agreements also manifests good elements of its leadership. Having to largely depend on diplomatic efforts to reconcile the government and opposition groups, the regional body experienced several violations of its peace agreements. Nonetheless, continued pressure and efforts to establish common ground yielded instances when the secession of hostilities was observed, albeit temporarily. These were significant in minimizing conflict casualties as well as providing time for peace discussions. It is this consistency on resolving the conflict through diplomacy that ultimately yielded the establishment of the Revitalized Agreement on Conflict Resolution in the Republic of South Sudan signed in 2018.

Lastly, IGAD also embraced the elements of inclusivity in its conflict resolution processes. Despite the conflict largely featuring the government of South Sudan and the SPLM-IO, several other actors including other militia groups, former detainees, religious leaders, civil society organizations, humanitarian organizations, and other external powers were also involved in the negotiations.

## Conclusion

The involvement of IGAD in the South Sudan peace processes at the backdrop of previous roles in Sudan (2004) and Somalia (2005) highlights its growing capacity and influence in peace and conflict resolution through new diplomatic dimensions. However, giving this blanket judgement negates other important aspects of the organization that are critical to its effective operations in conflict resolution should such a need arise. In the larger context of the South Sudan conflict and the mediation processes, it can be deduced that the organization is far from providing a strong institutional leadership that can guarantee regional peace and security. The long duration of the conflict and conflict resolution processes remains a stain on the operational and organizational capacities of IGAD.

The existing weak political culture characterized by interstate competitions, authoritarian leadership, and absence of a strong regional hegemon as is the case of Nigeria, Egypt and South Africa in their respective regions, hinders decisive actions which are critical in conflict resolution. These glaring shortcomings are seen not only in relation to conflict resolution processes but also cut across the organization's ability to address humanitarian crises during conflict. It is plausible to argue that, perhaps, the insistence on IGAD to oversee conflict resolution in South Sudan despite

Table 8.1 Implementation matrix for the reinforcement of UNMISS

Type	Units to be deployed during phase 1 (March 2014)	Units to be deployed during phase 2 (June 2014)	Units to be deployed during phase 3 (late 2014)
<b>Infantry</b>	Nepal: 350 Ghana: 300 Rwanda: 800	Nepal: 500 Ghana: 550 Kenya: 310	Battalion 1: 850 Battalion 2: 850
<b>Aviation support</b>	Bangladesh: three military utility helicopters (inter-mission cooperation)		Nine additional military utility helicopters: 165
<b>Riverine support</b>			Bangladesh engineering company: 275
<b>Other</b>	Level II: 63		Three sector headquarters: 120
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,450</b>	<b>1,423</b>	<b>2,450</b>

Source: UN Security Council (2014)

facing several challenges may be to advance the growing idea that ‘African problems require African solutions’ and that IGAD can be a model organization of African regionalism.

Nonetheless, despite these concrete concerns, there still exists massive opportunity for IGAD to develop its internal capacities and enhance more collaboration with the African Union, particularly AU’s Peace and Security Council. Its mediation approach offers better commitment to the sanctity of fundamental principles such as territorial integrity while also preventing, to an extent, an increase in the violation of human rights. Its experience, which is marked by a legacy of success and failure, will continue to be relevant for the region where old tensions continue, and new conflicts are emerging. Ultimately, its development into a strong organization mandated to oversee regional peace and security can only stem from the understanding amongst member states that their respective national securities are grossly intertwined and that IGAD offers a platform on which they can seek to address conflicts without recourse to violence.

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