Abstract

Individuation is an ambiguous word that is properly used in many senses. We focus on four that are relevant for medieval philosophy: metaphysical, epistemic, logical, and linguistic. In the metaphysical sense used here, it is a certain non-temporal process whereby a universal becomes an individual, e.g., man becomes Socrates. In the epistemic sense used here, it is a certain process whereby a knower discerns an individual, e.g., Plato discerns Socrates. In the logical sense we use, it is a certain process whereby a universal concept becomes an individual concept, e.g., the concept of man becomes the concept of Socrates. In the linguistic sense in the chapter, it is a certain way in which words are effectively used to refer to individuals, e.g., Plato uses “Socrates” to refer to Socrates. These four senses of individuation give rise to four distinct philosophical problems that are often confused and called by the same name: the problem of individuation. The metaphysical problem concerns the question of what makes something to be individual, the epistemic problem concerns the question of what makes someone to know something as individual, the logical problem concerns the question of what makes a concept individual, and the linguistic problem concerns the question of what makes a linguistic term pick out an individual. In all four cases, what we seek as an answer to these questions is referred to as the principle or (less frequently) the cause of individuation.