Abstract

Statebuilding became a central paradigm in the practice of international intervention in the first years of the twenty-first century (cf. Mallaby 2002; Rotberg 2002) for two main reasons located at the interface of security and development: first, countries torn by violent conflict and characterized by institutional dysfunctionalities became more numerous. Second, weak or failing statehood became a synonym for almost unpredictable security risks such as transnational terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking, or the spread of contagious diseases after 9/11. Today, a quarter-century after 1989 and fifteen years after 9/11, the track record of the international community with building peaceful structures in war-torn countries, strengthening state capacities and implementing government and governance reforms is mixed at best. Against this background, critical Security Studies has gained influence − criticizing the social-engineering-based concept of ‘liberal peace’ and revealing the weaknesses of the ‘peacebuilding-as-statebuilding’ approach.