Abstract

General elections and candidate selection methods are two of the most central institutions in any democratic regime. Their centrality is, first and foremost, due to the fact that these institutions determine the distribution of political power and the identity of political elites. The literature clearly postulates that the choice of an electoral system will have consequences for, among other factors, voting and legislative behavior (see, for example: Carey and Shugart 1995; Katz 1997; Rae 1967; Taagepera and Shugart 1989). Candidate selection methods, which have only recently received growing scholarly attention, also have ramifications for legislative behavior and party unity (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Hazan and Rahat 2010; Narud, Pedersen and Valen 2002; Ranney 1981; Schattschneider 1942).