


This article was downloaded by: 10.3.97.143

On: 01 Dec 2023

Access details: *subscription number*

Publisher: *Routledge*

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK



## **Routledge Handbook of Conflict Response and Leadership in Africa**

Alpaslan Özerdem, Sinem Akgül-Açkmee, Ian Liebenberg

### **Leadership of the United Nations and African Union in Darfur, 2003–2006**

Publication details

<https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780429318603-10>

Kathryn Crewe Kelly

**Published online on: 15 Sep 2021**

**How to cite :-** Kathryn Crewe Kelly. 15 Sep 2021, *Leadership of the United Nations and African Union in Darfur, 2003–2006* from: Routledge Handbook of Conflict Response and Leadership in Africa  
Routledge

Accessed on: 01 Dec 2023

<https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780429318603-10>

**PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT**

Full terms and conditions of use: <https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms>

This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

# LEADERSHIP OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND AFRICAN UNION IN DARFUR, 2003–2006

How a simplified conflict narrative dominated the discourse around intervention<sup>1</sup>

*Kathryn Crewe Kelly*

## Introduction

Case studies of international leadership in conflict resolution typically assume a certain level of intentionality and coordination with regard to chosen interventions. They suppose that third parties make rational cost/benefit calculations about all options on the table. Often absent from our understanding of how a particular course of action was determined by a third party in a given conflict are the less visible and less tangible influences on decision making, namely the social and institutional discourses that defined the menu of potential conflict interventions to begin with. In the following case, the chapter examines the claim that an overly simplistic advocacy narrative of events and prescriptions for international action in Darfur, Sudan, pointed the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) leadership down a path early in the conflict there, resulting in a heavy emphasis on peacekeeping rather than peacemaking as the tool of choice. The consequence of this emphasis, the chapter argues, was an avoidable prolongation of political contestation and violence, but how and why the narrative dominated decision making in the midst of many alternative information sources is less obvious. The definition of leadership relied upon here is closest to the theory of “adaptive leadership” proposed by Ronald Heifetz (1994) at the Harvard Kennedy School, which posits that true leaders move beyond applying a repertoire of known responses when confronted with harsh new realities by proposing new solutions to new problems.

## The case: the Darfur rebellion

In 2003, northern and southern Sudan looked to be on the cusp of signing a peace agreement after 20 years of conflict. Two armed political movements based in the Darfur region of Western Sudan, which had, until then, put their faith in southern rebel leader John Garang to negotiate a deal on behalf of all of Sudan’s marginalized groups, realized that the door might be closing (Flint, 2007; Burr & Collins, 2008). In response to years of the central government’s

economic neglect, Arabization campaigns, and exploitation of livelihood conflicts between migratory herders and sedentary farmers over receding arable land, the Darfur groups formally launched their own rebellion against the Government of Sudan.<sup>2</sup> That February, the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF) – a secular<sup>3</sup> group that was drawn largely from the agriculturalist Fur and Massalit tribes and that subsequently changed its name to the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) – began attacking government targets, starting with a police station in the central mountainous region of Darfur (Burr & Collins, 2008, p. 288). The SLM/A's attacks spread to other police stations and army posts, and, in late April, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) – an Islamist group drawn largely from the Zaghawa tribe – joined the SLM/A in an attack on the airport outside of the capital of North Darfur (Burr & Collins, 2008, p. 288). These types of attacks by the SLM/A and JEM, loosely in coordination with each other and based on similar, yet eventually incompatible goals – regional autonomy in the case of the former and national regime change in the case of the latter – continued into the summer (Burr & Collins, 2008, p. 292; Flint 2007).

The government, caught off guard, responded slowly, as the majority of its forces remained engaged against the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in southern Sudan (Burr & Collins, 2008, p. 292). However, by Summer 2003, the government had mobilized its army, air force, and local militias – both Popular Defence Force and Jinjaweed – to a level not previously seen in the region (Flint & De Waal, 2005). These forces, which already had begun attacking villages on horseback in October 2002, responded with indiscriminate and systematic village “cleaning operations”, in coordination with government air support, targeting the ethnic homelands of the SLM/A and JEM fighters (Burr & Collins, 2008, p. 292). This pattern of attacks, well established through interviews with Darfuris by groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, continued intensely for nearly two years and sporadically after that (AI, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2004a, 2004b; HRW 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2005a, 2005b). By early 2005, some 1.5 million Darfuris had already been displaced by violence or lack of food, with nearly 200,000 fleeing to Chad, and at least 150,000 people had died as a result of the conflict (Guha-Sapir & Degomme, 2005).

### International response

Reports by humanitarian and human rights organizations operating in Darfur began to attract the attention of donor governments, the UN, and the AU in mid- to late 2003. Chadian President Idriss Déby, sensing the potential threat of unrest in Darfur to his own regime because of his Zaghawa ties, mediated a 45-day ceasefire, loosely under the umbrella of the AU, between government and rebel forces in early September 2003 (Slim, 2004, p. 813). Later that month, the UN launched its first appeal for \$139 million to provide humanitarian assistance to Darfur (Slim, 2004, p. 814). A second 45-day, Chadian-brokered humanitarian ceasefire was signed in N'Djamena in April 2004, and the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) – under the rubric of “African Solutions to African Problems” – was given the task of monitoring its implementation as well as sponsoring negotiations to reach a political settlement (Murphy, 2007; De Waal, 2007, p. 1041; Slim, 2004, p. 817; Lanz, 2011). The AU Peace and Security Council – an entity modelled on the UN Security Council – had only been established in December 2003 and, according to a former AU official, was “not particularly keen” on going into the negotiations that followed but felt pressured by NGOs and was “there basically to support President Déby”.<sup>4</sup> The UN maintained the lead on coordinating humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring. The UN Security Council did not hold a major discussion on the Darfur conflict until July 7, 2004 (Slim, 2004, p. 811).<sup>5</sup>

Public pressure on donor governments to enhance the mission of AMIS to incorporate civilian protection and to reinforce it with additional resources, mounted from late 2004, when the US Government publicly referred to the situation in Darfur as “genocide”<sup>6</sup> (Hamilton, 2011). The UN Security Council also referred the case of Darfur to a Commission of Inquiry, which ultimately led to the indictment of Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir by the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, making it nearly impossible for Bashir to become a credible signatory to any peace deal. This pressure continued into 2006, the height of the Darfur advocacy movement in the United States and Europe, a full year after a massive influx of humanitarian assistance had stabilized malnutrition and mortality rates in the region (Hamilton, 2011; Degomme, 2011). Save Darfur, a wide-ranging collection of student and church groups, with their own complicated history of advocacy in southern Sudan, came to wield a significant influence on US and international policymaking through public awareness, fundraising, and green-branded pressure campaigns aimed at stopping the “genocide” and deploying a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur. The movement’s efforts peaked with a celebrity-backed rally on the US National Mall in April 2006.<sup>7</sup>

Around the same time, an AU-brokered peace agreement between the Sudanese Government and one faction of the SLM/A led by a Zaghawa named Minni Minawi – the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) – was signed in Abuja in May 2006 and paved the way for a UN peacekeeping force with a Chapter VII civilian protection mandate to replace AMIS. However, DPA negotiations were rushed to such an extent that the agreement fell apart within weeks. The DPA was negotiated under pressure from the UN Security Council to quickly conclude talks, in part to heed the UN Department of Peacekeeping (DPKO) advice that there be a “peace to keep” but more indirectly as a result of pressure from advocacy groups on international envoys to the talks to get peacekeepers deployed (Guéhenno, 2006a; Toga, 2007, p. 239; Nathan, 2007, p. 253). It was also limited in scope by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which created a power-sharing arrangement between the Sudanese Government and SPLA. The DPA granted Darfur one assistant to the president and created a regional governing authority but, unlike the CPA, provided few international guarantees of implementation and was relatively unknown to the broader Darfuri population (DPA, 2006). While the DPA also provided for AU and UN officials to facilitate conversations in Darfur to raise awareness and build support for its implementation, Abdel Wahid, the Fur leader of the SLM/A faction that did not sign the agreement, beat the AU and UN to the punch, quickly spreading the word – along with money and threats of violence – among the Fur population that the DPA did not merit their support (Fadul & Tanner, 2007; Weissman, 2008). Meanwhile, many Zaghawa members of Minni Minawi’s SLM/A faction that did sign the agreement flocked to JEM (Tanner and Tubiana, 2007).

Fighting escalated both between the rebels and the government and amongst the rebels themselves. This violence re-displaced civilians and worsened access for aid workers in what, by then, had become the largest humanitarian operation in the world (“UN warns”, 2006; De Waal, 2007; Fadul & Tanner, 2007; Tanner & Tubiana, 2007; Weissman, 2008). According to the UN, displacement figures, which had steadied around 3 million in mid-2005, began to rise again, and the percentage of the population accessible by humanitarian aid workers dropped from just over 80% right after the DPA was signed to just above 60% a few months later (UN Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 33). Nevertheless, throughout 2006, the Save Darfur movement continued to push predominately for peacekeepers rather than a resumption of political talks that would ensure a sustainable peace agreement (Hamilton, 2011). Demonstrators at a rally, Global Days for Darfur, organized by Save Darfur in Central Park during the UN’s General Assembly meetings in September 2006, wore “blue hats” to symbolize the proposed transition of AMIS to a UN force (Save Darfur, n.d.).

The UN Security Council's decision to convert AMIS into the hybrid AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) finally came in July 2007, after much negotiation with the Government of Sudan about the force's composition<sup>8</sup> (De Waal, 2007, p. 1042). The conversion and deployment of nearly 26,000 personnel – the second largest peacekeeping mission in history – ultimately took several years to complete (UNAMID, n.d.). Throughout its deployment, the mission was consistently criticized, fairly or not, for failing to enforce its Chapter VII mandate, in part due to the government's ability to dictate conditions for the force's composition and deployment (Elbasri, A., 2014; Giddo, 2014; Lynch, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c; Niam, 2010; Sengupta & Gettleman, 2014). As the peacekeepers themselves became targets, advocates acknowledged the force was out of its depth and called on the UN Security Council and AU Commission to adjust its mandate (Mills, 2009; ENOUGH, 2014; Raghavan, 2014). Today, UNAMID has withdrawn from Darfur, and its net impact is unclear.

Subsequent attempts to negotiate a viable and sustainable peace deal in Darfur faltered, including partial or failed talks facilitated by the AU and UN in Doha in 2011 and other third parties, such as Libya. Ever hopeful that the CPA would provide a framework to resolve Darfur's problems, the international community never invested as much effort in obtaining a political solution in Darfur as it did in peacekeeping, even after South Sudan's secession in 2011 brought the North–South deal to an end. Bashir was deposed in 2019, and violence of a different nature, but with the same roots of political and economic marginalization and inter-communal conflict, continues today in Darfur (UN, 2020). As the AU and UN discussed plans for UNAMID's withdrawal, some advocated for a smaller protection force to remain in place (HRW, 2020). When a former UN official interviewed for this research was asked whether the “peacekeeping solution” from the beginning overshadowed other potentially more effective interventions in Darfur, he answered, “It's a fact that it did”.

Was this a failure of leadership by the UN and AU? Or were they responding to other pressures? According to Sudan scholar Alex De Waal (2015), “The Darfur conflict was highly unusual in that the international narrative for the crisis was set by a western advocacy campaign that framed the problem as genocide and the challenge as international intervention, military and judicial” (p. 88). Other Sudan experts, including Julie Flint (2010), have agreed with De Waal, referring to the “the subordination of peacemaking to peacekeeping, driven in part by advocacy campaigns to ‘save’ Darfur through military intervention and/or robust peacekeeping” (p. 12). However, the advocacy narrative around Darfur, was by no means the only information available to the UN Security Council and AU Peace and Security Council when making decisions about how to intervene in Darfur. These organizations' own bureaucracies – with their own principles and doctrine for responding to complex conflicts and humanitarian emergencies – as well as news media and multiple humanitarian, human rights, conflict prevention, and other types of advocacy organizations beyond Save Darfur, vocally reported on the conflict. Member states, too, relied on a range of sources that painted a more complicated picture of a political conflict with deep historical, economic, territorial, and environmental roots, requiring a more complex solution and multifaceted response. Nevertheless, the Darfur advocacy narrative described by De Waal and Flint emerged as the *dominant* one, crowding out other descriptions and prescriptions for action. The question posed here is, how?

### **Deconstructing the Darfur narrative and its dominance**

It would be easy to credit or blame the Darfur advocacy movement with singlehandedly draining the international narrative around the conflict of complexity, resulting in an overemphasis on genocide as the frame and peacekeeping as the solution, but the story of this storyline is more

complicated than that. Not only were UN and AU leaders relying on more than just advocacy arguments for information about the conflict, but broader discursive dynamics were at play. To quote one former member of the advocacy movement, “I don’t think they were really making their policy decisions based on what was being recommended by a bunch of people with green wrist bands”. The advocacy narrative won the debate for more reasons than just its simplistic or normative appeal. It dominated the debate because it resonated within and was compatible with existing UN, AU, NGO, and other discourses. Moreover, the discursive resources that would have been necessary to create the space for a more inclusive and sustainable political solution, particularly a locally owned one, did not exist at the time.

To understand how this occurred, we can look first at elements of the simplified narrative in question. Severine Autesserre (2014) defines a simplified conflict narrative as “an uncomplicated storyline, which builds on elements already familiar to the general public, and a straightforward solution” (p. 131). She says dominant peacebuilding narratives tend to “include views about the primary causes, consequences, and solutions to violence in the country of intervention”, they “resonate” more when they assign cause or responsibility for harm, and include well defined “good” and “evil” individuals or obvious perpetrators and victims (Autesserre, 2014, pp. 33, 131). Simplified conflict narratives also carry frames that do not necessarily cause but do orient and authorize action by outside parties (Autesserre, 2009, 2012). These frames “shape our views on what counts as a problem . . . and what does not” (Autesserre, 2012, pp. 5–6; Fischer, 2003; Schön and Rein, 1994). Moreover, frames are often based on situations we have encountered before and therefore expect to see again – they simplify the world and decision making for us, so that we do not have to analyse every occurrence anew (Autesserre, 2014, p. 37; Roe, 1994; Goffman, 1974; Laws and Rein, 2003).

The Darfur advocacy narrative could be summarized by the following characteristics:

- 1 A monocausal explanation of violence attributing the conflict to the genocidal intentions of the Government of Sudan and centring on an analogy to the 1994 Rwandan genocide, with brief or no mention of the Darfur insurgency or complicated history that preceded it and a linear rather than circular logic of violence blaming one side, the Government of Sudan (Frederick, 2005; Murphy, 2007; Gruley, 2009; De Waal, 2015; Cobb, 2013; Autesserre, 2014)
- 2 A binary moral construct and ethnically polarized conception of the parties as being distinguishable along “Arab” versus “non-Arab” lines as well consisting of organized government attacks on civilians – monolithically “evil” versus “good” – often excluding the rebels as actors capable of initiating violence or negotiating on behalf of their own interests (Frederick, 2005; Murphy, 2007; Gruley, 2009; Blayton, 2009a; Cobb, 2013; Autesserre, 2014)
- 3 A single prescription for action, namely military action, or peacekeeping, with accountability-focused interventions – sanctions and criminal prosecutions – as close companions, and little connection between these future solutions and present or past conditions, given a lack of focus on the political situation or potential local solutions (Flint, 2010; Cobb, 2013; Autesserre, 2014)

This simplified narrative created several path dependencies. The storyline’s compressed plotline<sup>9</sup> and history, starting in 2003, effaced a longer series of events and motivating behaviours of the parties, such as the history of regional conflict and cross-border arms flows from Chad, as well as JEM’s affiliation with a former ideologue of the Sudanese Government. The narrative’s monocausal explanation of violence also overlooked conflict drivers that could have revealed opportunities for addressing underlying causes, including years of cyclical drought, desertification, and

changing migration patterns. The storyline's binary moral characterization of the parties had the effect of delegitimizing the government's participation in any potential political agreement because of its criminal lot but also deprived the rebels – not even a character in the story – of a role in finding a solution. In addition, the simplification of a multiparty conflict into a two-sided conflict – based on precedent in North–South talks – would make any agreement difficult to implement. The ethnic 'Arab' versus 'non-Arab' construct understood in the genocide framing ignored the complexity of Darfur's identity landscape and excluded a wide range of actors from consideration in political talks, including 'Arab' tribes affiliated with the government-backed militias, also historically marginalized. Finally, the storyline's melodramatic plotline – depicting Darfur as a damsel in distress, in need of a protective father figure and dispenser of justice (Hardy, 2008) – externalized responsibility for resolving the conflict by implying that only outside actors, namely peacekeepers, could rescue Darfur, disempowering civilians and marginalizing local solutions.

Nevertheless, the Rwanda storyline became hegemonic for at least three reasons. First, it resonated within existing social and institutional discourses familiar to relevant organizational and member state leaders, particularly in the United Nations. According to Rebecca Hamilton (2011), the Save Darfur movement had consciously used the Dallaire Model – referring to the UN peacekeeping commander who was unable to convince UN officials in New York to send reinforcements during the 1994 Rwandan genocide – to mobilize public support and influence policymakers to intervene in Darfur (pp. 44–46). "Of course", she wrote, "Darfur in 2004 was nothing like Rwanda in 1994. But framing Darfur as a Rwanda-like problem resulted in sufficient guilt-by-association to promote a flurry of political rhetoric" (p. 32).<sup>10</sup> In addition, the Rwanda storyline's resonance within the responsibility to protect (R2P)<sup>11</sup> discourse gave it credibility and acceptability (Hajer, 1995, pp. 59–60). According to Hamilton (2011), the idea of R2P – that "sovereignty is contingent upon a country's responsibility to protect its civilians" – was a "catalyst" for action by Save Darfur (pp. 48–49). David Lanz (2011) has also cited Darfur activists' claims that R2P provided the "intellectual underpinning" of the advocacy movement (p. 240).

Political scientist Maarten Hajer refers to narratives used in this way as *argumentative storylines* – the purposeful "mobilization of bias" through use of "catchy one-liners" or "symbolic references" that "sound right" within a certain social or institutional context and justify particular courses of action (Hajer, 1995, pp. 62–63). In that sense, the Rwanda storyline applied to Darfur thwarted adaptive leadership opportunities by comparing the situation to something already seen in that past – a known problem with a presumed solution. Characterizing Darfur as a "protection problem" under R2P, even if it was far more complicated than that, pointed primarily to a peacekeeping response within established UN practices. The concept also reinforced the notion of a two-sided conflict, giving higher priority to military and judicial intervention than a political solution, even though the concept of R2P calls for a more comprehensive approach.<sup>12</sup>

In a show of positive leadership, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's monthly reports to the UN Security Council on Darfur starting in July 2004 reflected a much greater institutional preference for comprehensive solutions to address the humanitarian, human rights, security, and political components of the conflict. However, according to a UN staffer, "the strategic decision, rightly or wrongly, was to push hard on the peacemaking front on the north-south talks". The UN Secretariat perhaps siding with organizational inertia, assessed that when North–South talks were concluded successfully, it would be much easier to push for a successful peace process in Darfur. Another UN staffer described the approach to Darfur as "intentionally putting it on the back burner". In contrast to the advocacy movement's Rwanda storyline, the Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council from 2004 through 2005 hung hope on this North–South storyline, that the CPA could eventually incorporate Darfur.<sup>13</sup> This storyline

shifted international attention, at least initially, to the humanitarian and human rights aspects of the Darfur problem – leaving space for the Rwanda analogy to thrive – because the security and political aspects would have been too complicated to address in the context of the North–South negotiations. This made it look like the UN was, in fact, not acting forcefully enough.

Secretary-General Annan – who had served as the Under-Secretary-General for UN peacekeeping during the Rwanda crisis in 1994 – was not dismissive of the security aspects of the problem, but, according to a former UN official:

Annan knew he had no troops or finances in his bottom left-hand drawer. The only way he could get meaningful support to the African Union [ceasefire monitoring force] as the UN was with the Security Council mandate, which would be another whole negotiation. He knew that wasn't going to happen. . . . But, he also knew he could be helpful in two ways. He could provide some technical support to the AU . . . and come up with a very credible plan that would have UN expertise underlying it, and use that to mobilize donor funding so that you could grow the AU mission in Darfur with funding from outside.

Thus the secretary-general exercised adaptive leadership as best he could to get a peacekeeping force deployed given the political demands upon him, but the possibility of adapting course to address Darfur's unique political problems was left unexplored outside the DPA.

The second reason the Rwanda storyline ultimately dominated the Darfur intervention debate is because it captured what Hajer (1993) calls “discursive affinity” – similarity between and overlap among many disparate and sometimes competing narratives about the conflict – within the international community (p. 47). In fact, several different *communities of meaning* (Yanow, 2000) occupied the discursive space informing or influencing UN and AU decision making around Darfur early in the conflict, including the advocacy, human rights, and humanitarian communities. Though not monolithic, these communities' descriptions of the conflict and prescriptions for action showed consistent patterns that lent themselves to supporting the Rwanda storyline and reinforcing the preceding tendencies in steering leaders' deliberations.<sup>14</sup> For example, early pleas for funding and access by humanitarian organizations such as Médecins Sans Frontières, perhaps inadvertently, first evoked the need for outside intervention, though many members opposed a military response so as to maintain their impartiality, neutrality, and access to the region (Weissman, 2006, 2008). According to interviews, human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, disagreed with advocates' genocide characterization but supported ethnic descriptors of the parties, civilian protection, and legalistic arguments that bounded responses. Conflict prevention organizations, such as the International Crisis Group, initially framed the conflict as a political problem requiring more comprehensive solutions but focused on peacekeeping as a primary tool after several months, co-producing Save Darfur's storyline.

These organizations' common characterizations of events in Darfur within their own dominant discourses reinforced the rhetorical effects of the Rwanda storyline as part of a virtual and leaderless *discourse coalition*, larger than the advocacy movement itself (Hajer, 1995, p. 65; Fischer, 2003, p. 107). Frequent shorthanding of the conflict in aid organizations' reports and fundraising calls as a “humanitarian crisis” masked or deemphasized the origins and underlying grievances of the parties to the conflict, requiring a solution in their own right. Human rights organizations' repeated characterizations of violence as “violations of international law” and “war crimes and crimes against humanity” had the effect of pointing to judicial solutions as well as anchoring what was possible in terms of outside engagement with the parties and their perceived



legitimacy to negotiate (Blayton, 2009a, 2009b). All of these phrases were reproduced in UN and AU documents, delimiting their leaders' fields of action. Of course, they also reinforced the two-party and ethnic frames.

The AU narrative, for its part, shorthanded violence in a somewhat different manner, though it inadvertently bolstered the Rwanda storyline by supporting advocates' case that AMIS was insufficient and only a UN peacekeeping force would suffice. Like the UN Secretariat's monthly reports to the UN Security Council, the AU Commission's regular reports to the Peace and Security Council showed adaptive leadership in maintaining a multi-causal assessment of the conflict – seeing the situation in Darfur for what it was, as opposed to comparing it to something else – but AU public statements often retained a statist bent, failing to name parties responsible for human rights abuses – shorthanding violence as “ceasefire violations” – or erring on the side of blaming the Darfur rebels in its calls for action. Again, this shorthanding had the effect of shortening the event history and oversimplifying the nature of violence, parties to the conflict, and potential solutions, though the AU narrative was more of a target than enabler for advocates' arguments given the AU's tendency to support member governments.

The third reason the Rwanda storyline became hegemonic was a combination of institutional practices and narrative positioning effects that marginalized and discredited alternate storylines, including the AU's. As time went on, a competing UN discourse intervened but lost out, or was perhaps misinterpreted to achieve a particular end. Once it became evident that AMIS would need a more permanent source of funding to sustain its operations, UN peacekeeping doctrine, derived from the 2000 Brahimi Report,<sup>15</sup> became the touchpoint for officials in UN DPKO opposed to the “blue hatting” of AMIS without a well supported peace agreement. The Brahimi Report had laid out the need for clear, credible, and achievable mandates for peacekeeping missions, among other recommendations related to funding mechanisms and development of better conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies (UN, 2000). Officials in UN DPKO, including UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno, remained unconvinced following the signing of the DPA that conditions were ripe for deployment of a protection force, and he spoke publicly about his concerns on multiple occasions in 2006. Guéhenno led the charge in observing that the DPA did not enjoy the support of all of the key players in Darfur, particularly once the movements began to fragment and that more engagement would be necessary (Guéhenno, 2006a, 2006b). According to a former UN staffer who was present at a meeting on Darfur chaired by Secretary-General Annan, Guéhenno was ushered away from the podium when he tried to explain at one point why peacekeeping “really [wasn't] the right idea”. As explained by the staffer, “if there was a culture that was able to kind of push back, but to help in a constructive way, if it had been the year after the Brahimi Report, all of those second secretaries would have known the doctrine and they would've said, ‘great, we have to help, but you know these limitations’, but that was lost, lost, lost”.

Guéhenno's calls for further cooperation by the armed groups in Darfur were not necessarily examples of adaptive leadership – ensuring a successful political process prior to deployment of a peacekeeping force would have been a technical solution in line with established UN practice – but had his admonitions been successful, they may have created the time, space, and political will to take more innovative approaches. Outside of formal UN, AU, and NGO circles, there were academic experts and longtime Darfur watchers who showed adaptive leadership in advocating for a more complex view of the conflict and prioritizing diplomatic and political responses, but they generally flew below the radar. De Waal (2004, 2006), for instance, was a recurring source of proposals in his Justice Africa blog for locally, specifically tribally managed security solutions that would not require disarmament of the parties by a peacekeeping force. De Waal was an advisor to the AU-sponsored peace talks in Abuja, as was Laurie Nathan (2006, 2007), who

commented on the need for local ownership of any political solution following the 2006 DPA. Reflected in these writings was a focus on the inclusion of not only Darfur's 'African' tribes but also its marginalized 'Arab' tribes, and the need to not characterize them as 'African' or 'Arab' at all (Justice Africa, 2004a, 2004b; Hovil, 2014).<sup>16</sup> Opposing advocates often rejected these voices as naïve or apologist in op-eds and influential publications, alleging that any attempts to inject complexity into the situation were likening it to anarchy and delaying action, while also implying that no morally responsible observer could suggest anything other than peacekeeping was an appropriate response (Cheadle & Prendergast, 2005a, 2005b). This kind of *narrative positioning* – how advocates positioned themselves and others within the moral space through storylines (Harré & van Langenhove, 1999, p. 20) – had the effect of determining who was authorized to speak credibly and whose voices were dismissed in the public debate.

Notably absent from the preceding discussion was the voice of Darfuris. While interviews with Darfuris formed the basis of much humanitarian and human rights reporting, and members of the diaspora were active in the advocacy community, displaced Darfuris had little voice on the international stage. According to one UN official who was asked whether any particular perspectives were marginalized during the course of deliberations about international intervention, "I think the only groups that actually felt – I felt were – marginalized and should have had more say in the conflict were the victims affected by the conflict itself".<sup>17</sup>

## Conclusion

Recalling Heifetz's (1994) definition of leadership – adapting to harsh new realities by proposing new solutions to new problems – this analysis illuminates the conclusion that missing from the dominant international interpretation of the Darfur conflict was a consensus to continue to treat the situation like a 'Darfur problem', rather than framing it as a small piece of a national Sudan problem or a problem similar to another intrastate conflict in Africa. While Sudan's problems were and are very interrelated, and national dialogue is still required, it is essential to understand the regional history, differences in local dynamics, and possible steps toward resolving underlying causes of the conflict in Darfur, as well as to engage and empower a full range of actors to participate in rebuilding their own future. Restoring both the agency and legitimacy of all parties involved in the conflict would necessitate a rethinking by outsiders of international approaches to changing dynamics and repairing relationships, especially as UNAMID exits the scene.

Nevertheless, a key takeaway of this case is that proposed solutions are only as good as the discursive resources available to them, and, as it happens, the discourse around international intervention in intrastate conflicts in 2006 was and perhaps still is impoverished. R2P provided a framework around which an advocacy movement could credibly organize calls to action in Darfur, but R2P was widely interpreted as entailing only a military solution. What discursive resources were available at the international level to activists to advocate for political solutions, particularly local dialogue? Not only were peace talks discredited by some advocates as an excuse for not taking bolder action – i.e. deploying peacekeepers – the idea of locally owned agreements and traditional approaches to reconciliation were rarely explored or valued, if at all, as solutions in their own rights. This lack of discursive resources was evident in the dominant narrative in at least three ways: (1) the negotiating parties in Darfur were not depicted as having sufficient agency to be a part of the solution to their own problem; (2) not all of the relevant parties, including, particularly, Darfuri civilians ('Arabs' and 'non-Arabs'), were conceived as capable participants; and (3) none of the mainstream storylines recognized local solutions as acceptable without international involvement.

In addition to the “vapidity of the international discourse”, as a former UN official described it, this case demonstrates how the pressure to *do something* – combined with the limited bandwidth of the international community and a finite repertoire of tools – can contribute to an inability to absorb complexity that would allow for the identification of new types of, and opportunities for, intervention. In other words, the case highlights the extreme discomfort of the international community with complexity in the face of urgency and a moral imperative to act. The fact that utterances of complexity are perceived, and the speakers are positioned, as stalling, or that attempts to understand and address the underlying causes of conflict are seen as not caring about human rights puts the long-term outcome of many intrastate conflicts around the world today in question.

True adaptive international leadership in intrastate conflicts must perhaps then also entail a high level of comfort by institutions, such as the UN and AU, with complexity. Or more importantly – seeing as many officials in the UN and AU saw Darfur for what it was but were constrained by discourses acting upon them – adaptive leadership in these situations may mean an ability of leaders in these organizations to communicate the implications of more complicated conflict storylines to the public, member states, and other stakeholders. Key figures in international organizations with large resources devoted to these conflicts must push back on oversimplified diagnoses and prescriptions for action. Within their own staffs as well, they must challenge assumptions and listen to concerned voices – the local ones, in particular – before applying the same playbook that might have been appropriate elsewhere, even, or especially, when faced with immense pressure to act. Advocacy and policy practices such as boiling down bottom-line messages into easily digested one-page memos may remain the norm for senior government decision makers too pressed for time to read more, but these audiences must also ask the hard questions to ensure that they are hearing multi-causal explanations of conflicts with proposals for multifaceted responses. Defying our desire to follow a blueprint at every outbreak of violence, each new conflict brings its own design, as well as its own vocabulary, and how leaders talk about and narrate violence in unique terms is far more important than whatever past conflict the current one looks like.

## Notes

- 1 Drawn from the author’s PhD dissertation, “Inter-Discursive Dynamics and Darfur: Analyzing Narrative Complexity behind Responses of the United Nations and African Union, 2003–2006”.
- 2 Alex De Waal and Julie Flint place the origin of Darfur rebellion in 2001 (Flint & De Waal, 2005). For an additional history of the region and conflict, see O’Fahey (1980), Johnson (2003), Burr & Collins (2008), and Tubiana (2007, 2009, 2010).
- 3 All of Darfur’s tribes are Muslim, unlike in southern Sudan where conflict with the central government was historically characterized by Muslim versus Christian/animist.
- 4 According to a former AU official, the African Union, following a long history of non-intervention in African states, was reluctant to become politically or militarily involved in Darfur, but Déby – Zaghawa himself – ran into credibility problems as the Government of Sudan saw him as being affiliated with Darfuris, some of whom had supported Déby’s rise to power. The AU had, in fact, been created following several crises on the continent in the early 1990s, including the conflicts in Rwanda and Somalia, as “a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts”. Darfur was the first real test of the AU Peace and Security Council’s role in that process.
- 5 The UN’s humanitarian coordinator, Jan Egeland, did brief the Security Council on the situation in April 2004 (UN, 2004a). According to Rebecca Hamilton, Egeland had tried to brief the UN Security Council in March, but Pakistan kept it off the agenda (Hamilton, 2011).
- 6 The legal definition of genocide under the 1948 Genocide Convention is “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group”.
- 7 According to former members of Save Darfur, even some of the most engaged activists were not aware of the details of peace talks that were coming to a close in Abuja that same week.
  - 8 UNAMID was not authorized to deploy until the Chinese Special Envoy for Darfur convinced the Sudanese Government to accept a hybrid force based on shared interests (state sovereignty and non-interference); according to Dan Large (2008) of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, the Chinese Government was helping Khartoum as much as it was helping itself by ensuring the deployment of a weak peacekeeping force (p. 39).
  - 9 For more background on how the narrative characteristics of this storyline were identified, see Sara Cobb’s (2013) definition of a “better formed story”, which is more complex than a simplified or compressed narrative in at least three ways: there are more events in the plot line, all parties share some responsibility for the conflict, and events in the past logically lead to events in the present and the future, rather than the narrative just focusing on the past or the future; moreover, the characters are complex – they are mutually acknowledged as legitimate in their actions but also imperfect – and, instead of relying on binary and simplistic moral constructs of “good” versus “evil”, morality in the better formed story is also complex, allowing for multiple “ways to be good” (p. 221).
  - 10 According to Rebecca Hamilton, many activists took the message from Samantha Power’s (2002) book, *A Problem from Hell: America in the Age of Genocide*, that the first step in responding appropriately to situations like Darfur is saying the “G word” (Hamilton, 2011). Former policy analyst with Save Darfur, Sean Brooks (2009), has acknowledged the movement’s inadvertent oversimplification of the “Arab versus African” dimension of violence early in the conflict and noted that Save Darfur’s leadership consciously addressed and corrected these mischaracterisations in its advocacy materials from 2006 onward. He notes that Save Darfur hired Sudanese experts, broadened the coalition to Diaspora and advocacy groups on several continents, and provide a voice for Darfuris themselves in peace talks (pp. 142, 149).
  - 11 R2P was the concept developed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Strategy, which met between 2000 and 2001, to agree upon international norms regarding the conditions under which principles of human rights should trump principles of state sovereignty, including, for instance, the deployment of peacekeepers to protect civilians and deliveries of humanitarian assistance.
  - 12 Fabrice Weissman (2010) of Médecins Sans Frontières highlighted the fact that R2P encompasses not only protection of civilians and humanitarian deliveries but also the “prevention of conflicts” and the “rebuilding of societies” in addition to the “use of ‘mass atrocities tool boxes’ including humanitarian, diplomatic, economic, judicial, social, political, and, as a last resort, military actions”. This broader interpretation is consistent with former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s speech, “An Action Plan to Prevent Genocide”, delivered on the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide in Rwanda, 7 April 2004 (UN, 2004b).
  - 13 A variant of this frame, casting Darfur as another symptom of a “center–periphery” problem, reinforced this dynamic. The center–periphery conception of the state’s relationship with society could be attributed to sociologist Edward Shils (1975). The center–periphery frame as applied to Darfur contradicted the Rwanda storyline, according to one interview subject, who observed that, if one acknowledged a “center–periphery problem” in Sudan, it was hard to claim that fighting in Darfur was “Arab versus non-Arab” in nature since both populations in Darfur had been marginalized and looked down upon for decades by most members of the ruling party in Khartoum.
  - 14 Moreover, the Rwanda analogy arguably started with a statement made by UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan Mukesh Kapila in a press conference on 19 March 2004 when he compared the situation in Darfur to the Rwandan genocide, saying that the only difference was the “numbers involved” (“Mass rape atrocity in west Sudan”, 2004; Power, 2004; Burr & Collins, 2008). Hugo Slim (2004) has referred to this as the “do something” moment (p. 814). According to a former UN official, however, Kapila’s statement was considered to be too little too late, as he was exiting his position.
  - 15 Also known as the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, the Brahimi Report was the product of a committee, named for its chair, Lakhdar Brahimi, which was tasked with reforming peacekeeping within the United Nations (UN, 2000).
  - 16 For later writings on the need to include civil society and minimize international involvement in the Darfur peace process, see Tubiana (2009), Murphy and Tubiana (2010), Tanner and Tubiana (2010), Flint (2010), and UNEP (2014).
  - 17 For comprehensive survey data on the views of Darfuri refugees in Chad regarding the best approaches to conflict resolution in the region later in the conflict, see 24 Hours for Darfur (2010).

## References

- 24 Hours for Darfur. (2010, July). *Darfurian Voices: Documenting Darfurian Refugees' Views on Issues of Peace, Justice, and Reconciliation*. Retrieved from: <http://static.squarespace.com/static/52920ed5e4b04a0741daa89c/t/529224ffe4b049dd0ca09a3f/1385309439460/Darfurian+Voices+-+Report+-+English.pdf>
- African Union – United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). (n.d.). Retrieved February 2, 2015 from: [www.unamid.unmissions.org](http://www.unamid.unmissions.org)
- Amnesty International (AI). (2003a, January 31). *Sudan: Preliminary Conclusions of Amnesty International's Mission*. Press Release. Retrieved from: [www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR54/003/2003/en/c19cbb2-fae2-11dd-8917-49d72d0853f5/af540032003en.pdf](http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR54/003/2003/en/c19cbb2-fae2-11dd-8917-49d72d0853f5/af540032003en.pdf)
- Amnesty International (AI). (2003b, January 31). *Sudan: Preliminary Conclusions of Amnesty International's Mission*. Press Release. Retrieved from: <http://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-preliminary-conclusions-amnesty-internationals-mission>
- Amnesty International (AI). (2003c, February 21). *Sudan: Urgent Call for Commission of Inquiry in Darfur as Situation Deteriorates*. Press Release. Retrieved from: [www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/sudan-urgent-call-commission-inquiry-darfur-situation-deteriorates](http://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/sudan-urgent-call-commission-inquiry-darfur-situation-deteriorates)
- Amnesty International (AI). (2004a, February 3). *Sudan: Darfur: Too Many People Killed for No Reason*. London: Amnesty International. Retrieved from: [www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR54/008/2004/en/452c12ed-d640-11dd-ab95-a13b602c0642/af540082004en.html](http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR54/008/2004/en/452c12ed-d640-11dd-ab95-a13b602c0642/af540082004en.html)
- Amnesty International (AI). (2004b, July 18). *Rape as a Weapon of War: Sexual Violence and Its Consequences*. London: Amnesty International. Retrieved from: [www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR54/076/2004/en/f86a52a0-d5b4-11dd-bb24-1fb85fe8fa05/af540762004en.html](http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR54/076/2004/en/f86a52a0-d5b4-11dd-bb24-1fb85fe8fa05/af540762004en.html)
- Autesserre, S. (2009). Hobbes and the Congo, Frames, Local Violence, and International Intervention. *International Organization*, 63(2), 249–280.
- Autesserre, S. (2012). Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and Their Unintended Consequences. *African Affairs*, 111(443): 202–222.
- Autesserre, S. (2014). *Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Blayton, J. (2009a, August 21). (1). Introduction. *Human Rights Reporting on Darfur: A Genre that Redefines Tragedy*. Retrieved from: <http://africanarguments.org/2009/08/21/human-rights-reporting-on-darfur-a-genre-that-redefines-tragedy-1/>
- Blayton, J. (2009b, August 22). (2). Activist and Apologist. *Human Rights Reporting on Darfur: A Genre that Redefines Tragedy*. Retrieved from: <http://africanarguments.org/2009/08/22/human-rights-reporting-on-darfur-a-genre-that-redefines-tragedy-2/>
- Brooks, S. (2009). When Killers Become Victims: Darfur in Context. *SAIS Review of International Affairs*, 29(2), 133–145.
- Burr, J.M. & Collins, R. (2008). *Darfur: The Long Road to Disaster*. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers.
- Cheadle, D. & Prendergast, J. (2005a, March 1). 'Never Again' – Again. *USA Today*. Retrieved from: [http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2005-03-01-darfur-edit\\_x.htm](http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2005-03-01-darfur-edit_x.htm)
- Cheadle, D. & Prendergast, J. (2005b, March 24). The Darfur Genocide. *Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved from: [www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/op-eds/the-darfur-genocide.aspx](http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/op-eds/the-darfur-genocide.aspx)
- Cobb, S. (2013). *Speaking of Violence: The Politics and Poetics of Narrative in Conflict Resolution*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). (2006). Retrieved from: [www.un.org/zh/focus/southernsudan/pdf/dpa.pdf](http://www.un.org/zh/focus/southernsudan/pdf/dpa.pdf)
- De Waal, A. (2004, August). Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap. *London Review of Books*, 26(15), 25–27. Retrieved from: [www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n15/alex-de-waal/counter-insurgency-on-the-cheap](http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n15/alex-de-waal/counter-insurgency-on-the-cheap)
- De Waal, A. (2006, July 6). Darfur's Fragile Peace. *Justice Africa*. Retrieved from: <http://beta.justiceafrica.com/>
- De Waal, A. (2007, November). Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect. *International Affairs*, 83(6), 1039–1054.
- De Waal, A. (2015). Evidence and Narratives: Recounting Lethal Violence in Darfur. In S. Abramowitz & C. Panter-Brick (Eds.), *Medical Humanitarianism: Ethnographies of Practice* (pp. 77–95). Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania.
- Degomme, O. (2011, February). *Mortality in the Darfur Conflict: A Study of Large-Scale Patterns based on a Meta-Analysis of Small-Scale Surveys*. Louvain: Université Catholique de Louvain. Retrieved from: [http://dial.academielouvain.be/downloader/downloader.php?pid=boreal%3A70989&datastream=PDF\\_01&disclaimer=2036367f4fe6674ec275bbc748fce7ecb838637598d585400d0c4ca13a548694](http://dial.academielouvain.be/downloader/downloader.php?pid=boreal%3A70989&datastream=PDF_01&disclaimer=2036367f4fe6674ec275bbc748fce7ecb838637598d585400d0c4ca13a548694)

- Elbasri, A. (2014, April 9). We Can't Say All That We See in Darfur. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from: [http://foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/04/09/we\\_can\\_t\\_say\\_all\\_that\\_we\\_say\\_in\\_darfur\\_sudan\\_united\\_nations](http://foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/04/09/we_can_t_say_all_that_we_say_in_darfur_sudan_united_nations)
- ENOUGH. (2014, August 11). *NGO Letter to UN Security Council on UNAMID*. Retrieved from: <http://enoughproject.org/reports/ngo-letter-un-security-council-unamid>
- Fadul, A.-J. & Tanner, V. (2007). Darfur after Abuja: A View from the Ground. In A. De Waal (Ed.), *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* (pp. 284–313). Cambridge, MA: Harvard Global Equity Initiative.
- Fischer, F. (2003). *Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practice*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Flint, J. (2007). Darfur's Armed Movements. In A. De Waal (Ed.), *War in Darfur: And the Search for Peace* (pp. 140–172). Cambridge, MA: Harvard Global Equity Initiative.
- Flint, J. (2010, January). *Rhetoric and Reality: The Failure to Resolve the Darfur Conflict*. Geneva: Small Arms Survey Human Security Baseline Assessment Working Paper Series. Retrieved from: [www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-19-The-Failure-to-Resolve-the-Darfur-Conflict.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-19-The-Failure-to-Resolve-the-Darfur-Conflict.pdf)
- Flint, J. & De Waal, A. (2005). *Darfur: A Short History of a Long War*. New York: Zed Books.
- Frederick, B. (2005, May 9). *Genocide v. Civil Conflict: Comparing Coverage of the Darfur Crisis in the New York Times and the People's Daily*. Retrieved from: [www.colorado.edu/Journalism/globalmedia/Darfur-Student-Papers/Darfur-FINAL-Frederick.pdf](http://www.colorado.edu/Journalism/globalmedia/Darfur-Student-Papers/Darfur-FINAL-Frederick.pdf)
- Giddo, S. (2014). *The Voices of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and the Effectiveness of the Peacekeeping Forces in Darfur*. PhD Dissertation, George Mason University.
- Goffman, E. (1974). *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Gruley, J.B. (2009). *Framing Darfur: Representations of Conflict, People, and Place in The New York Times and The Washington Post*. Michigan State Dissertation. Retrieved from: <http://gradworks.umi.com/14/68/1468336.html>
- Guéhenno, J.M. (2006a, May 18). *Key Challenges in Today's UN Peacekeeping Operations*. Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from: [www.cfr.org/international-organizations-and-alliances/key-challenges-todays-un-peacekeeping-operations-rush-transcript-federal-news-service-inc/p10766](http://www.cfr.org/international-organizations-and-alliances/key-challenges-todays-un-peacekeeping-operations-rush-transcript-federal-news-service-inc/p10766)
- Guéhenno, J.M. (2006b, October 4). *Press Conference by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, UN Headquarters, New York*. Retrieved from: [www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/articles/pr\\_JMG.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/articles/pr_JMG.pdf)
- Guha-Sapir, D. & Degomme, O. (2005). *Counting the Deaths: Mortality Estimates from Multiple Survey Data*. Brussels: CRED. Retrieved from: [www.cred.be/sites/default/files/DarfurCountingtheDeaths.pdf](http://www.cred.be/sites/default/files/DarfurCountingtheDeaths.pdf)
- Hajer, M. (1993). Discourse Coalitions and the Institutionalization of Practice: The Case of Acid Rain in Britain. In F. Fischer & J. Forester (Eds.), *The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Hajer, M. (1995). *The Politics of Environmental Discourse. Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hamilton, R. (2011). *Fighting for Darfur: Public Action and the Struggle to Stop Genocide*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hardy, S. (2008, July). Mediation and Genre. *Negotiation Journal*, 24(3), 247–268.
- Harré, R. & Langenhove, L. (1999). The Dynamics of Social Episodes. In R. Harré & L. van Langenhove (Eds.), *Positioning Theory*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Heifetz, R. (1994). *Leadership Without Easy Answers*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard College Press.
- Hovil, L. (2014, February 10). *Why Do We Continually Misunderstand Conflicts in Africa?* Retrieved from: [www.africanarguments.org/2014/02/10/why-do-we-continually-misunderstand-conflict-in-africa-by-lucy-hovil/](http://www.africanarguments.org/2014/02/10/why-do-we-continually-misunderstand-conflict-in-africa-by-lucy-hovil/)
- Human Rights Watch. (2004a, April). *Darfur in Flames: Atrocities in Western Sudan, 16 5(A)*. New York: Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from: [www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/sudan0404.pdf](http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/sudan0404.pdf)
- Human Rights Watch. (2004b, May). *Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government Forces and Militias in Sudan, 16, 6(A)*. New York: Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from: [www.hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0504/sudan0504full.pdf](http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0504/sudan0504full.pdf)
- Human Rights Watch. (2004c, November). *"If We Return We Will Be Killed": Consolidation of Ethnic Cleansing in Darfur, Sudan*. Retrieved from: [www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/darfur1104.pdf](http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/darfur1104.pdf)
- Human Rights Watch. (2005a, January). *Targeting the Fur: Mass Killings in Darfur*. Retrieved from: [www.hrw.org/legacy/background/africa/darfur0105/darfur0105.pdf](http://www.hrw.org/legacy/background/africa/darfur0105/darfur0105.pdf)

- Human Rights Watch. (2005b, December). *Entrenching Impunity*. Retrieved from: [www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/darfur1205webwcover.pdf](http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/darfur1205webwcover.pdf)
- Human Rights Watch. (2020, March). *Sudan: UN/AU Plan for Darfur Falls Short*. Retrieved from: [www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/16/sudan-un/au-plan-darfur-falls-short](http://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/16/sudan-un/au-plan-darfur-falls-short)
- Johnson, D. (2003). *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Justice Africa. (2004a, July 5). *Prospects for Peace in Sudan: June–July 2004*. Retrieved from: <http://beta.justiceafrica.com/1492/sudan/>
- Justice Africa. (2004b, September 3). *Prospects for Peace in Sudan: August–September 2004*. Retrieved from: <http://beta.justiceafrica.com/1504/sudan/>
- Lanz, D. (2011). Why Darfur? The Responsibility to Protect as a Rallying Cry for Transnational Advocacy Groups. *Global Responsibility to Protect*, 3(2), 223–247. Retrieved from: <http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/187598411x575685?crawler=true>
- Large, D. (2008). *China's Role in the Mediation and Resolution of Conflict in Africa*. Retrieved from: [www.hcdcentre.org/publications/chinas-role-in-the-mediation-and-resolution-of-conflict-in-africa/](http://www.hcdcentre.org/publications/chinas-role-in-the-mediation-and-resolution-of-conflict-in-africa/)
- Laws, D. & Rein, M. (2003). Reframing Practice. In M. Hajer & H. Wagenaar (Eds.), *Deliberative Policy Analysis* (pp. 172–206). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Lynch, C. (2014a). They Just Stood Watching. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/04/07/they-just-stood-watching-2/>
- Lynch, C. (2014b). Now We Will Kill You. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/04/08/now-we-will-kill-you/>
- Lynch, C. (2014c). A Mission that Was Set Up to Fail. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/04/08/a-mission-that-was-set-up-to-fail/>
- Mass rape atrocity in west Sudan. (2004, March 19). *BBC News*. Retrieved from: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3549325.stm>
- Mills, K. (2009). Vacillating on Darfur: Responsibility to Protect, to Prosecute, or to Feed? *Global Responsibility to Protect*, 1(4), 532–559.
- Murphy, D. (2007). Narrating Darfur: Darfur in the U.S. Press, March–September 2004. In A. De Waal (Ed.), *War in Darfur: And the Search for Peace* (pp. 314–336). Cambridge, MA: Harvard Global Equity Initiative.
- Murphy, T. & Tubiana J. (2010). *Civil Society in Darfur: The Missing Peace*. Washington, DC: USIP. Retrieved from: [www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Civil%20Society%20in%20Darfur%20-%20Sept.%202010.pdf](http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Civil%20Society%20in%20Darfur%20-%20Sept.%202010.pdf)
- Nathan, L. (2006, September). *No Ownership, No Peace: The Darfur Peace Agreement*. Crisis States Research Centre, Working Paper No. 5. Retrieved from: [http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/NoOwnershipNoPeaceDarfur\\_Nathan.pdf](http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/NoOwnershipNoPeaceDarfur_Nathan.pdf)
- Nathan, L. (2007). The Making and Unmaking of the Darfur Peace Agreement. In A. De Waal (Ed.), *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* (pp. 245–283). Cambridge, MA: Harvard Global Equity Initiative.
- Niam, T.B. (2010, December 4). *AMIS is More Effective than UNAMID*.
- O'Fahey, R. (1980). *State and Society in Dār Fūr*. London: C. Hurst.
- Power, S. (2002). *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*. New York: Basic Books.
- Raghavan, S. (2014, January 3). Record Number of U.N. Peacekeepers Fails to Stop African Wars. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from: [www.washingtonpost.com/world/record-number-of-un-peacekeepers-fails-to-stop-african-wars/2014/01/03/17ed0574-7487-11e3-9389-09ef9944065e\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/record-number-of-un-peacekeepers-fails-to-stop-african-wars/2014/01/03/17ed0574-7487-11e3-9389-09ef9944065e_story.html)
- Roe, E. (1994). *Narrative Policy Analysis: Theory and Practice*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Save Darfur. (n.d.). *History and Unity Statement*. Retrieved January 25, 2015, from: <http://savedarfur.org/about/history/>
- Schön, D. & Rein, M. (1994). *Frame Reflection: Toward the Resolution of Intractable Policy Controversies*. New York: Basic Books.
- Sengupta, S. & Gettleman, J. (2014, December 25). U.N. Set to Cut Force in Darfur as Fighting Rises. *New York Times*. Retrieved from: <http://mobile.nytimes.com/2014/12/26/world/africa/united-nations-set-to-cut-force-in-darfur-as-fighting-rises.html?referrer=&r=0>
- Shils, E. (1975). *Center and Periphery*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Slim, H. (2004). Dithering over Darfur? A Preliminary Review of the International Response. *International Affairs*, 80(5), 811–828.
- Tanner, V. & Tubiana, J. (2007, July). *Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups*. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. Retrieved from: [www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-06-Darfur-rebels.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-06-Darfur-rebels.pdf)

- Tanner, V. & Tubiana, J. (2010, April). *The Emergence of Grassroots Security and Livelihood Agreements in Darfur, An Analysis for the U.S. Agency for International Development*.
- Toga, D. (2007). The African Union Mediation and the Abuja Peace Talks. In A. De Waal (Ed.), *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* (pp. 214–244). Cambridge, MA: Harvard Global Equity Initiative.
- Tubiana, J. (2007). Darfur: A Conflict for Land. In A. De Waal (Ed.), *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* (pp. 68–91). Cambridge, MA: Harvard Global Equity Initiative.
- Tubiana, J. (2009). Lire entre les lignes d'un conflit: fractures locales et actions internationales au Coeur du Darfour (Reading between the Lines of Conflict: Local Divisions and International Action in the Darfur Heartland). *Afrique Contemporaine*, 232(4).
- Tubiana, J. (2010). *Chroniques du Darfour*. Grenoble: Glénat.
- UN News. (2020, January 7). *Sudan: Intercommunal Clashes Displace Tens of Thousands in Volatile Darfur Region*. Retrieved from: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/01/1054911>
- UN Warns of New Darfur Disaster. (2006, August 28). *BBC News*. Retrieved from: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5293516.stm>
- United Nations. (2000, August 21). *Identical Letters dated 21 August 2000 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council*. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations ("The Brahimi Report"), A/55/305–S/2000/809. Retrieved from: [Http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/55/305](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/55/305)
- United Nations. (2004a, April 2). *Press Briefing on Humanitarian Crisis in Darfur by United Nations Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland*. Retrieved from: [www.un.org/press/en/2004/egelandbrf.DOC.htm](http://www.un.org/press/en/2004/egelandbrf.DOC.htm)
- United Nations. (2004b). *An Action Plan to Prevent Genocide, delivered on the Tenth Anniversary of the Rwandan Genocide in Rwanda, April 7, 2004*. Retrieved from: <http://www.preventgenocide.org/prevent/UNdocs/KofiAnnansActionPlanToPreventGenocide7Apr2004.htm>
- United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP). (2014, January). *Local-Level Agreements in Darfur: A Review with Reference to Access and Management of Natural Resources*. Retrieved from: [www.unep.org/disastersandconflicts/portals/155/countries/Sudan/pdf/UNEP\\_LLA\\_Darfur.pdf](http://www.unep.org/disastersandconflicts/portals/155/countries/Sudan/pdf/UNEP_LLA_Darfur.pdf)
- Weissman, F. (2006, November 15). Darfur: Humanitarian Aid Held Hostage. *Médecins Sans Frontières*. Retrieved from: [www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news-stories/ideaopinion/darfur-humanitarian-aid-held-hostage](http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news-stories/ideaopinion/darfur-humanitarian-aid-held-hostage)
- Weissman, F. (2008, July). Humanitarian Dilemmas in Darfur. *Médecins Sans Frontières*. Retrieved from: [www.msf.fr/sites/www.msf.fr/files/214a9aa0483c6e560e05cdafb00beb11.pdf](http://www.msf.fr/sites/www.msf.fr/files/214a9aa0483c6e560e05cdafb00beb11.pdf)
- Weissman, F. (2010, October 3). Not In Our Name: Why MSF Does Not Support the "Responsibility to Protect." *Médecins Sans Frontières*. Retrieved from: <http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news-stories/ideaopinion/not-our-name-why-msf-does-not-support-responsibility-protect>
- Yanow, D. (2000). *Conducting Interpretive Policy Analysis: Qualitative Research Methods*, vol. 47. Thousand Oaks: Sage University Press.