Animal Rationality and Belief

Authored by: Hans-Johann Glock

The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds

Print publication date:  July  2017
Online publication date:  July  2017

Print ISBN: 9781138822887
eBook ISBN: 9781315742250
Adobe ISBN:

10.4324/9781315742250.ch8

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Abstract

Moderate differentialists like Aristotle and Kant credited animals with “lower” mental/psychic phenomena like sentience, emotions, moods and perception, while denying the “higher” faculties of intellect and reason, including the capacity for genuine belief. In the same vein, Sellars (1957), Davidson (1985), Brandom (1994) and McDowell (1996) grant sentience or consciousness, while balking at intentional states like belief and desire. Against this stance, I shall rebut a priori philosophical objections against the idea of intentionality in animals, and present positive arguments in its favor.

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