This article was downloaded by: *10.3.97.143*
On: 08 Dec 2023
Access details: *subscription number*
Publisher: *Routledge*
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK



Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict

Karl Cordell, Stefan Wolff

The nation-state

Publication details
https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203845493.ch4
Colin Clark
Published online on: 12 Oct 2010

How to cite :- Colin Clark. 12 Oct 2010, *The nation-state from:* Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict Routledge
Accessed on: 08 Dec 2023
https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203845493.ch4

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT

Full terms and conditions of use: https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms

This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 19:24 08 Dec 2023; For: 9780203845493, chapter4, 10.4324/9780203845493.ch4

4 The nation-state

Civic and ethnic dimensions

Colin Clark

> Nationalism is not a single beast. There are different varieties of nationalism. It can be well argued that some of the speeches by Conservative members – particularly those who regard themselves as Eurosceptic – are nationalistic. It seems that British nationalism is fine, but any other nationalism – Scottish, Welsh or Irish – is bad. That is not an acceptable distinction. If I were to draw such a distinction, it would be between ethnic nationalism, which is bad and should be rejected wherever it raises its ugly head, and civic nationalism, which is a good and progressive force that can be found all over the world spreading democracy and increasing the rights of ordinary people whatever their ethnic background. It is civic nationalism which is wound up in the Bill – a nationalism that gives the people who live in Scotland, no matter who they are, the same democratic rights as can be expected by people living in any other democratic society.
>
> (John McAllion, Hansard, 23 February 1998: column 134)

On 23 February 1998, during a debate in the House of Commons on the intricacies of the Scotland Bill, the Labour MP for Dundee East, Mr John McAllion, offered the above contribution in response to a suggestion by the Conservative MP for Woodspring, Dr Liam Fox, that certain devolutionary aspects within the Bill could trigger negative forms of 'residual English nationalism' and damage the nature of the Union holding Great Britain together. Of course, Fox's undue concerns were placed to the side and the Scotland Bill soon became an Act. In May 1999 the Scottish Parliament, located in Edinburgh, started up again for business, having last met in March 1707. The Scotland Act (1998) devolved all powers to the Edinburgh Parliament except those issues referred to as 'reserved matters' – and, indeed, it was a lengthy list, including constitutional affairs, foreign policy and immigration, and as such the Union was not about to crumble any time soon. In relation to this chapter on the civic and ethnic dimensions to the nation-state, McAllion's statement at Westminster gives us some indication of the lively, dichotomous debates that can occur when examining the many philosophical, geographical and political territories that nationalism can cover. It is also emblematic of the rather broad and sweeping statements that have been made in the respective names of both civic and ethnic forms of nationalism. We shall see that the reality of this apparent distinction to which McAllion refers – 'good' civic nationalism and 'bad' ethnic nationalism – is much more contested and complex than would first appear. The dichotomy itself needs to be explained and problematised as well as asking questions about whether or not different forms of civic nationalism can in fact be reactionary and, similarly, whether some forms of ethnic nationalism can actually be progressive.

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 19:24 08 Dec 2023; For: 9780203845493, chapter4, 10.4324/9780203845493.ch4

In this chapter we will examine this apparent divide and offer some thoughts, analysis and examples to illustrate that the ethnic–civic distinction is indeed less stable and more fragile than appears from a brief examination of the literature within nationalism studies, as well as looking at different views from civil society and other agencies. To begin with we need to set out the parameters of the debate and look closely at what the civic and ethnic dimensions to the nation-state are.

> 'Civic nationalism maintains that the nation should be composed of all those – regardless of race, colour, creed, gender, language or ethnicity – who subscribe to the nation's political creed. This nationalism is called civic because it envisages the nation as a community of equal, rights bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values.
>
> (Ignatieff, 1994: 3–4)

> There is considerable evidence that modern nations are connected with earlier ethnic categories and communities and are created out of pre-existing origin myths, ethnic cultures and shared memories; and that those nations with a vivid, widespread sense of an ethnic past, are likely to be more unified and distinctive than those which lack that sense.
>
> (Smith, 1996: 385)

Debates rage on the topic of the 'ethnic' and the 'civic' in nationalist discourses. For Ignatieff (1994) the appeal of civic nationalism is obvious, rejecting as it does any appeal to the 'who and what' of the citizens found within its territory – more important is a common belief in agreed political practices and values. For Smith (1996) this is somewhat illusionary because you cannot escape the fact that the 'ethnic past' is a vital element for even the most 'modern' of nations and indeed those without, or denying, this past will ultimately become undone in denial. But where do these discussions begin? A common starting point for discussing the ethnic-linguistic and civic-political distinction is the work of historians such as Friedrich Meinecke (1907) and Hans Kohn (1944). In his influential work, Meinecke made an important distinction between what he termed 'cultural nations' and 'political nations' – the former having common 'cultural heritage' and the latter having a shared 'political history and constitution'. For Kohn (1944), a useful distinction was to be drawn between 'Eastern' and 'Western' nationalisms with the dividing line being the river Rhine. To the West of this river was a kind of nationalism that displayed qualities of being both rationalistic and voluntaristic in nature, whilst to the east was a nationalism that was much more deterministic and organic. Such early work set the tone for more recent debates, many of which still tend to offer generalised caricatures rather than substance and specifics: it is regularly, and lazily, asserted that ethnic nationalism is associated with xenophobic attitudes and exclusionary policies, as well as violence when required, and civic nationalism is associated with highly liberal states who actively encourage the integration of new members with appeals to humanistic and universal values. Is it really this simple?

The distinction is clearly not as straight forward as convention dictates. And whilst accepting this, it is still useful to spend time looking at Kohn's 1944 book *The Idea of Nationalism*. This text has attracted much attention, largely because some of its content still resonates today. Kohn, writing in the context of Nazism and the war, was focused

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 19:24 08 Dec 2023; For: 9780203845493, chapter4, 10.4324/9780203845493.ch4

on looking at the origins of national identities and he clearly regards nations as modern entities that emerged around the mid-late eighteenth century. However, in arguing this, he acknowledges that modern nations are a 'product' of historical forces and do come from 'somewhere' and this past needs to be recognised and paid attention to. In many ways, the work of Kohn has been pivotal in shaping the thinking and direction of many scholars in the field of nationalism studies offering a variety of perspectives, such as Anthony Smith, Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson. For example, the place and role of history and the past is important in Smith's 'ethnosymbolist' work whilst Kohn's ideas of nationalism being ingrained within populations via 'high culture' and mass education systems is familiar to Gellner's body of work. Similarly, Kohn also notes the role of print capitalism in such 'nationalising' campaigns and also speaks of nationalism being a 'state of mind'; this somewhat akin to Anderson's later claims to the 'imagined communities' that we all, by necessity, inhabit. In Kohn's framework, nations are something different from the other group identities we all share, such as those governed by family, community, town or religion. Kohn appreciates the ever-changing, non-static nature of nations and the political and socioeconomic forces that can often drive such changes and redrawing of maps, borders and boundaries. However, despite this ebb and flow, Kohn offers some foundations that are usually required to assist in the development of nations, including language, traditions, descent and religion.

In considering the place and direction of German nationalism, Prague-born Kohn established the dichotomy between what could be termed 'Eastern' and 'Western' nationalisms. He looked around Europe at the time of writing and concluded that rather more progressive and favourable forms of nationalism could be identified in the West, when compared to the more reactionary and hostile types witnessed in the East. Drawing on contemporary examples, Kohn suggested that those nationalisms evident in the West were forms that were influenced by ideas of the nation as a grouping or 'association of citizens' who were governed by common laws within a shared, bordered territory. Within its borders, and on its own soil, the civic nation promotes the principle of *jus soli* ('law of ground') and membership is theoretically open to all, or at least not closed off in any definitive and absolute way. Across in the East, Kohn argued, it appeared that different examples of nationalisms were formed and established on a foundation that much preferred a strong belief in similar ethnic origins and common culture. On this basis, members of the nation were part of something larger than themselves and were part of the nation for life, even if moving across shores and residing in other territories. In the case of the East then, it was argued that citizenship was given by birth, through descent and blood, and fixed via the principle of *jus sanguinis* ('right of blood') rather than *jus soli*. It has been argued by Smith (2001), that the source of this contrast is largely concerned with class dynamics – that is, in the East, due to the rule of autocrats and landowners, organic and authoritarian forms of nationalism developed whilst in the West, due to an assertive (some would say ruthless) bourgeoisie class, civic enterprise and mass citizen-nations were promoted.

It goes without saying that, like much work in the social sciences, Kohn's framework is rather static and one-dimensional in character. The rigid dichotomy between East and West does present somewhat essentialised and reified ideas of nationalism, identity and culture and as such has been subject to criticism, especially when considering the nature and extent of any such distinction between East and West as well as specific examples that challenge the divide (such as the Czech lands and Ireland, to name but two cases in point). Indeed, Smith (1991: 11) informs us that it is 'historic territory,

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 19:24 08 Dec 2023; For: 9780203845493, chapter4, 10.4324/9780203845493.ch4

legal-political community, legal-political equality of members, and common civic culture and ideology' that give us the building blocks of the 'Western' *model* of the nation but are such aspects, to some degree, not also evident in certain 'Eastern' *realities*? If nothing else, we can see here the issue in comparing and contrasting 'models' with 'real life': clear boundaries and borders tend to collapse when shifting between the two worlds, depending on the examples being drawn upon and the time period being consulted. Indeed, with the time/place context very much placed in the foreground, Shulman (2002) sought to show the inherent weaknesses in those common arguments that suggest that civic nationalism is dominant in Western Europe and North America whilst ethnic nationalism is somehow the preserve of Central and Eastern Europe. Shulman argues that state policies, in practice, tend to flow from a combination of civic, ethnic and cultural conceptions of national identity and he gives us various explanations for finding strong cultural national identities in the West as well as strong civic national identities in the East. To support his contention, Shulman analyses a range of survey data from some fifteen countries to get a sense of what such measurements can tell us about 'common' thinking and practices with regard to national identity. This is done by assessing attitudes on issues such as state policies towards assimilation and immigration as well as the various criteria adopted for granting national membership. Shulman, in presenting and analysing the survey data, argues that on the basis of this data the 'civic as West' and 'ethnic as East' dichotomy on many measures is false and on other measures is only 'weakly true'.

However, before consigning Kohn's classic work to a dusty shelf we should note that some (normative) elements of Kohn hold good and are worthy of retaining, not least the notion (at least in theory) of 'choice' – that is, within the civic engagement, we can *choose*, to some degree, where we belong, whereas in the ethnic model we are born into a nation and even though we may decide to leave (to begin a new life on another continent) we are for ever attached to our place of birth. And Kohn is not alone, obviously, in attempting to draw up such typologies and you can find in other work notions of what might be termed 'continuous' (Seton-Watson, 1965) and 'created' (Tilly, 1995) nations as well as broader separations between nationalisms based on ethnicity and those based on territory. However, what is important to bear in mind here is that these typologies and models are exactly that – typologies and models. The truth of the (practical, geographical) matter is that nationalisms change shape and identity over time and place and, indeed, in most cases, will incorporate aspects of *both* the civic and ethnic. So the question remains: is the distinction between the two types of nationalism worth anything more than a theoretical exercise on paper or can it have analytical purchase as Kohn hoped it would?

This is a question that hangs and has many answers. It is unfortunate that crude distinctions still abound, where civic nationalism – especially when combined with hearty doses of liberalism – is regarded as being (almost) a step in the right direction and deserving of space whilst varieties of ethnic nationalism – especially in the context of events in the Balkans and other territories in the 1990s and 2000s – are widely regarded as being outside mainstream democratic discourse and consideration. Indeed, if we look to the work of political philosopher David Miller (1995) we can see that his concept of the nation revolves around a set of preferences that specifically and intentionally avoid mention of genealogies and ethno-linguistic heritage and practices. Instead, public culture, residence and history come to the foreground, excluding any 'dangerous' aspects that rely on 'blood and belonging' – ideas of descent. Even so, as

Orwell (1945) powerfully argued, it does seem that nationalism, whatever its key ingredients, must *always* have the potential to produce exclusionary policies that are driven by latent xenophobic sentiments and tendencies. One of the most obvious examples of this has been the plight of minority groups such as Jews and Roma, whose treatment over many years, across different areas of Europe and beyond, has shown in explicit detail that even those nations with strongly developed civic nationalist states – such as France or England – can spectacularly fail to support minority group rights and offer appropriate protection (Smith, 1994). It is evident then that although ethnic nationalism is characterised as exclusionary, reactionary, 'bad', it is also the case that examples of civic nationalism can also struggle and fail when it comes to hearing the claims of different cultures within its borders. A genuine and meaningful multiculturalism, if nothing else, demands for a 'plural nation' that is not content to stop at merely 'celebrating diversity' but goes further than this to specifically include the many cultures that are represented within its borders: to weave and embed myriad cultures into the fabric of the nation-state and the governing bodies and institutions that claim to speak in its name (Parekh, 2005). As an example of this, but not without its controversy, is the United States. Built up via historical processes of conquest, slavery, civil war, migration and immigration, America has become, when compared to other nations, a relatively plural and polyethnic nation and yet it is also a nation that is bound together by common laws, languages and allegiances, not to mention the everyday celebrations of flag and constitution. This does not change the fact, however, that the (very relative) unity we see today is the product of earlier brutality and oppression – a point made famous by Renan in his essay *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?* back in 1882 (Renan 1882/1994: 17–18). Indeed, America is often upheld in the literature as something of an 'ideal' civic nation and yet like many other countries, such as France and England, it consciously, for many years, withheld civic status from various groups of people, not least women, Native Americans and Black slaves.

A key idea then is that civic nationalism offers the possibility to all people that they can be citizens of the nation. If we look at the examples of France and England at different time periods this idea seems problematic. For example, at the time of the French revolution – often viewed as the dramatic and bloody beginnings of civic nationalism – we can see that conditions were attached to who could, or might, be a citizen, especially when gender entered the equation. Certainly, it is noteworthy that women gained the right to vote in France only in 1945, so it took a long time to reformulate the notion of 'universal citizenship' to ensure this wasn't just about male citizens. Similarly, if we turn to England, and draw on the work of Liah Greenfeld (1992), we can see that for Greenfeld the civic–ethnic contrast or dichotomy is fundamentally related to the differences between individualism and collectivism and she goes on to argue that during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, due to major socioeconomic structural changes, the word 'nation' in England adopted new meanings. However, despite the promises and possibilities within the civic–individualist framework for all to be members of the nation, the reality in England meant that many sections of the population, for historical and contemporary reasons, were routinely ignored from the benefits and rights of civic membership, such as women, Catholics and the poor. The issue here, in a sense, is to illustrate the fact that the 'rules' of the civic conception of nationhood have been 'broken' from almost the very beginning and the exception soon becomes the norm. We need to acknowledge, of course, the dangers of applying present day standards to the past, but the concern is that such exclusions are not just

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 19:24 08 Dec 2023; For: 9780203845493, chapter4, 10.4324/9780203845493.ch4

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 19:24 08 Dec 2023; For: 9780203845493, chapter4, 10.4324/9780203845493.ch4

confined to the vaults of history: we continue to witness the operation of exclusionary politics in both East and West that seeks to deny citizenship to those considered to be on the 'outside' (of the civic nation) looking in. You only need to think of the problems faced by refugees, migrants and asylum-seekers in trying to gain entry to many different nations to get a perspective on the seriousness of this issue. Indeed, the recent work of Vicki Squire confirms this point by critically examining the debates over asylum in recent years and she shows us how far asylum has been characterised as a matter of asylum seekers ('them') being a socioeconomic and political 'problem' and a 'threat' to 'host' states ('us'). Looking across the United Kingdom and the European Union in particular, Squire argues that various neo-liberal responses to the asylum process have been chiefly driven by concerns over securitisation, criminalisation and economics rather than any adherence to international conventions or laws. When examined in their historical and political context, this is not a surprise and asylum seekers are routinely rendered as scapegoats for the dislocations that are produced as a result of broader shifts in globalised thinking on the nation-state. To escape this manner of exclusionary politics, Squire argues for a radical change of direction in how states conceive and respond to asylum as well as identity and citizenship more broadly (Squire, 2009).

In all of this, it does seem to be the case that despite the apparent contrasts and differences between the ethnic-linguistic and civic-political nationalisms on display, there is a particular 'closeness' between the actual *policies* that emerge out of such manifestations. In a sense, for analytical precision and depth, it is perhaps better to think of nationalism as a whole rather than trying to create 'civic–ethnic', 'political–cultural' or 'good–bad' distinctions that might be helpful at a general hypothetical level but are rendered problematic when applied to 'real world' examples and situations. Indeed, it is important to remember that this distinction is merely a normative and analytical one: it cannot account for specific nationalisms and it cannot account for potential trajectories of any 'nationalism at large'. It seems clear, whether reading the work of Anthony Smith (1998) or Eric Hobsbawm (1992), that even those nationalisms claiming to be 'the most' civic and political ('Western') are, in reality, very often guided, forged and influenced in their development via the ethnic and linguistic. The example of France alone illustrates this point, both during and after the revolution. The same is true for those nationalisms that seem, at first glance, to be virulent strains of the 'ethnic': for example, John Breuilly (1993) has shown that in the case of German nationalism around the 1850s, many speeches and debates in Parliament illustrated both civic and territorial aspects in addition to the 'ethnic' ones on display (and Germany is often presented in the literature as an atypical model of the 'ethnic'). You can see today, all around Europe, examples of the relatively harmonious fusion and merging of the ethnic and civic, whether in Scotland, Switzerland or the Czech and Slovak lands. Of course, we can also witness the opposite, especially if we extend our gaze to Israel or India. In essence, tracing a clear pattern of historical development using such dichotomous concepts is inherently problematic.

It is worth looking at the critiques of the ethnic–civic distinction a little more to fully understand these discourses. Indeed, as has been noted by Spencer and Wollman (2002), the distinction between ethnic and civic forms of nationalism is problematic in many ways. At a 'deep' philosophical level, the actual separation of the two is not without concern. Is it not the case, for example, that all nations are, at a fundamental level, 'ethnic' nations? Each nation will claim their uniqueness and their borders and

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 19:24 08 Dec 2023; For: 9780203845493, chapter4, 10.4324/9780203845493.ch4

boundaries and in so doing will be excluding of those who are not considered members of that particular nation ('aliens' or 'others'). If we follow the work of Brubaker (1998), for example, we can see how it often depends on how narrow or broad we stitch 'culture' onto the distinction that is suggested operates between the ethnic and the civic. Ethnic nationalism can place emphasis on the importance on descent and heritage, and by doing so, can be restrictive. This narrowness of interpretation can mean that there are few examples of ethnic nationalism in existence as such a framework means that any emphasis on 'common culture' has to be defined as an example of civic nationalism. From the other side, if ethnic nationalism is classified in a broader ethnocultural sense, and conversely civic nationalism is interpreted narrowly as displaying acultural notions of citizenship, then the problem is reversed – all nationalisms would be defined as ethnic/cultural and the civic conception would be rendered almost meaningless. You can see here the power of questioning the intellectual distinction between ethnic-linguistic and civic-political and, further, Kohn's (1944) Western and Eastern division is challenged. In this kind of framework, even the prime examples of civic nationalism – America, England, France, etc. – would be reclassified as they obviously contain ethnic/cultural aspects to their nationalisms (Özkirimli, 2005).

Is the civic 'model' the one to aspire to then? If we look to the work of Gans (2003) it can be observed that the idea of civic nationalism, as a political entity that is voluntary and is ethnically 'colour-blind' (both literally and metaphorically), is in fact a fallacy that does not hold true. Gans argues that adherence to shared ideas cannot be seen as any kind of nationalism, unless drawing upon vague and abstract notions of 'common culture'. That is, civic nationalism in any kind of 'pure' form does not actually exist, given historical developments and philosophical definitions of what constitutes nations. Similarly, Brown (2000) argues that the ethnic–civic question is, for most people, a mute one – given that the majority of the population in so-called civic nations have no choice in their national identity as the acquire citizenship by birth. Further, gaining entry to other 'civic' nations may be as limited as in the case of 'ethnic' nations (for example, witness the visa/legal problems faced by someone trying to move permanently from France to the United States, especially for reasons *other* than work or marriage). So, civic nations, like ethnic nations, can be equally demanding in terms of allegiances to 'blood and soil' and can also take measures to resist voluntary renunciations of national identity and citizenship. This point is made very well by Muro and Quiroga (2005), who look at the example of Spanish nationalism, a geography that provides fertile ground for examining the interplay between the ethnic and civic. They argue that when considered historically, Spanish nationalism has had at least two recognisable 'versions' – a 'liberal' incarnation and a 'conservative traditionalist' project. This was especially the case during the nineteenth century. However, in turning to the twentieth century, Muro and Quiroga suggest that although these two ideological projects cemented themselves into party politics, the Basque and Catalan nationalist movements caused a shift in thinking and helped, to an extent, unify Spanish nationalists to defend 'Renio de España' ('the Kingdom of Spain') against these new regional sources of separatist identity politics. In the present context, they suggest, Spanish nationalism is a struggle between centre and periphery with appeals to 'civic' status and nationhood used to compete with regionalist forces.

Another criticism of the ethnic and civic distinction is the 'normative project' (Smith, 1996) that can shadow and follow the debate, leading to the airing of moral favouritism, prejudice and bias. For example, McCrone (1998: 7) discusses the 'great fault lines' of

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 19:24 08 Dec 2023; For: 9780203845493, chapter4, 10.4324/9780203845493.ch4

Eastern and Western thinking on nationalism and notes that, even going back to Kohn's work, we can recognise the thinly disguised idea that Western (political) forms of nationalism – the kinds that produced 'citizens' – are somehow superior or 'better' than Eastern (ethnic and cultural) forms of nationalism which simply produce 'the folk'. McCrone (1998: 9) concedes that whilst commentators such as Gellner (1994), in his work on the time zones of Europe, and Brubaker (1992), in his work on French and German models of nationalism, have put the civic–ethnic distinction to good academic use he still suggests that ultimately the distinction '…does lend itself to Eurocentric caricature – why can't *they* be more like *us*?'. This is certainly a theme that is apparent in some of the literature on the ethnic/civic distinction and moral judgments do not seem to be too far from the surface. Consider the work of Plamenatz (1976) who as recently as the mid-1970s spoke of an Eastern kind of (ethnic) nationalism as being 'backward', 'imitative' and 'illiberal' whilst the Western (civic) variety is upheld as one that is 'culturally better equipped' for ensuring 'success and excellence'. Challenging such static and reified ideas is the more recent work of Stefan Auer (2004). In an interview for Radio Prague (Vaughan, 2005) about his book *Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe*, Auer (2004) captures this theme vividly and his last sentence is especially important I would suggest:

> … the book is partly a response to a number of scholarly studies that were written immediately after the collapse of communism, that argued or suggested that the process of post-communist transition will be hampered or undermined by the forces of nationalism. So what happened in Yugoslavia was seen as epitomising the problems of Eastern Europe. It was argued that the nations of Eastern Europe were more inclined to adopt this kind of xenophobic form of nationalism … There is a vast body of literature that differentiates between 'civic nationalism' and 'ethnic nationalism'. Civic nationalism is seen as a kind of progressive force that fits into the project of liberal democracy and is characteristic of Western nations like Britain and France. Opposed to it is usually a concept of ethnic nationalism that, so it was argued, was characteristic of Eastern Europe. I thought that that sort of schematic division of Europe was unhelpful in understanding what was going on in Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, it's quite unhelpful in understanding what's going on in Western Europe.

So what are we left with here? Has the ethnic/civic distinction – such a 'keeper' within the field of nationalism studies – lost all of its contemporary analytical purchase? In an increasingly global world is it now somehow less important, given that nation-states have, it is argued, given way to cosmopolitan cities and new transnational realities? As has been suggested above, there is perhaps some scope for continuing to employ the distinction as a Weberian 'ideal type' model and focus more on the advantages this approach can give us and focus less on using the dichotomy when it comes to 'real world' scenarios. Or, perhaps, a better approach is to recognise that the distinction between civic and ethnic is now redundant and actually creates more problems than it could ever solve – and in its place alternatives should be fostered and employed. This is where we can return to Brubaker (1998) who has helpfully suggested a 'state-formed' and 'counter-state' dichotomy for (better?) understanding different types of nationalism. In using the term 'state-formed', Brubaker is arguing that the terms 'nation' and 'state' are in accordance, both in terms of territory and institutions. By 'counter-state', he is

talking about the exact opposite – where ‘nation’ is *opposed* to the territorial and institutional framing of the currently positioned state. As Brubaker argues (1998: 300–01) in explaining each new distinction, there is nothing necessarily ‘civic’ about state-formed nationalism and likewise counter-state nationalism need not be ‘ethnic’. What is important here is that the *state* is the frame of reference, not the *nation*. These conceptions of nationalism can incorporate ethnic and cultural aspects of nationhood as well as paying heed to the importance of territory and individual political histories. So, counter-state nationalisms can have ‘civic’ qualities whilst ‘state-formed’ nationalisms can have ‘ethnic’ components and roots. However, is this distinction any more relevant and useful than the ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ options presented by Kohn back in 1944?

It is worth noting, in closing this brief chapter, that even though the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalisms has been largely agreed as problematic, and of limited value beyond a kind of ‘ideal type’ model-making, it continues to be a source of much scholarly angst and debate. Indeed, if commentators are not arguing about the origins and/or endings of nationalism, then it is usually the civic–ethnic distinction – and other such dichotomies – that spills forth and holds attention. An example of this was the eighteenth annual meeting of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism at the London School of Economics, London, during April 2008. Including speakers such as Oliver Zimmer, Paul Gilroy and Bhikhu Parekh, the conference was concerned with the topic of ethnic and civic conceptions of nationhood and the conference promotional material suggested that:

> ‘It has long been standard in the field of nationalism studies to classify nations according to which principle serves to unify the nation. The distinction between the Western, political type of nationalism, and Eastern, genealogical nationalism as systematised by Hans Kohn in 1945 has been used, extended and adjusted by scholars of nationalism to conceptualise a framework of ‘inclusive’ nationalism based on citizenship and territory and ‘exclusive’ nationalism based on common ethnic ties and descent. This conference seeks to assess the continuing relevance of this dichotomy in its various forms: its contribution to theoretical work on nationalism, its usefulness for historical interpretation and its value for contemporary policy-making.

Although clearly written to attract papers and general interest, the framing of the conference is nonetheless interesting and reflects the continued ‘hardness’ and rigidity of thinking on this dichotomy. It has been shown in this chapter, by drawing on some of the thinking of key scholars in the field, that the civic–ethnic distinction is an extension or a new way of thinking about the political–cultural distinction and in the field of nationalism studies such dichotomies are going to be around, just like nation-states, for a long time yet.

Acknowledgement

This chapter could not have been written without the assistance of Elizabeth R. Lambert, who has taught me all I know about the fluidity of transatlantic borders and the enduring nature of nation-states.

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 19:24 08 Dec 2023; For: 9780203845493, chapter4, 10.4324/9780203845493.ch4

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 19:24 08 Dec 2023; For: 9780203845493, chapter4, 10.4324/9780203845493.ch4

Further reading

Brubaker, R. (2004) *Ethnicity without Groups*, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Greenfeld, L. (2002) *Nationalism: five roads to modernity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kohn, H. (1944) *The Idea of Nationalism: a study of its origins and background*, New York: Macmillan.
Miller, D. (1995) *On Nationality*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smith, A. (1998) *Nationalism and Modernism*, London: Routledge.

References

Auer, S. (2004) *Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe*, London: Routledge.
ASEN (2008) *Nationalism, East and West: civic and ethnic conceptions of nationhood*, annual conference announcement and call for papers, London School of Economics, available on line: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/ASEN/conference_08.html (accessed 18 June 2009).
Breuilly, J. (1993) *Nationalism and the State*, 2nd edn, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Brubaker, R. (1992) *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
—(1998) 'Myths and misconceptions in the study of nationalism', in John Hall (ed.) *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the theory of nationalism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brown, D. (2000) *Contemporary Nationalism: civic, ethnocultural and multicultural politics*, London: Routledge.
Gans, C. (2003) *The Limits of Nationalism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gellner, E. (1994) *Encounters with Nationalism.* Oxford: Blackwell.
Greenfeld, L. (1992) *Nationalism: five roads to modernity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hobsbawm, E. (1992) *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: programme, myth, reality*, 2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ignatieff, M. (1994) *Blood and Belonging: journeys into the new nationalism*, London: Vintage.
Kohn, H. (1944) *The Idea of Nationalism: a study of its origins and background*, New York: Macmillan.
McAllion, J. (1998) Speech in the House of Commons on the Scotland Bill, 23 February, Hansard, col. 134, available on line at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmhansrd/vo980223/debtext/80223–39.htm#80223–39_spnew2 (accessed 11 July 2009).
McCrone, D. (1998) *The Sociology of Nationalism*, London: Routledge.
Meinecke, F. (1970/1907) *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
Miller, D. (1995) *On Nationality*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Muro, D., and Quiroga, A. (2005) 'Spanish nationalism: ethnic or civic?' *Ethnicities* 5 (1): 9–29.
Orwell, G. (1953/1945) 'Notes on nationalism', in *England, your England, and other Essays*, London: Secker & Warburg.
Özkirimli, U. (2005) *Contemporary Debates on Nationalism: a critical engagement*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Parekh, B. (2005) *Rethinking Multiculturalism: cultural diversity and political theory*, 2nd edn, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Plamenatz, J. (1976) 'Two types of nationalism', in E. Kamenka (ed.) *Nationalism: the nature and evolution of an idea*, Canberra: Australian National University Press.
Renan, E. (1994/1882) 'Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?' in J. Hutchinson and A. D. Smith (eds) *Nationalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Seton-Watson, H. (1965) *Nationalism Old and New*, London: Methuen.

Shulman, S. (2002) ‘Challenging the civic/ethnic and west/east dichotomies in the study of nationalism’, *Comparative and Political Studies*, 35 (5): 554–85.

Spencer, P., and Wollman, H. (2002) *Nationalism: a critical introduction*, London: Sage.

Smith, A. (1991) *National Identity*, London: Penguin.

—(1994) ‘Ethnic nationalism and the plight of minorities’, *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 7 (2–3): 186–98.

—(1996) ‘Opening statement: nations and their past’, *Nations and Nationalism* 2 (3): 358–65.

—(1998) *Nationalism and Modernism*, London: Routledge.

—(2001) *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Squire, V. (2009) *The Exclusionary Politics of Asylum*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Tilly, C. (1995) *European Revolutions*, *1492–1992*. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.

Vaughan, D. (2005) ‘Can nationalism in Central Europe be a force for good? An interview with Dr Stefan Auer’, *Radio Prague* 23 October, http://www.radio.cz/en/print/article/71970 (accessed 12 August 2009).

Downloaded By: 10.3.97.143 At: 19:24 08 Dec 2023; For: 9780203845493, chapter4, 10.4324/9780203845493.ch4