The Significance of Ethical ­Disagreement for Theories of Ethical Thought and Talk

Authored by: Gunnar Björnsson

The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics

Print publication date:  August  2017
Online publication date:  August  2017

Print ISBN: 9781138812208
eBook ISBN: 9781315213217
Adobe ISBN:


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This chapter has two sections, each focusing on a distinct way in which ethical ­disagreement and variations in ethical judgment matter for theories of ethical thought and talk. In the first section, we look at how the variation poses problems for both cognitivist and non-cognitivist ways of specifying the nature of ethical judgments. In the second, we look at how disagreement phenomena have been taken to undermine cognitivist accounts, but also at how the seeming variation in cognitive and non-cognitive contents between parties of deep ethical disagreement challenge both cognitivist and non-­cognitivist accounts of disagreement itself.

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