


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Aner Govrin, Tair Caspi

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Charles Hanly

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TRUTH AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

*Charles Hanly*¹

Introduction

The sophist Protagorean idea that individuals “are the measure of all things” has had a resurgence, in recent decades, with the rise of “postmodern” thinking. The postmodern viewpoint has been defined as one of “incredulity toward metanarratives,” favouring instead a multiplicity of “language games” and “clouds of sociality” (Lyotard, xxiv). Such a viewpoint has found support within psychoanalysis. Supporters maintain that there are no facts at all in clinical psychoanalysis to be shared by competent observers. Goldberg (1976) qualifies this generality by acknowledging that analysts of the same theoretical school are able to share clinical facts but clinicians of differing theoretical schools cannot. In what follows, I will consider this general and qualified claim in the context of three main philosophical theories of truth: the correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic theories. In the course of the discussion, we will see that this postmodern trend in psychoanalysis depends on claims about truth which lack plausibility.

Philosophical Theories of Truth

The Correspondence Theory

The correspondence theory of truth is for many people the most intuitively plausible theory (see Hanly, 1990, 2006, 2009). It states that truth consists of the degree of correspondence between an object and its description. It assumes that under normal conditions the human mind is able to gain knowledge of objects by means of observation and its experimental refinement. This observational knowledge can then be used to test interpretations, formulations, diagnoses and theories. The correspondence theory is implied with oblique eloquence in Galileo’s “*eppur si muove*” (see Drake, 1978, pp. 356–357). Neither his official recantation of his astronomical discoveries, nor the majestic coherence of Ptolemaic astronomy, nor the obvious agreement of Ptolemaic theory with experience, nor the consensus of generations of scholars and ecclesiastical authorities, could alter the fact that Galileo’s observations of the moon, planets, and sun had enabled him to describe much more accurately the nature of these objects and what was actually happening in nature with their states of motion and rest. This same view of truth and of science has been held by the great seminal scientists: Harvey, Newton, Darwin, Einstein, and Freud,

and by scientists generally. The school of thought in philosophy with which the correspondence concept of truth is associated is realism: critics of correspondence would say naïve realism; advocates would say critical realism.

The Coherence Theory

The next theory of truth to consider is the coherence theory (see Hanly, 1990, 2009). At least in its “strong” version advocated by some philosophers, the coherence theory lacks the intuitive plausibility of the correspondence theory. It pushes the limits of the ordinary ways in which we understand truth and reality. Putnam (1981) has articulated one such strong version of the coherence theory of truth. According to Putnam, the question “What objects does the world consist of?” only makes sense within a theory or description:

Truth . . . is some sort of (idealized) rational acceptability – some sort of ideal coherence of beliefs with each other and with our experiences as those experiences are themselves represented in our belief system – and not correspondence with mind-independent or discourse-independent “states of affairs” (p. 47).

Thus on a strong version of the coherence theory, there may be more than one true description of the world. The correspondence theory allows for only one. In effect, the coherence theory abandons objects as they actually are as the ground of truths about objects for objects as they are constructed or constituted by the belief and theory investments that govern their observation and the way in which they are experienced by observers. The mind must, as a matter of psychological and epistemological inevitability, subject the objects which it seeks to know to the conditions under which it is able to know them. The original form of this idea is traceable to Kant (1781), although Kant believed himself to be a scientific realist. Among its modern adherents have been Bradley (1897), Merleau-Ponty (1945), Sartre (1943), Ricoeur (1970), Habermas (1971), and the philosophers of science Kuhn (1970), Feyerabend (1965), and Putnam (1981). The school of thought, in philosophy, to which the coherence theory belongs is idealism or rationalism (analyst readers who are not philosophically sophisticated are reminded that “rationalism” when used to denote a school of thought does not imply that the ideas of the school are always rational or that the ideas of the school of thought opposed to it, “empiricism,” are irrational).

A key reason why strong coherentism lacks plausibility is that, just as arguments can be valid without being sound because the truth of the conclusions depends upon the truth of the premises, so a theory can be logically consistent without being true. We can see this by considering the case of Euclidean geometry. This is a mathematical system that is complete and completely coherent. For this reason, it escapes Gödel’s theorem that the axioms of complex mathematical systems allow for the formulation of theorems that cannot be proven by the axioms and theorems that can be proven. Yet it turns out that Euclidean geometry does not describe the space of the universe. Physics has been able to identify facts that show this to be the case. The axioms of Euclidean geometry were believed to be self-evidently true. Plato, Descartes, and Leibniz considered them to be innate to the mind. Kant considered them to be *a priori* conditions of experience. Yet despite this self-evidence and coherence, and despite the fact that we actually do observe the world in a Euclidean fashion, these axioms have been shown by relativity physics to be approximations suitable only to regions of space smaller than the solar system and on relatively short distances on the earth’s surface.

Another example of coherence without truth is found in the neuroses and psychoses. If coherence were a sufficient and adequate criterion of truth, it would follow that the loss of reality in neurosis and psychosis would necessarily involve incoherence, but it does not. Psychoanalysis is familiar, in the psychoses, with systems of belief, observation, and behaviour that are remarkable both for their coherence and for their detachment from reality. The following bit of case history is representative. A psychotic student in a university seminar experienced growing agitation when certain topics were under discussion while the sounds of shuffling feet around the table were accompanied by the sounds of streetcars passing under the windows. This agitation cohered perfectly with his belief that such conjunctions of sounds signaled the approach of evil forces at work in the student's Manichean cosmos. Coherent as well with his beliefs were the ritual pre-cautions he undertook to oppose the advance of those forces. Nowhere are the shortcomings of coherence as a sufficient criterion of truth more forcefully demonstrated than in our own field. Just as an argument may be valid and yet have a false conclusion, so a system of beliefs or a narrative may be coherent but false. The concept of coherence is not sufficient to bridge the gap between ideas and objects.

The Pragmatic Theory

The third theory of truth under consideration is pragmatism (see Hanly, 2006). William James (1907) was the founder along with Dewey (1918) and Peirce (1903) of pragmatism. James affirmed that to say of an idea, "it is true because it is useful," is identical with saying, "an idea works because it is true," by which he meant, "It corresponds with reality."

However, there is an ambiguity in James's use of the term "useful" that needs elucidation. The term "useful" may mean "can be used to engineer or otherwise bring about specific changes that would not occur without the use of the idea," or it may mean "psychologically beneficial" for the individual in the sense of having advantageous consequences for the individual who has the idea. I propose to refer to the former as "scientific pragmatism" and the latter as "philosophical pragmatism." Like the strong version of the coherence theory, there are compelling reasons to reject philosophical pragmatism.

The problem with philosophical pragmatism becomes clear when we consider James's application of this theory to religion. James claimed that if a hypothesis works satisfactorily in the broadest sense, then it is true. Therefore, if the belief that God exists works well for a believer, for example, if it enables him to respond to misfortune with fortitude, then the belief is true. But no such implication can be drawn; all that is established is that the belief in the truth of the idea is beneficial, and not that the belief is true. By parity of reasoning on the basis of James's conception of pragmatism, Agamemnon's belief in the goddess Artemis, to whom he ritually sacrificed his daughter Iphigenia, was true because a brisk offshore wind subsequently got up, which enabled his becalmed fleet to sail to Troy. But this reasoning no more establishes the existence of Artemis in the forests of Olympus than the utility of a belief in a Judaic-Christian god proves the existence of an infinite creator of the universe. The fact that a belief is good for one, that it is useful in the broadest sense, does not prove its truth, that is, that there is a reality corresponding to it.

Russell (1945) states the underlying difficulty with James's definition of pragmatism in a colorful and insightful way:

the fallacies spring from an attempt to ignore all extra-human facts. Berkeleian idealism combined with skepticism causes him to substitute belief in God for God, and to

pretend that this will do just as well. But this is only a form of the subjectivist madness which is characteristic of most modern philosophy.

(pp. 772–773)

Drawing on Insights From Coherentism and Pragmatism

I have argued that the strong version of the coherence theory and the philosophical version of the pragmatic theory are both implausible. However, there are more plausible versions of coherentism and pragmatism which incorporate some of the insights of these theories without entailing their problematic consequences. Indeed, these more plausible versions of coherentism and pragmatism are compatible with the correspondence theory of truth. We can see this compatibility by considering Freud's own position on the development of a scientific theory such as psychoanalysis.

Coherentism

Freud employed a coherence criterion within the framework of his realist epistemology. He appreciated the extent to which any inquiry has to be guided by preliminary ideas. In this respect, Freud's grasp of epistemology was more realistic and empirical than that of Bacon (1620), the great founder of modern empiricism. But Freud also thought that these preliminary ideas can and must be continually criticized and made to reflect the facts of observation more accurately. From the need to have a theory that will enable us to make predictions about what we will observe in order to make systematic observations, it does not follow that these predictions must govern what we will find. The preliminary ideas Harvey had concerning the circulation of the blood did not add or subtract anything from his crucial measurement of the amount of blood pumped by the heart in a single pulse. Hawking's (1988) mathematical derivation which proves, on current thermodynamic and quantum assumptions, that black holes emit particles does not affect the observations that will now have to be made on cosmic radiation to test the empirical truth of this derivation.

Nowhere is the use of coherence more evident than in Freud's (1918) effort to prove the objective reality of the Wolf Man's primal scene. But even though his interpretation makes coherent sense of the details of the Wolf Man's infantile history and its connection with both his infantile and adult neuroses, Freud does not claim that he had succeeded in proving that the primal scene was an occurrence rather than a fantasy. A crucial fact concerning the Gruska scene (the boy's urination) could only be established inferentially. Similarly, Freud only claimed that his hypothesis in 'Totem and Taboo' was more plausible than existing theories and that it probably contained some measure of truth. He did not claim either that its coherence made it true or that such coherence constituted a limit beyond which knowledge could not reach.

Thus, Freud used coherence as a necessary but not a sufficient criterion of truth. He took correspondence to be necessary and sufficient. Freud used coherence as a formal, logical criterion and correspondence as a material, epistemological criterion. Indeed, correspondence is built into the foundations of psychoanalysis. It is part of the meaning of the reality principle.

Pragmatism

What I earlier called "scientific pragmatism," which employs a scientific definition of "useful," is consistent with correspondence. According to scientific pragmatism, a hypothesis is rendered pragmatically true if there can be derived from it a means of bringing about a change predicted

by the hypothesis in some thing or event and if it can provide an explanation including the mechanism of its production. It is the fact that the change is predicted, explained, and brought about – and not whether the change is beneficial or adverse – that is the crucial validating element that provides pragmatic evidence of correspondence.

The amelioration of the human condition is one of the great benefits of science and technology, but it is the fact that the change was predicted, and not the benefit, that confirms the hypothesis. The truth of the hypothesis, in cases of immunity to otherwise malignant infections, that the injection of a small, controlled amount of a disease-causing virus will stimulate the production of antibodies that will then protect against future infections from the virus is confirmed by a change in the body – its future resistance to the disease on account of the antibodies caused by the immunizing injection. There can be no question about the human benefits of immunization, but it is the ability to use the scientific ideas to bring about this change (granted, a highly desirable one) that provides a pragmatic confirmation of the ideas of the immunization hypothesis.

We find that Freud relied on a scientifically pragmatic criterion of truth in his construction of psychoanalytic knowledge. A familiar example of his use of a pragmatic criterion is his far-reaching modification of his early seduction theory when he came upon hysterical neurosis in which the stable remission of symptoms predicted by his theory was not brought about by the clinical technique that, according to the theory, should have worked. According to the principles outlined above, (1) Freud's seduction hypothesis could explain the nature and origin of these neuroses by tracing them to their causal origins: repressed memories of having been sexually seduced in childhood were rendered traumatic by the onset of sexuality at puberty and caused sexuality to become symptomatic; (2) the method of cure specified by the theory would consist of a cathartic return of the affect-charged memories and, in so doing, disarm their interference with normal sexual development and activity; (3) the seduction hypothesis predicted that the affect-laden return of the memories of childhood seductions would cure the symptoms by allowing sexual activity to flourish; but (4) Freud discovered that, in some cases, the return to consciousness of childhood scenes of sexual seduction resulted in no symptom change or in only a temporary improvement. Freud concluded that the seduction theory, in the form in which he originally stated it, was false on the pragmatic grounds that it did not work in the way it would have to have worked if it were true in all cases of hysteria.

In order better to explain the clinical phenomena he was observing, he modified the theory by introducing, in addition to the accidents of childhood object relations, the influence of an inherited sexual instinct active from birth according to a genetic program of developmental stages or infantile sexuality. He correspondingly modified the cathartic method by recognizing transference and processes of repeating, remembering, and working through. The fact that these theoretical and technical changes worked better than the theory and clinical technique they replaced constituted a pragmatic confirmation of them, just as the failure of the seduction theory to work provided a pragmatic disconfirmation of it.

Truth and Subjectivism in Psychoanalysis

As mentioned at the outset, the postmodern viewpoint of “incredulity toward metanarratives” has found support within psychoanalysis. Supporters are inclined to claim that there are no facts at all in clinical psychoanalysis to be shared by competent observers. A prominent American analyst affirmed at an anniversary scientific meeting of the *International Journal* that “it is a fact, that there is no such thing as a clinical fact.” These postmodern analysts end up rejecting the correspondence theory of truth and relying on the problematic claims of strong coherentism

or philosophical pragmatism that we have just considered. Let us consider some examples of analysts who have come to understand psychoanalysis in a way that is compatible with such a postmodern framework.

Goldberg

We find Goldberg (1976; 1988) articulating a coherence theory. The philosophical idea that observations are theory-bound is used to explain differences in clinical observation:

when two individuals with roughly similar neurophysiological equipment view the same thing or event and each see it differently, it is not necessarily true that one is incompetent or even wrong; rather it may be that they each observe with a different theory.

(Goldberg, 1976, p. 67)

From this epistemological premise we can infer that shared coherent theories will produce clinical observations that will confirm the theories that constitute the observations but there are no perspectives and no facts that could adjudicate any alternative theory. This idea agrees with Putnam (1981) that there may be more than one true theory about the same thing because the observations that confirm theories are contaminated by the very theoretical concepts they confirm. As Putnam states it, ‘the very (experiential) inputs upon which our knowledge is based are conceptually contaminated’ (1981, p. 54).

Spence

Spence (1982a, 1982b), despite some ambiguity, comes down in favour of coherence as the criterion of truth in psychoanalysis when he claims that “the analyst functions more as a pattern-maker than a pattern-finder” and goes on to refer to analyses as “artistic masterpieces.” This account agrees with the notion that a present intention or perception interprets the past – that there is no discrete, specific, particular past which continues to be what it was; there are only the diverse perspectives on the past brought about by the intentions inherent in current projects, moods, affects, attitudes, and theories.

However, Spence does not accurately represent the analytic process. The description above of the uncertainty of associations is tendentious and incomplete. Even when a patient is filling the hour with reports of manifest dream contents to the exclusion of associations, the details of the material are clear and determinate. There is nothing indefinite or elusive about it. Of course, it is unintelligible and uninterpretable in the absence of associations and transferences, but this fact has itself an obvious interpretation: the patient is anxiously clinging to the manifest dream content. This interpretation, properly timed and expressed and linked to the transference, will begin a process of change that will enable the patient to begin associating to his dreams. These associations will then also be determinate and discrete. If they are incomplete – as they are likely to be – it will be because further resistances are at work. If they become vague and uncertain, it is for the same reason. Vagueness and uncertainty are themselves determinate states of affairs that have an explanation. They are not characteristic qualities of mental contents and states as such. The same is true of fantasies, memories, character traits, and so on.

Pattern-making by the analyst is not required so long as resistances and defences are interpreted in such a way as to allow the intrinsic forces at work in the psychic life of the patient to

make themselves known. These forces will determine the pattern as they will determine the transference. The forces in question are the drives, their vicissitudes, and their derivatives.

The ideas of pattern-making, of theory-bound observation, and the like are rationalizations for countertransference resistance to the threats posed by the drives, that is, by the instinctual unconscious of the analyst. It is for this reason that psychoanalytic adherents of coherence have to find some way to banish the drives conceptually. Psychoanalytic theories that repudiate the drives are also likely to employ coherence as a concept of truth. Freud (1900) was certainly aware of the complexity of dreams and the extent to which they are representative of all mental phenomena; however, Freud (1905) also believed that the obscurities of a dream can be cleared up, that each manifest element can be traced along the paths of displacement and condensation from whence it came and that the meaning of the dream is to be found in the unconscious wishes of the dreamer. We are not always able to find the meaning, but it is there to be found, independently of any pattern-making activity on the part of the analyst.

The task of interpretation as Freud conceived it is to make the interpretation correspond with the operative unconscious wishes of the dreamer – wishes that have a definite nature of their own. (For an opposing view, see Viderman, 1970).

Relational Analysis

Relational analysts who reject outright any drive factors in neurosis are a third example of psychoanalysts whose views on psychoanalysis can be seen to fit all too easily within a postmodern framework. These comments apply to and are limited to Stolorow's idea of co-creation. There are relational analysts, such as Greenberg and Mitchell (1983), who seek a synthesis of drive and relational causalities. Stolorow and Atwood (1992) and some relational analysts are inclined towards the claim that, because analytic truths are co-created by the analytic dyad, there will not necessarily be facts about the patient in clinical psychoanalysis which would be available to any competent observer who is not part of the dyad. Stolorow maintains that the analyst and the analysand are inextricably related to the extent of being reciprocally determinative the one of the other. Hence, in analysis a patient's associations and transference do not, under any conditions, convey who and what the patient is but only who and what the patient is in relation to the analyst.

Such analysts criticize psychoanalytic realists for being absolutists because they claim to be able to know who the patient really is and to be able to know what motivates the patient better than the patient does himself. These psychoanalytic criticisms cohere with the philosophical criticism of the critical realist's advocacy of correspondence and advance the further implication that the realist not only logically introduces a deity into epistemology but is also self-deifying with claims of omniscience.

These criticisms and the philosophical ideas on which they are based have, no doubt, a certain merit. It is possible to use a conviction of correspondence to believe that, because one sees something in a certain way, it must be that way. It would be bad analytic technique to see, for example, a woman patient's recurrent complaints about male peers being privileged over her at her place of work as being necessarily complaints about not having a penis. What the motives are cannot be decided *a priori*; it would be a misuse of theory and inadequate technique to do so. The analyst would, in such a case, be prescribing the motive rather than discovering it. Her complaints could be realistic, and the psychoanalytic question would then have to do with the motives of her passivity in the face of mistreatment. Her complaints could be unrealistic and symptomatic, yet not motivated by penis envy. Her complaints could be realistic and also motivated by penis envy. An analyst who failed to be open to the possibilities would have failed to

maintain evenly suspended attention; he would be simplistic and narrow in his grasp of psychoanalytic theory and technique, and, on the assumptions we have made, probably unconsciously hostile toward the patient.

Shortcomings of this kind occur, but it would be a mistake to define an idea or to repudiate it on the basis of its misuse. The situation is more complicated. Good technique would invite the analyst to discover the motives of his patient's complaining by facilitating and following her associations and transferences, and bid the analyst not to rely on his/her preferred ideas. The scientific, philosophical, and common-sense idea of correspondence does not include the idea that truths are easily come by or that success is guaranteed.

In psychoanalysis, through sympathetic identification clarified by countertransference awareness, this same self-critical capacity can facilitate our search after an understanding of our patients in their terms rather than our own. The complement of this self-critical receptive observation on the part of the analyst is the struggle for self-honesty in the analysand. The view that an analysis consists of a mutual construction by analyst and analysand of the analysand's life fails to do justice to this struggle. There are analysands who have been able to use the analytic process to discover more about themselves, to recover more of their past and find ways to reconcile themselves with it, than their analysts could comprehend. Fortunately for our profession and for our patients, the process that the analyst facilitates can yield for the analysand a degree of resolving self-knowledge and improved functioning that exceeds those of his analyst. There is a common human nature, although to be sure not in the form of an Aristotelian essence that exists in nature and awaits our better understanding. It is embodied in the lives lived by individuals. These individual lives are part of nature. They are there to be known, however difficult that may be. The self-honesty of an analysand in his realization that he feared his father because he wanted to murder him, or of an analysand in her realization that her frigidity and the pleasure she took in rape fantasies was caused by her wish to use intercourse to castrate the man, implies that these realizations correspond with real wishes that continue to influence the individual's life. Neither the pain of those realizations nor their beneficial effects of this self-knowledge can be accounted for by any other assumption. In the end, each person has only his own life to live, however shared with others.

At the core of the being of each person there is a solitude in which he is related to himself. Truth resides in this solitude to the extent that one can remember one's own past as it actually was. The ground of good analytic work in the analyst is his attitude of respect for this solitude.

The Importance of Truth in Clinical Psychoanalysis

A notion of truth that corresponds to reality is essential to psychoanalysis. Indeed, sometimes it is a matter of the utmost urgency to be able to ascertain what is true in reality. Consider, for instance, a situation I once experienced in treating one of my analysands. A borderline patient in his second year of analysis, a young professional man who had lost his first job on account of a pretentious insubordination out of envy, now a student in his professional field, came to his session beside himself with rage and threatening to kill an external examiner who had failed him. I quickly became aware of how badly I needed to be able to estimate, by the end of the session, his capacity to contain the rage that drove his wish to revenge the insult to his grandiosity and how much I needed to help him with this task during the session. The patient had, during periods of severe depression, told me of wanting to let the world know "that he was somebody" by committing a mass murder; he owned a substantial arsenal of guns and ammunition. I was painfully aware of how much I needed to know whether or not he was likely to carry out his threats and how difficult it would be to know. There were no self-evident certainties on which to rely, nor anything either absolutistic or naïve about my urgent search for understanding. I was

alone with his urgent need for my help without having any clear idea of what might emerge that would make it possible for me to help him. I did not for a moment think that his enraged murderous threat was a co-creation of him by his analysis or that I had any interpretive access to it for that reason. And I was aware that I would not be able to know with the confidence I wanted to have how well my thinking about him corresponded with his reality and what confidence I could place in whatever interventions I could make before the end of the session. The crucial observation would be what would happen to his murderous rage; for that observation I had no alternative but to wait for what would unfold in the session. I had no acceptable choice but to give myself up to the task.

I concluded from his account of the damaging interview with the examining professor, punctuated and disorganized as it was by outpourings of vengeful rage and death threats, that there was some possibility that he had been neither passed nor failed but would be required to resubmit his work after dealing with criticisms. I was confident enough of this construction, despite the fear that it might be the product of my own wishful thinking, that I communicated it to him as something he might want to explore further. I was concerned about the risk if it should turn out not to be true. But at least it might buy time for further analytic work. I offered this reality testing in the context of interpreting to him the intensity of his rage in words that implicitly pointed to but did not explicitly mention the work of a phantasy of having been castrated. I had learned to link interpretations with tentative alternatives to his view of the reality of situations in which he found himself because of his difficulties with reality testing. Instead of interpreting his grandiosity or his castration anxiety directly, I interpreted his hurt pride (Ferenczi, 1952). These interpretations facilitated an encouraging sequence of associations toward the end of the session about his immigrant father, often the object of his derogating criticism, who he now acknowledged had had the “balls” to leave his homeland and try to make a go of it in a new country, even though it didn’t work out very well for him. I hoped that he was letting me know that he too might have the balls to go back to his faculty and find out what really confronted him instead of carrying out his death threats. By the end of the session I observed a diminution in the frequency of his outbursts of indignant, narcissistic rage and sensed some reduction in their intensity. But he was by no means either calm or appeased. I was left with the anxiety-provoking question as to whether or not he could sustain this fragile improvement in self-mastery after the session.

I was confident enough of what I had seen and understood not to warn my colleague or inform the police because of my impression that my interpretations corresponded well enough to be heard and because they appeared to have had some, at least temporary, beneficial effect. I was not confident enough to sleep that night. Without more evidence that I could not have until the next few days, I was taking a risk. I believed that any other action on my part would very likely be ruinous to the analysis. He had previously gone through a period in which he believed that I was taping his sessions in order to inform the police. All of these perceptions, estimations, hopes, fears, and judgements were fallibly based on the evidence that became available during the session.

I was relieved and grateful for the efficacy of psychoanalytic interpretation, when my patient arrived the next morning and kept subsequent appointments with only rumblings of his rage and humiliation audible in his complaints of unfairness in a mood that was by no means calm but was sufficiently reconciled to his situation to abandon his threats of revenge and to get on with the tasks at hand. I was lucky that, as I had surmised, he had not been failed; there were some inadequacies in his work that required improvement for the examination to qualify him for his graduate degree. I could now be reasonably satisfied that the observations and the ideas that guided my actions corresponded well enough with the reality of my patient’s psychic life to help

him modify his narcissistic, violent rage. My satisfaction was chastened by my realization that I would probably have to become the object of my patient's murderous rage in the transference in order for it to be finally worked through (Hanly, 1998).

In my opinion, psychoanalysis works best when analysts employ all three criteria of truth according their strengths and limitations.

Note

- 1 I am grateful for the excellent editorial work Bradley Murray Ph.D. contributed to the preparation of this chapter.

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