


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EUROPE AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Images of self and the other

Senem Aydın-Düzgit, Johanna Chovanec and Bahar Rumelili

Introduction

It is widely known that contemporary relations between Turkey and Europe are closely entwined with a history of interactions between the two sides. This is particularly the case for mutual identity representations, the roots of which can be traced back to images developed in the context of Ottoman-European relations. The academic literature, which focuses on modern day identity representations between Turkey and the EU – especially within the context of Turkey’s bid for EU membership – has repeatedly found that Turkey’s ambivalence towards Europe draws heavily from historical representations of Europe in the (Ottoman-) Turkish psyche, whereas European reluctance to admit Turkey as an EU member stems to an important extent from prejudices fed by historical narratives in Europe (Yılmaz, 2011; Aydın-Düzgit, 2012).

Against this background, this chapter provides an in-depth account of mutual identity representations between the Ottoman Empire and Europe during a key period, namely the years between the 1789 French Revolution and the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, when tumultuous changes in Europe and the Ottoman Empire were coupled with intense political, diplomatic and cultural interactions, producing lasting effects on their relations in the modern era.

As expressed by one historian, “the eighteenth century was a turning point in Ottoman-European relations” (Renda, 2011: 329). Following the Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1683, diplomacy and trade between the two sides intensified, significantly raising their mutual interest in one another (Renda, 2011: 329). In the long nineteenth century which followed, both sides were forced to deal with the threat of nationalism and independence movements, invoking questions of imperial or national collective identities (see Chovanec and Heilo, 2020). In the case of the Ottoman Empire, these movements brought about a significant loss of territory, leading to constant efforts by the Ottomans to modernise the administration, economy and society of the Empire and to preserve it from total collapse. The French Revolution paved the way to the first extensive reform programme in Ottoman history, known as the New Order (1791–1808). The New Order programme included first attempts by the Ottomans in adopting parts of European military technologies and hence provoked discussions of Westernisation and, in relation to that, cultural identity. Although the New Order program failed, the Ottoman state engaged in successive comprehensive reform initiatives in the Tanzimat era (1830–1876)

which included the proclamation of the Tanzimat (1839) and the Reform Edict (1856). The Tanzimat Edict was mainly declared to meet the grievances of the Empire's Ottoman subjects and to gather European support against its erosion of sovereignty in Egypt, whereas the Reform Edict was directed at improving the conditions of the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire in return for obtaining a better deal with the European powers at the 1856 Paris Conference which ended the Crimean War (1853–1856) and led to the official acceptance of the Ottomans to the European states system.

The Tanzimat period ended with Abdulhamid II ascending the throne. After a very brief experiment with constitutional monarchy in 1876, Abdulhamid dismissed the parliament and the Ottoman Empire entered a 30-year absolutist rule which is associated with the rise of Islamism and pan-Islamism as emergent ideologies in response to the legitimacy crisis in the Empire and wider developments in the world. The Hamidian era also brought large scale infrastructural modernisation, dissemination of public education in the Empire, and the rise of a new educated bureaucratic and military elite which eventually brought down Abdulhamid and initiated the second constitutional period in 1908 under the banner of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Successive waves of violence towards Christian minorities during the Hamidian era and the 15 years of CUP government had a decisive impact on the representations of the Ottomans in Europe. The Turkish War of Independence fought after the First World War ultimately led to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923.

The following sections of this chapter will provide an overview of how European representations of the Ottoman Empire have evolved and were contested within this period, to be followed by a discussion of the ways in which Ottoman representations of the European Others were shaped within the given era. The chapter will conclude by a discussion on the potential role of these representations in the shaping of contemporary Turkey–Europe relations.

European representations of the Ottoman Empire

From the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans in 1453 to the second siege of Vienna in 1683, the Turks were represented as the primary (Islamic) *Other* against which Christendom had to unite (Kuran-Burçoğlu, 2007: 255). As Neumann highlights, the Ottomans “had the military might, the physical proximity, and a strong religious tradition that made it a particularly relevant *other* in the evolution of the fledgling international society that evolved from the ashes of Western Christendom” (Neumann, 1999: 40, 44). Especially in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the Turks were often represented as barbarians and infidels inferior to civilised Europeans on all accounts. They were seen as a “pernicious force sent by God to scourge Christendom for its sins” where “all that was required was for the Christians to repent, unite, and take up defence of the faith” (Neumann, 1999: 45). Even in the early sixteenth century when Christendom was beginning to crumble, representations of the Turk as the “enemy of faith and culture” prevailed. Yet it slowly began to coexist with the discourse on the Ottoman Empire as a mere political force, where representations varied between admiration for its power and peaceful co-existence of its subjects to disdain for its tyranny (Çırakman, 2005).

In 1683, the Ottoman army was defeated at the gates of Vienna during their second siege of the city, resulting in the Treaty of Carlowitz of 1699 which, according to many historians, confirmed the beginning of the decline of the Ottoman Empire. The continuing decline in Ottoman military strength and developments in Europe such as the Enlightenment have seen significant shifts in European representations of the Ottomans (ibid.). Initially it led to a broader variety of representations of and a fascination for Ottoman lifeworlds. The Ottoman

Empire, perceived once as invincible and threatening, turned into a curious and exotic neighbour (Neumann, 2003: 261; Schmidt-Haberkamp, 2011: 10). The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed an increased European interest in the arts, music and architecture of the Ottoman Empire.

Parallel to the variety of representations, imitations and images of Ottoman life worlds in the cultural realms, stereotypes of the Ottoman government as barbaric and oppressive continued to be present in Europe. While the Ottoman state and society were associated by European writers with the concept of “tyranny” in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this concept was replaced with “despotism” in the eighteenth century. Çırakman (2001: 49) observes that while “tyranny” denoted “both positive and negative features”, “despotism” had no redeeming features. The “despotic” nature often focused on the state of the non-Muslim minorities of the empire replacing the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century praise for the tolerance of the Ottoman state and the peaceful coexistence of different religious groups within it (Çırakman, 2005: 105–164).

Drawing on essentialist differences of geography and climate, European authors began to posit an irredeemable difference between “the Orient” and Europe. Revealing a “European self-image as indisputably civilised, progressive, liberal, and rational”, this perspective represented the Ottoman Empire as despotic, irrational, backward, fatalistic and stagnant (Çırakman, 2001: 64; Yapp, 1992: 149–151). This shift in representations was confirmed by Said’s monumental work on Orientalism which demonstrated the role of European imperialism behind the nineteenth-century European Orientalist discourse which depicted the “Orient” as its negative *Other* (Said, 1978; Gürpınar, 2012). This negative and prejudiced image was hence in part a product of assumptions inherent in Enlightenment discourse. It was also a corollary of gradual secularisation and the emergence of the idea of moral and material progress and civilisation as a central element of European identity, which reflected negatively on the Ottoman Empire (Yapp, 1992: 152–153). The “Orient” and the “Occident”, as allegedly homogeneous socio-political entities, were now being imagined as “irreconcilable and contrary civilisations” (Konrad, 2011: 30). For instance, Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt (1798–1801) was justified in France by the claim that they were saving the Egyptians from the “yoke” of the despotic Ottomans (ibid.: 31). Despite the prevalence of these negative representations, particularly in Britain and France, positive representations could be discerned in the German speaking world where there were still numerous accounts praising certain aspects of the Ottoman social and political system. In fact, by the end of the eighteenth century, the concept of the “good Turk” had entered into the discourse of the German speaking world and was even popularised with Mozart’s “Entführung aus dem Serail” (The Abduction from the Seraglio), to mention only the most popular among many examples (ibid.: 70).

Hence the Ottoman government entered the nineteenth century bearing generally a negative image in the eyes of Europeans. This was further exacerbated by the Greek revolt in the 1820s, which appealed to the philhellenism prevalent in Europe at the time and once again reinforced the image of the Turks as “barbaric and un-European” (ibid.: 33).

In the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was continuously taking part in shifting diplomatic arrangements with the “European” empires and nation-states, directed at the empire’s survival in the face of its continuing decline and the independence struggles of its subject nations. The British and French alliance with the Ottoman Empire against the Russians in 1853 leading to the Crimean War led to the emergence of different voices particularly among British elites. Gürpınar (2012: 349) has shown how the British fear of Russia’s growing power and the Westernising reforms of the Ottoman government led to the emergence of an alternative image of the Ottoman Empire as a promising candidate to the newly established European

order. Several French and British writers saw a great ruler and reformer in Mahmud II (ibid.: 352) and efforts of David Urquhart, a Russophobe and a turcophile in the parliament were influential in promoting a positive image of the Turk during the 1830s and 40s (ibid.: 355 and Çiçek, 2010: 50–57).

Nonetheless, this positive attitude which peaked during the Crimean War in the 1850s began to erode in the 1860s due to unresolved ethnic conflicts within the Empire also fuelled by European powers and the growing foreign debt of the Ottoman state (Gürpınar, 2012: 350). A particularly crucial turning point for the British support of the Ottoman Empire was the Bulgarian unrest which erupted in 1876 and triggered a major war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. The uprising and its suppression by the Ottoman army was covered extensively in European and particularly the British press. The leader of the British opposition William Gladstone's pamphlet *Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East* was an instant bestseller. Gladstone employed particularly racist language which described the Turks as "the one great anti-human specimens of humanity" (Gladstone, 1876: 10). Newspapers and the pamphlet described stories of massacres in graphic detail, which created a strongly negative public opinion against the Ottomans and in favour of the Christian Slavs.

As Neumann (1999: 54–55) highlights, the nineteenth century gradually saw European representations of the Ottomans as the "barbarian Other" change into that of the "sick man". The metaphor of the "sick man" was later coined with the phrase "of Europe", thus "adding ambiguity to the Turk by offering him a principled place among the European hale if he could only heal himself" (Neumann, 1999: 55). Protection of basic individual rights, an organised state bureaucracy, a fairly efficient and non-discriminatory court system, adherence to international law were among some tenets of "European civilisation" which were increasingly demanded from the Ottoman Empire for it to obtain European support in this era's shifting alliances. The analysis of political cartoons in the European press between 1876 and 1909, which corresponds to the Hamidian era in the Ottoman Empire, also demonstrate that the most prevalent European visual imagery of the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman Sultan at the time was that of an "old man" or a "sick man" who was invariably drawn with a hookah or a tobacco (Alkan, 2016).

Despite the prevalence of generalisable stereotypes, there were nonetheless certain differences among European powers on the perception of the Ottomans, dependent on the domestic dynamics present in these countries. In the case of Germany for instance, the discussions about Turks and orthodox minorities drew on the domestic culture wars in the country between Catholics and Protestants. While turcophile editors associated Catholic fanaticism with that of the "backward" orthodox Christianity under Ottoman rule, others conflated Muslim and Catholic fanaticism, comparing Muslim *softas* (madrasa graduates) with the Jesuits (Gummer, 2010: 160, 164). The choice between the Russians and Ottomans was also a constant debate in Germany (Gummer, 2010: 169, 175). Although Ottoman forces were defeated in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, their fierce resistance to Russian forces sparked admiration for the fighting power and discipline of the Turks among German officials and soldiers (Gummer, 2010: 184).

The reign of Abdulhamid II, who distrusted and diplomatically alienated the British, further worsened the image of the Empire especially in Britain (Gürpınar, 2012: 365). The wave of violence against the Armenians in the 1890s overwhelmingly turned the British public against the Ottoman Empire and even the Tories dropped defending the Ottoman cause (Gummer, 2010: 190). The French press on the other hand, was censured in order to protect the interests of French investors in the Empire, and for two years nothing was published on the massacres of

Armenians (Gummer, 2010: 225–226). There was a philarmenian movement in Germany as well, but it was smothered by turcophilism which:

was not just a reaction to the Armenian question, but part of broader concern for stability and security. Turcophile interpretations of the massacres tapped into a familiar repertoire of clichés from the German culture wars that had been used during the Great Eastern Crisis, as well as ways of viewing social order that privileged state violence.

(Gummer, 2010: 191)

The Ottomans' decisive victory against the Greeks in 1896 further reinforced the positive image of the Empire in Germany as a source of stability and order (ibid.: 231).

This heightened sympathy and positive perceptions of the Ottoman Empire in Germany were first shaken with the Young Turk revolution in 1908 and soon after with the embarrassing Ottoman defeat in the Balkan Wars in 1912–1913 (Gummer, 2010: 248). The Committee of Union and Progress once again turned the diplomatic face of the Empire to Britain and France, shunning Germany which had vehemently supported Abdulhamid. Nonetheless, Gummer (2010: 300–304) has found that German turcophilism which had much to do with domestic struggles within Germany (mainly Protestants vs Catholics) still survived and even thrived during World War I when the two sides entered into an alliance with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

Overall, it can be argued that despite its core constitutive role in the formation of the European Self, there has not been a uniform and constant European representation of the Ottoman/Turkish Other in history. Developments both in Europe and in the Ottoman Empire had a key influence on how European representations evolved over time. It was observed that especially in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the competing representations of the late Ottoman Empire in individual European countries were largely determined by competing claims about their respective national identities. Hence, while Britain and France emphasised civilisation and progress as yard sticks in judging the worth of the Turk, the German discourse was focused on strong rule, order, discipline and dynamism. Comparisons of the Ottomans/Turks with the Russians, Greeks and minorities within the Ottoman Empire were also discerned as significant elements of the representations of the Turks/Ottoman Empire, driven by different trends like philhellenism, russophobia and philarmenia.

Ottoman representations of Europe

In pre-eighteenth-century Ottoman discourse, there were mainly two terms used for European Others, namely *Rum* (Roman) for a Greek Orthodox Christian and *Frenk* (Frank) for a Latin or Western European Christian. The term *Fregistan* was used to refer to Western or Latin Christendom. At the same time, Muslims within the Empire were thought of as the community of the *umma* and as part of the *Dar-ül Islam* (abode of Islam) (Berkes, 1998: 9). As discussed by Wigen (2010: 38), the Ottomans reigned through the concept of *âhan şîmul*, “a universal claim to rule the whole world”. Against this background, the Sultan was perceived as the legitimate ruler of the entire world, whereas for example the King of France was addressed as the “bey” of a province. Regions that were not subjugated by the Ottoman emperors but ruled by Christians were referred to as *Dar-ül Harb* (abode of war) and contrasted with the *Dar-ül Islam* (abode of Islam) of the Ottoman realms. Thus, the Frenks were “both infidel and unsubjected, and

hence “uncivilised” and served as an important reference point in the formation of the Ottoman Self (ibid.: 32).

After the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699) which brought territorial losses to the Ottoman Empire in Europe and thus shook the sense of Ottoman superiority, the Ottoman bureaucrats embarked on their first attempts at Westernisation to counter Western military and technological strength. This growing interest in Europe led to an increase in the number of ambassadorial missions to European capitals throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth century until permanent embassies were established in 1835 (see Unat, 1968). Since most segments of Ottoman society had virtually no contact with European countries, these missions were the main point of interaction, cultural exchange, and learning between the Empire and Europe. The observations of Ottoman ambassadors were practically the only source on Ottoman perceptions on Europe until the Tanzimat era when newspaper printing gradually helped to produce a variety of sources (see Göçek, 1987).

Wigen (2010: 107–110) underlines the two substantial changes, among others, that took place in Ottoman representations of Europe between the eighteenth century and the establishment of the Turkish Republic. The first significant change happened around the late eighteenth century when the religious-loaded term *Frenğistan* (land of the Franks), used in reference to Europe, was replaced by *Avrupa* (Europe), a more secular definition. Concurrent with this shift, in proposing imitation of Europe as the only way to secure the future of the empire, “Ottoman reformists split European practices semantically into a ‘material’ and a ‘spiritual’ aspect, making it possible to imitate the former while still rejecting the latter” (ibid.: 29).

With the Tanzimat edict of 1839, relations between Europe and the Ottoman Empire entered a new phase. The edict aimed to reorder state society relations in the Empire while holding European states to witness its pledge to restore and implement justice and prosperity. Ottoman statesmen at the time represented Europe in multiple ways (see Aydın-Düzgüt et al., 2017). For instance, Sadık Rifat Paşa, who was influential in drafting the Tanzimat Edict, used the concept of civilisation for the first time in Ottoman language in describing the new European order. For him, civilisation rested on principles, peace and prosperity, which he also associated with the Ottoman ideal of the Circle of Justice – a tacit contract between the ruler and the ruled (Wigen, 2010: 48–49; Mardin, 2000: 180; Aydın, 2007: 18–20). Mustafa Reşid Paşa, an Ottoman diplomat in London and Paris who had close relations with the British associated Europe with liberty (Mardin, 2000: 170–180). Mustafa Sami Efendi, an ambassador and writer, underlined the significance of knowledge and learning behind European success (Wigen, 2010: 51). At the time, there was also resistance to European influence among the higher echelons of Ottoman bureaucracy. Mehmet Akif Paşa, the first Ottoman foreign secretary, pointed at the European double standards in the application of international law (Karaca, 2004). Although there are very few records of public perceptions of Europe at the time, it was reported that Mahmud II’s Westernising reforms helped create an image of him as the “infidel sultan” among the Empire’s Muslim subjects (Anscombe, 2010: 170). The desire of the Ottoman palace to present itself as part of European civilisation was clearly seen in symbolic events as well, such as the visit of Ottoman Sultan Abdulaziz to the Paris World Fair of 1867 and the display of Ottoman culture as part of the Fair (Zaptçioğlu, 2012).

The Young Ottomans, a small cadre of intellectuals which emerged from the mid rank Ottoman bureaucracy in the 1860s, employed an extensive criticism of Tanzimat reforms and the Palace’s Westernising policies in their opposition to the arbitrary rule of the Ottoman Sublime Porte. In the writings of Young Ottoman intellectuals such as Namık Kemal (1840–1888) and Ziya Paşa (1825–1880), the European *Other* was represented as “belonging to a greater community with an inclusive identity, one that the Ottoman Empire can also take part in if it

adheres to the same practices” (Wigen, 2010: 57). These authors represented civilisation not “as something inherently European, but as something the Europeans have succeeded in achieving” (ibid.). They equated modern European ideals such as equality and liberty with the “highest Islamic ideals” which the Ottomans had deviated from. While the European *Other* was associated with rationality and morality, the current Ottoman *Self* was associated with irrationality (Wigen, 2010: 60–61).

Despite the positive attributes that they ascribed to Europe, young Ottomans contested European intervention in the domestic affairs of the Empire particularly where the affairs of Christian minorities were concerned (Çiçek, 2010). Hence, while they desired to become a part of European civilisation, they were also concerned with protecting the integrity of Ottoman identity as an inclusive project covering minorities. Similar to policies implemented in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy (see Leonhard, 2012), the Ottoman Empire also aimed at fostering the identification of the various peoples living in their realms with the Empire, a development often described as Ottomanism (*Osmanlılık*), Ottomanness (*Osmanlılık*) or Ottoman union (*ittihâd-ı Osmanî*) in the secondary literature (Chovanec, 2020; Elfenbein, 2020; Topal, 2020).

Westernisation in the Ottoman context was not limited to reforms in the state administration, but was extended to the adoption of Western oriented consumption and leisure patterns in the urban centres of the Empire, which attracted considerable criticisms in the late Tanzimat era, also from the Young Turks. The concept which symbolised this reaction was *alla franca* (francophile), meaning the “unnecessary adoption of European ways” (Wigen, 2010: 65), which was contrasted with *alla turca*, the Ottoman or Turkish mode.

The Hamidian Era between 1876 and 1908 was generally marked by the rise of anti-Western Islamism both as part of Abdulhamid’s deliberate policies to increase the legitimacy of his rule, and as part of a broader trend in the Middle East (Deringil, 1991; Karpat, 2001; Aydın, 2007). Abdulhamid II strove to perfect his image as a Muslim leader, caliph, and protector of Muslims and as a general leader of Muslims all over the world (Karpat, 2001: 136–183; Deringil, 1991). In addition to this, he spent conscious and careful effort to present the Ottoman Empire and its peoples in a better light and as part of humanity in the eyes of the European public (Baleva, 2012). For instance, during the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877–78, in response to the European public outcry against “Turkish atrocities” mentioned earlier, Abdulhamid arranged for photos of wounded Muslims to be taken and thus had the “Russian atrocities” documented (Baleva, 2012). In these photos, which were dispatched to European embassies, special care was taken to portray Muslim sufferers individually and humanise them.

Aydın (2007) has argued that the rise of anti-Western Islamism and pan-Islamist visions of world order in the late nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire was, in fact, a reaction to the “legitimacy crisis of a single, globalised, international system” which had been intellectually justified through Orientalist and racist discourses (Aydın, 2007: 4–7). The Hamidian era was particularly rich in rebuttals of Orientalist arguments (Wigen, 2010: 70). For instance, prominent orientalist Ernest Renan’s presentation of the Muslim World and its past as the history of an inferior Semitic race incompatible with science and progress triggered a massive reaction from Arabic and Turkish speaking Muslim intellectuals in the Empire (Aydın, 2007: 47–53).

Nonetheless, an interesting development during the Hamidian era was also the internalisation and reproduction of the orientalist discourse within the Empire in a way that reflected on the eastern periphery of Ottoman realms. Based on his observations on Ottoman government in Mount Lebanon, Makdisi (2002: 769) has argued that in the second half of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman government gradually established a regime “in which an advanced imperial centre reformed and disciplined backward peripheries of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious

empire”. This discursive *othering* particularly targeted Druzes, Maronites, Yezidis and other similar groups standing low in the Ottoman ethnic and religious social hierarchy.

Concurrent with the rise of Islamism, thanks to the ethnic and nationalist separatist movements in the Empire, the emergence of turcology as a discipline and the influence of several Russian born Turkic intellectuals (Uzer, 2016), Turkism also emerged in this period as a competing discourse on national identity in the Ottoman Empire. It was observed that in the years between the *Young Turk* revolution of 1908 and the promulgation of the second constitutional period, concepts used in the identification of the Ottoman Self such as Ottoman and Muslim were increasingly replaced by Turk and Turkey (Wigen, 2010: 75). Probably the most influential Turkist writer of the time and the ideological father of Turkish nationalism, Ziya Gökalp, made a stark distinction between “civilisation” and “culture” in defining the Turkish national community. While civilisation was a well-known trope used in nineteenth-century discourses on the Ottoman Self, culture (*hars*), as inspired by the German concept of *Kultur*, was new. He associated civilisation with universal, international, technical, economic and progressive categories, while defining culture with reference to particular national, religious and immutable categories (Topal, 2017: 13). In this constellation, Europe was associated with material and technological qualities, where Gökalp welcomed Westernisation. Nonetheless, a strict line was drawn between the West and the Turkish national community in the context of culture (Karadaş, 2010).

Although in the minority, between 1908 and 1918, there was also a group of heavily pro-Western intellectuals in the Empire, known as the “Westerners” (*Garbçılar*), who did not shy away from demonstrating their confrontation with Islam and infatuation with Western sciences and technology (Hanioglu, 1997). Led by Abdullah Cevdet, the “Westerners” imagined a society based on science, technology and progress; criticised traditional Islam and advocated the clearing of religion from dogma and superstition. Despite their criticisms however, they still saw Islam as essential to Turkishness and criticised Western imperialism and the constitutive role that Christianity plays in European identity (Hanioglu, 1997: 145).

Overall, similar to European representations of the Ottoman *Other* in the given era, Ottoman representations of the European *Other* have not been homogenous and have been subject to political constellations within the Empire as well as to its relationship with European powers in the emerging European state system. Nonetheless, it can be argued that it was the representations of Europe which evolved in this period that ultimately shaped the ways in which Europe was perceived in the modern Turkish Republic.

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the evolution of mutual identity representations between the Ottoman Empire and Europe between the late eighteenth and early twentieth centuries, a period of intensified relations and tumultuous political changes on both sides. We have stressed that there is no fixed and uniform image of the *Other*. Identity representations in both contexts have varied with changes in the international and domestic contexts, and in interaction with one another. Despite this variation, in the current context of political relations between Turkey and the EU, history is often invoked to cement a representation of the *Other* as the eternal enemy in order to justify exclusion and antagonism. That is why stressing the historical variations in identity representations and images, as we have done in this chapter, bears a high degree of contemporary political relevance.

Much of the existing literature on identity relations between Turkey and Europe remains focused on the contemporary post-Cold War period, when the issue of the Europeanness

of Turkey came to be debated in the context of Turkey's EU membership bid.¹ However, as this chapter sought to show, mutual identity representations between Turkey and Europe have developed and evolved over a much longer historical context. Yet there are very few, if any, *longue-durée* studies that trace the evolution of identity relations between Turkey and Europe, identifying the patterns, turning points and trajectories in the evolution of identity representations across time. The existing scholarship is predominantly fragmentary in nature, focusing mostly on individual moments and impact of particular political events and does not deal with the transformation of representations in the *longue durée* (see Gürpınar, 2012; Gummer, 2010).

In addition, most of the existing literature focuses either on European images of the Turkish *Other* or the Turkish images of the European *Other* without analysing the interaction between the two. In other words, scant attention has been paid to the ways in which European representations of Turkey's identity resonate in Turkey and in turn shape Turkish representations of European identity. As political and cultural relations intensified between Turkey and Europe, the identity debates in Turkey and Europe have become increasingly interactive and dialogical, such that either side is aware of how its identity is being portrayed by the *Other*, and responds accordingly. Consequently, negative representations of Turkish identity in Europe produce negative representations of Europe in Turkey, generating vicious cycles in identity debates.

Finally, while it is possible to identify dominant images of the *Other* in certain historical periods, it is also important to stress the ongoing domestic contestation, which results from competing groups putting forward competing images. Capturing this contestation calls for greater attention on the part of the existing scholarship on the level of analysis (i.e. the variation between public and elite representations, policymakers versus scholars/intellectuals, cultural and political contexts).

Note

- 1 A recent literature review found that out of a total of 313 works focused on identity relationship between Turkey and the EU, around 150 analyse the contemporary post-1999 period, while in the 1789–1922 period, the number of relevant works is 40, in the 1923–1945 period 45, and in the 1946–1988 period, it is 65 (Gülmez et al., 2017).

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