


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16 Multilateral frameworks for conflict resolution

Eva Sobotka

This chapter examines the evolution of approaches to international conflict resolution and focuses on the shift in the nature of conflict resolution that emerged with the end of the Cold War and the demise of the accompanying bipolar system. The first section of the chapter outlines developments in conflict resolution from peacekeeping to the emergence of multilateral conflict resolution enforcement frameworks in the United Nations (UN) context. Examining multilateral approaches in the conflict resolution that were applied in El Salvador, Mozambique and Tajikistan, it illustrates peacekeeping, peace-making and conflict prevention/resolution approaches in practice. The second section of the chapter analyses the multidimensional character of conflict resolution, the functions of various actors and their potential impact on conflict resolution within multilateral frameworks. This section discusses examples of conflicts where new approaches to conflict resolution have been implemented, including a role for regional organisations, such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the European Union (EU). Lastly, acknowledging critiques made following the high-profile failures in peacekeeping in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which caused member states to place stringent conditions upon UN operations, the chapter takes a closer look at a case of conflict resolution in Kosovo.

The evolution of conflict resolution frameworks

Following the end of the Cold War, fundamental changes in the nature of the international system have ushered in a new thinking with respect to traditional approaches to conflict resolution (Saunders 1999, p. 7). One cause of the change was identified as the strengthening of the internationalisation of international relations and the recognition of a duty of the international community to maintain international peace and thus secure the elementary security of individuals (Bigo 2003, p. 185). Yet, the promise of world peace in 1989 never materialised. Instead, the number of increasingly internal, violent conflicts around the world soared, where the majority of victims were civilian and where identity conflicts and poverty became a common feature (Gurr 2002; Fleitz Jr 2002, p. 16).

The United Nations is designed to serve as both first and last resort in dealing with threats to peace. Since 1945, peacekeeping has been a method of operation mostly applied by the United Nations in its efforts to resolve conflicts and secure lasting peace. The UN Charter commits states to the maintenance of international peace, justice and human rights, including social progress. These goals are also achieved through

assistance in early intervention in conflict. Article 33(1) of the Charter requires that parties to any dispute seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and resort to regional agencies or apply any other peaceful means of their own choice. The UN Secretary General is mandated by the General Assembly and the Security Council to undertake and maintain efforts including the appointment of special representatives and envoys, good offices, fact-finding missions, and other peaceable means to assist parties in the resolution of disputes prior to their escalation. Preventive diplomacy is intended to be proactive, although traditionally the international community has taken only a reactive stance to conflict.

Since the UN Charter does not provide an explicit definition of peacekeeping, its meaning was established in an *ad hoc* fashion through specific situations and deployments. Still, Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the UN Charter provide a basis for understanding this term: Chapter VI refers to approaches of peaceful settlement while Chapter VII enables the enforcement of decisions, should the Security Council decide to do so. Chapter VII also sanctions the use of armed force, if necessary. The decision of the Security Council to intervene is dependent on the agreement of the five permanent members, which is not always guided by the normative criteria of human rights protection or humanitarian need (Weiss 1996, p. 62). The provisions for regional organisations under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter were intended to provide an option through which the Security Council could mandate action and thus proceed with collective responsibility for peace and security between the United Nations and the regional organisations. Article 53 of the UN Charter provides for the possibility that disputes are first addressed by regional organisations, as long as the Security Council is informed. However, the unwillingness of states in the Security Council to support action, whether directly or indirectly through authorisation for regional organisations, during the Cold War has limited the ability of the United Nations and other actors to undertake collective action. That said, during the initial phases of conflict, the humanitarian agencies of the United Nations have played more independent roles, working with local and government actors to support initiatives aimed at crisis alleviation, of which assessment missions, diplomatic initiatives, support of civil society initiatives, and emergency aid are just a few examples.

Cold War peacekeeping and conflict resolution

The first UN peacekeeping mission was the Emergency Force (UNEF), which was dispatched to the Sinai peninsula in response to the 1956 Suez crisis. Its role was to observe the cease-fire, and the withdrawal of British, French and Israeli forces. The mission was successful and set a precedent for other UN missions, creating a role for unarmed and neutral forces in keeping sides of the conflict away from each other by creating a buffer zone between them. A set of principles was established to guide future UN missions. Through trial and error during the Cold War, the international community adapted and amended principles of peacekeeping, developed by the UNEF into a set of minimum conditions for the deployment of UN peacekeeping missions (Allen 1996, pp. 137–41; Hansen et al. 2001, p. 3). These principles can be summarised as: acceptance, impartiality and minimum use of force. While acceptance means that parties to a dispute consent to the deployment of a peacekeeping force and agree to co-operate with it. Impartiality refers to the importance of traditional peacekeeping troops being acceptable to the warring parties and having no stake in their dispute. Peacekeepers are

bound to minimum use of force and permitted to use force only in self-defence. In the words of the former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 'peacekeeping can rightly be called the invention of the United Nations' (Boutros-Ghali 1992, p. 14).

During the Cold War, peacekeeping missions were deployed to mediate inter-state conflicts and their number rose to a total of fourteen in the period 1945–90. In a number of conflict situations, the United Nations created multinational military forces to supervise a truce or administer arrangements that had been established as part of the conflict's resolution. Such peacekeeping forces were an important part of many efforts at conflict resolution, and by the 1990s they had become an accepted resource for conflict management in global affairs. United Nations peacekeeping forces were sent to the Sinai peninsula following the Suez crisis (1956–67), the Congo (1960–64), West Irian Jaya (1962–63), Cyprus (1964–90s), the Sinai again (1973–79), the Golan Heights in Syria (1974–90s), southern Lebanon (1978–90s), territories in the former Yugoslavia (beginning in 1992), Cambodia (beginning in 1992), Mozambique (beginning in 1992) and Somalia (beginning in 1993). Although traditional peacekeeping missions must be multilateral, they do not have to be conducted by the United Nations. One of the most successful peacekeeping missions deployed, in the period 1945–90, was the Multinational Force Organisation (MFO), a non-UN multilateral operation in the Sinai peninsula to help verify the terms of the 1979 Israel–Egypt Camp David Accords.

The United Nations provided mechanisms for dealing with conflicts, either avoiding war or assisting in bringing it to an end. These mechanisms were less effective, however, with conflicts involving the major powers, who exercise a veto in the Security Council. The United Nations also had only limited jurisdiction to become involved in civil wars and the internal affairs of member states. Nevertheless, within these limits the United Nations performed important services in conflict resolution. At the end of World War II, there were issues that needed resolution based on international agreement. Although the United Nations was active in helping to resolve many conflicts, critics noted that its effectiveness was limited by the ability of the superpowers to restrict UN action (Fleitz

Table 16.1 Selected traditional peacekeeping missions, 1945–1990

<i>Peacekeeping mission</i>	<i>Start–end</i>	<i>Authorised size</i>	<i>Total cost (\$ million)</i>
UNMOGIP (India–Pakistan)	1948–	102	163
UNTSO (Palestine)	1948–	572	592
UNEF I (Sinai–Gaza Strip)	1956–67	6,073	214
UNOGIL (Lebanon)	1958	591	4
ONUC (Congo)	1960–64	19,828	400
UNSF (West New Guinea)	1962–63	1,576	26
UNYOM (Yemen)	1963–64	189	2
UNFICYP (Cyprus)	1964	1,257	980
UNIPOM (India–Pakistan)	1965–66	96	2
UNEF II (Sinai–Suez)	1973–79	6,973	446
UNDOF (Golan Heights)	1974–	1,454	732
UNIFIL (Lebanon)	1978–	7,000	3,240
UNIMOG (Iran–Iraq)	1988–91	399	190
UNGOMAP (Afghanistan)	1988–90	50	14

Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko>.

Jr 2002). Although the International Court of Justice has limited jurisdiction, its rulings and advisory opinions played an important role in resolving some conflicts and further defining the rights and obligations of states under international law.

As the Cold War came to an end, the demand for the United Nations by the international community increased, aiding in the end of the Iran–Iraq War of the 1980s; mediating conflicts in Cambodia, Angola, and the western Sahara in 1988; assisting in the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989; and monitoring the elections that brought an end to the civil war in Nicaragua in 1990. Formal observer groups were among the most important mechanisms created by the United Nations to help monitor agreements. Major UN observation missions played a role in Palestine (1948), India and Pakistan (1949), Lebanon (1958), Yemen (1963), the Dominican Republic (1965), Afghanistan (1988), the Iran–Iraq cease-fire (1988) and Kuwait (1991).

In addition, the United Nations was the organisational framework for two major military mobilisations in response to aggression. This function was limited by the Cold War rivalries, which meant that either the United States or the Soviet Union could prevent the UN response to North Korean attacks. However, in 1950, when North Korea invaded South Korea, the Soviet Union was temporarily boycotting the United Nations. This enabled the Security Council to pass without veto the appropriate resolutions calling on member states to contribute forces for a UN police action to stop the aggression, with the United States providing the major source of military power for the action. The second major UN military response was in 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait. In the Persian Gulf War of 1990–91, the United States again provided the major source of military power, and the United Nations provided the international authority for the multinational response to Iraqi aggression. Such multilateral action had become possible by the end of the Cold War.

Post-Cold War peacekeeping and conflict resolution during the 1990s

Assessing the opportunities for UN-led missions, we must first acknowledge how the world of conflict management has changed since the end of the 1980s and beginning of 1990s. As Monty Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr have both noted, international conflict reached its peak during this period (as measured by both the number of international conflicts and the number of fatalities or war-related deaths in those conflicts (Gurr 2002, pp. 41–62; Marshall 2002, p. 66). At the beginning of 1988, as the Cold War was coming to its end, there were only five operations active in the field: three in the Middle East, a small observer mission in Kashmir and UNFYICYPI Cyprus. Between 1996 and 1998, twenty-nine operations were created, compared to the establishment of only thirteen operations undertaken between 1948 and 1987 and none between 1979 and 1988.

In addition, the increase in operations has brought about a diversification in the nature of these operations. In ‘An Agenda for Peace’ then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali recommended strengthening and making more efficient, within the frameworks and provisions, the capacity of the United Nations for *preventive diplomacy*, for peacemaking and peacekeeping (Boutros-Ghali 1992, p. 1). Traditional state-centric approaches to conflict resolution were no longer suitable. The function of missions has evolved into a multiplicity of tasks, while the composition of missions has become more diverse. Hence the contemporary practice and theory of peacekeeping has become more *multilateral*, *multidimensional*, *multinational* and *multicultural*. The second generation of conflict resolution techniques contributed to the notion of human

security as opposed to state security. This allowed the inclusion of non-state actors and attempted to address the root causes of the conflict, focusing on conflict transformation. The complexity of arrangements concerning multilateral peacekeeping today requires the involvement of various levels of actors in an operation: two or more conflicting parties, peacekeepers, the United Nations, regional and international organisation or institutions, civil society, international financial institutions, corporations and influential private individuals, usually acting under the umbrella of a foundation or peace institute. Similarly, the terms of multilateralism or multiculturalism in conflict resolution require that a peacekeeping force is formed from a diverse range of nations or agencies, each of which will bring its own understanding, resources, political influence in conflict resolution.

The first such multidimensional operation, the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), was deployed in Namibia at the end of the Cold War. Although a detailed assessment of UN-mediated interventions in the 1980s and 1990s is outside the scope of this chapter, and there is an obvious temptation to focus on the United Nations' negotiation failures, we can point to a few cases where the United Nations did succeed through its mediated interventions in promoting a peaceful settlement of major conflicts. The conditions of these successful cases are also instructive about the potential strengths that the United Nations can bring to a negotiating table. As is shown by the three case studies that follow, over the years the United Nations has developed a more nuanced approach to (ethnic) conflict resolution.

El Salvador (1991–1995)

The resolution of this conflict is a good example of the emerging multidimensional and multilateral approach to peacekeeping. The Special Representative of the Secretary General, Alvaro de Soto, played a key role in leading the parties to a negotiated settlement (Hume 1994, p. 45). The fundamentally different political position of parties to the conflict made the political settlement a subject of intensive negotiation, despite the fact that a military stalemate helped to bring the parties to the negotiating table. The government's goal was to end the war, whereas the goal of the Farabundo Marti National Liberati (FMLN) was to change Salvadorian society entirely, starting with intensive demilitarisation. The United Nations was an outside mediator, and was able to replace the diminishing influence of big powers, the United States and the former Soviet Union. Through the United Nations, which was perceived as neutral, both parties turned to the negotiator, who was a trusted source of proposals, reframing the meaning of concessions, creating a sense of urgency, imposing deadlines and resorting to sanctions, if necessary. In maintaining its independence when undertaking these tasks, the Special Representative also enjoyed the support of 'allies' – Colombia, Mexico, Spain and Venezuela – who lent their support when negotiations were running into difficulties.

Mozambique (1992–1994)

The special representative of the UN Secretary General, Aldo Ajello, who was responsible for overseeing the implementation of the General Peace Agreement, played a critical role in mediating when one of the parties threatened not to fulfil their commitments (Ajello 1999). While the peace accords were negotiated between Marxist-led government party

FRELIMO and the opposition guerrilla movement RENAMO, with the assistance of Sant'Egidio, a Catholic organisation, and the direct support of Italian government, implementation of the General Peace Agreement, signed in 1992, was undertaken by the United Nations (Bartoli 1999, p. 256). When the RENAMO candidate, Alfonso Dhlakama, threatened that he would pull out of the UN-supervised general election, because he feared that the process was not fair, the Special Representative intervened and thus helped the general election to maintain its credibility. The special representative convinced all parties that the election would be fair and that the UN supervision and monitoring commission would inquire into all irregularities of the election.

Tajikistan (1991)

The United Nations helped to facilitate negotiations between the government of Tajikistan and Islamic rebel groups in a war that displaced one-sixth of a total population of 6 million, following the break-up of the Soviet Union. In the 1996 Peace Agreement between Tajik President Imomali Rakhmonov and the Islamic leader Said Abdullo Nuri, both parties agreed to power sharing in the Commission for National Reconciliation, prisoners' exchanges, amnesty laws and the integration of the armed forces of both sides into a new army. An important role in this conflict settlement was played by non-governmental organisations, which worked hard in promoting community reconciliation and cohesion (Saunders 1996a, p. 425, 1999, p. 173).

Since the early 1990s a number of terms have been applied and suggested for the extension of international responsibility and administration of war-torn societies. Some scholars have adopted the UN terminology 'interim administration' and 'transitional arrangements', which refers to the temporary assumption of governmental functions by the United Nations over territories and peoples that have been left in a conflict-torn environment, for instance because of civil war, crimes against humanity, territorial disputes and environmental disaster (Caplan 2005, pp. 16–41). Others have referred to comprehensive peace-building efforts, which are derived from former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 'Agenda for Peace'. The term signifies the readiness of the United Nations to take on increasing responsibilities in such complicated operations through the 1990s, as is evident from the gradual drift from traditional peacekeeping to wider peace enforcement, humanitarian intervention and, ultimately, the civil, political, social and economic reconstruction of entire societies (Pugh 1997, p. 20).

A crucial development in the post-Cold War era has been the increase in the number of political and non-political actors who deal with conflict and its resolution. In recent years, the impact of international organisations (e.g. UN, NATO), regional organisations (Organisation of American States, OAS; European Union, EU), non-governmental organisations (e.g. Amnesty International, International Crises Group, the Carter Centre) and individuals have all become increasingly involved in various aspects of conflict resolution. There is also a strong tendency to favour multilateral approaches to conflicts, especially with the potential for spill-over effects.

Table 16.2 Non-UN peacekeeping and interventions, 1990–2005

<i>State or regional organisations peacekeeping</i>	<i>Location and intervention</i>
Great Britain	Sierra Leone
France	Central African Republic, Ivory Coast, Lesotho
South Africa	Burundi
French-led coalition	Democratic Republic of the Congo
Italy	Albania
US-led coalition	Haiti
Australian-led coalition	East Timor, Solomon Islands
Africa	
Economic Community of West African States	Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast
Southern African Development Community	Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho,
Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States	Central African Republic
African Union	Burundi, Sudan
Europe	
Commonwealth of Independent States	Moldova, Georgia, Tajikistan
European Union	Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia
NATO	Kosovo
Asia	
NATO	Afghanistan

Source: Bellamy and Williams (2005).

Actors and their function in multilateral frameworks for conflict resolution

The 1990s began with a hopeful phase in which the United Nations set out to implement the expanded conception of peacemaking envisioned in Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 'Agenda for Peace', with notable peace-building operations in areas with recent peace settlements, including Cambodia, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and El Salvador. A general model for UN peace-building has emerged from these cases. It calls for military measures to secure the demobilisation, disarmament and cantonment of opposing forces; constitutional measures to implement elections and establish a transitional government; governance measures to support civilian government and infrastructure, including training and, if necessary, supervision of local police; human rights measures; the return of refugees; and the restoration of war-damaged infrastructure. At first, this model appeared to have striking successes, and in some cases, such as Namibia and Mozambique, a peaceful transformation from war was indeed achieved. In others, however, such as Angola and Cambodia, violent conflict resumed.

While international interventions have, in these cases, seemed to have halted ethnic wars, the extent of transformation of the underlying conflict remains limited. Ethno-nationalist leaderships remain and settlements based on the realities of ethnic divisions in the war have preserved these divisions during peace time. These high-profile cases, of course, involved imposed settlements, achieved after considerable vacillation on the

part of a divided international community. More impressive have been the cases in which conflicts were prevented even before they became violent. Here, real changes in the context of the conflict and in the structure of the societies have resulted in some impressive transformations. In the case of Estonia, for example, a potential ethnic conflict was averted in part through the well-known interventions of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, supported by the EU and Scandinavian governments. In part, the transformed economic context served to create incentives for the Russian-speaking community. Moreover, an additional key factor was the introduction of an electoral system that created incentives for cross-ethnic voting, thus resulting in a transition from ethnic politics to a politics of economic and regional interest groups. Non-Estonian politicians were included in the party lists of Estonian parties, and the Estonian Centre Party won wide support from Russian-speakers as a vehicle for promoting their interests. This is a particularly striking success for the conflict management and ethnic accommodation approaches, made possible by the transformation of the Estonian context after 1991.

Several problems remain to exist with regard to the United Nations' preventive capacity. Although both the UN Charter and the 1988 *Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations and on the Role of the UN in the Field* urged the United Nations to become involved 'early in a dispute of a situation' or 'at any stage of a dispute or a situation', the fact is that most disputes do not reach the Security Council's agenda until they have escalated into armed conflict (Peck 1998, p. 70). Ultimately, the decision for action has rested with member states.

The engagement of human rights and humanitarian agencies has become more visible since the 1980s and 1990s. These agencies were increasingly drawn into the costly business of rebuilding war-torn societies, and were responding to the acute humanitarian need, by targeting development and human rights monitoring programmes specifically towards peace-building. In some cases, their activities supported UN peace-building operations, for example in Mozambique, where donors helped to keep the elections on schedule and supported the transformation of RENAMO into a political party. In other cases, development aid was channelled to directly mitigate conflict, as when donors supported refugees in neglected parts of Somalia with the intention of reducing discontent in a politically unstable area. Programmes to support the reintegration of child soldiers or the rehabilitation of agricultural land are further examples of development tasks that can readily have a peace-building component. Capacity-building and support for indigenous conflict handling capacity are also crucial.

Development aid can, of course, have unintended as well as intended consequences; in some circumstances, aid is captured by the parties to the conflict, and then sustains the fighting. Although development agencies are increasingly important and influential in this field, they generally see their role as principally to support and encourage the work of others, rather than to take prime responsibility for transforming particular conflicts. (That role is still seen as a new and untested function.) Most of the conflict transformation work has therefore been left to NGOs (Collier 2007; Lederach 2001). In addition to NGOs, international financial institutions have begun to incorporate conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction departments within their organisations, most importantly the World Bank's Post-conflict Reconstruction Unit. This shift is in part the result of a more holistic approach to peace and conflict resolution that has led various scholars and practitioners to link conflict with issues of human rights and development (Holtzman et al. 1998).

Table 16.3 Functions of multidimensional peacekeeping operations

Military component

- Monitoring and verification of cease-fires
- Cantonment
- Disarmament and demobilisation of combatants
- Overseeing the withdrawal of foreign forces
- Mine awareness education and mine clearance
- Ensuring security for UN and other international personnel
- Activities in support of the peace process

Civilian police component

- Crowd control
- Establishment and maintenance of judicial system
- Law enforcement
- Monitoring, training and advising local law enforcement authorities on organisational, administrative and human rights issues

Civilian component*Political element*

- Political guidance on overall peace process
- Assistance in the rehabilitation of existing political institutions
- Promotion of national reconciliation

Electoral element

- Monitoring and verification of all aspects and staged of the electoral process; co-ordination of technical assistance
- Education of the public about electoral processes and provision of help in the development of grass-roots democratic institutions

Human rights element

- Human rights monitoring
- Investigating of specific cases of human rights violation
- Awareness raising of human rights

Humanitarian help element

- Provision of humanitarian aid (food and other emergency relief supplies)
- Implementation of refugee repatriation programmes
- Resettlement of displaced persons
- Reintegration of ex-combatants

Source: Hansen et al. (2001).

Collective threats to security are best met by collective responses, yet strong norms regarding sovereignty and non-interference have limited the ability of states to collectively deal with conflicts, let alone engage in prevention (Brems Knudsen and Bagge Laustsen 2006). Demand for UN interventions, particularly in the form of peacekeeping operations, has strained the resources available to that organisation. Conflicts in the post-Cold War period have tested the United Nations' capabilities to the limit, and the failures in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina have led to critical assessment (Betts 1994, p. 25; Rieff 1994, p. 17; Luttwak 1999). The genocide in

Rwanda, where approximately 800,000 people were killed between April and July of 1994, was described as one of the most ‘most abhorrent events of the twentieth century’ (United Nations 1999a, b). A year later, in one of the worst war crimes committed in Europe since the end of the Second World War, the Bosnian town of Srebreniça, which had been designated the world’s first-ever civilian safe area under Security Council Resolution 819 (16 April 1993), fell to Serb militias. Eight thousand Muslims were killed under the eyes of the UN peacekeeping force deployed in the area.

In light of such failures in peacekeeping, the concept of peace support operations (PSO) has evolved as an expression of states’ reluctance to deploy forces and provide resources in conflicts for which they are inadequately prepared and supported. This new way of thinking is best exemplified by Wilkinson, who argues that, in a world marked by civil wars, collapsed states and declining respect for international and humanitarian law, the wider peacekeeping concepts developed in the 1990s are in need of updating (Wilkinson 2000).

During the 1990s, the debate surrounding conflict resolution increasingly advocated a more innovative approach. Today, multilateral conflict resolution frameworks involve a broad range of functions and actors, who make use of a wide repertoire of practices. The operations are multilateral and multidimensional, incorporating military and civilian police and other civilian components. The civilian police component has become an increasingly important player in conflict resolution. Operating under the auspices of the UN Security Council, international police monitors assist in the creation of secure environments and in the maintenance of public order. Finally there is a civilian component, which consists of intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), or agencies, regional organisations and non-governmental organisations, international organisations, foundations, etc. With respect to their mandates, civilian component can be further divided to include subcomponents, such as political, electoral, human rights and humanitarian mandates. Following on from this, it is arguable that the use of Australian forces to lead the peace operations in East Timor in 1999 (see below) and the deployment of British forces in Sierra Leone in 2000 are examples of such multilateral and multidimensional operations.

East Timor

UN involvement in East Timor dates to the UN General Assembly Resolution in 1960, when East Timor was added to the United Nations’ list of non-self-governing territories. When Portugal, which administered the territory, decided to establish a provisional government in 1974, civil war broke out between those who sought independence and those who wanted union with Indonesia. Indonesia annexed East Timor in 1976. For years afterwards, the United Nations conducted negotiations with Indonesia and Portugal to resolve the status of East Timor. A set of agreements was reached in 1999, confirming East Timor as holding ‘special autonomy status’ within the territory of Indonesia. In the same year, a multinational force led by Australia was deployed to protect the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). Further to a general election in 2001 and independence in 2002, the United Nations has continued its presence with a successor mission known as the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor. It is responsible for helping to maintain security in the country and producing core administrative assistance to the new government (Ramesh 2001, p. 118).

Another example of the early application of the multilateral approach to conflict resolution, including peace support operations to conflict resolution is the intervention of the United Nations in the conflict in Kosovo.

Kosovo

Conflict resolution in Kosovo falls under the category of humanitarian intervention and the creation of international trusteeship (Brems Knudsen and Laustsen 2006). Like traditional peacekeeping (Chapter VI of the UN Charter), the Charter's basis for humanitarian intervention is ambiguous, lying somewhere in the grey zone between Chapter VI and Chapter VII. Here we can speak of a third generation of conflict resolution operations, which involves the application of all the principles of traditional peacekeeping (consent, partiality and absence of use of force). In addition, such intervention may involve further tasks, such as capturing criminals, gathering evidence of war crimes and effectively helping to rebuild the country's administrative institutions.

With the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 and the establishment of UNMIK, the United Nations and its partners, NATO, OSCE and the EU became responsible for the territory, the people and the society of Kosovo. For the first time in recent history, the United Nations administered an entire territory. To facilitate the implementation of the mandate, the operation was divided into four pillars, each managed by a different organisation: Civil Administration (UNMIK), Humanitarian Assistance (UNHCR), Institution Building (OSCE) and Economic Reconstruction (EU). The overall strategy in Resolution 1244 involves five phases. During the first phase, an interim civil administration controlled by UNMIK was to be established. The interim administration was to be strengthened and a gradual transfer to the population of Kosovo was to begin during the second phase, while preparation for election was initiated. The holding of elections was to constitute the third phase, leading to establishment of provisional administration in the fourth phase. In the fifth phase, the conflict in Kosovo has been finally resolved and the overall administration of the territory transferred to a permanent civil administration directed and controlled by the local population. The largest obstacle to the consolidation of democratic peace in Kosovo is inherent in the structure of the UN operation: the unresolved end status of the territory. It is clearly stated in Resolution 1244 that Kosovo is a legal part of Yugoslavia, and Yugoslavia has no intention of allowing Kosovo to leave the Federation. The Kosovo Albanians nevertheless continued to demand the creation of an independent state.

The UN trusteeship operation in Kosovo has had positive effects on the humanitarian and democratic stability in the territory, although certain aspects of the current operation continue to be a cause of conflict. Since the conflict in Kosovo there has been a stimulus given to the policy development in relation to conflict prevention and conflict resolution in the European Union, and the emergence of a new framework of conflict resolution approaches (Hansen, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse 2001: 27).

Conclusion

By the 1990s it was clear that international organisations still could not prevent wars, but that the international conflict resolution mechanisms of the United Nations were more effective than those that had been available to the League of Nations. At the end of the twentieth century, such mechanisms were an accepted part of the structure of

global political power. New impetus to lateral thinking on conflict resolution, going beyond the state-centred approach to a multidimensional approach has taken place. During the Cold War conflict resolution activities of the United Nations operated in permissive environments but, since 1988, peacekeeping has had to adapt to semi-permissive or non-consensual environments, where multilateral and multinational approach in conflict resolution/settlement have become a predominant feature.

As we have seen, there are many examples of an increase in understanding by member states that multilateral approaches to peacekeeping and conflict prevention is, from a long-term perspective, a much more effective solution. The use of multilateral conflict resolution will gain currency with the increasing use of these concepts by the United Nations and regional organisations, such as the EU, OSCE or the Organisation of African Unity or ECOWAS. By their very nature, regional organisations have a more concentrated focus on a specific area, thus allowing the United Nations to focus its limited resources on the emergence of conflicts outside the purview of areas falling under regional systems. In the meantime, the capacity of these collective security arrangements must be increased through the sharing of both resources and experience by the United Nations and regional organisations.

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