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The Epistemic Significance of Moral Disagreement
- Introduction
- Metaphysical versus Epistemological Arguments from Disagreement
- From Initial Thoughts to the Core Argument
- The Core Argument Refined
- Are There DPPs? Idealization, Error Theory, Relativism, and Intuitionism
- On Rejecting Premise (1): Epistemic Permissivism and Epistemic Egocentrism
- On Rejecting Premise (2): Demoting One’s Peer
- On Rejecting the Inference from (3) to (4): Level-Splitting
- Radical Moral Disagreement: Deep, Widespread, Extreme
- References
Abstract
Unfortunately, we possess no analogue to an eye exam, by which we might determine whose moral vision is askew and whose is in good working order.
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