


This article was downloaded by: 10.3.97.143

On: 08 Dec 2023

Access details: *subscription number*

Publisher: *Routledge*

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK



East and South-East Asia International relations and security perspectives

Andrew T. H. Tan

Globalization and East and South-East Asia

Publication details

<https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203146026-17>

Alistair D. B. Cook

Published online on: 21 Mar 2013

How to cite :- Alistair D. B. Cook. 21 Mar 2013, *Globalization and East and South-East Asia from: East and South-East Asia, International relations and security perspectives* Routledge

Accessed on: 08 Dec 2023

<https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203146026-17>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT

Full terms and conditions of use: <https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms>

This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Globalization and East and South-East Asia

Alistair D. B. Cook

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been increasing scholarly interest in the development of regional co-operation the world over. The development of the global economy, with its borderless commerce and financial flows, as well as instantaneous communication and information exchange, have not only eroded traditional notions of sovereignty of East and South-East Asian states, but have also led to the emergence of 'non-traditional' security challenges. These scenarios test traditional policy responses and require more nuanced and co-operative frameworks to address what are largely either internal or transnational security challenges.

Through the emergence of such non-traditional security challenges regional co-operative arrangements have taken on many and varied forms. East and South-East Asia are no exception to this development, yet the regions' experiences have brought about a different dynamic to regionalism to the oft-cited example of the European Union (EU) as an institutionalized regional integration framework. While observing globalization and the development of regionalism, it is important to ground it in reality and explore the developments of a particular region. As a result of its varied forms of regional co-operation East and South-East Asia is a prime example. This process of co-operation raises interesting and fundamental questions about the nature of interstate relations in the 21st century. Under what conditions are states and societies in the region likely to co-operate and does that experience have wider implications for global governance? What are the types of examples that East and South-East Asian states face which encourage such co-operation? Why has this region had this particular experience of globalization and is it important? This chapter addresses these central questions, first investigating the evolution of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its relationship with the wider region.

ASEAN centrality: from South-East to East Asian co-operation

The historical evolution of ASEAN is largely seen in the context of preventive action, pacific settlement of disputes, acceleration of economic growth, social progress and cultural development, providing development assistance, increased co-operation, freedom from external

interference and non-interference in the domestic affairs of another member state (ASEAN 1967). It was founded in 1967 through the signing of the ASEAN Declaration in Bangkok by the Founding Father Nations of ASEAN—namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. This was followed by the establishment in 1971 of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, and then the binding commitment of the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Co-operation, which established the fundamental principles of interaction between ASEAN member states outlined in the ASEAN Declaration. It is this treaty that largely forms the basis for interactions not only in South-East Asia but the wider East Asian region as well—the so-called ‘ASEAN Way’ (Tan 2011b: 60). The ASEAN family has expanded to become the comprehensive South-East Asian organization with the inclusion of Brunei Darussalam in 1984, Viet Nam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar (Burma) in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. With Timor-Leste’s independence from Indonesia in 1999, the newly independent state fell outside of ASEAN membership; however, recent negotiations have progressed and it is likely that Timor-Leste will become an ASEAN member state.

There were numerous influences that spurred the creation of ASEAN and its founding principles, an effort to ensure independence from external aggression such as Cold War rivalries, and foster a stronger voice for South-East Asian states in international forums. A notable driving force at the time was the post-colonial and newly independent status of the member states (other than Thailand), and the experience of weak domestic political structures, social instability and human insecurity. Indeed, the East Asian experience of globalization in this regard, through the development of a regional institution, ASEAN, illustrates well the character of regional relations. Yet, as Lee Jones argues, the dominant non-interference principle has oftentimes been ignored or circumvented depending on internal social forces (Jones 2010). Yet the rhetoric spurred by a region that was largely colonized by Western powers, was to reinforce rather than pool their individual national sovereignty in contrast to but reflective of the European supranational experience (Pettman 2010: 297).

A second characteristic apparent in ASEAN is the close nature of the political élite decision makers. Initially this was the result of forging relations between leaders in the various independence movements and subsequent interests to guard against communist forces in the region. However, subsequent generations of leaders have retained a close relationship, not least because of the large number of meetings that take place and the consensus decision-making process within the ASEAN context. Indeed, this élite-driven regional organization has also spurred track two-level interactions, more so than the EU case. A network of think tanks called the ASEAN-ISIS (Institutes of Strategic and International Studies) provide academics and policy analysts with a forum in which to interact with one another in a regional setting. While this network historically has been seen as close to the various member state governments, it also illustrates another regional policy-making characteristic of incremental change where academics and policy makers frame their arguments within the language and nuances of those in power, not only out of necessity, but also reflective of the elite nature of the system as well as the revolving door of academics and policy makers taking up formal government positions across the region (Stone 2011).

While the intent of such a network is to open up governments to ‘outsider’ thinking and new policy alternatives, there is also the ‘elephant in the room’, that individual governments, with their reliance on a professional civil service and educated élite, are in fact ahead of the game and have more first-hand experience in policy making and policy delivery to realize what is achievable and indeed desirable. Whichever way the ASEAN track-two process is framed, it is clear that there is a network of interaction outside of formal government processes that adds value to the policy-making process even if it is incremental. Indeed, Linda Quayle argues for

the importance of what is being done at these levels and to focus on international politics to uncover patterns of co-operation between regional civil society and South-East Asian states, making the decreasing gap between them the focal point (Quayle 2012: 201). Through focusing the diverse relationship across and between state and society actors, the dynamics of regional relations becomes clearer.

The observation above that policy delivery is often left wanting, leads to discussion of this as a third characteristic. As a regional organization, ASEAN has come through various rounds of criticism for its inherent promotion of the *status quo* and rhetorical commitments made at the regional level. Indeed, from a theoretical standpoint this largely amounts to being an organization that operates at the lowest bargaining level rather than one that drives progressive change. While this may well characterize the organization in isolation, it is difficult to reach the same conclusion when putting it in historical context. Essentially evaluating the functionality and worth of ASEAN depends on your point of comparison—for many this includes comparison to the EU or its ‘policy impact’ in the immediate term. However, utilizing isolated cases rarely produces nuanced understanding of any organization. That said, there are significant shortcomings regarding the amount of time and effort devoted to reaching an agreement only for it to be undermined by non-implementation—a notable example being the thus-far decade-long negotiation for implementing the 2002 Code of Conduct in the South China Sea illustrating divergent member states’ interests. The areas in which the organization excels remain at the lowest bargaining level with incremental institutional improvements, yet it produces a level of stability that is conducive to maintaining South-East Asia as a region of strategic co-operation and healthy competition.

It is this success that has allowed the regional organization to become the default driver and blueprint for wider East Asian interactions within the global community. Most notably through the ASEAN Vision 2020 and 2003 Bali Concord II, which announced the ASEAN Community based on three pillars: an ASEAN Security Community (later the ASEAN Political Security Community, or APSC); an ASEAN Economic Community; and an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, which has garnered much interest as it established new mechanisms and speaks to many issues of ‘new regionalism’ (Caballero-Anthony 2010: 4). However, it is important to note major powers’ unwillingness to accept the leadership of a competing power, leaving ASEAN as the least unacceptable alternative as regional co-ordinator (Camroux 2012: 102). While there have been other attempts at driving the wider East Asian community through a process of multi-lateral co-operation initiatives, undoubtedly the ASEAN framework remains the East Asian linchpin on many security and economic matters. In addition, the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum exists and is primarily focused on economic issues but has also begun to focus on non-traditional security issues such as fighting transnational crime and terrorism. However, this form of ‘open regionalism’ including some South American states, for example, has yet to gain as much policy traction as the ASEAN-led processes.

One of the successes of ASEAN is its adaptive framework which has allowed for actor buy-in to responses to particular situations. A significant example is the establishment of the tripartite core group mechanism in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008. While the incapacity of the military government in Myanmar to deliver humanitarian assistance to those affected was clear, the solution was not. There were the competing concerns over sovereignty voiced by the government and delivery of humanitarian assistance voiced by the international community. In response and through ASEAN-led negotiations, the tripartite core group (TCG), consisting of Myanmar, ASEAN and the United Nations (UN), was established to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to those affected in the delta region. This mechanism was contingent upon three constraints: maintenance of personal relations with

military decision makers, continuation of an ASEAN/UN-led mechanism and ongoing funding from donor nations (Cook 2010). However, what the experience illustrated was the ability of ASEAN to foster the necessary dialogue and provide a regionally led response, even in this case undermining the traditional non-interference norm.

However, if the *raison d'être* of the organization is revisited, ensuring freedom from external interference and then ensuring that the two major interested powers bought into the diplomatic moves of ASEAN provides good reasons why this path worked and, whether by accident or design, it ensured that external interests were curbed by the dominant regional norms. It is this preventive streak in the regional organization that has ensured its longevity and its central role in regional affairs. It is precisely because it is removed from the overt influence of one or other power that it is able to maintain its position. The way in which ASEAN is organized provides a preventive forum for co-operation and interaction and as a result of this platform, it allows for deliberation to take hold and engage otherwise would-be deteriorating relationships.

While the debate continues over whether ASEAN provides grounds for increased and deeper multilateral co-operation, it is clear that it is the game in town that is accepted by the political leaders in the wider region. Since the 1990s the ASEAN framework has expanded in several directions, on a problem-solving basis from the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to discuss wider Asia-Pacific security concerns, to the ASEAN Plus Three to discuss regional economic concerns.

The normative developments of regionalism in East Asia

While the development of ASEAN sought to prevent interstate conflict, states in the region also sought to prevent negative external direct intervention by more powerful states. One of the ways that emerged in the region was the *de facto* leadership of ASEAN in the wider East Asian community. While on the one hand it is criticized for its incremental development and operational failures to act collectively, on the other hand it created conditions conducive to more powerful states, notably the People's Republic of China and the USA, interacting in a less confrontational and more multilateral manner (Goh 2011a). The emergence of a system that engaged more powerful states and other Dialogue Partners within the operational constraints of ASEAN became known as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which was established in 1994.

Through this forum, its mandate was to build confidence between states, offer an avenue for preventive diplomacy, and ultimately to resolve conflict between member states. While its early years saw the ARF increase in prominence as a pro-engagement forum, it also became a forum that was circumvented when hot-button issues arose as a result of the dominant ASEAN norms of non-interference. This is most notably the case when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003. As a result, the Six-Party Talks were established, a mechanism excluding an ASEAN leadership role, but which included ARF member states: China, North Korea, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Japan, Russia and the USA. This development undermined the ability of the ARF to command the necessary diplomatic capital to generate discussion and resolve conflict within its framework (Emmers and Tan 2011). While the ARF aims to focus on terrorism, maritime security and disaster relief, it remains a difficult area for states to navigate and there is little optimism that it will generate the necessary capacity to provide robust responses to current and emerging challenges (Haacke 2009).

Indeed, the ARF as well as other regional apparatus in the Asia-Pacific since the terrorist attacks on the USA on 11 September 2001 suffered from a lack of engagement by the USA, which had focused its energies on the 'war on terror' in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, this lower-level engagement by the USA did not deter states in the Asia-Pacific from engaging with

one another, and in turn this developed into a series of new regional economic and security arrangements (Searight 2011), notably including the ASEAN Plus Three (China, South Korea and Japan) through the Chiang Mai Initiative. While China and Japan competed to lead the East Asian region, the dominance of China in this forum is evident. Indeed, the Japanese enthusiasm for the development of the Hatoyama vision of an East Asian Community, including the USA was a clear policy choice to rebalance the influence of China on regional affairs (Komori 2009; 331). Essentially what these forums have allowed is for the development of ‘soft balancing’ rather than an avenue whereby states negotiate to establish firm norms and rules when considering security (Goh 2011b). Ultimately a ‘soft balancing’ arrangement works for East Asia while its members have competing concerns both domestically in consolidating their state structures and in its knock-on effect of determining their relations with immediate neighbours (McDougall 2012). However, while ASEAN norms dominate regional interactions they also deter states from addressing fundamental disputes and internal political dynamics in their longer-term interests.

As Shahar Hameiri and Kanishka Jayasuriya argue, East Asian regionalism is seeing an increase in internal political shifts across government as power and decision making moves from traditional agencies to ones deemed more technically appropriate to address transnational issues. For example, in Australia there was a shift from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to the Australian Federal Police in making foreign policy decisions relating to capacity building and peace-keeping in the South-West Pacific and South-East Asia under the guise of the ‘whole-of-government’ approach (Hameiri and Jayasuriya 2011: 27). This observation draws marked attention to the informal development of regionalism and the complex web of interactions across and between levels of government in the wider region.

From financial crisis to currency swaps: the Chiang Mai Initiative

During the early years of ASEAN, scholars and policy makers were divided over the notion of ASEAN exceptionalism. The reason for the development of the ‘ASEAN Way’ was argued to be a result of the diverse political make-up in South-East Asia, ranging from absolute monarchy (Brunei Darussalam), to democracy (the Philippines), to communist (Viet Nam) and military-dominated (Myanmar) government systems. The ‘ASEAN Way’ essentially reflected the ‘soft authoritarianism’ of the region whereby the informal nature of negotiations and reliance on personal relations between leaders ensured the survival of the non-interference principle and consensus-building decision-making process. It is arguably the adherence to these fundamental principles that has allowed the organization to remain relevant and be a primary, even if a default, driver in regional relations. However, the onset of the 1997 Asian financial crisis underlined the region’s connectivity to the global economy and the need for greater regional co-operation.

As a result of the financial collapse of many states in the region, many leaders rethought their approaches to regional multilateralism (Gilson 2006: 230). Indeed, with the biggest casualty of the crisis being the downfall of Indonesia’s authoritarian leader President Suharto, many analysts were reconsidering the ASEAN Way, and looked to opening up the policy-making process and driving forward a people-centric agenda. While criticism of the ASEAN Way became commonplace it remains the dominant framework for interaction although there are incremental signs of change to open up the process such as the signing of the ASEAN Charter in 2008. In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, regional leaders gathered to initiate a regional mechanism to respond to financial crises, as the region’s economies experienced the downside to globalization and the poor institutional mechanisms available to the affected economies (Emmers and Ravenhill 2011).

While there were initial suggestions to develop an Asian Monetary Fund under Japan's leadership, this idea was prematurely brushed aside, as International Monetary Fund (IMF) and US Treasury officials later acknowledged (Katzenstein 2000: 365). However, through a period of negotiations, the economies concerned developed the proposal that became known as the Chiang Mai Initiative. It was unveiled in 2000, and provided a regional mechanism to facilitate emergency liquidity funds. The difference between this proposal and that of the Asian Monetary Fund was that it was a series of bilateral swap agreements among ASEAN member states, China, Japan and South Korea (ASEAN Plus Three). The funds were also only to be available to those member states that had initiated negotiations with the IMF. As a result, the compromise essentially ensured the survival of the global financial system and IMF dominance but with a regional and supplementary fund (Grimes 2011). After several rounds of negotiations, joint ministerial statements and the signing of 16 bilateral currency-swap agreements, the ASEAN Plus Three group agreed in 2009 to transform the complex currency-swap agreements into a uniform facility to manage regional financial crises known as the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) (Grimes 2011).

With the Asian financial crisis firmly in the minds of policy makers, East Asian states were better prepared for financial adjustments as the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis in the USA and the EU took hold. However, the ASEAN Plus Three group had taken 10 years to negotiate and reach this point. Of particular note was the contest between China and Japan over which country would be best placed to control the CMIM. However, the 2008 global financial crisis was the catalyst that led to compromise and the CMIM agreement being reached and launched in 2010. Essentially both China and Japan provide the overwhelming capacity to lend to the other member states. This rivalry played out over the duration of the previous decade of negotiations and only the onset of a global financial meltdown saw compromise reached. While the global financial crisis did not take hold in East Asia, economies were affected by the drop in demand for exports. During the global financial crisis the CMIM was not drawn upon by member states (Emmers and Ravenhill 2011), illustrating that individual state policies of increased foreign exchange reserves and conservative fiscal policies ensured that they were well placed to weather the financial turmoil (Katada 2011). There was also recognition that the eurozone troubles illustrated the fundamentally political nature of currency co-operation even though regional financial co-operation began to increase (Hamilton-Hart 2012: 243). That said, while the CMIM was not utilized, the global financial crisis did bring to bear significant review of the CMIM regional mechanism and highlighted additional challenges to the Sino-Japanese rivalry over its leadership and highlighted the 'open' nature of East Asian regionalism which provides a more fluid nature to membership and levels of interaction in the region (Katzenstein 2000: 365).

Second, the CMIM was also faced with another challenge, which is the accessibility to funds needed to stave off another financial crisis. While the CMIM pool of resources had doubled to US \$240 billion in 2012, member states needed to access between \$40 billion and \$60 billion each during the Asian financial crisis. Third, the conditionality attached to the loans is the same for all group members, which makes the loan disproportionately expensive for the poorest states. While China and Japan are the largest lenders, there are a greater number of potential borrowers in ASEAN Plus Three (Grimes 2011). As a result, increasing the group size to include more lender nations such as Australia, the USA and India has been mooted. However, as strategic shifts in the power relations between the USA and China continue to play out, coupled with the domestic uncertainty in the USA this makes it an unlikely player in the near term. What the development of the CMIM mechanism illustrates is that even while regional negotiations take significant time to come to fruition, states in the region recognize their interconnectedness to a globalized world and continue to seek out responses at the regional level to supplement international arrangements (Hamilton-Hart 2012: 247). These developments in turn

add new dynamics to the structure of the global system as they merge global with local norms, and build bridges across and between different levels of governance, making the global system a complex web of interaction (McDougall 2002: 114).

Emergence of the East Asian Summit

From the CMIM and the ASEAN Plus Three framework, there was an organic development of East Asian interactions that was previously stymied under the direction of the USA, which saw a clear-cut role for itself in the region. While the USA pursued its foreign policy with an increased focus on the Middle East and the ‘war on terror’, East Asia pursued an integration strategy to combat its own security concerns, which were more focused on economic issues and developing a preparedness strategy to respond to any future financial turmoil so the disruption of the Asian financial crisis could be averted in the future. Indeed, ASEAN Plus Three laid the groundwork for increasing co-operation between the South-East and North-East Asian sub-regions (Nabers 2003).

Through the success of ASEAN Plus Three emerged the development of the East Asian Summit (EAS), which came into being at the 11th ASEAN summit in 2005. However, the absence of initial US membership was notable and ensured that questions around its viability in the longer term abounded—particularly as the membership had increased to include the likes of India, Australia and New Zealand. However, by 2010 both the USA and Russia were invited to join the EAS, and in 2011 both Presidents attended the meeting. The main thrust of diplomats and observers alike is that the emergence of the EAS is supplementary and complementary to the other regional meetings such as the ASEAN Plus Three, ARF and ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM); it is rather more a reinforcement mechanism to support the other structures and to develop dialogue of regional security issues including maritime security, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, and North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons. As for the positioning of the EAS, through its membership it includes the major powers—China, India, Russia and the USA—and as such is its comparative advantage where other regional arrangements tend to favour a particular power (Ba 2009). Notably China is seen to dominate the ASEAN Plus Three arrangement, and the USA the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), a series of US-led bilateral trade negotiations. (For more on TPP, see Elms and Lim 2012.)

While there remain different layers of regional interaction in matters of membership, scope, development and leadership, there is an unquestionable shift towards more institutional arrangements which encourage leaders to respond considering the dominant regional norms and rules. However, it remains to be seen whether institutional proliferation will lead to deeper interactions. That said, the increasingly sectoral nature of these meetings provides avenues for new partnerships to be forged and potentially more tangible outcomes. Until recently the regional forums have been dominated by the foreign services or heads of government meetings where rhetoric necessarily dominates and functional co-operation has remained limited.

ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting(-Plus)

While East and South-East Asia remains a region with many overlapping institutions or meetings, the establishment of the ADMM furthers what the ASEAN Regional Forum is mandated to discuss—security concerns. It achieves this in the notable way that it focuses on technical operations in the context of wider security concerns. It was established in 2006 and meets annually, and is the highest ranking ministerial meeting on defence co-operation in the region, seeking to foster transparent dialogue and co-operation (ASEAN 2007). Importantly, the establishment of the ADMM was the result of the Shangri-La Dialogue—an international forum

organized by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), a London-based think tank (Capie and Taylor 2010). This generation of a track one-level meeting by a non-state actor is important as it illustrates that while it takes the form of a state-led mechanism, it grew out of the non-state sector showing the complex web of interactions across and between different levels of governance rather than solely government.

At the second ADMM meeting in 2007, the grouping agreed to a Three-Year Work Programme (2008–10), which included five areas of concentration including the promotion of regional defence and security co-operation, shaping and sharing of norms, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict peace building (ASEAN 2008). With the completion of the first work plan, a second was agreed for 2011–13, which narrowed its focus to defence and security measures but particularly on enhancing existing practical co-operation and developing possible co-operation, as well as enhancing ties with Dialogue Partners to shape and share norms.

Since its inception the ADMM has deepened interaction amongst its member states, and has sought to expand the areas of co-operation. These embryonic areas start out as concept papers before they develop into policy development areas. For example, the ADMM has adopted the Concept Paper on the Use of ASEAN Military Assets and Capacities in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) and the Concept Paper on Defence Establishments and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) Co-operation on Non-Traditional Security. While the areas of co-operation remain largely non-controversial, they build trust and share norms amongst the militaries of the region, serving to raise standards and minimize misunderstandings with this core function of government—national defence and security.

The ADMM-Plus meetings involve the 10 ASEAN member states plus their Dialogue Partners, such as Australia, China, India and the USA, and held its inaugural meeting in 2010. The meetings focus on five core areas of co-operation including disaster relief, counter-terrorism, maritime security, peace-keeping and military medicine. Importantly, the ADMM-Plus includes the same members as the EAS, and as such offers a mechanism through which co-operative initiatives can be heard at the heads of government level (Haywood 2011).

In 2011 the inaugural ASEAN HADR exercise (AHX) was conducted in Indonesia and Singapore in an effort to enhance the region's capacity to respond to natural disasters. During the sixth ADMM, ministers acknowledged the conduct of the second AHX in Brunei in 2012, co-hosted by Brunei and Singapore, and also endorsed the ADMM-Plus HADR/Military Medicine exercise in Brunei in 2013 to build further capacity in an area of mutual agreement. Indeed, the recent ADMM concept paper on a network of peace-keeping centres converges with the APSC blueprint, and provides a specific priority to take stock of ASEAN states' peace-keeping capacities (Haywood 2011). Thereby the ADMM-Plus illustrates tangible developments in confidence building, which will form an important step towards co-operation around larger issues of security-sector governance and capacity.

At the sixth ADMM, held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in 2012, all 10 ASEAN defence ministers were present and importantly discussed the recent dispute between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea. This was seen as an incremental but significant break from the past in that hard questions were being raised about the security concerns of its member states. With the recent development of ADMM-Plus it offers an avenue for policy traction and co-operation amongst member states, yet it is far from clear if or when it will develop the capacity to tackle more controversial areas.

Conclusions

The evolution of regional interactions in East Asia within the global system illustrates some fundamental points that are sometimes overlooked when analysing the underlying reasons behind regional development. One of the most important reasons lies in the history of the region. With

an overwhelming membership of states that gained their independence at the end of the Second World War, having previously been governed from afar, states, let alone democracies, were not consolidated and therefore national institutions were weak. It is not surprising that the regional institutions that emerged began from a different premise—to assist in consolidating their newly found independence from states outside the region.

An important observation of the evolution of regional relations is that oftentimes scholars and analysts will evaluate intention solely with deed. This is a common occurrence in the West but one that does not adequately explain the state of regional interactions in East Asia. With recent history in mind, it does not necessarily hold true that because a formalized and robust regime does not exist, neither does intention. Rather more it boils down to state capacity in the region to a significant extent. While there are competing reasons as to the motivation of one particular forum over another by states, the participation in inclusive forums by regional states, most notably ASEAN ones, is illustrative of the recognized need to co-operate.

However, as the evolution of the Shangri-La Dialogue shows, external norm entrepreneurs at the track-two level, in this case the IISS, were able to organize an Asian Security Summit at the bridging track level known as track 1.5, which in turn spurred the creation of an ASEAN mechanism to fill this gap at the track-one level: the ADMM (Capie and Taylor 2010). This development illustrates two points clearly. The first is that ASEAN member states can be influenced from outside, particularly in areas where it runs in tandem to ASEAN member state interests and the organization's mandate. The second is that the success of regional interactions can be determined by the success or failure of facilitation. Without adequate funding by states, already stretched by a large number of meetings in other important policy areas, it is unlikely that the facilitation gap can be filled without looking elsewhere for funding. However, while new policy areas may not be covered at present, either through funding shortfalls or deemed lower down on policy preferences, it does not mean that interest does not exist to participate in such a forum; for that researchers need to look at internal state dynamics.

In essence, while many scholars view ASEAN as a low-level bargaining forum, it is important to understand the collaborative work being carried out by member states and societies. Also important is the motivation to host a particular forum. If it is one in which there is broad agreement that co-operation and meetings between particular government departments will create conditions conducive to peace and security, then it is more likely to succeed. Overall, the development of regional processes in East and South-East Asia both reflect dominant internal and external dynamics through a complex web of state and society relations.

Bibliography

- ASEAN, *Declaration*, 1967, www.aseansec.org/64.htm.
- 'ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) Concept Paper', *ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta*, 2007, www.asean.org/21216.pdf.
- 'ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) Three (3)—Year Work Programme: Building the Foundation and Setting the Direction for Defence Dialogues and Cooperation', *ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta*, 2008, www.aseansec.org/21214.pdf.
- Ba, Alice, 'Regionalism's Multiple Negotiations: ASEAN in East Asia', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* Vol. 22, No. 3 (2009).
- Caballero-Anthony, Mely, 'Non-Traditional Security Challenges, Regional Governance, and the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC)', *Asia Security Initiative Policy Series Working Paper* No. 7 (September 2010).
- Camroux, David, 'Regionalism in Asia as Disguised Multilateralism: A Critical Analysis of the East Asia Summit and the Trans-Pacific Partnership', *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs* Vol. 47, No. 1 (2012).

- Capie, David and Taylor, Brendon, 'The Shangri-La Dialogue and the Institutionalization of Defence Diplomacy in Asia', *The Pacific Review* Vol. 23, No. 3 (2010).
- Cook, Alistair D.B., 'Positions of Responsibility: A Comparison of ASEAN and EU Approaches Towards Myanmar', *International Politics* Vol. 47, No. 3 (2010).
- Elms, Deborah and Lim, C.L., 'The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) Negotiations: Overview and Prospects', *RSIS Working Paper* No. 232 (February 2012).
- Emmers, Ralf and Ravenhill, John, 'The Asian and Global Financial Crises: Consequences for East Asian Regionalism', *Contemporary Politics* Vol. 17, No. 2 (2011).
- Emmers, Ralf and Tan, See Seng, 'The ASEAN Regional Forum and Preventive Diplomacy: Built to Fail?' *Asian Security* Vol. 7, No. 1 (2011).
- Gilson, Julie, 'Region Building in East Asia: ASEAN Plus Three and Beyond', in Welfens, Paul J.J., Knipping, Franz, Chirathivat, Suthiphand and Ryan, Cillian (eds), *Integration in Asia and Europe: Historical Dynamics, Political Issues and Economic Perspectives*, Berlin Heidelberg: Springer, 2006.
- Goh, Evelyn, 'How Japan Matters in the Evolving East Asian Security Order', *International Affairs* Vol. 87, No. 4 (2011a).
- 'Institutions and the Great Power Bargain in East Asia: ASEAN's Limited "Brokerage" Role', *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* Vol. 11 (2011b).
- Grimes, William W., 'The Asian Monetary Fund Reborn?: Implications of Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization', *Asia Policy* No. 11 (January 2011).
- Haacke, Jurgen, 'The ASEAN Regional Forum: From Dialogue to Practical Security Cooperation', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* Vol. 22, No. 3 (2009).
- Hameiri, Shahar and Jayasuriya, Kanishka, 'Regulatory Regionalism and the Dynamics of Territorial Politics: The Case of the Asia-Pacific Region', *Political Studies* Vol. 59, Issue 1 (2011).
- Hamilton-Hart, Natasha, 'Regional and Multi-level Governance: East Asian Leadership After the Global Financial Crisis', *Asia Europe Journal* Vol. 9 (February 2012).
- Haywood, Holly, 'New Institutional Developments in ASEAN: Towards a More Effective (Genuine) Security Architecture?' *NTS Alert* Issue 2 (September 2011), Singapore: RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies for NTS-Asia, www.rsis.edu.sg/nts/HTML-Newsletter/alert/NTS-alert-sep-1102.html.
- Jones, Lee, 'ASEAN's Unchanged Melody? The Theory and Practice of "Non-Interference" in Southeast Asia', *The Pacific Review* Vol. 23, No. 4 (2010).
- Katada, Saori, 'Seeking a Place for East Asian Regionalism: Challenges and Opportunities Under the Global Financial Crisis', *The Pacific Review* Vol. 24, No. 3 (2011).
- Katzenstein, Peter J., 'Regionalism and Asia', *New Political Economy* Vol. 5, No. 3 (2000).
- Komori, Yasumasa, 'Regional Governance in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific', *East Asia* Vol. 26 (2009).
- McDougall, Derek, 'Asia-Pacific Security Regionalism: The Impact of Post-1997 Developments', *Contemporary Security Policy* Vol. 23, No. 2 (2002).
- 'Responses to "Rising China" in the East Asian Region: Soft Balancing with Accommodation', *Journal of Contemporary China* Vol. 21, No. 73 (2012).
- Nabers, Dirk, 'The Social Construction of International Institutions: The Case of ASEAN +3', *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* Vol. 3 (2003).
- Pettman, Ralph, 'Asian Perspectives on the European Experience of Regionalism', *International Politics* Vol. 47, No. 3/4 (2010).
- Quayle, Linda, 'Bridging the Gap: An "English School" Perspective on ASEAN and Regional Civil Society', *The Pacific Review* Vol. 25, No. 2 (April 2012).
- Searight, Amy, 'The United States and Asian Regionalism: The Politics of Reactive Leadership', in Aggarwal, V.K. and Lee, S. (eds), *Trade Policy in the Asia-Pacific: The Role of Ideas, Interests, and Domestic Institutions*, Springer, 2011.
- Stone, Diane, 'The ASEAN-ISIS Network: Interpretive Communities, Informal Diplomacy and Discourses of Region', *Minerva* Vol. 49 (2011).
- Tan, See Seng, 'Providers Not Protectors: Institutionalizing Responsible Sovereignty in Southeast Asia', *Asian Security* Vol. 7, No. 3 (2011a): 201–27.
- 'Is Asia-Pacific Regionalism Outgrowing ASEAN?' *The RUSI Journal* Vol. 156, No. 1 (2011b): 58–62.