


This article was downloaded by: 10.3.97.143

On: 20 Mar 2023

Access details: *subscription number*

Publisher: *Routledge*

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK



The Routledge International Handbook of Psychoanalysis and Philosophy

Aner Govrin, Tair Caspi

The Anxieties of Truth in Psychoanalytic and Philosophic Thought

Publication details

<https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780429297076-21>

Shlomit Yadlin-Gadot

Published online on: 25 Nov 2022

How to cite :- Shlomit Yadlin-Gadot. 25 Nov 2022, *The Anxieties of Truth in Psychoanalytic and Philosophic Thought from: The Routledge International Handbook of Psychoanalysis and Philosophy* Routledge

Accessed on: 20 Mar 2023

<https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780429297076-21>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT

Full terms and conditions of use: <https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms>

This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

THE ANXIETIES OF TRUTH IN PSYCHOANALYTIC AND PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT

Shlomit Yadlin-Gadot

Introduction

Truth is a traditional age-old topic in philosophy, reflecting the major part it played throughout the history of the human subject. Wars have been fought trying to enforce different truths, gods have been created to articulate them, and particular lives have been formed and reformed in their light. It seems that what we know of truth in a definite manner is that it carries with it weight and sanctity that appertain to its function as a directive, a value or a point of reference. Yet, any and all attempts to define it belay these possibilities. Philosophical thought hasn't achieved a consensual definition of the concept and the various paradigmatic definitions available are riddled with methodological, logical and ethical challenges (Kunne 2003).

In psychoanalysis as in philosophy, truth was and remains a nodal concept. From its very inception, psychoanalysis has defined its essence in terms of the pursuit of truth (Freud 1933/1964). Freud, in his early work as a modernist, strove to establish psychoanalysis as a science in search of truth as constructed in the framework of a realistic epistemology. Truth was the goal of psychoanalysis, the analyst's gift to his patient, the therapeutic factor in clinical practice. Following Freud, however, an epistemological shift was gradually effected in psychoanalytic thought. The transition from a realistic epistemology to a subjective one was accompanied by the splintering of the 'one' realistic truth – the truth of correspondence – into a multiplicity of truths: Ideal, subjective, intersubjective, coherent and pragmatic truths, etc.

Truth remained the *raison d'être* of psychoanalysis (Hanly 1990), but its various definitions resulted in the formulation of different objectives and methodologies for clinical psychoanalysis. These different perspectives on truth, organized in distinct theoretical discourses, split the psychoanalytic society into diverse schools. The discussions among them are often accompanied by antagonism, rejectionist critiques and difficulties in mounting real dialogue (Summers 2008; Cavell 1983, 1998). In the traditional psychoanalytic discussions of epistemology, each school takes a position that attests to the 'correctness' of a particular epistemology, explains its advantages as a framework for psychoanalysis, while arguing that other epistemological approaches are erroneous and may even endanger psychoanalytic practice.

The view that I wish to develop here does not propose to choose between epistemologies, but rather continues a line of thought that seeks to create the theoretical space for multiple epistemologies and the practical space for multiple truths, recognized as inherent features of our

psychic function. Articulating a psychological definition of truth, I will depict truth as a psychic dynamic that functions in accord with the human need for certainty as it expresses itself across critical dimension of the subject's life.

The vantage point of this psychological account is the Kantian assumption that the mind-independent external reality around us is an incomprehensible one. We can know it only as it is mediated by fixed categories of consciousness that structure perceived phenomena in particular ways (Kant 1781/2013). Following this stage of perception, our experience is further organized by means of attention and symbolic paradigms (Neisser 1967, 1976; James 1890/2013; Kuhn 1962/1996; Gedo 1997). We mold and remold our realities in light and by means of different organizational principles, creating within them continuously, automatically and unconsciously Archimedean points of stability and certainty.

The history of Western philosophical thought has given rise to six paradigmatic notions of truth, truths that frequent our language and clinical experience, philosophical theory and psychoanalytic meta-theory. I will present each of these truths as reflecting an organizing principle in the psyche and as constituting its Archimedean point of certainty. In each person's psyche, these principles of organization function simultaneously, embodied in distinctive cognitive, experiential and emotional modes and rooted in basic human needs. I term these organizational principles '*truth axes*'. Their unique configuration is shaped by a singular developmental history which enhances certain truths, inhibits and forecloses others and, in that way, determines their interrelations. These truths sometimes overlap but are often incompatible with each other, generating tensions within the psyche and driving processes of repression and dissociation (Yadlin-Gadot 2016, 2017a, 2017b, 2019).

From this perspective, truth must be recognized not as an abstract construct, external to the subject, but also, and perhaps more importantly, as an inherent group of distinct and definable organizing principles of the psyche. These organizational principles, truth axes, define epistemic multiplicity as a main feature of subjectivity. They construct the various images of reality we inhabit and create the multidimensional experience we have of our world and of ourselves. Moreover, this formulation explains both the multiplicity of truths recognized in philosophic and psychoanalytic thought and truth's irrefractability, even after the postmodern turn which, on the face of it, has given the concept a mortal blow.

In the first part of the present chapter I describe, in a nutshell, aspects of the discussion of truth in Western philosophy that lead to the concept's psychological definition. In the second part, I review the evolution of truth in psychoanalytic thought. In the third part, drawing on the psychoanalytic and philosophic discussions, I offer a definition of truth as an active principle of the mind, rooted in basic needs and driving processes of repression and dissociation.

Part 1: Situating Truth in a Psychological Framework

Intuitively, truth *should be* self-evident and One. Yet the tensions aroused by truth as a question were already evident in ancient Greek philosophy, with Plato's eternal and objective 'idea' (Plato 380 BC/1871) – I call this 'Ideal truth' – pitted against the subjectivism implied in Protagoras's dictum that "man is the measure of all things".¹ Aristotle's 'substances' (Aristotle 350 BC/1953) in the framework of realistic epistemology offered an alternative, sense-based, anchorage for objective truth that came to be called 'Correspondent truth'.

Kant and Hegel, introducing the ideas of phenomena and ongoing dialectic, challenged the possibility of an absolute truth. They paved the way to the *linguistic turn*, which positioned meaning, conceptual and symbolic schemes as prior to fact (Habermas 2003), thus further challenging our ability to know objective reality or even define its basic characteristics (Russell 1961).

And yet, the linguistic turn did not end in a stoic relinquishing of ‘truth’ as a basic constituent of the mind’s work. Indeed, latter-day thinkers, for whom the linguistic turn was pivotal, *also continued to debate the concept of truth and show its complex nature in novel ways* (Rorty 1989). Even in the face of the wide range of epistemological, logical and ethical arguments, the quest for truth continued, defining and re-defining its status and method, taking into account its problematic nature and criticizing earlier arguments.

The vital continuing search for truth begs the question of its intractability. What drives this search? What are its origins? *The history of philosophical thought suggests that the answer to this question is clearly of a psychological nature*: human beings have a need for certainty, security, control and the elimination of doubt. Nietzsche’s (1886/2009) critique of metaphysics is accepted as a prime modern origin of the line of thought that led to the dismantling of our naïve belief in metaphysics inasmuch as it aspires for absolute truth on the one hand and explores the immense human attachment to absolute truth on the other.

In Nietzsche’s view, the quest for truth is driven by our fears. When we aim for objectivity, we buy ourselves stability and direction, but we sacrifice our integrity and the vitality of our thought (Nietzsche 1886/2009, cl. 10). The ‘Will to Truth’ is characteristic of a more general psychological tendency for self-deception. Man lacks the courage and integrity needed to contain his natural curiosity (*ibid.*, cl. 227). Humanity, ever attached to a thoroughly flawed idea called ‘truth’, actively represses its creativity and life forces.

The American Pragmatic view, influenced by Nietzsche’s thought, posited that the concern of truth was to advance the welfare of the individual. Thinkers such as Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, John Dewey and Richard Rorty saw truth as a means to an end of improving humanity’s lot (James 1907/2004; Rorty 1989). On the other side of the ocean, Heidegger (1996) saw truth as reflecting man’s need to control the world in general and death in particular. Levinas (1969) and Derrida (1978) both associated metaphysics with violence, seeing truth as a result and paradigmatic example of an illusory purity that man tried to place as a guarantee of his identity and superiority, with the result of a looming xenophobia. The postmodern critique was formulated: generalization, categorization and truth are forms of symbolic violence the subject imposes on the objects of her thought.

Notwithstanding the differences in content, all of the above views suggest that the pertinence of truth is of a psychological nature: Human beings have a need for certainty, constancy and mental control. Contrary to naïve intuition, and many philosophical positions, this implies that what *truth satisfies are not states of affairs, but rather states of mind*. If until now the search for truth involved three orders – reality, propositions and the constraints of human consciousness – we now add a fourth order: that of the psychological needs of the subject-as-thinker.

These needs preserve the concept of truth, allowing it to rise like a phoenix from the ashes of discarded modern thought, retaining its traditional definitions and granting it contemporary meanings. Alongside the two essentialist truths – the ‘Ideal’ truth and the truth of correspondence with reality (‘Correspondent’ truth), both of which claim the existence of an order independent of consciousness – four additional conceptions of truth, which, in Hempel’s words, entailed an “essential softening of the truth” (Hempel 1935/1994), remain vital in philosophic thought. I refer to these conceptions as Coherent, Intersubjective, Pragmatic and Subjective-Existential truths. I present here briefly these paradigmatic notions of truth, for clarity denoting them with capital letters (Ideal, Correspondent, etc.).²

The Correspondent conception of truth, introduced by Aristotle (Aristotle 350 BC/1953), maintains that truth values are established by correspondence between a proposition and an external mind-independent fact. Correspondent truth is anchored in a realistic epistemology,

which maintains that the world has a mind-independent existence that the subject is able to know by means of his senses (Hetherington 2012).

The Coherent conception of truth as, for example, in Spinoza's thinking (Spinoza 1677/1989), determines truth values by examining the compatibility of a belief with a whole system of beliefs. This truth is often associated with 'idealistic' epistemology that posits a single, abstract and unconditional principle, unknown in itself, yet determining the unity of the world (Hetherington 2012).

The Ideal conception of truth, as in Plato's thought (Plato 380 BC/1871), determines truth values by the compatibility between particular beliefs or empirically perceived cases and their corresponding eternal decrees or forms. It is situated in the realm of 'objective idealism' that claims the existence of a mind-independent order inaccessible to the senses and partially known by means of laborious mental processes (Russell 1961).

Subjective Idealism shares the premise of absolute and objective idealism, that all known reality resides within the mind. But whereas the latter assumes a principle external to the system that creates and unifies it, the former assumes the 'I' or the Ego as the constituting source of reality. Subjective and Intersubjective truths are embedded in the assumptions of subjective idealism (Orange et al. 1998).

The Subjective-Existential conception of truth, seeds of which can be found in the work of Kierkegaard, perceives truth as highly personal, embodying the subject's experienced authenticity. Here, experience is prior to any essence or generalization (Elleray 2007).

The Intersubjective conception of truth regards objectivity as established by interpersonal agreement, sometimes explicit, often implicit. This truth reflects the logic of intersubjective epistemologies, whereby the world achieves its true transcendence through the presence of a foreign subjectivity (Husserl 1983).

Pragmatic truth concerns the usefulness and practicality of an idea in the context of the believer's life. A true belief is one that has been proven valid by the compatibility between its predictions and its results. Here, truth is process based and tomorrow, today's truth may be no more than an opinion (James 1912/2010, 1907/2004).

Part 2: Epistemology and Truth in Psychoanalytic Theory and Discourse

Psychoanalysis joined truth's odyssey at its modern apex, and has maintained with it a complex relationship, characterized by frequent vicissitudes. Psychoanalysis was born into one truth, the scientific or the Correspondent theory of truth. For Freud this truth was there to anchor psychoanalysis' standing as a science and to supply a rationale for clinical psychotherapy. In *The Question of a Weltanschauung* (1933), upholding Aristotle's concept of truth, Freud leaves no doubt as to which path psychoanalysis should follow: "Scientific thinking[?]" he states, "endeavour is to arrive at correspondence with reality. . . . This correspondence with the real external world we call 'truth'" (Freud 1933, 169).³ The separateness of the external and internal worlds has always been a cornerstone of the Freudian theory of pathology and development as in meta-theoretical assumptions. The Freudian infant gradually and painfully moves from an internal world of wish fulfilment to a frustrating grasp of external (yet sustaining) reality, transforming an early 'pleasure-ego' into a 'reality-ego' (Freud 1911). The areas where the delineation of external and internal fails are those of neurosis and psychosis, and it is there that the subject, due to lapses in reality testing, loses hold of his Correspondent truth and allows Subjective-Existential truths to prevail. The latter is based on correspondence to psychic reality and the former on correspondence to external reality.

In this view, truth that critically relies on internal reality is the hallmark of neurosis and needs to give way, by means of the analyst's interpretations, to Correspondent truth. The *analyst* remains

able to differentiate between the external and the internal truths even when his patient cannot. In the form they take in the Realistic–Correspondent meta-theory, both truths (Correspondent and Subjective–Existential) *are found or revealed; they are neither constructed nor co-constructed*.

The Kleinian infant, like the Freudian one, begins life in a reality that is wholly phantasmatic and internal (Klein 1930, 1932). Gradually, through such mechanisms as splitting, projection, introjections and identification, the differentiation of internal and external worlds evolves. Klein's concept of 'position' implied the ability to move *in* and *out* of depressive reality-testing. Winnicott's move from the experiential realm of 'relating' to 'usage' (1969/1971) reflects the same sensibilities as regards the delineation of inner and outer realities. Yet, Winnicott is the first to define as an autonomous entity the transitional realm as that which stands *between* the inner and the outer realities (Winnicott 1951). Winnicott's third area of intermediateness collapses the internal-external/subject-object divide that is inherent in the notion of Correspondence.⁴ In this sense he is effecting an epistemological shift, *but only within this third area of experience*. Outside of it, we may still make clear the differentiation of realistic epistemology between inner and outer, psychic and external reality.

Whereas Winnicott maintains the traditional dualism of world and self, *values begin a movement of reversal*, because the inner 'true' is valued more highly than before. The transitional realm is understood as the source of meaning, subjectivity and culture, and its constitution and analysis become the main focus and interest of psychoanalysis. Here, Winnicott distances himself from the classical notion of pre-existent truths and forms a new understanding of knowledge as a process of becoming. Freud wanted Ego where there was Id. Winnicott, endowing the Id with the respected adjective of 'true', offers it vindication. Winnicott's chaperoning of Subjective–Existential truth and the transitional realm he created might well have played a part in the gradual legitimation of idealistic trends in psychoanalysis.

Kohut's self-psychology positioned itself in a similar manner. The self-psychologist validates the patient's concept of reality even if it conflicts with the 'objective' reality the therapist is familiar with (Kohut 1984). The core area of psychoanalytic metapsychology occupies, for Kohut, an imaginary position inside the psychic organization of the individual, the position of an observer with whose insights the analyst vicariously identifies through the process of empathy. And yet, the point that remains valid in Kohut's thought, as in the thought of his predecessors, is that inner and outer realities may be delineated by the *analyst*. The analyst strives to fortify the patient's subjectivity and its truths, but he does this without losing the clarity of his hold on the distinction between psychical and material realities.⁵

The first radical shift in object relation theory from realism to idealism may be attributed to Bion, who delved deeply into issues of knowledge and truth. The following brief review will not do justice to his complex ideas, but may illustrate their part in effecting the idealistic shift. With the use of 'O' and 'K', respectively denoting truth and knowledge, Bion articulates his late theory of knowledge: "O . . . the ultimate reality, represented by terms such as absolute truth, the godhead, the infinite, the thing-in-itself . . . does not fall in the domain of knowledge or learning save incidentally; O can 'become', but it cannot be 'known'" (Bion 1970, 25). For Bion, there is no convergence between K and O. This is because K is basically sense-based, while O is not (Bion 1970, 87). Therefore, the psychoanalytic and the scientific truths (and realities) are fundamentally different from each other. Psychoanalysis must be "a science that is not restricted by its genesis in knowledge and sensuous background. It must be a science of at-one-ment" (ibid. 88).

Only by means of 'at-one-ment' may O be touched upon and approached. At-one-ment is a way of being or becoming which is not only different from knowledge, but is indeed, obstructed by it. Near-O states, predicated on the departure from K, involve risking the loss of

both meaning and the continuity of consciousness. And yet, the event of ‘Becoming O’ gives rise to psychic change. The subject is forced first to abandon K, hitherto fundamental in his consciousness, and then to return to it in order to bind the inchoate experience (Bion 1965, 151). The transformation effected is an emotional learning that is always mediated in an intersubjective fashion, predicated on the interaction between container and contained that transforms the indigestible into the thinkable.

The relevant truth and reality for psychoanalysis (O in Bion’s case) can be experienced but cannot be known. Here the downfall of realistic epistemology, which is predicated on the assumption of a knowable reality. The method and criterion of O’s appropriation are completely subjective and experiential. Finally, accessing any knowledge involves an intersubjective event; therefore, knowledge is necessarily infused with subjectivity and validated by it. These formulations may be viewed as ‘stepping stones’ in the river of psychoanalytic thought, marking the gradual transition from realistic to idealistic epistemology.

From a different direction, and by reference to Coherent and Pragmatic truths, Spence and Schafer did their part in effecting the epistemic shift in psychoanalysis.⁶ Spence extended the purview of the Pragmatic approach in psychoanalysis, claiming that practitioners place the individual subject at the center of the psychoanalytic world and, as such, his wellbeing forms the criteria for truth. Spence described the therapeutic efficacy of narrative (Coherent) and Pragmatic truths,⁷ but objected to accepting them as adequate substitutions for historic (Correspondent) truth. He warns that “microstructure analysis . . . may be our only defense against the perils of narrative persuasion” (Spence 1983, 480) and advocates a return to the bedrock of realistic epistemology. In contradistinction, Schafer, basing his theory on these same Coherent and Pragmatic truths, demotes Correspondent truth from the privileged status Spence granted it. The basic assumption of what came to be called the ‘Narrative Approach’ is that people construct stories of their lives in order to better understand them. The narrative rendered is always provisional, admitting potential retellings: “This point of view does not deny truth. There is plenty of truth. It is just that truth comes in different versions. It always has. In this regard, the entire matter may be formulated as one of giving up denials” (Schafer 1996, 250).

Two epistemological shifts are here effected. Firstly, we part from the realm of realism and of biographical, Correspondent truth. Secondly, we relinquish monistic epistemologies in favour of parallel, potentially incongruent truths. Thus, Pragmatic, Subjective and Intersubjective epistemologies accept that several truths may be pertinent to a particular subject, when mental materials are contextualized in different areas and phases of a person’s life. This means that psychic realities do not lend themselves to unitary formulation.

The narrative approach leans heavily on Coherent truth. Yet, in the psychoanalytic context, it carries also a significant element of intersubjectivity inasmuch as the analyst, even only in the role of supplying the context and the legitimation of the telling, plays a role in the constitution of the patient’s narrative. Acknowledging the analyst’s influence in the evolving truth, we draw closer to the basic premise of intersubjective epistemology: a person attains his sense of certainty about objective reality through the agency of an ‘other’. According to this approach, the reality and truth that psychoanalysis achieves are mutually constructed through the organization of experience within an intersubjective field of reference (Stolorow et al. 2001). Here, observer and observed, analyst and analysand, are inextricably involved, mutually and reciprocally determining themselves and their reality (Stolorow and Atwood 1997).

Different versions of the psychoanalytic understanding of reality have developed under the heading of subjectivist and intersubjectivist approaches, the common factor among them being the disbelief in the existence of one well-circumscribed objective reality.⁸ Here, the task of the analytic dialogue shifts from a classical concern with interpreting reality of any kind to an interest

in the process by which analyst and patient create and shape an impact on the other through the play of mutual influences.

The Relations of Truth and Epistemology, Values and Multiplicity

Looked at from a psychoanalytic perspective, epistemology and truth are not one and the same, but they are interrelated. The former defines the process and premises whereby and according to which belief transforms into knowledge, while the latter refers to an adequate description of a particular state of affairs. Now, *each epistemology has a notion of truth that it naturally gives rise to*. Thus, realistic epistemology, as applies to Freud's unconscious, is the natural home of Correspondent truth. Objective idealism, in which Bion's O resides, retains the possibility of objective truth but recognizes that the road leading to it is imbued with experiential subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Subjective epistemology privileges subjectivity as a realm where beliefs are validated and therefore promotes a Subjective-Existential truth. In Intersubjective epistemology, intersubjectivity (as a principle of truth, culture or language) is a precondition for subjectivity and precedes it logically and epistemologically. Therefore, subjective truths will always be coloured by the intersubjective and, in a way, subordinated to it.

Each epistemology, alongside its privileged truth, *also accommodates other truths, but values them differently*. For example, Coherent truth is a pivotal and valid possibility in idealist epistemologies but, within a realistic perspective, it will be considered as narrative. Similarly, the experience of Correspondence for a subjective epistemologist is, of course, an illusion. This has important implications for psychoanalysis and for the general understanding of the subject in his relation to truth. Subjective truths have been given recognition from the early days of Freud, but they were regarded as neurotic symptoms: mental health was asymptotic to objective truth. By contrast, Kohut and Winnicott acknowledged Correspondent truth but *privileged* Subjective-Existential truth as expressing the core essence of being human, as well as the vehicle of personal development and of therapeutic effect. Spence acknowledged Pragmatic truth but warned of its destructive effect on clinical methodology and objectives. Epistemologies may *recognize* various truths, but they favour the truth that is primary to them.

Another way in which psychoanalytic theories incorporate different truths (and determine their value and function in psychic life) is by means of their anchoring in different psychic structures. In Freudian theory, for example, Intersubjective truth appears as constitutive of the superego because, as a personality structure, the superego embodies socialization, a function mediated by parental agents. Intersubjective truths, internalized as personality structures, are often depicted as being in conflict with other truths, internalized in different structures: Subjective-Existential truth, for example, is anchored in Freud's Id or Winnicott's True self. Freud privileges the vitality of Correspondence as expressed in reality testing (Freud 1923). Winnicott, of course, believing in the True self and its spontaneous, body-based creativity, might find the reign of Correspondence restrictive, rendering emotional life poorer (Winnicott 1960).

A similar picture can be observed regarding Ideal truths. In certain psychoanalytic theories of personality, the Ideal truth appears as a psychic structure such as Freud's ideal ego (Freud 1914, 93).⁹ In Kohut and Wolf (1978) theory, the *ideal* appears in various forms, especially that part of the self that ties up meanings with motivational force. By and large, most psychoanalysts would agree that ideals are often experienced as truths by patients. However, differences abound regarding their therapeutic use by analysts. Kohut's belief that a life bereft of ideal truth is barren (*ibid.*, 420) translates into the recommendation that analysts should offer themselves to their patients as ideal objects.¹⁰ Kleinians, on the other hand, find fault in the acceptance of ideals as truth, suggesting the influence of splitting as a defence against aggression (Klein 1932). Benjamin contends

that the analyst who poses *an* ideal or *as* an ideal might seriously compromise the inquiry of the patient's experiences of lack, weakness and damage (Benjamin 1994).

Similar considerations apply to the analytic use of the Coherent–narrative truth. Whereas for Schafer (1996) Coherent truth is a condition of communication and knowability and supplies solid structure for formulating and enhancing identity, Levenson (1988) and Laplanche (2008) speak of narrative structures as defensive by definition: they translate the inchoate mental richness of the unconscious into congealed ego language. Laplanche (*ibid.*) stresses the importance of de-translation as a processes that decomposes the coagulated truths of the ego and allows greater flexibility.

What is clear from these short illustrations is that different psychoanalytic schools acknowledge the different truths that both reflect and influence mental life. However, they ascribe their value differently, often as dictated by their epistemological convictions, and interpret differently the processes that are set in motion when pursuing a particular truth. From the vantage point of the Ideal truth, Pragmatic truth may seem inferior. The reverse may hold as well, when Ideal truths are understood as defence against action, freedom and personal responsibility.

As stated above, traditional psychoanalytic discussions of epistemology attest to the ‘correctness’ of a particular epistemology as a framework for psychoanalysis, while arguing that other epistemological approaches are erroneous and may even endanger psychoanalytic practice (a review of these detailed discussions may be found in Yadlin–Gadot 2016). Alongside this traditional approach, there is a line of work in psychoanalysis that may be identified as accepting the phenomenon of multiple epistemologies. Here, the plurality of epistemologies is grasped as an integral characteristic of mental life. The different images of reality that manifest themselves through the various epistemologies are seen as inherent to the interpretative construction of the world. Thus, no single structure renders other structures redundant, but rather relies on the way in which the other perspectives ‘capture’ different aspects of mental life (Schafer 1995; Rosegrant 2010; Schermer 2011). In these formulations, truth, indeed ‘reality’, are no longer conceived of as existing ‘out there’ in the world, but rather as constituted by our epistemic and symbolic construals of the world, construals motivated by the demands of the psyche. Here, the psychoanalytic subject, indeed psychoanalysis itself, exist in a realm of multiple truths

The co-existence of paradigmatic notions of truth are naturally and unfailingly present, not only in theory, but in the experiential life of the subject both outside and inside the clinic. Patients and therapists constantly use the concept of truth and its derivatives. Thus, we can easily imagine a patient saying: “I felt that something real was happening to me in therapy”, which expresses a Subjective truth. Similarly, in saying “Nothing I can do about it . . . it’s the truth”, the patient expresses a sense of discontent in relation to considerations regarding the externality of Correspondent truth. Occasionally, a patient may pit one truth against another, as in “Perhaps it’s right, but it’s not my experience, to me it doesn’t ring true”. Here, a Correspondent truth is set against a Subjective truth. To further demonstrate the scope of possibilities here, consider a patient saying “That’s true, but so what?” Here the patient agrees that the therapist’s description of some situation or other matches reality, but for him the statement doesn’t offer a way forward; it has no Pragmatic truth value. “I may be like that, but this is not how I want to be”. Here the patient’s Ideal truth comes injured from an attack set by the Correspondent truth. “My friends think it is best for me to leave the job, but as far as I’m concerned, it’s a betrayal of my principles”. The Intersubjective truth here clashes with the Ideal truth. Such statements, whose basis may be Intersubjective, Correspondent or Ideal, negotiate among themselves and express different positionings of the self. In each of them, the speaking subject aligns himself with one truth or another and this alignment effectively defines his self-positioning.

The therapist is attentive, even if not consciously, to various kinds of truth. While he listens, he automatically and unconsciously considers a number of possible meanings to what he hears: he examines what the patient is referring to in the world around him; at the same time, he scrutinizes the internal coherence of what is being said in relation to the speaker and in relation to what is understood to be his inner world. The therapist compares this inner world with the world as he experiences it and understands what he is being told according to the relevant social contexts. He hears the various elements of the evolving narrative and, of course, experiences the meaning of the verbal message in terms of the impact of what is being said and the intentions he thinks gave rise to it. This rapid, complex, unconscious action of the therapist reflects features of communication and of the human mind as depicted in the different truth notions. The multiplicity of ‘truth’ and ‘reality’, as it appears here, illustrates the fact that, rather than trying to decide between different notions of truth, we relate to them as different perspectives that organize elements of perception, emotion and thought in distinct and paradigmatic forms.

Part 3: Truth as Organizing Principles of Mind

The thesis I offer here accepts epistemic multiplicity as its point of departure, and explains its inevitability in psychic existence in terms of basic needs. Nietzsche underlined the interpretative role human needs carry in relation to our construals of reality, also stressing their potential tyranny: “It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their ‘For’ and ‘Against’. Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that it would like to compel all the other drives to accept as a norm” (Nietzsche 1888/1968, cl. 481).

This point, whereby the world is construed in accordance with our needs, is a nodal one. We create the realities we need. But as we have various needs we form various images of reality in accordance with them. Thus, we remain with different realities and different truths. In addition, every need has a ‘lust to rule’; it craves exclusivity and aspires to an unshifting image of reality, the comfort of a single truth. Nevertheless, all needs continue with their ‘interpretations’ of the world, creating images of reality and truth that do not necessarily overlap or cohere. Each image of reality captures a possible, yet incomplete, aspect of experience, its organic truth serving as a point of certainty within it.

The philosopher and psychoanalyst Fiumara described reality’s constitution:

speaking of reality. . . . we are not referring to the world in itself . . . but rather to the sort of reality which the individual laboriously carves out . . . a construct negotiated within the limits of what may be thought and done within his symbolic horizon. . . . Before we decide to inhabit a specific epistemology. . . . we may have gone through several epistemological migration.

(1992, 3, 8)

My basic contention is that we do *not* decide in which epistemology to dwell. Rather, our basic psychological needs determine our multiple existence within several epistemologically defined realities. Different truths govern our lives: we are realistic inasmuch as our truth corresponds to what we perceive as facts. We hold Subjective truth in believing in what we feel. We accord with Intersubjective truths, be they myth or decrees, often unaware that they are rooted in interpersonal agreements. We consider and act upon our Ideal truths, grounded in our principles and ethics. Similarly, foreseeing practical implications of our decisions, we give prevalence to pragmatic truths. All serve as mental guidelines; all are experienced as truths. All may be traced to recurring philosophical arguments.

In this vein, I discuss the paradigmatic truths described as organizing principles of the mind that satisfy the psyche's need for stability and certainty across critical dimensions of the subject's life. I suggest that all these truths, in different forms and ratios, are present in the mental space of every person, answering to different needs and dimensions of living. Each truth functions as an *organizational principle of psyche that provides for a deep emotional need which motivates its formulation*. Let me briefly sketch these needs.

At the root of the *Correspondent truth* is the need to be in touch with external reality so as to enhance the chances of survival, through explaining, responding to and anticipating events that influence the exchanges between man and what is perceived as the mind-independent world around him.

At the root of the *Coherent truth* is the need for compatibility and harmony among a person's beliefs, expectations and behavioural tendencies. Coherence allows the smooth transition among the various activities that the subject is engaged with, as well as among different fields of knowledge and different experiences. This, in turn, allows the individual to create a sense of identity, continuity and regularity across time.

Man's need for perfection and completeness, for that which bestows guidance, meaning and validity to daily life and allows overcoming the repulsive, the abhorred and the arbitrary, is at the root of the *Ideal truth*. Ideal truths give man a sense of the eternal, of harmony and beauty on the macro level, serving as both directives and sources of motivation.

The *Subjective-Existential truth* arises in the subject's need to be loyal to *himself*, to be positioned at center stage as a criterion for planning his life and determining meaning without subordinating himself to a universal concept of subject or truth. This axis of truth also embodies acutely bodily sensitivity and experience.

The organization of experience in terms of future benefit is the basis for *Pragmatic truth*. This axis addresses the need to feel effective in one's ability to achieve one's goals in the world. It embodies active agency and overcomes the experience of helplessness and inevitability. It differentiates between forward and backward in a person's life and allows a sense of progress or regress as time goes by.

At the root of the *Intersubjective truth* is the profound need for a connection with those around us and a shared reality with them. This truth is predicated upon the representation of the psychoanalytic object and the ability of the subject to cohere with the inner dynamics of this representation. But the axis also generalizes the need for a singular object to the gratifying experience of belonging and cohering with a whole social field.

These *different* needs drive the creation of various images of the world, each related to a different experienced reality. The Correspondent truth axis creates a 'factual' reality enabling us to negotiate the mind-independent reality around us. In this reality we rely heavily on sense information, observe and try to master the realistic constraints in which we live our lives. The Coherent truth axis produces for us a cohesive and consistent reality at the level of both personal identity and perceived externality. This axis often functions to downplay the significance of facts and tendencies that do not cohere with one's core beliefs about self and world. The Ideal truth axis embodies a reality to which we aspire and in which we believe. It exists within us and at times outside of us. We move toward its realization in many things we do and find guidance within it. The Pragmatic truth axis creates an image of reality that accommodates our objectives and interests. Here, we may plan and decide in ways that determine what may best enhance our well-being. We exist within it as active, initiating agents. The Subjective-Existential truth axis produces a person's subjective-authentic image of reality, containing his private, often hidden truths; finally, the Intersubjective truth axis creates the reality we share with those around us.

Since truth axes differ in the needs to which they answer and the realities they create, they also differ in the relationships between need and reality, namely, in their world experience. Recurring patterns of world experience create different states of self in the form of balancing mechanisms (Bromberg 2009; Mitchell 1991; Rowan 2010). The various states of the self are not perceived here as sporadic, infinite or situational, which is the accepted position of many relational and post-modern writers (e.g., Bromberg 2009; Gubrium and Holstein 1994; Rowan 2010). Rather, the different self-states are understood as subject to general alignments that correspond to the different truth axes, alignments that are universal and may be defined and described. The vulnerable subjective self of inner truths, to which experiences of shame, exposure and fear of annihilation are linked, differs from the matter of fact, realistic self of the correspondent axis. The self of the intersubjective axis is the one supported by agreement of its community, or lost within it, the one experiencing anxieties of alienation and questions of belongingness. The self that scrutinizes itself against its ideals and senses either guilt or satisfaction is once again a self that differs from the pragmatic one that aims to calculate and understand the ways reality could benefit it.

The complex of epistemic assumption, characteristic self-state, image of reality and experienced truth form together a truth axis. In that sense, a truth axis is a multi-dimensional mental domain. The various truth axes exist in the psychic space of every person in different forms and degrees of dominance. Each person may have one or two dominant axes, whose relation to other axes may vary considerably. One person may be more responsive to ideals, while another responds to the people around him and allows them to determine his aspirations, fears and wishes. This person will probably experience a sense of belonging and creativity when he is part of an establishment, while another person will only experience self-worth when he is guided predominantly by his inner truths. Every organizing axis can have constructive or pathological expressions but, in both cases, the underlying logic of truth will be apparent. Of course, a person does not always respond to events with the same logic of truth. Different contexts arousing different needs may activate one or another of the axes at particular times. Usually, one lives according to directives of various different truth axes simultaneously. Life, as we experience it, eclipses any one register, and is perpetually given in multiple significations.

Conclusion and Clinical Implications

The thesis presented in this chapter touches on metaphysical, epistemological and meta-psychological issues. Despite the seeming complexity of these issues, I have attempted to explicate what is, in fact, a common feature of the human mind: epistemic multiplicity, as given in the mental and emotional experiencing of several unrelenting and often conflicting truths. Presenting paradigmatic notions of truth formulated in philosophic thought, I have tried to illuminate that, in the domain of truth, as in other subject-relevant domains, the individual subject recapitulates the path of the historic subject. The abstract notions of truth formulated in philosophic thought reflect the particular subject's search for stability and constancy across the critical dimensions of her life. The differential motivations driving truth's psychic creation serve to explain truth's intractability on the one hand, and its multiplicity on the other.

I have shown that as clinicians, we are intuitively tuned to our patient's various truths, constantly listening to what hasn't been said alongside what *is* being said. We are attentive, even if not consciously, to *various kinds* of truth. While listening to the information we are given, we attune to accounts, variations and meanings that are present in different ways in the analytic space, tapping different levels of awareness. When an analyst's conscious observation is directed through the prism of a certain epistemology – be it subjective, realistic or intersubjective,

presenting a specific understanding of a particular object of analysis – it seems safe to say that he, in tandem, intuitively considers the totality of possible epistemologies and evaluates them for compatibilities, overlaps, conflicts or tensions. This rapid, complex, unconscious action of the therapist reflects features of communication and of the human mind as depicted in the different truth notions. The concept of the truth axes is, in a way, a formalization and articulation of part of our intuitive movements as therapists and our intuitive understanding of the complexity of human experience.

From the perspective I present here, each psychoanalytic theory may be viewed as focused on one or two truths or epistemologies, creating a deep analysis of their evolution, from the level of need to the level of health, pathology and therapeutic objectives. From this vantage point, the different psychoanalytic theories are not seen as competing, but as creating a theoretic arc that parallels the epistemic multiplicity of the mind.

The various psychic truths arise from different needs and express their associated dreads and desires. Their differential sources guarantee that they often do not cohere. We often see our patients battling among their conflicting truths, baffled by the different ways in which they experience one single event. The therapeutic objective here is not necessarily to resolve conflicts. In analysis, we can help our patients understand and articulate the different realities they inhabit. While doing so, we will discover and articulate the tensions and the difficulties that arise from the different intersections, tensions, contradictions and incompatibilities among these realities.

We grant legitimacy to the various truths, admitting that life is too complex to be accounted for by one reality alone. We avoid re-traumatization of our patients who, in the past, may have had their Subjective–Existential truths banned, their actual experiences ignored, their Pragmatic truths dismissed on moral grounds, their Ideal truths scoffed at, and so on. We learn the Inter-subjective truths that shaped our patients’ sensibilities and probably co-construct with them some new ones. We may allow patients to know, acknowledge and articulate the multi-dimensionality of their living and its discontents. Thus, the patient can better inquire into the range of meanings and truths in his world by overcoming or circumventing the compulsion to determine particular meanings with which he identifies and which he may keep repeating.

Acknowledging that all truth axes express basic needs and are determined by them draws together the dimensions of the therapeutic and the ethic. The analyst is not expected to be neutral in his relation to the different languages, to equally identify with them or to be devoid of natural preferences and tendencies. His challenge consists in being aware of these tendencies and their significance (Hoffman 2009). Thus, the value-laden character of our practice and its prioritization of psychic needs are acknowledged. From this perspective, analytic work may be construed as creating a space that may contain various versions of world, self and experience, acknowledging and recognizing their validity, though they often do not cohere. At its best, this dialogue holds the potential of unravelling dynamics of dissociation and denial, allowing the experience of possibility and choice, in place of restriction and inevitability.

Notes

- 1 As quoted in Plato’s ‘Theaetetus’, <http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/theatu.html>.
- 2 Four of these notions appear most frequently in contemporary theory, both philosophical and psychoanalytic. These are the Correspondent, Coherent, Intersubjective and Pragmatic notions of truth (Hanly 1990, 2001; Kunne 2003; Lynch 2001). To these I add one classical notion, the Ideal truth, presented already by Plato. This truth is often considered obsolete outside religious context, but I will illuminate its enduring relevance in psychoanalytic theory and practice. I add also the Subjective-Existential truth, which appears in explicit and implicit ways in psychoanalytic theory and practice, reflecting its immense influence on psychic life. A detailed account of the way these truths are delineated and placed

- in theoretic dialectic with further definitions, including deflationary theories of truth, appears in Yadlin-Gadot (2016).
- 3 He repudiates ‘the anarchist theory’ which argues that the criterion for truth – correspondence with the external world – is absent in the psychoanalytic method. Freud criticizes such a view on the ground that “it breaks down with its first step into practical life” (Freud 1933, 175).
 - 4 Winnicott’s concept of *psyche-soma* echoes the same sensibilities. Whereas in binary ontology the psyche and soma fall into the respective categories of inner and outer, for Winnicott this division is a distortion, similar to the one eventuating in a dominant false self that takes over space and functions from the true self (Winnicott 1949).
 - 5 I am presenting here my analysis of Kohut’s epistemology. Others, such as Gedo, situate him in a phenomenological-subjective epistemology, stating that “Kohut (1977, 1984; Kohut and Wolf 1978) and his followers . . . have founded a school of psychoanalytic thought conforming to the principle that our theories should be as near to personal experience as possible. As a result, the propositions of self-psychology deal only with issues that can be articulated in the language of subjectivity” (Gedo 1997, 782). Fosshage also perceives Kohut as updating psychoanalytic epistemology by means of the method of observation he introduced into the clinic. Kohut (1982) recognized “the relativity of our perceptions of reality”, “the framework of ordering concepts that shape our observations and explanations” (ibid. 400), and that “the field that is observed, of necessity, includes the observer” (Kohut 1984, 41). Deeming the patient’s subjectivity the principal focus of the analytic endeavor, Kohut (1959, 1982) delineated how our method of observation relies on empathy and vicarious introspection, what he called the “empathic mode of observation”, and designated it the method by which the field of psychoanalysis itself is defined (Kohut 1977; Fosshage 2011, 140). Thus, when all is filtered through the analyst’s subjective processing, epistemology transforms into the subjective-phenomenal.
 - 6 As with many contemporary ideas, both referenced Freud in the development of their thinking. In 1937 Freud’s states that “an assured conviction of the truth of [the] construction . . . achieves the same therapeutic result as a recaptured memory” (Freud 1937, 265). Freud engages here two notions of truth: the Coherent truth, appertaining to the fit between a newly formed construction and earlier conceptions held by the patient (‘assured conviction’); and the Pragmatic truth, in which the construction is examined according to its therapeutic consequences (‘the same therapeutic results’). Freud forms here a new equation between the practical implications of a belief and its presumed objective truth-value.
 - 7 Spence gives here a detailed definition of what he terms narrative truth and of its constitution: “To the extent that a narrative is persuasive and compelling, it acquires features of what might be called *narrative truth*. Goodness of fit seems particularly significant in bringing about this change. A particular clinical event – an association, for example, or a partly-recovered memory – may seem to clarify the unfolding account of the patient’s life history so precisely that both patient and analyst come to the conclusion that it *must* be true . . . under these conditions, narrative fit is usually taken to be conclusive, and if a piece of the past completes the unfinished clinical picture in just the right way . . . then it acquires its own truth value and no further checking is necessary. Many of Freud’s constructions seem to have followed this path. What was originally hypothetical and problematic, possessing no known truth value, turns out to bring together pieces of the patient’s life story which, up to that point, had seemed disconnected and even contradictory. The construction that began as a contribution to the coherence of the narrative . . . gradually comes to acquire truth value in its own right and is assumed to satisfy the criteria of accuracy. . . . As soon as that step is taken, the *construction* becomes a *reconstruction* – a piece of the past that is taken to be as real as the name of the patient’s father or the date of his birth” (Spence 1982, 181).
 - 8 Constructivist (Hoffman 1991), Hermeneutic (Bouchard 1995) and Perspectival Realism (Orange 1992; Orange et al. 1998) are examples of approaches in psychoanalysis that contend that human behaviour is not determined by reality, which cannot be known and therefore cannot be posited as existing in relations of causality, but by the constructions of human beings. These approaches vary in the degree to which they retain vestiges of realism. For a detailed discussion of the variations among these approaches, see Yadlin-Gadot (2016).
 - 9 In ‘Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego’ (1921), Freud again relates to the ego ideal as a configuration that is distinct from the ego and which enables the understanding of diverse phenomena in which the other is perceived as superior. This explains submission to hypnosis and to leadership, infatuation and admiration, etc., when according to Freud, the subject projects his ideal ego upon another person.
 - 10 The possibility of mitigating a persecutory superego through identification with the analyst as a benign, tolerant, auxiliary superego function was stressed early on by Strachey (1934).

References

- Aristotle (350 bc/1953). *Metaphysics*, 4:1. Translated by W. D. Ross. Accessed 23.7. 2019, source: <http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.4.iv.html>
- Benjamin, Jessica (1994). "Commentary on Papers by Tansey, Davies, and Hirsch". *Psychoanal. Dial.*, 4:193–201.
- Bion, Wilfred R. (1965). *Transformations*. London: Tavistock.
- (1970). *Attention and Interpretation: A Scientific Approach to Insight in Psycho-Analysis and Groups*. London: Tavistock.
- Bouchard, Marc-Andre (1995). "The Specificity of Hermeneutics in Psychoanalysis: Leaps on the Path from Construction to Recollection". *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 76:533–546.
- Bromberg, Philip M. (2009). "Truth, Human Relatedness, and the Analytic Process: An Interpersonal/Relational Perspective". *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 90:347–361.
- Cavell, M. (1983). *The Psychoanalytic Mind: From Freud to Philosophy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- (1998). "Triangulation, One's Own Mind and Objectivity". *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 79:449–467.
- Derrida, Jacques (1978). "Violence and Metaphysics". In *Writing and Difference*. Translated by A. Bass. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Fiumara, Gemma Corradi (1992). *The Symbolic Function*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Elleray, Rebecca (2007). "Kierkegaard, Socrates and Existential Individuality". *Richmond J Philos.*, 16:1–12.
- Fosshage, James L. (2011). "The Use and Impact of the Analyst's Subjectivity with Empathic and other Listening/Experiencing Perspectives". *Psychoanal. Q.*, 80:139–160.
- Freud, Sigmund (1911). *Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning*. SE 12, 213–227.
- (1914). *On Narcissism*. SE 14, 67–103.
- (1921). *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*. SE 18, 69–143.
- (1923). *The Ego and the Id*. SE 19, 3–48.
- (1933). *The Question of a Weltanschauung*. SE 22, 158–184.
- (1937). *Constructions in Analysis*. SE 23, 255–271.
- (1953–1974). *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*. Edited and translated by J. Strachey. London: Hogarth Press (in text reference: SE).
- Gedo, John E. (1997). "Reflections on Metapsychology, Theoretical Coherence, Hermeneutics, and Biology". *J. Amer. Psychoanal. Assn.*, 45:779–806.
- Gubrium, Jaber F, and Holstein, James A. (1994). "Grounding the Postmodern Self". *Sociol Q.*, 35(4):685–703.
- Habermas, Jürgen (2003). *Truth and Justification*. Translated by B. Fultner. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Hanly, Charles (1990). "The Concept of Truth in Psychoanalysis". In Hanly, C. (ed.) *The Problem of Truth in Applied Psychoanalysis*, pp. 1–24. New York: Guilford.
- (2001). "Critical Realism: Distinguishing the Psychological Subjectivity of the Analyst from Epistemological Subjectivism". *J. Amer. Psychoanal. Assn.*, 49:515–532.
- Heidegger, Martin (1996). *Being and Time*. Translated by J. Stambough. Albany: State University of New-York Press.
- Hempel, Carl G. (1935/1994). "On the Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth". In Horwich, P. (ed.) *Theories of Truth*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hetherington, Stephen (2012). *Epistemology: The Key Thinkers*. New York: Continuum International Publishing Group.
- Hoffman, Irwin Z. (1991). "Discussion: Toward a Social-Constructivist View of the Psychoanalytic Situation". *Psychoanal. Dial.*, 1:74–105.
- (2009). "Therapeutic Passion in the Countertransference". *Psychoanal. Dial.*, 19:617–637.
- Husserl, Edmund (1983). *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*. Translated by F. Kersten. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- James, William (1890/2013). *The Principles of Psychology*. eBooks@Adelaide. Accessed 5.8.2019, source: <http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/j/james/william/principles/>
- (1907/2004). *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking*. Project Gutenberg EBook. Accessed 5.8.2019, source: www.gutenberg.org/catalog/world/readfile?fk_files=3440524
- (1912/2010). *Essays in Radical Empiricism*. Project Gutenberg EBook. Accessed 5.8.2019, source: www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm
- Kant, Immanuel (1781/2013). "On External Objects". In *The Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated by J.M.D. Meiklejohn. Project Gutenberg EBook. Accessed 3.8.2019, source: www.gutenberg.org/files/4280/4280-h/4280-h.htm

- Klein, Melanie (1930). "The Importance of Symbol Formation in the Development of the Ego". In Klein, M. (1964). *Contributions to Psychoanalysis, 1921–1945*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- (1932). "The Psychoanalysis of Children". In Klein, M. (1964). *Contributions to Psychoanalysis, 1921–1945*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Kohut, Heinz (1959). "Introspection, Empathy, and Psychoanalysis". *J. Amer. Psychoanal. Assn.*, 7:459–483.
- (1977). *The Restoration of the Self*. New York: International Universities Press.
- (1982). "Introspection, Empathy, and the Semicircle of Mental Health". *Int. J. Psychoanal.*, 63:395–408.
- (1984). *How Does Analysis Cure?* Edited by A. Goldberg and P. Stepansky. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kohut, Heinz, and Wolf, Ernest (1978). "The Disorders of the Self and their Treatment: An Outline". *Int. J. Psychoanal.*, 59:413–425.
- Kuhn, Thomas (1962/1996). *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kunne, Wolfgang (2003). *Conceptions of Truth*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Laplanche, Jean (2008). "Narrativity and Hermeneutics: Some Propositions". *Psychoanal. Q.*, 77:1016–1018.
- Levenson, Edgar A. (1988). "The Pursuit of the Particular- On Psychoanalytic Inquiry". *Contemp. Psychoanal.*, 24:1–16.
- Levinas, Emmanuel (1969). *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*. Translated by A. Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.
- Lynch, Michael P. (2001). *The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Mitchell, Stephen A. (1991). "Contemporary Perspectives on Self: Toward an Integration". *Psychoanal. Dial.*, 1:121–147.
- Neisser, U. (1967). *Cognitive Psychology*. Englewood. Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- (1976). *Cognition and Reality*. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich (1886/2009). *Beyond Good and Evil*. Translated by Zimmern H. Project Gutenberg EBook. Accessed 5.6.2019, source: www.gutenberg.org/files/4363/4363-h/4363-h.htm
- (1888/1968). *The Will to Power*. Translated with commentary, W. Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books.
- Orange, Donna (1992). "Perspectival Realism and Social Constructivism: Commentary on Irwin Hoffman's 'Discussion: Toward a Social-Constructivist View of the Psychoanalytic Situation'". *Psychoanal. Dial.*, 2:561–565.
- Orange, D. M., Stolorow, Robert D., and Atwood, George E. (1998). "Hermeneutics, Intersubjectivity Theory, and Psychoanalysis". *J. Amer. Psychoanal. Assn.*, 46:568–571.
- Plato (380 bc/1871). *Republic*. Translated by B. Jowett. Accessed 23.7. 2019, source: <http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/theatu.html>. The Internet Classics Archive by Daniel C. Stevenson, Web Atomics.
- Rorty, Richard (1989). *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rosegrant, John (2010). "Three Psychoanalytic Realities". *Psychoanal. Psychol.*, 27:492–512.
- Rowan, John (2010). *Personification: Using the Dialogical Self in Psychotherapy and Counselling*. London: Routledge.
- Russell, Bertrand (1961). *History of Western Philosophy*. London: Routledge.
- Schafer, Roy (1995). "In The Wake of Heinz Hartmann". *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 76:223–235.
- (1996). "Authority, Evidence, and Knowledge in the Psychoanalytic Relationship". *Psychoanal. Q.*, 65:236–253.
- Schermer, Victor (2011). "Interpreting Psychoanalytic Interpretation: A Fourfold Perspective". *Psychoanal. Rev.*, 98:817–842.
- Spence, Donald P. (1982). *Narrative Truth and Historical Truth: Meaning and Interpretation in Psychoanalysis*. New York: Norton and Co.
- (1983). "Narrative Persuasion". *Psychoanal. Contemp. Thought*, 6:457–481.
- Spinoza, Baruch (1677/1989). *Ethics*. Translated by A. Boyle, Introduction and Notes by G.H.R. Parkinson. London: Everyman Classics.
- Stolorow, Robert D., and Atwood, George. (1997). "Deconstructing the Myth of the Neutral Analyst: An Alternative from Intersubjective Systems Theory". *Psychoanal. Q.*, 66:431–449.
- Stolorow, Robert D., Orange, Donna, and Atwood, George. (2001). "Cartesian and Post-Cartesian Trends in Relational Psychoanalysis". *Psychoanal. Psychol.*, 18:468–484.
- Strachey, J. (1934). "The Nature of the Therapeutic Action of Psycho-Analysis". *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 15:127–159.

- Summers, Frank. (2008). "Theoretical Insularity and the Crisis of Psychoanalysis". *J. Psychoanal. Psychology*, 25:413–424.
- Winnicott, Donald W. (1949). "Mind and its Relation to the Psyche-Soma". In Winnicott, D. W. (1975). *Through Pediatrics to Psychoanalysis*, pp. 245–255. London: Hogarth Press.
- (1951). "Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena". In Winnicott, D. W. (1975). *Through Pediatrics to Psychoanalysis*, pp. 229–243. London: The Hogarth Press.
- (1960). "Ego Distortion in Terms of True and False Self". In Winnicott, D. W. (1965). *The Maturation Processes and the Facilitating Environment: Studies in the Theory of Emotional Development*, pp. 140–153. London: The Hogarth Press.
- (1969/1971). "The Use of an Object and Relating through Identifications". In Winnicott, D.W. (1971). *Playing and Reality*, pp. 86–94. London: Tavistock.
- Yadlin-Gadot, Shlomit (2016). *Truth Matters: Theory and Practice in Psychoanalysis*. Leiden and Boston: Brill Publishers.
- (2017a). "Truth Axes and the Transformation of Self". *Psychoanal. Rev.*, 104(2):163–201.
- (2017b). "(E)Facing Truth: Between Philosophy and Psychoanalysis". *J. Theor. Philos. Psychol.*, 37(1):1–20.
- (2019). "Post-truth, Hegemonic Discourse and the Psychoanalytic Task of Decentering". *Psychoanal. Dialogues*, 29(2):172–188.