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

Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism

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Asean

Publication details
https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203803608.ch26
Anja Jetschke
Published online on: 28 Nov 2011

How to cite :- Anja Jetschke. 28 Nov 2011, *Asean from:* Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism Routledge
Accessed on: 02 Dec 2023
https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203803608.ch26

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Part V
Organizations

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26 ASEAN

Anja Jetschke

Established on 8 August 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is arguably the most successful regional organization among developing countries. It currently comprises ten member states and a population of 600 million people, 8.8 per cent of the world population. In comparative perspective, and especially during the early 1990s when most ASEAN members collectively experienced an 'economic miracle' and became part of the East Asian development model (see Stubbs, Chapter 7 of this volume), ASEAN was commonly perceived to be an alternative to the European model of regionalism (Camroux 1996; Gilson 2005; Söderbaum and Van Langenhove 2005). Whereas the EU appeared to represent 'regionalism', a government-driven process of successive pooling of sovereignty into common institutions (integration), Asia represented 'regionalization', a business and production-network driven process of regional cooperation (Aggarwal 2005; Katzenstein 2005: 44). It might therefore come as a surprise that scholarly debates on ASEAN still revolve around the key question as to whether or not ASEAN 'exists' (Martin Jones and Smith 2007; Chesterman 2008).

This chapter provides an overview of ASEAN's history and key scholarly debates related to the process of region-building through ASEAN. The main debate is whether or not ASEAN acts as an autonomous regional organization in the sense that it has some 'actorness' or actor quality. Actorness refers to the ability to influence attitudes, expectations and ultimately the behaviour of others. In this context, this article is concerned with the central question of whether or not ASEAN is a case of successful regionalism. That is, is there a drive towards building autonomous regional institutions able to influence the behaviour of member states? Scholars remain notoriously divided on this question, with one camp arguing that ASEAN is a relevant institution, even if it is not comparable to the European Union, and others arguing that ASEAN fails to orient member-state behaviour towards ASEAN expectations. This chapter argues that ASEAN presents an interesting puzzle. Overall, one can surely argue that ASEAN reveals only limited actor quality. Its members continue to cherish the principle of sovereignty and state autonomy, granting the Association little autonomy. In the area of economics, ASEAN has established EU-like institutions without delegating sovereignty to them, but it explicitly formulates the goal of an ASEAN Economic Community modelled after that of the European Economic Community in the ASEAN Charter of 2008, and members have taken the unusual step of establishing potentially sovereignty-undermining institutions, such as an enhanced dispute settlement mechanism (DSM)

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and a Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR). In examining the effects of this institutionalization, however, all available empirical evidence points to the fact that ASEAN has not contributed significantly to the economic success of its member states. In the security realm, ASEAN remains firmly committed to the 'ASEAN Way' of cooperation with a strict adherence to non-interference and the sovereignty of its member states. Looking at the effects of the Association, there is convincing empirical evidence that ASEAN is a causal factor in promoting peace among its member states. However, whether or not this pattern can be extended to the region as a whole remains an issue of contention.

This chapter is structured as follows: the first part provides a historical overview of ASEAN's genesis, the ASEAN Way and its institutional development. The second part evaluates ASEAN regionalism in three policy areas: economics, security and the political. Each subsection addresses the same questions: What is the state of the art in terms of regionalism and research on it? How important is the impact of ASEAN on member states? What are the major determinants of ASEAN's relevance? Rather than making an argument about the general importance of ASEAN regionalism, this chapter concludes with a summary of the key findings and a plea for more empirical research that tests the various theoretical arguments that underlie statements about ASEAN.

Historical overview

ASEAN was established by five Southeast Asian states: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. It was the third attempt of members to establish a regional grouping after similar endeavours had failed. The Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), established in 1961 by the Philippines, Thailand and Malaya, as well as Maphilindo, an organization set up by Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia in 1963 as an organization between Malay people, had previously made little progress because of conflicting territorial claims to Sabah, which could not be resolved by the procedures established by these institutions. Other regional groupings with Asia-Pacific membership, such as the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) established in 1954 as a functional equivalent to NATO in Europe, as well as the Asia Pacific Council (ASPAC) established in 1966 and comprised of Australia, Japan, South Korea, South Vietnam and Thailand, had previously failed due to its heterogeneous membership.

ASEAN was thus a truly 'indigenous' organization built on Asian norms of non-interference, non-alignment and the principle to avoid public discussion of contentious issues as agreed upon during the Bandung Conference of 1955 (Acharya 2009: 78–89). The Association's founding document, the Bangkok Declaration – a short document of less than two full pages in length – defined the goal of the regional organization vaguely: the aim was, most importantly, to 'accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavors in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community' (Bangkok Declaration 1967: Art. 1). An important goal was to provide a unified front against external encroachments, to insulate the region from superpower competition and to provide stability for its members so that they could politically survive and economically thrive (Hoadley and Rüland 2006).

ASEAN did not make much headway for about 10 years. After its first decade, external observers credited the organization for a single achievement: that it had survived (Poon-Kim 1977; Melchor 1978). However, this changed with the onset of the Cambodian conflict and – more importantly – the changed role of the US in Southeast Asia after the loss of the Vietnam War in 1975 and the rise of Vietnam as a communist state. ASEAN members now feared Vietnamese support for internal communist subversion movements, which kicked member governments into action. Their international environment was fundamentally shifting. According to Shaun Narine

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'ASEAN truly started to function as an international organization' (Narine 1997: 968). In the following years, and until the signing of the Paris Peace Accords of 1991, which officially ended the Cambodian conflict, ASEAN carved out for itself a diplomatic role in the management of the Cambodian question, and members managed to maintain their solidarity despite diverging threat perceptions. Whereas Thailand and Singapore perceived Vietnam as a major threat and China as a useful balancer of this threat, for Indonesia and Malaysia the reverse was the case. They regarded China as a threat and Vietnam as an ally against Chinese hegemonic ambitions. ASEAN successfully lobbied the United Nations (UN) against official recognition of the Cambodian government installed by Vietnam, and supported the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea led by exiled Prince Norodom Sihanouk, even if this meant support for Khmer Rouge, who were part of the coalition government (Narine 1997).

After the Cold War, ASEAN was seen as becoming an essential part of an East Asian regionalism and actively started to shape regional institutions. Key factors influencing institution-building in the 1990s were the concerns of ASEAN member states about the continuing US presence in the region, and the economic and military rise of China (Beeson 2010b: 63). ASEAN became actively involved in the set-up of interregional and intraregional discussion forums (Pempel 2005; Katsumata 2006; Solingen 2008). Institutionalization of the Asian security complex occurred according to the ideas and practices of ASEAN, which assumed the 'driver's seat' because of competition for hegemony between China, Japan and the US. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), established in 1994, brings together 27 states in a Forum dealing with Asian security issues (see Takeshi Yuzawa, Chapter 27 of this volume; Katsumata 2006; Simon 2006).[1] Interregional dialogue forums such as the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM 1996) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC 1989) complemented the web of regional institutions (see Julie Gilson, Chapter 32 of this volume; Aggarwal 1993; Hänggi *et al.* 2006). ASEAN Plus Three (China, South Korea, Japan) institutionalized a similar discussion forum between ASEAN members and East Asian governments (see Tekeshi Terada, Chapter 29 of this volume, Nabers 2003).

The fundamental military and economic shifts associated with the global ascendance of China and India have raised concerns about a power transition at the top of the global hierarchy of states, and provided great impetus to ASEAN regionalism. The latest achievement in this regard is the ASEAN Charter (2008) envisioning an integrated ASEAN Community (AC) along the lines of the European Community. Initially triggered by the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–8, the ASEAN Charter answers the concerns of ASEAN member states that the Association will disintegrate and become irrelevant given the centrifugal forces of India and China.

ASEAN is perhaps best known for its specific approach to regional cooperation, also called the 'ASEAN Way'. This has been promoted as a specific form of cooperation emphasizing informal rules, consensual decision-making, loose structure and conflict avoidance instead of conflict management (Acharya 1995). The key words characterizing cooperation are 'restraint' in the form of a commitment to non-interference, 'respect' for each member state as expressed through frequent consultation, and 'responsibility' as expressed in the consideration of each member state's concerns and interests (Narine 1997: 965). Given member states' postcolonial ('subaltern') identity (Ayoob 1995), the Westphalian state is the centrepiece around which standards of appropriate behaviour for regional cooperation have been designed: all the organization's declarations and official statements emphasize Westphalian norms such as respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, and non-interference. The ASEAN Way of cooperation stresses the principle of flexible adaptation and circumvents overinstitutionalization and bureaucratization. ASEAN cooperation is strictly intergovernmental. Consensus is the dominant decision rule, although various projects allow for a departure from the principle to 'unanimity' in the form of an ASEAN Minus X-decision rule.

Institutional design

This section reviews the Association's institutional development to answer the question of whether or not the organization has assumed greater 'actorness' over time and to facilitate an evaluation of movement towards regionalism. This can be measured most importantly in terms of the centralization of the organization, the delegation of sovereignty (level) and the increase of its activities (scope) (Koremenos *et al.* 2001). Starting at a very low level of centralization, the Association has seen an increase in formalization. Overall, this increased formalization has not translated into a greater autonomy for ASEAN.

Much has been made of the cultural underpinnings of the ASEAN Way of cooperation. But ASEAN's institutional design story is plainly Eurocentric: ASEAN's institutional design is a virtual copy of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). When the five members decided to set up ASEAN, they took over the institutional structure of ASEAN's forerunner institution, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) (Jorgensen-Dahl 1982: 22).[2] Upon establishing ASA in 1961, the three founding members, the Philippines, Malaya and Thailand, had a clear institutional template to draw on, EFTA, which had been established a year earlier.[3] EFTA did not foresee political goals and institutions or the delegation of sovereignty by its member states, and it promoted a concept of 'open regionalism', as the UK as a founding member was not willing to sever its ties to trading partners within the Commonwealth (Haefs and Ziegler 1972: 68). Given ASEAN member states' strong export orientation and their preference for retaining their sovereignty, EFTA was certainly the better fit for Southeast Asian member states. This was the institutional design that was carried over to ASEAN and gave it its distinct 'flying circus'[4] design of rotating chairmanships.

ASEAN therefore initially had a highly decentralized institutional structure. The Association's double core consisted of: (1) a council of foreign ministers, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), convening once a year and rotating on a yearly basis among member states; and (2) a secretary-general (SG) who was selected from a member state on a rotating basis. A standing committee attached to the AMM organized work within the council meetings. The institutional structure around the SG was decentralized and did not include a secretariat. Instead, national ASEAN secretariats in each member states provided their services. The SG also had a functional committee structure attached to it, but these committees were based in individual member states (as in EFTA). This institutional design soon contributed to the perception that the organization was too decentralized, too consensus-oriented, and institutionally inefficient (Wah 1992; Alagappa 2003).

ASEAN members started centralizing the Association in the mid-1970s. Members established an ASEAN Secretariat, to be based in Jakarta, aimed at assisting the SG and serving as document depository, a high council in 1976, intended as dispute-settlement mechanism for the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), and the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organization (AIPO) in September 1977, with the specific aim of anchoring ASEAN among the societies of ASEAN members. AIPO was a parliamentarian initiative very much in line with the parliamentarization of other regional organizations around that time,[5] and the organization remained outside of ASEAN's formal decision-making structure. Until today, it serves a largely advisory role.[6]

After the end of the Cold War, member states further strengthened the office of the secretary-general. The SG received an enlarged mandate to 'initiate, advise, coordinate and implement' ASEAN activities.[7] He was accorded ministerial status. An expanded professional staff in the ASEAN Secretariat was appointed on the basis of open and regionwide competitive recruitment, equally considered a precondition for more autonomy from member states.

The financial crisis of 1997–8 led to further changes in the institutional design, culminating in the adoption of the ASEAN Charter on 20 November 2007 (in effect since 15 December 2008).

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As a result of the institutional reforms spelled out in the ASEAN Vision of 1997 and the accompanying Ha Noi Plan of Action (1998), the Bali Concord II establishing an ASEAN Economic Community (2003) and the ASEAN Charter, the new ASEAN Community now consists of three official communities, each headed by a council. These are the ASEAN Security and Political Community (ASPC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and the ASEAN Social and Cultural Community (ASCC). An ASEAN Coordinating Council helps leaders prepare for their summits, supported by the SG and ASEAN Secretariat (ASEC). The AMM, the previous major decision-making organ of ASEAN besides the biannual summit meetings, was renamed into ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (AFMM). The role of the SG has again been strengthened and the number of deputy SGs has been doubled from two to four.

Members have taken little acknowledged steps that might point towards deeper political integration, if the new institutions develop respective practices. For example, the new Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR) is explicitly modelled after the Committee of Permanent Representatives of the EU (COREPER), a little acknowledged but powerful body that has spurred integration within the EU. The permanent representatives will oversee the work of the secretary-general and prepare the ASEAN summit meetings. ASEC has adopted a new self-understanding as the 'guardian of treaties' and representative of ASEAN community interests (Ong 2010). The ASEAN Charter establishes the first regional human rights mechanism: AICHR. Although the mechanism is strictly intergovernmental and gives the body little independent power, it might provide a crucial entry point for civil society associations.

The ASEAN Charter also provides the Association with a legal personality and promotes an ASEAN identity through a motto ('One Vision, One Identity, One Community') and an ASEAN anthem. ASEAN members have concluded comprehensive technical programmes with different development agencies, helping it develop the technical expertise necessary for economic integration (Martin 2009).

ASEAN has surely seen an evolutionary development since 1967 in terms of the scope of issues (Khong and Nesadurai 2007: 33). Cooperation tasks have expanded and now include such areas as economic integration, competition and consumer protection, disaster management and humanitarian assistance, but also non-traditional security issues such as transnational crime and terrorism (Caballero-Anthony 2009b).[8] Moreover, ASEAN also experienced enlargement or territorial expansion, through Brunei's accession in 1984, and the accession of the former communist states of Vietnam in 1995, Myanmar and Laos in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.[9]

The key question from an institutional-design perspective is whether this move towards centralization and the acknowledgement of ASEAN by more states in Southeast Asia is accompanied by more independence or autonomy from member states. There is some movement towards greater autonomy of the organization, but the reforms look better on paper than in practice. This, in turn, makes it difficult to substantially evaluate effects. For example, evaluating the Association's legal personality, Simon Chesterman argues that from a legal perspective ASEAN still does not exist, as it has practically developed autonomy only in the AEC and in the dispute settlement for the Southeast Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone. ASEAN's capacity to enter into treaties on behalf of member states is nullified by member states' practice of signing and ratifying treaties in their individual capacities, not collectively (Chesterman 2008: 205–208). Implementation remains the full responsibility of the individual ASEAN members. There is a movement towards introducing soft compliance mechanisms ('score cards'), but ASEC still lacks the basic competences to enforce ASEAN rules among member states.

Another indicator for organizational autonomy is the existence of an independent dispute settlement mechanism (DSM). Here again, ASEAN has seen movement towards dispute settlement more on paper than in practice. Neither the high council of 1976 nor the council of AFTA,

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the DSM of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) of 1992, have ever been utilized (terms of references for the high council were adopted in 2001), despite existing conflicts. ASEAN has adopted a mixed-panel system similar to that of the World Trade Organization (WTO), exhibiting political and independent arbitration and having the competence to issue final and binding decisions. In 2004, members agreed to revise the procedures for appeals to the effect that these will be decided upon by professional experts on the basis of law. This move is intended to depoliticize arbitration and contributes to the independence of the DSM (Khong and Nesadurai 2007: 56). While this looks good on paper, these mechanisms have not been used (Henry 2007: 865; Vander Kooi 2007). There is therefore no empirical evidence allowing a systematic evaluation of the role of dispute settlement for the autonomy of ASEAN.

Economic regionalism

Economic development has always had a central place in the causal belief system on regionalism. It was a means to nation-state development, stability and hence 'regional resilience'. Development would strengthen the nation state by undermining internal subversive movements. On an aggregate level, this would shield the region from external great power intervention, as these would not get the opportunity to exploit domestic instability. These goals were driven by a political elite in what were, at that time, fragile state formations. Communism was the primary internal and external threat. Hence, regional cooperation was primarily a vehicle to ensure stability, enabling governments to focus on nation-building.

Yet, members did not move towards significantly deeper cooperation or integration, although economic cooperation has been on ASEAN's agenda since the very establishment of the organization. The dominant trade patterns in the region, with external trade clearly dominating over intraregional trade, determined regional economic dynamics and a lack of economic institutions (regionalism) comparable to the other regions (Haggard 1997). Economic cooperation included small-scale industrial projects in the 1970s and an experiment with preferential trade schemes, such as a Preferential Trade Arrangement (1977) and a Common Effective Preferential Trade (CEPT) scheme (1992). These measures were complemented by joint industrialization projects, such as the ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIP), ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures (AIJV) and brand-to-brand complementation in selected industries (1988). However, these schemes are generally regarded as not effective in promoting trade among ASEAN members (Dent 2008c: 89).

External economic competitive pressures, most importantly from the European Community, spurred and inspired integration schemes. The accession of Portugal and Spain to the EC raised concerns that this would lead to the diversion of foreign direct investment (FDI) to Latin America. In 1987, the Single European Act gained effect, establishing a European single market where goods, services and capital would flow freely. At the Manila Summit of 1987, ASEAN members decided to introduce preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Similarly, the Maastricht treaty of 1991, and the eventual economic rise of China, set off competition for economic regionalism that would lead to the establishment of regional economic groupings around the world. The ASEAN Free Trade Agreement of 1992 was an answer to these pressures, although ASEAN studiously avoided integration along the lines of the EU (Stubbs 2000). However, similar to efforts during the 1970s, these projects did not measure up to the proclaimed rhetoric of regional integration. ASEAN PTAs were soon dubbed 'preferential trade to be avoided' given the long list of exemptions (Indorf 1987).

The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–8 provided a critical juncture for ASEAN members to rethink the basis of their cooperation. As the crisis spread from Thailand to other countries, most of Southeast Asia and Japan saw their currencies, stock markets and other asset prices devalued, not to

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speak of a steep rise in unemployment. Indonesia and Thailand were the most affected, while Singapore, Brunei and Vietnam were the least affected. Malaysia, Laos and the Philippines were somewhere in between these two extremes, suggesting a combination of international and domestic factors as explanations for the variation of the impact (Kim *et al.* 2001). Nevertheless, the whole region suffered from a loss of demand and of confidence. In the absence of reaction from the International Monetary Fund and the US, members were obliged to accept aid from China and other partners, notably Japan and South Korea. Governments learned that 'we can't help each other' (Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, as quoted in Rüland 2000: 439).

The 1997–8 Asian Financial Crisis underlined not only the interdependence of Northeast and Southeast Asian countries, but – according to many practitioners, academics and economic analysts – exposed the weakness of existing regional institutional economic arrangements and spurred financial cooperation. The first response of members was to institutionalize the annual leaders' summits and ministerial dialogues through the ASEAN Plus Three process involving China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. This process produced the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) in May 2000, a series of initially bilateral swap agreements to provide emergency foreign-currency liquidity support in the event of a future crisis. These two measures 'broke the institutional status quo' by bringing the two institutional subregions under the auspices of one embryonic architecture (Ravenhill and Emmers 2010: 4). The crisis also increased the discipline among ASEAN members to comply with AFTA regulations. However, by 2004, it appeared that individual action would no longer translate into collective success. An alarming report by a management-consulting firm on ASEAN's competitiveness *vis-à-vis* China and India, and a realization that ASEAN's reputation needed to be restored, kicked ASEAN governments, elites and policy networks into action and started a debate of ways to 'reinvent' ASEAN (Tay *et al.* 2001; Yeo 2008). The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) drawing inspiration of the EU integration experience is a concrete outcome.

The key question is how the economic rise of China will affect ASEAN as a regional organization. Here, the main concern among members is that China's rise will reduce ASEAN's ability to attract FDI, undermine economic success and the rational of ASEAN, which is based on output legitimacy (economic growth). The ASEAN Community constitutes a policy solution to this anticipated scenario. However, it might well be that this FDI diversion is not taking place, as some authors suggest (Ravenhill 2010), lessening pressures on ASEAN members to implement the ambitious goals of developing a 'single market'. In the end, this might leave AEC as one of ASEAN's ambitious but never implemented goals.

Whether or not ASEAN economic regionalism can be considered successful is an issue of great contention. Scholarly expertise on ASEAN converges on the point that ASEAN member states prospered, as did the ASEAN region, but not as part of an integration scheme. Rather, it was because of individual economic development strategies and the general dynamism of East Asia (Hamilton-Hart 2003; Higgott and Robison 1985; Morley 1999; Stubbs 2005). While earlier studies emphasized impediments for deeper integration, such as the lack of economic complementarity, cultural diversity or the lack of a regional hegemon (Capanelli *et al.*, 2010; Langhammer and Hiemenz 1979; Mattli 1999), more recent studies argue that the Asian Financial Crisis has laid the groundwork for true regionalism, as expressed in the rise of preferential trade agreements in the region.

Systematic comparative studies allow us to put the ASEAN experience of economic regionalism into comparative perspective and reassess its underlying evaluative standards (Lombaerde 2006). Whether or not one considers regional trade arrangements a success or not is heavily dependent on the indicators one uses to measure intraregional trade (Iapadre 2006). The weaknesses of the most widely used indicator, the traditional Balassa index measuring intraregional

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trade, is that it is highly sensitive to a region's size and the number of its members. This indicator ranks the EU as the region with the highest intraregional trade, followed by NAFTA, ASEAN and Mercosur. If one takes a different indicator, that of relative trade openness, capturing the total trade-creating effects of regional trade agreements and other integration factors, then ASEAN emerges as the most open region, followed by the EU, NAFTA and Mercosur (Iapadre 2006: 80).

This not only confirms preponderant approaches to the region, arguing that Asia has its own model of regional integration based on the trade-creating effects of fragmented production networks ('Asia factory', see World Bank 1993; Katzenstein 2000; Stubbs 2005; Baldwin 2008b). It might also provide an answer to the question of why regional integration has not proceeded in the way the EU has; ASEAN member states' economic development thrived independently of an economic integration policy, and the very success of their individual economic policies reduced the functional demand for integration.

Security regionalism

As in the case of economic regionalism, there is significant debate over the question of whether or not ASEAN regionalism effectively enhances the chance of cooperation and is able to lessen the state of anarchy or reduce conflict in the region. Academics struggle with the phenomenon of a 'self-blocking security multilateralism' (Katzenstein and Okawara 2004: 116), that is, security dynamics that appear to be stuck between the establishment of cooperative security institutions such as the ARF and self-interested, opportunistic and sometimes even militaristic behaviour as displayed in relation to the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Others identify a 'perennial under-institutionalization' (Beeson 2010b: 330), or an 'organizational gap' (Calder and Fukuyama 2008). As in the case of economic cooperation, the key puzzle constituted by ASEAN is why the region lacks strong institutions able to solve cooperation problems (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002).

As in the economic realm, ASEAN's approach to security cooperation was distinctly individualist and self-determined in the sense that it relied on individual undertakings, not collective defence. Indonesia and the Philippines insisted that ASEAN would neither become a security pact serving only great powers nor provide mutual assistance to its members. According to Philippine Foreign Minister Narciso Ramos: 'Each state must look after its own security' (as quoted in Acharya 2009: 89). Official statements continued to deny a military role for ASEAN (Acharya 2009: 90), but did not foreclose bilateral military cooperation or the continuation of defence pacts with outside powers such as the US and Great Britain. ASEAN members relied on the security umbrella supplied by US (US-Philippines mutual defence treaties of 1957/1983; Thailand-US Thanat-Rusk communiqué of 1962) and to a lesser degree by the UK (Five-Power Defence Agreement between the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore). ASEAN embarked on an official policy of creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone (declaration on a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) 1971), with little bearing on mutual security guarantees that included the suspected stationing of nuclear weapons (as in the Philippines).

Since the end of the Cold War, the region has seen a virtual proliferation of institutions for security management and the emergence of an informal network of policymakers constituting 'track-2 diplomacy' (Job 2003; Evans 2005). Institutions such as the ARF are characterized by the same informality as ASEAN. Few have developed into dynamic security arrangements, providing an ideal basis for lively debates on the significance of these institutions.

Proponents of realism emphasize that Asian security dynamics are well explained by their approach. Stability in Asia during the Cold War was guaranteed by a policy of 'extended deterrence' of the US and the USSR, consisting of the much-touted 'hubs-and-spoke network'

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of security guarantees for Western-oriented states by the US on the one hand and security guarantees for communist states by the USSR on the other. The pattern of bilateral-security guarantees and military pacts ensured mutual deterrence and stability between the two superpowers, between China, the US and the USSR, between China and Taiwan, between North and South Korea, and between India and Pakistan (Buzan 2003). Greater security cooperation among ASEAN member states in the mid-1970s, when the security equation for ASEAN appeared to change due to the withdrawal of the US from Vietnam and rapprochement between China and the US, seems to fit with this explanation. It was then that ASEAN engaged in greater security cooperation and established the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC, established 1976).

Asian security dynamics after the Cold War are determined, according to this approach, by the emergence of a power vacuum that has resulted from the withdrawal of US troops and the demise of the USSR. This has put China into a position able to project its power to Southeast Asia, provoking balancing strategies among other Asian states. Proponents of neo-liberal institutionalism and constructivism argue that the empirical evidence does not support realism. Southeast Asian states neither balance nor bandwagon but rather pursue a strategy of 'cooperative balancing' (Rüland 2000), 'hedging' or 'soft balancing' (Khong 2004) through the establishment of cooperative institutions such as the ARF, the East Asian Summit or ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea) lacking the antagonistic features of open balancing strategies. However, even neo-liberal institutional approaches do not fully buy into the implications of an institutional argument, as ASEAN and the ARF are not strong institutions with formalized enforcement mechanisms: the very features of the ASEAN Way inhibit effective conflict resolution (Leifer 1999), in the cases of the unresolved Spratly Islands, bilateral conflicts, the Taiwan question, or the nuclearization of North Korea (Katzenstein 2004), and fail to restrain member states in their egoistic interests. Even where members have explicitly agreed to exchange information, as in the case of confidence and security-building measures in the ARF, reluctance to share information predominates. ASEAN therefore not only disconfirms a functionalist explanation but fails to match rhetoric and practice (Kahler 2000; Nair 2009; Martin Jones and Smith 2007).

From a constructivist perspective, the great puzzle is less why ASEAN does not exhibit strong institutions but how such a weak institutional design 'explains the fact that in Southeast Asia, the members of the Association of ASEAN, defying all expectations, have not fought a war against each other since 1967' (Acharya 1998: 199). Constructivists argue that what matters is not so much the formal institutional underpinnings of regionalism but the extent to which these institutions manage to form collective identities, a sense of belonging to an international community and identification with others (Busse 1999; Narine 2002; Khong 2004; Acharya 2009). ASEAN has managed to 'socialize' its members into a pattern of cooperative behaviour and has provided some socialization to China, who only had limited experience with international institutions (Johnston 2008). At least if it comes to the influence of ASEAN on member states, there is now systematic evidence indicating that the international institutionalization within ASEAN has significantly reduced the likelihood of militarized interstate disputes (Kivimäki 2001; Goldsmith 2007; Haftel 2007). Systematic evidence of these effects on the wider region is still lacking.

Political Cooperation

ASEAN has no explicit membership criteria requiring domestic adaptations by member states. ASEAN members understand their organization as providing a dialogue forum for regional security among like-minded states with similar external and internal security predicaments (Alagappa 2003). At no point during ASEAN's history did the number of democratic states

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exceed those of authoritarian ones. A brief period of democratic opening within the organization (when Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand were in a transition to democracy) was cut short with the accession of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam after 1995.

Demands for the democratization of ASEAN, in the sense of ensuring greater civil society participation and providing a mechanism to sanction human rights violations in member states, have been on the agenda of civil society groups for a long time and correlate with democratization trends in individual countries. ASEAN was widely perceived as a club of autocratic states, and the ASEAN Way and its emphasis on non-interference as a function of this membership. The establishment of AIPO in 1977 might be seen as the earliest attempt to connect ASEAN as an elitist project to ASEAN societies. In 1997, Thailand was at the forefront of promoting a departure from the non-interference principle in relation to Myanmar (Haacke 1999). It took the democratization of Indonesia to provide these demands with greater leverage. Indonesia promoted the inclusion of a human rights mechanism in the ASEAN Charter (reluctantly supported by Thailand and the Philippines), and bottom-up pressures by a network of civil society organizations, such as the Solidarity for Asian Peoples' Advocacy (SAPA). There was much indignation about the discrepancy of ASEAN's rhetoric on making the drafting of the ASEAN Charter participatory and the practice of the High Level Task Force to conduct behind the door negotiations on it (Pavin 2009).

Myanmar has been on the Association's agenda ever since its controversial accession in 1997, not least because of external pressures by the EU, the US and the UN. These developments propelled new discussions over the extent to which ASEAN promotes norms of good governance, human rights and democratic accountability (Katsumata 2009). Many hold that the relative stability produced by the Westphalian norms of the ASEAN Way comes at a price: that of more democratic political systems and a deepening of the ASEAN Community (Kuhonta 2006; Collins 2007; Rizal Sukma 2009). While ASEAN's contribution to good governance in the region can certainly be disputed, it is debatable whether or not this justifies claims that ASEAN contributes to the stability of authoritarian states. The variance among ASEAN member states in terms of their level of democracy and ability to undergo democratic transition rather suggests that these are determined by both domestic and international factors and that the ASEAN influence can be neglected.

Conclusion

This overview chapter on ASEAN as a case of Asian regionalism initially raised two questions. First, has ASEAN assumed greater actor-quality over time in the areas of economic and security cooperation in the sense that members and external states orient their behaviour towards ASEAN and its community norms? Second, to what extent is ASEAN able to reliably influence member states' behaviour? The findings of this chapter can be summarized as follows: first, if it comes to the institutional design of ASEAN, the Association has certainly seen an increase in centralization and institutionalization. While ASEAN firmly remains an intergovernmental organization, members have gradually increased the organizational capacity of the regional organization since 1967. Second, scholarship on ASEAN remains deeply divided over the question of how relevant ASEAN is as a regional organization for the behaviour of its member states. The region as such exhibits a number of 'empirical anomalies' that traditional approaches to international political economy or international relations find hard to explain (Suh *et al.* 2004).

ASEAN regionalism still constitutes a puzzle, that is, an empirical phenomenon that is not explained by the most preponderant theoretical approaches in the field. The key puzzle is that of an apparent 'under-institutionalization' or 'organizational gap'. Why does the region exhibit so

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little institutional formalization if compared to other regions (notably Europe and Latin America)? And how does such a weak institutional design account for some of the regularities that we observe in the region, such as the ability to reduce tension among member states and produce sustained economic growth?[10] There is systematic evidence that institutionalized cooperation has significantly decreased the chance that ASEAN members will go to war with each other. And this is the more astonishing given that ASEAN members are a collection of autocratic and democratic states that generally have a greater likelihood to go to war with each other (Mansfield and Snyder 2002; Ray 1998). Little evidence suggests, on the other hand, that ASEAN has had a significant effect on regional integration.

While the organizational characteristics of ASEAN invite debate and are likely to continue in the future, it would help to sharpen the arguments if scholarship would in general try to develop coherent hypotheses to test theoretical claims. Overall, the literature on ASEAN has definitely become more theory-oriented (Acharya and Stubbs 2006; Rüland 2000; Rüland and Jetschke 2008). And in terms of (meta-)theoretical concepts, such as 'hedging' or 'analytic eclecticism', scholarship on ASEAN regionalism is extremely productive. Scholarship on ASEAN regionalism has also started to challenge the Eurocentrism in the field (Acharya and Stubbs 2006). The challenge rather seems to reduce the number of concepts and to test theoretical arguments by developing competitive hypotheses and developing rigorous research designs.

Notes

1 ARF participants are as November 2010 (in alphabetical order): Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Russian Federation, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor Leste, United States and Vietnam.

2 This literature frequently refers to ASA as an unsuccessful forerunner of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), established in 1967. ASA failed due to the outbreak of a militarized dispute between the Philippines and Malaya, and Indonesia and Malaya respectively (konfrontasi) over the (then) British North Borneo (Sabah). The foreign ministers of Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand did not meet after September 1963 due to their bilateral conflicts, but ASA's national secretariats continued to exist until ASEAN came into existence. Jorgensen-Dahl claims: 'The break in relations between Malaya and the Philippines in September 1963 did not signal the dissolution of the organisation.' (Jorgensen-Dahl 1982: 28)

3 According to Sompong Sucharitkul, a close adviser of Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, members looked at the institutional design of the EEC and EFTA as templates. They eventually decided to take over the less ambitious (EFTA) design. Personal communication with author, 16 September 2010.

4 Former ASEAN Secretary-General, Narciso G. Reyes, as quoted by ASEAN Secretariat, URL: www.aseansec.org/11850.htm. Accessed 10 January 2010.

5 In the 1970s, more than seven regional organizations established parliamentary assemblies (Marschall 2005).

6 Not much has been written on AIPO, and even the key reference collections of ASEAN, the two 'ASEAN Readers', do not cover the organization (Sandhu *et al.*, 1992; Siddique 2003). For more information, see URL: http://www.aipo.org/, last accessed 25 October 2010.

7 www.aseansec.org/11850.htm

8 For an overview of ASEAN's cooperation areas see: URL http://www.asean.org/contact_us.html, last accessed 25 October 2010.

9 The process was greatly facilitated by the fact that ASEAN did not have a set of common rules and obligations comparable to the acquis communautaire or the Copenhagen criteria (establishing membership rights on the basis of requirements of democratic governance and the protection of human rights) of the EU.

10 Others identify the gap between rhetoric and practice as a key puzzle (Jetschke 2009; Katsumata 2009; Nair 2009).